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Trafficking in human beings (THB) is considered one of the heinous forms 
of crime in the EU and targeted by a number of legal acts and policy 
documents. Among the most recent ones are the EU Anti-trafficking 
Directive,1 the EU Strategy 2012 – 20162 and the 2017 Communication3 
stepping up EU action on that gruesome issue. The 2017 SOCTA report 
of Europol also lists human trafficking among the top five priority crime 
threats for EU. It is widely acknowledged that trafficking in human beings, 
like all organised (and some non-organised) crime activities, is profit-driven 
(Europol, 2015; FATF, 2011; OSCE, 2010; UNODC, 2016). Therefore, it 
can be best understood and addressed when criminal finances are being 
placed in the very centre of its analysis and investigation. Nonetheless, 
according to the mid-term report on the implementation of the EU 
anti-trafficking strategy4 “financial (including asset-tracing) investigations 
are conducted in several member states on a case-by-case basis when 
a case of THB is encountered.” Europol (2015) also admits that “there 
is a significant intelligence gap amongst LEAs regarding the financial 
aspects of THB.” The agency reports that this partial knowledge is a 
result of the limited number of financial investigations into the proceeds 
generated by THB and in turn contributes to difficulties in identification 
and prosecution of traffickers.
A previous report on the subject of organised crime finances (CSD, 2015) 
has come to similar conclusions about the investigations of organised 
crime in general: law enforcement institutions have traditionally been 
focused on predicate crimes with the aim to imprison perpetrators and 
seize illicit goods. Information on the financial aspects of organised 
crime has been regarded as irrelevant and no deliberate efforts to 
collect and analyse such data have been made. Hence, the quality 
of the financial information collected (if at all) is fragmented and 
compromised because law enforcement agents operating at the local 
level lack knowledge and experience in financial matters. The report 
focused on three main illicit criminal markets in the EU: cocaine 
trafficking; illicit tobacco trade, and organised VAT fraud and explored 
the sources and mechanisms for financing organised crime, settlement 
of payments, access to financing in critical moments, costs of business 
and the management of profits.
1 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011.
2 The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012 – 2016, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM/2012/0286 final.
3 Reporting on the Follow-up to the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 
and Identifying Further Concrete Actions, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 4.12.2017. COM (2017) 728 final.
4 Mid-Term Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy Towards the Eradication of Trafficking in 
Human Beings, Commission staff working document, 17.10.2014, COM (2014) 635 final.
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Although this report did not focus particularly on trafficking in human 
beings, it offered several important insights for better understanding of 
the financial underpinnings of illegal markets and specifically about the 
sources of financing that criminal entrepreneurs rely on. The analysis 
clearly demonstrated that the need for financing applies to entry at every 
level of illicit markets: from the low/retail level to the high level, even 
though the scale of investment was likely to differ (CSD, 2015). One of 
the main conclusions of the study, in line with the social embeddedness 
perspective, is that the social capital of criminal entrepreneurs – their 
trusted connections and reputation – is of bigger importance than 
the financial capital for entering, operating and succeeding in a given 
criminal market contrary to the expectation that capital will be readily 
available when the potential for profit is high and the perceived risk 
is low. Moreover, the higher the levels of risk associated with a given 
criminal activity, the greater the role of social capital in comparison with 
financial capital for entering the market. Likewise, upward mobility in 
criminal markets is not merely a matter of accumulating financial capital, 
but also building social capital in terms of developing a customer base of 
trusted clients and establishing trusted relationships with suppliers from 
upper levels (CSD, 2015).
The analysis identified three main sources of financing – reinvestment 
of criminal proceeds, borrowing capital and use of legitimate sources. 
Reinvestment of criminal proceeds is reported as the main form for 
financing of the criminal operations with shared investment schemes 
widely spread for all supply chain levels and across different markets. 
Shared investments apparently not only allow criminal entrepreneurs to 
kick-start a given project, when they cannot raise the necessary financial 
resources on their own, but more importantly it is a tool for sharing 
business risks. Borrowing capital from other criminal entrepreneurs 
appears to be the least practiced form of financing, usually used in 
critical moments. Such illicit lending was rather obtained by other 
well-established, career criminals in their wider network in virtue of 
established trusted relationships or through a trusted surety and less 
likely from loan sharks. The data collected within the study did not find 
evidence for existence of specialised “underground bankers” who finance 
criminal projects. The analysis also showed that legitimate money is often 
invested in criminal markets. At the retail or wholesale level of drug and 
illicit tobacco markets, these legitimate funds might come from variety of 
sources: personal savings, revenues from a legal business of the criminal 
entrepreneur, loans from family or friends, payday loans, and small bank 
credits. At higher levels of drug trafficking or illicit tobacco markets, as 
well as with large scale VAT frauds, such legitimate funds may originate 
from legal business revenues, EU or national subsidies, and bank loans 
(CSD, 2015).
Despite the insights presented in CSD’s 2015 Financing of Organised 
Crime report, the financial mechanisms behind a number of important 
markets generating substantial revenues remain under-researched, of 
which trafficking in human beings is one prominent example. The current 
analysis fills this gap by applying the same approach that has been 
already developed within the 2015 report and by providing a detailed 
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account on the business models of traffickers in human beings. The 
analysis discusses the financial underpinnings of trafficking in human 
beings focusing on two major forms of exploitation, namely sexual 
exploitation and labour exploitation.
The current report is organised in five chapters and a conclusion. The 
first chapter presents the current state of research on criminal money 
management in the context of trafficking in human beings and briefly 
discusses the methodology applied in the study. The second chapter covers 
the contemporary trends and developments in the market structure and 
social organisation of THB in selected EU countries. The third chapter 
focuses on financial aspects of THB, whereas the fourth covers the role 
and implications of ICT on human trafficking. The last chapter provides 
an overview of the role of money laundering investigations in tackling 
this criminal activity. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main findings 
and policy recommendations for prevention and combatting THB.

Research on organised crime and especially its financial underpinnings is 
an indispensable component of more effective and smarter approaches to 
prevention and investigation (see Antonopoulos et al., 2015). It is particularly 
important to enhance understanding of the financing mechanisms behind 
crimes which pay well and are at the same time considered to pose low 
risk for offenders. Trafficking in human beings is a prominent example, 
representing a very lucrative form also of organised crime groups (Belser, 
2005; Government of the Netherlands, 2016; Wheaton et al., 2010), 
which is expected to surpass key forms of organised crime (e.g. drug and 
arms trafficking) in terms of generated profits, while at the same time 
being associated with relatively low risks and costs for perpetrators (Akee 
et al., 2014; Fahey, 2009; Wheaton et al., 2010). Despite the lucrativeness 
of THB, however, most of the research predominantly focuses on the 
crime of trafficking and less on the financial aspects such as utilisation 
of profits and investments (OSCE, 2014). Deepening the understanding 
of the financial mechanisms of this market will aid in the development 
of more effective counteraction strategies with the ultimate aim to make 
trafficking a much less lucrative illicit enterprise.
This chapter examines the current state of research on financing of organised 
crime more generally and trafficking in human beings specifically. Subject 
of analysis is the definition of the crime, followed by the main theoretical 
perspectives in the analysis of financial underpinnings of organised crime 
and THB, as well as existing knowledge on the concrete mechanisms, 
actors, and strategies used by criminal groups more generally and human 
traffickers specifically. The methodology and the data sources on which 
the current study is based are also discussed.
The definition of human trafficking applied in this report closely follows 
the one provided in the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol). The 
convention and its protocol are the first global attempt in modern times 
to define and counter trafficking, which set out the first widely accepted 
definition of human trafficking (Di Nicola, 2014; Bressan, 2012; Shelley, 
2010). In Article 3, paragraph (a) it states that “[…] ‘trafficking in persons’ 
shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt 
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
1. ANAlySING THE FINANCES OF TRAFFICKING 
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of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation”. The same article further defines 
exploitation, stating it “shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.”
State parties are committed to criminalise the forms of conducts under 
the aforementioned definition, and the description of modes and means 
of coercion is intentionally left broad as to include a vast range of 
conducts. Article 3, paragraph (b) also sets out the irrelevance of the 
consent given at any time by the victims under all circumstances, where 
one of the means identified in subparagraph (a) is used. Furthermore, 
the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child 
for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ 
even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in the definition” 
(Aronowitz, 2001, p. 165). The Palermo Protocol entered into force on 
25 December 2003 and as of November 2018 had been signed by 
117 countries and ratified by 112. The Protocol aims to counter trafficking 
through judicial and law enforcement means. Its definition provides the 
common basis for the international community to prevent, combat and 
punish trafficking, and to identify, protect, and assist victims. Indeed, 
15 years after the issue of the Protocol, an increasing number of states 
have deployed efforts to prosecute traffickers, implemented measures 
and interventions for the protection and assistance of trafficked people, 
and to prevent THB (Di Nicola, 2014; Aronowitz, 2001; Antonopoulos & 
Papanicolaou, 2018).
The EU has also pointed out the urgency of addressing the issue of 
trafficking in human beings. At the European level, action against trafficking 
of migrants was undertaken with the adoption of a common framework 
in 2002.5 More recently, the Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 5 April 2011 on Preventing and Combating Trafficking 
in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims (Directive 2011/36/EU), has 
replaced the Council decision, adopting a broader definition of THB 
aligned to the one set out in the UN anti-trafficking Protocol,6 while 
including additional forms of exploitation. In the preliminary remarks 
(No. 11), Directive 2011/36/EU states that “forced begging should be 
understood as a form of forced labour or services” and that “the 
expression ‘exploitation of criminal activities’ should be understood as 
the exploitation of a person to commit, inter alia, pick-pocketing, shop-
lifting, drug trafficking and other similar activities which are subject to 
penalties and imply financial gain.”
5 Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings, OJ L 203, 1.8.2002.
6 Article 2 of Directive 2011/36/EU defines the offences concerning THB as follows “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange 
or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms 
of coercion of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”
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One of the biggest challenges in analysing the finances of THB was 
how to disentangle the conflation between trafficking for sexual 
exploitation and prostitution. The THB for sexual exploitation is deeply 
interwoven with the domestic and foreign prostitution markets and it is 
almost impossible to distinguish between these two phenomena since 
the empirical boundaries between the two are often blurred. Moreover, 
the legality of prostitution in EU countries varies widely from licensing 
and regulation of sex work (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, 
Hungary, Latvia), to criminalisation of procurement and operation of 
brothels (most EU countries) and criminalisation of the purchase of sex 
(Sweden, France, Ireland), which has direct implications on the legal 
status of the victims of THB in the different countries. The convergence 
between prostitution and sex trafficking cannot be ignored and it is 
essential to understand that this intertwining is not only conceptual, 
but perhaps even more acute in practice, where the markets of sex 
work and trafficking often share spaces, operative structures, and actors. 
Hence, in the economic terms of the “business approach” to organised 
crime, traffickers adjust their operational strategies to the dominant 
“business conditions” of the sex markets in order to maximise profits 
and minimise the risks (OSCE, 2010).
In this regard, looking into the sex work market, its operational structure, 
and the financial aspects associated with sex trade (whether legal or 
illegal) is not only unavoidable when trying to determine the financial 
operations of THB, but rather useful or even necessary, as the exploitation 
of THB victims in the post arrival phase merges with the broader sex 
work supply. Taking into account all this in the report, where appropriate 
both qualitative and quantitative data related to prostitution are used 
as a proxy for achieving a better understanding of the financial aspects 
associated with sex trafficking.
The spectrum of actors engaging in THB spans from independent 
traffickers to more or less structured criminal networks and groups 
(UNODC, 2010a). Some researchers contend that there is “little evidence 
of highly structured, hierarchical organised crime enterprises involved in 
human trafficking” as opposed to “more loosely, organised, entrepreneurial 
organised crime networks” (Aronowitz, 2009, p. 66). However, some 
degree of organisation and cooperation between individuals is widely 
acknowledged as an important feature of many criminal actors engaged in 
human trafficking (FATF, 2011; UNODC, 2016; Europol, 2016). Therefore, 
an examination of current understanding of the financial underpinnings 
of other markets dominated by organised crime is valuable in informing 
research on THB.
Financial aspects of organised crime and specifically financing of organised 
crime generally have been conceptualised along two schools of thought – 
1.2. FINANCIAl AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 
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the illegal enterprise model and the social embeddedness approach. 
Becker (1968) pioneered the study of crime as an economic activity, 
which is the result of a potential offender’s rational calculations:
“The individual calculates (1) all his practical opportunities of earning 
legitimate income, (2) the amounts of income offered by these 
opportunities, (3) the amounts of income offered by various illegal 
methods, (4) the probability of being arrested if he acts illegally and 
(5) the probable punishment should he be caught. After making 
these calculations, he chooses the act or occupation with the highest 
discounted return” (Becker, 1968).
The rational choice assumption has been further developed and incorpo-
rated in studies on organised crime. The illegal enterprise model treats 
criminal entrepreneurs as rational actors seeking profit maximisation 
(Reuter, 1983). The central idea of the illegal enterprise approach has 
been initially formulated by Smith (1980) in his spectrum-based theory, 
which contends that illegal entrepreneurship should be considered as 
part of a wider spectrum of economic activities in a given market 
that could be ranked on a scale that reflects levels of legitimacy in a 
given marketplace. He describes illegal enterprises as an extension of 
legitimate market activities into areas prohibited by law, where they 
pursue profit via meeting latent illicit demand. Other scholars studying 
organised crime based on these assumptions thus see illegal enterprises 
as similar to legal businesses, which allows for their analysis through the 
application of theories used to explain formal legal organisations and 
markets (Gottschalk, 2010; Haller, 1990; Schloenhardt, 1999).
Peter Reuter (1983) has been among the first scholars to apply the 
illegal enterprise approach to conceptualise the financial underpinnings 
of organised crime. His analysis of the consequences of product illegality 
posits that unlike licit entrepreneurs, criminal entrepreneurs face numerous 
constraints to access external credit. The main obstacles are related to:
• lack of separation between the ownership and management in the 
illicit enterprise;
• lack of standardised and detailed record keeping that provides lenders 
with sufficient evidence about the assets and financial flows of the 
borrower;
• lack of legal institutions and mechanisms for dispute settlement and 
recovering the claim of the lenders in case borrowers fail to meet 
their contractual obligations.
These constraints for access to external credit prompt criminal entrepre-
neurs to rely exclusively on reinvestment of the profits from illicit activity 
in order to grow (Reuter, 1983). Furthermore, the constant threats of law 
enforcement investigation, arrest and seizure of assets compels criminal 
entrepreneurs either to pay higher rates to employees to ensure their 
loyalty or to ultimately limit the number of these employees in order 
to curb potentially dangerous information leaks as well as operational 
costs. In addition, very often product illegality also prohibits advertising 
of the product and thus also naturally limits the market for the illicit 
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goods. All these factors presuppose that illicit enterprises remain small in 
size and turnover, ephemeral and with limited geographical scope and 
range of activity (Reuter, 1983). The constraints that illegal entrepreneurs 
face can largely be explained by the fact that they operate outside 
and against the state (Paoli, 2002). These constraints force illegal actors 
to organise their activity in such a way, so that they minimise the 
risk of police apprehension. Thus their opportunities for vertical and 
horizontal integration are practically limited and there are few incentives 
for consolidation of large-scale, modern bureaucracies. The exception 
of this tendency are mafia-type associations, terrorist organisations and 
gangs, which apparently function as something different than simple 
economic subjects (Paoli, 2002).
The illicit enterprise paradigm has been criticised for failing to account 
for the fact that organised crime does not occur in a social vacuum. 
The fundamental argument is that social relations and life events shape 
involvement in organised crime and developments in criminal careers. 
In addition, the criminal markets studied by Reuter are exclusively local 
and the assumptions based on their analysis could not be extrapolated 
to all criminal businesses, such as drug trafficking (Kleemans, 2013). 
Building on research into criminal careers of organised crime offenders, 
scholars argue that understanding about the limits between legality and 
illegality should be reconsidered, since the career of these offenders 
start precisely because they have acquired the needed contacts and 
opportunities from their legitimate business or occupation (Kleemans & 
de Poot, 2008). The financial stakes and the illegality of the products 
and/or services supplied in the criminal markets make building trust and 
curbing distrust a recurring and even more pressing problem compared 
with legal markets. Furthermore, criminal entrepreneurs operate in 
insecure and potentially hostile environment where formal mechanisms 
to secure investments, contracts and goods are absent. However, these 
business risks are mitigated through the essential role of social relations 
in the economy – personal reputation and social capital open up 
new opportunities for pooling and sharing resources including financial 
resources (Kleemans, 2013).
The concept of social embeddedness and the role of social networks 
in organised crime is widely applied in the mainstream research on 
organised crime (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; E. R. Kleemans, 2013; 
Morselli, 2005; van de Bunt et al., 2013). Previous empirical studies have 
established that social connections and opportunities are vital for the 
genesis and sustained functioning of organised criminal groups. Social ties 
and networks are used to motivate and enable criminal entrepreneurship 
and forge criminal partnerships (Kleemans & de Poot, 2008; Leukfeldt, 
2015). Indeed, except for some elite fraudsters, few criminals suddenly 
engage in major crimes without spending some time in criminal (and 
sometimes non-criminal) networks (Kleemans & de Poot, 2008; van 
Koppen et al., 2010) that generate for them a reputation of a varying 
degree of reliability (Levi, 2015). Social connections provide and facilitate 
access to criminal opportunities, whereas the criminal social network 
enables multi-criminality, expansion and sustainability (Leukfeldt, 2015; 
Kleemans & de Poot, 2008; Edwards & Levi, 2008; Bouchard & Morselli, 
16 Financing	oF	organised	crime:	human	traFFicking	in	Focus
2014), including through playing a crucial role in criminal recruitment. In 
certain contexts, stronger social interactions allow individuals involved in 
criminal activities to more easily exchange information and know-how 
that diminish the costs of crime (Lederman et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
these social interactions may facilitate the influence of criminals on other 
community members to develop a propensity for crime and violence 
(Lederman et al., 2002).
In terms of the access to and accumulation of social capital in organised 
criminal groups, there has been mounting empirical evidence in recent 
years in support of the argument that cross-border criminal partnerships 
are in fact less structured, less resilient, and more flexible than previously 
thought in the traditional models of organised criminality (Kleemans 
et al., 1998; Kleemans et al., 2002; van de Bunt & Kleemans, 2007; 
Kruisbergen et al., 2012; Leukfeldt, 2015). Although strict hierarchical lines 
seem to be lacking in such circumstances, studies nevertheless point 
to dependency relationships, wherein some actors exert more power 
and influence than others within the same network. Moreover, such 
criminals act as nodes that facilitate communication and cooperation 
with other criminal networks, where they may play a similar role. The 
persons occupying these roles have been identified to possess and/or 
control resource that others in the network rely on, such as finances, 
know-how and connections, i.e. social capital (van der Hulst, 2008). 
Another important role in the criminal social network is the broker 
who facilitates connections, communication and cooperation with social 
structures outside the criminal network, for example in bringing together 
different social strata, distant geographies, ethnic groups, or in providing 
links with the licit reality (Leukfeldt, 2015, p. 95).
In addition to examining the mechanisms illicit entrepreneurs use to 
mitigate the risks they face and to initiate, sustain, and expand their 
businesses, research has also focused on the handling of the proceeds 
of crime and money laundering – how offenders actually spend their 
money and try to conceal its criminal background. Normally, offenders 
do not use their profits to invest but rather spend their money on 
an extravagant lifestyle, thereby enhancing their prestige among peers 
(Naylor, 2002). However, conspicuous spending does not preclude the 
possibility of investment. In various cases, spending money on luxury 
items (e.g. cars and jewellery) is combined with investments in real estate 
and legal firms. In those cases, criminal earnings simply are large enough 
to facilitate both (Kleemans et al. 2002, p. 131).
Usually, when they invest proceeds offenders tend to stay close to home 
(Kruisbergen et al., 2015). Considerations of proximity and availability seem 
to be more prominent in driving investment behaviour in comparison 
to profitability (the standard economic approach: criminal entrepreneurs 
make cost/benefit efficient investments in a globalised economy) or 
power (the criminal infiltration approach: organised crime offenders gain 
power and influence by investing in the legal economy). The distance 
between the offender and his assets is often unsubstantial, comprising 
both physical and social distance. They predominantly invest in their 
country of origin or the country of residence, and their investments 
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consist of tangible, familiar assets such as residences and other real 
estate and (small) companies in well-known sectors, whereas purely 
financial assets, e.g. bonds and stocks in companies in which offenders 
are not personally involved, are far less common.
However, the processes, actors, and mechanisms involved in financing 
criminal markets remain under-researched. This gap is significant, considering 
that accessing capital is an important constraint for some criminals when 
they seek to become important actors in illicit markets for goods and 
services (Dean et al., 2010). There is general information available regarding 
the level of financing required for a criminal group’s operations in specific 
illicit markets, e.g. the illicit drugs market. For example, previous research 
has shown that financiers are often behind the financing of large-scale 
trafficking of commodities such as cigarettes or drugs (von Lampe, 2005; 
Caulkins et al., 2009; CSD, 2012; Rusev et al., 2013; Antonopoulos & 
Hall, 2016; Di Nicola & Terenghi, 2016). Yet despite the influence of these 
financiers, they remain outside the scope of analysis of organised crime 
at EU level, where such information is largely omitted. Even less is known 
about a number of other illicit markets such as smuggling and trafficking 
in human beings, counterfeiting of goods and money (cf. Antonopoulos 
et al., 2018), payment card fraud, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and so 
on (Antonopoulos et al., 2015). Similarly, the extent to which criminal 
entrepreneurs also engage in a process that has been defined as “reverse 
money laundering” where funds from legitimated sources are used illegal 
for purposes is poorly understood (Antonopoulos et al., 2015). All these 
issues have been addressed and thoroughly examined within the Financing 
of Organised Crime report, which explored the financial underpinnings of 
three major organised crime activities – drug trafficking, illicit tobacco 
trade and organised VAT frauds (CSD, 2015).
As with other illegal activities, the financial management process of 
human trafficking is still not sufficiently understood. Nevertheless, some 
studies have explored the financial mechanisms of THB, as well as the 
illegal markets for sex services. Since the prostitution market in many 
countries is inextricably linked with trafficking for sexual exploitation, 
studies which focus on the financial aspects of pimping should also be 
considered as part of the larger body of literature dealing with criminal 
money management in the illegal markets for sex services (Dank et al., 
2014; Englund et al., 2008; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Petrunov, 2011; 
Schloenhardt, 1999). The growing body of research that has focused 
on this criminal activity explores both the factors which make THB a 
profitable activity, as well as the costs, accounting practices, profits and 
profit sharing, access to capital, money laundering, and investment.
There are a number of macro factors that make human trafficking a 
profitable criminal activity (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2015; Schloenhardt, 
1999; Wheaton et al., 2010). Globalisation has eroded borders, facilitating 
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THB in all stages of this activity – from recruitment through transportation 
to exploitation (Kara, 2009). Human traffickers take advantage of 
the difference between the low wages and the lack of employment 
opportunities in one region and the inverse in another (Wheaton et 
al., 2010). The desire to migrate has meant that many people have 
become vulnerable to exploitation (Europol, 2016; Hepburn & Simon, 
2013). Similarly, research has been directed towards establishing factors 
which make certain countries preferred destinations and other key source 
countries. Legislation with regards to migration and prostitution, size 
of markets (sex/labour demand), income levels, and purchasing power 
have been suggested as pull factors, whereas poverty, unemployment, 
inequality, limited immigration possibilities and the social and economic 
marginalisation have been suggested as push factors (Jakobsson & 
Kotsadam, 2015; Schloenhardt, 1999; Wheaton et al., 2010).
Similar to activities in other licit and illicit markets, the objective of THB 
is the maximisation of profits. The supply of human trafficking victims for 
sexual and labour exploitation seeks to satisfy the demand for cheap labour 
(Kara, 2009; Wheaton et al., 2010). Nevertheless, as with other organised 
criminal activities, research has shown that the role of social capital and 
opportunities – family links, neighbourhood/community exposure (e.g. 
gang involvement, etc.), recruitment/mentorship by pimp or sex worker, 
etc. – is important in THB. Cross-border trafficking of human beings 
involves complex processes of coordination, whereby finding suitable 
co-offenders requires building of sufficient trust. To become involved in 
this type of organised crime, offenders have to either join an existing 
crime group, or start off criminal activities with others and set up a 
new crime group. Mutual reliance and trust in each other’s capacities is 
essential for successful cooperation. Therefore, organised crime offenders 
in human trafficking use social ties and networks to establish trust before 
any cooperation and collusion takes place (von Lampe & Johansen, 2004; 
van Koppen, 2013). Social relations and network dynamics ensure that 
the recruitment of new offenders and the creation of new partnerships 
are not the same as traditional models claim. Family, friends, and 
acquaintances work together and introduce each other to others and are 
the base of criminal entrepreneurship and expansion (Kleemans et al. 
1998). The concrete financial mechanisms behind THB operations have 
also been explored.
1.3.1. Access to funding and settlement of payments
Use and access to credit do not seem to play an important role in human 
trafficking business, at least according to the scant empirical evidence 
available. Thus, compared to other criminal markets such as the drug 
market for example, entry into a prostitution market is not dependent on 
access to credit facilities (Korsell et al., 2011). Drug traffickers, especially 
on importation and wholesale levels, periodically need large sums in 
order to buy merchandise in bulk, so credits are common in this market 
and access to credit is very important to criminal entrepreneurs. On the 
other hand, human trafficking is characterised by low need for external 
financing, as the main costs are related to covering the transportation of 
analysing	the	Finances	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	 19
the potential victims, which in most cases is comparatively cheap (Korsell 
et. al., 2011). Generally, traffickers encounter few or no barriers to entry 
in the THB market (Wheaton et al., 2010), and there are few or no costs 
related to market entry (Leman & Janssens, 2008).
The existing evidence unequivocally shows that cash is the predominant 
form of payment in the human trafficking business (Englund et al., 2008; 
ILO, 1998; Korsell et al., 2011; Petrunov, 2011). A fine example provides 
empirical data on the prostitution markets in several cities in the United 
States (Dank et al., 2014). Most of the interviewed offenders (67% of 
the respondents) reported that cash was the main form of payment they 
accepted from clients. However, card payments were also accepted by 
10% of the respondents, whereas about 7% reported accepting in-kind 
payments in the form of drugs or other merchandise – various gifts such 
as expensive clothes or jewellery. Offenders who reported acceptance 
of card payments usually maintained a legitimately registered bogus 
company, which was used as a front such as house cleaning (Dank et 
al., 2014).
1.3.2. Costs for doing business
Since traffickers aim to limit costs and maximise profits, it is important 
to map the applicable costs for engaging in this illicit market (Europol, 
2015). Several types of operational costs associated with the trafficking 
operations can be outlined – recruitment fees paid to other sex workers, 
other traffickers or brothel owners in the country of origin, costs for travel 
of the trafficked victim (including fees for travel agencies), payments for 
visas and travel documents, bribes to consulate/border officials, expenses 
for advertising, rental costs for accommodation and workplace, fees to 
other facilitators such as hotel employees, taxi drivers, etc. (Englund et 
al., 2008). Other costs related to trafficking could include corruption 
payments and payments to facilitators such as bellmen, hotel clerks, 
bartenders, and cab drivers, as well as for protection to gangs and 
other entities that provided needed security (Leman & Janssens, 2008; 
Raphael & Myers-Powell, 2010).
A good illustration of the costs for maintaining a prostitution business 
comes from a comprehensive study of the prostitution market in eight 
cities in the United States (Dank et al., 2014), based on interviews with 
142 convicted offenders. The majority of the exploited sex workers were 
nationals of the country and were less often trafficked from abroad. 
Several types of operational costs linked to running prostitution business 
have been reported:
• Transportation costs – depending on the modus operandi (providing 
services to client’s address vs providing services at a particular venue) 
some entrepreneurs use personal cars and cover expenditures on fuel 
or other transportation costs such as car rentals.
• Hotels and motels – when sex workers service their clients in a 
commercial establishment, their manager covers the costs on renting 
hotel rooms or maintaining spaces for customer appointments.
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• Housing – operational expenditures on apartments and homes for sex 
workers.
• Appearance – covering some or all of the costs for clothing, makeup, 
hair, nails, and accessories for the sex workers.
• Advertising – expenses directly related to producing and disseminating 
advertisements, which can include producing professional photographs 
and the cost of posting the advertisements on a website or in a print 
source. Although online expenses were deemed lower, advertisements 
need to be re-posted, sometimes multiple times a day in order to 
remain at the top of the websites.
• Communication expenses – business-related charges for cell phones 
and mobile plans. Many of the interviewed respondents chose to 
use prepaid phones, which allowed pimps to regulate the number 
of minutes available and the money invested into each phone. The 
additional benefit of using prepaid phones is that they could easily 
be replaced, and thus the risk to be traced by law enforcement is 
minimised.
• Legal fees – lawyer fees resulting from arrests of employees or the 
pimps.
• Additional costs – payment for other employees such as drivers, 
bodyguards, recruiters, traffickers.
Figure 1. Business-related expenses, %
Source: Dank et al., (2014), p. 205.
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Costs associated with trafficking in human beings can be generally 
categorised according to the stages of the trafficking process – recruitment, 
transportation, and exploitation. In other criminal markets, the sale of 
an illicit product (arms or drugs) is usually preceded by incurring the 
cost of production or purchase. On the other hand, in THB victims are 
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often lured into the trafficking network by deception, violence or the 
exploitation of a relationship of trust. Due to the large pool of potential 
victims in search of a better life, the recruitment costs are very low 
(Kara, 2009). Nevertheless, some recruitment costs are incurred. Some 
traffickers employ (fake) employment agencies, newspaper advertisements, 
distribution of business cards in shops and restaurants, as well as the 
placing of online ads to find victims.
The existing empirical evidence suggests that the main costs of human 
trafficking are incurred for transportation to the destination (Balarezo, 
2013). These expenses can include buying the means of transport or 
payment to someone to escort victims to the destination. Alternatively, 
the price of a plane or bus ticket or fuel costs are needed. More violent 
and profit driven criminal groups might attempt to lower the costs of 
transportation to a point where the victims’ lives are threatened – victims 
getting sick while being transported might not be provided with any 
medical care (Shelley, 2010).
A substantial cost related to transportation is the securing of counterfeit 
or forged documents (Wheaton et al., 2010). Corruption is an often 
used mechanism to facilitate travel, especially from countries of origin 
with more barriers for legal migration to the desired destination. It is 
an important cost for traffickers (Council of Europe, 2002; Kemp & 
Raijman, 2014; Shelley, 2010) both in terms of facilitating transportation 
and subsequent exploitation. Government officials in the countries of 
origin and the recipient countries – e.g. border guards, customs officials, 
consular officers and other diplomatic personnel – are bribed or extorted. 
A corrupt official might be actively involved, for example, by informing 
traffickers on controls and thus facilitating passage, or alternatively the 
service might be passive such as when officials fail to react by turning 
a blind eye (Aronowitz, 2009; Kemp & Raijman, 2014; Shelley, 2010). 
Traffickers might secure multiple work permits or visas, which serve to 
strengthen control over the victims by using the threat of being sent back 
due to the withdrawal of the residence permit (Kemp & Raijman, 2014).
Depending on the structure of the criminal group or network, salaries or 
ad-hoc payments to participants, associates or intermediaries are another 
important expense. Traffickers who are steady part of a criminal group 
might receive a salary, while others are only loosely associated and are 
paid on a freelance basis (Leman & Janssens, 2008). Depending on the 
size of the group or network tasks might be outsourced or taken care of 
in-house. The former approach generally includes legal consultations or 
other specialised services such as the production of counterfeit or forged 
documents (Leman & Janssens, 2008).
1.3.3. Pricing, profit and profit sharing, 
accounting practices
Generally, the profits of traffickers can be categorised as profits 
generated through the sale of trafficked persons to exploiters and profits 
of the exploitation itself (Kara, 2009). As many trafficked persons are 
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lured, seduced or actively looking for help with finding a job and 
accommodation in a wealthier country, they (or their family) are paying 
for this service. Normally this payment is made prior to the departure 
(Kane, 2013; Salt & Stein, 1997). In arrangements where the victims of 
trafficking are sold or re-sold, the price will vary strongly depending on 
the region of destination (Wheaton et al., 2010).
Sex workers are often considered as generating most profit out of all 
the trafficked persons (Kara, 2009) and they are often forced to hand 
their wages over to the traffickers (Aronowitz, 2009; Europol, 2015). 
Not surprisingly, pricing of sex services varies significantly. Price ranges 
for various parts of the world have been reported, including Europe 
(Englund et al., 2008; Korsell et al., 2011; Mancuso, 2014; Petrunov, 
2011), North America (Cunningham & Kendall, 2014; Dank et al., 2014; 
Horning & Sriken, 2017; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007; Raphael & Myers-
Powell, 2010; Rosen & Venkatesh, 2008), Latin America (Blanchette & 
Da Silva, 2017; Zhang, 2011), and Asia (ILO, 1998; Li, 2014). The 
amount paid for the sexual services depends on the economy of the 
country. The estimated prices for sexual intercourse varies from US$15 
in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa up till US$100 in more industrialised 
countries (Belser, 2005). The total profit will depend on the amount 
of hours worked by the victim (trafficked person). Most often rates 
are charged by time increment or by sex act and sometimes by date 
(Dank et al., 2014).
Prices are reported to change over time due to various factors. For 
example, crack cocaine epidemic in the 1990s and 2000s in the United 
States brought many young women on the streets and the prices fell 
due to tighter competition (Dank et al., 2014). Internet played somewhat 
similar role, since it facilitated further expansion of the sex market, 
provided for easier market entry and increased competition, putting 
downward pressure on price levels. On the other hand, the internet also 
broadened the client base, which to some extent neutralised the effects 
of the increased competition (Dank et al., 2014; Marcus et al., 2016). 
Prices also differ with regards of the type of sex services provided and 
the market segment where the sex workers operate – e.g. escort services, 
sex services in brothels or other in-door venues, street prostitution 
(Dank et al., 2014; Englund et al., 2008; Petrunov, 2011). The use of 
condoms is also reported to affect the price of sex services (Finn & 
Stalans, 2017; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007). Another factor that influences 
price difference is the type of customer – e.g. new customers pay more 
than regular customers. Price ranges may also differ depending on the 
racial background of customers and price peaks around major events or 
holidays (Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007).
The involvement in the sex market arguably also bears some opportunity 
cost for the sex workers and it can be used to explain the pricing of sex 
services. Thus, some authors have tested and provided evidence for the 
theory that sex workers (specifically in the high-end, escort prostitution) 
charge higher fees to compensate for the lost opportunity to participate 
in the “marriage market” (Edlund et al., 2009). An alternative theory 
emphasises on labour market as opportunity cost, since sex workers in 
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high-end prostitution market generally earn more than twice the typical 
earnings of non-manual workers and more than three times that of 
manual workers (Moffatt & Peters, 2004; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007).
The management of the criminal finances in human trafficking/prostitu-
tion businesses appears to be deeply entangled with control over sex 
workers. This is exemplified by the ratio of earnings kept by the sex 
worker and the pimp/collected by the trafficker, the accounting practices 
of traffickers and the imposition of daily quotas to the sex workers. In 
more exploitative trafficking arrangements, payments to victims of human 
trafficking are low and in some cases non-existent. Often (sex) workers 
work long hours for a low salary, sustenance is subtracted from their 
wages, and health conditions are poor (Europol, 2016).
A number of strategies are used to keep victims in an exploitative 
situation. Debt bondage is one of the key mechanisms to establish and 
exert control over the victims (Englund et al., 2008; Korsell et al., 2011; 
Petrunov, 2011) and results in the victims keeping a small proportion of 
the money they earn (Europol, 2016). In most cases the sex workers are 
expected first to repay the costs for their recruitment and transportations 
to the destination country often with highly inflated rate of interest 
(Korsell et al., 2011; Schloenhardt, 1999; Wheaton et al., 2010). Victims 
end up in an exploitative situation where they have to pay off the debt 
through working, often in industrial sweatshops, as sex workers, drug 
carriers or as virtual prisoners (Aronowitz, 2009; Belser, 2005; Europol, 
2016; GLA, 2015; Kane, 2013; Salt & Stein, 1997; A. Schloenhardt, 1999; 
Wheaton et al., 2010). Often the freedom of the trafficked person is 
restricted, as he/she is not allowed to leave until the heavy debt is 
paid off. Even after the initial debts have been repaid, some victims 
continue to work for traffickers throughout their lives (Aronowitz, 2009). 
In many cases, victims are expected to cover all their living expenses 
and the operational costs of the business from their share. In labour 
trafficking, some employers keep part of the wages due to lack of skills 
of the workers, as money presumably used for the “training” the victims 
(Bressán & Arcos, 2017).
However, arrangements where victims retain more of the revenue have 
also been reported. For victims of trafficking who are paid, there are 
differing estimates of the money they are allowed to keep for themselves. 
Some studies have reported that victims receive around 30-40% of the 
total turnover (Belser, 2005; Bressán & Arcos, 2017). Even then, however, 
sex workers seem also to be regularly fined by the traffickers for numerous 
reasons such as not meeting their daily quota of earnings, tardiness, 
improper clothing, attempts to escape, etc. Therefore they often receive 
not more than 10% of their earnings (Dank et al., 2014; Englund et al., 
2008; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Petrunov, 2011) or sometimes even 2-3% 
of the price paid by the customer (Bressán & Arcos, 2017).
Human traffickers and pimps employ basic accounting and bookkeeping 
practices in order to assure proper management of their finances and 
track record of the earnings and costs associated with the business. 
Usually the sex workers are obliged to keep a record of the payments, 
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although traffickers also use variety of techniques to cross-check the 
declared amounts such as supervisors, secret clients, etc. (Dank et al., 
2014; Korsell et al., 2011; Petrunov, 2011). This also allows them to closely 
monitor the sex workers and control their earnings (Petrunov, 2011). 
Among other financial aspects of human trafficking many researchers 
reported the impositions of daily quotas to be reached by the sex 
workers or providing performance incentives in order to encourage 
maximum earnings. The quotas may vary depending on the time of 
week and anticipated demand (Dank et al., 2014; Englund et al., 2008). 
Since the traffickers/pimps expect certain revenues from the sex workers 
they not only facilitate contacts with clients but also use variety of 
methods to ensure that the managed sex workers will make more money 
(Englund et al., 2008; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007; Petrunov, 2011).
1.3.4. Handling of proceeds
Much of the revenue generated from the sex work is used for immediate 
consumption by both the sex workers and the traffickers, money 
laundering appears to be used rarely. However, both sex workers and 
traffickers do tend to send part of their profits to their countries of 
origin (Englund et al., 2008; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Petrunov, 2011). 
Various techniques are used – smuggling of the cash across borders, use 
of money transfer services such as Western Union and Money Gram, 
informal value transfer services such as hawala, purchasing of goods – 
i.e. trade-based money laundering (FATF, 2011; Petrunov, 2011). In cases 
related to labour trafficking, shell companies, which are specifically set 
up to employ trafficked persons play an important role. Eventually the 
accounts of these companies are credited through payment of invoices 
for services and thus traffickers are able to monetise their illicit services 
(FATF, 2011).
The process of money laundering usually starts with stockpiling the 
generated revenues in cash and then transferring it in small amounts 
to the country of origin. In cases related to sex trafficking, the cash 
smuggling is done either by the sex workers themselves or by associates 
of the traffickers who act as cash couriers. Another common method 
is the use of money remittance companies. However, traffickers try to 
obfuscate the money trail and conceal the actual intended recipient, so 
usually the sex worker transfers the amounts to family members or close 
relatives or designated persons with false IDs. The third technique used 
is import/export companies to buy goods, which are subsequently sold in 
the country of origin. Such goods are reported to include new and used 
cars, caravans, yachts, heavy-duty machinery, construction equipment, 
furniture, clothes, shoes, leather goods, jewellery, watches, perfumery, 
etc. In many cases traffickers establish companies in their countries of 
origin, which then sell these goods (FATF, 2011; Petrunov, 2011). In cases 
where the money is to be invested in property or some legitimate 
business, traffickers take certain steps to conceal the origin of the funds. 
They use a variety of techniques for this purpose such as declaring loans 
or donations received from physical and legal persons, fictitious gambling 
and lottery game wins, mortgaging real estate property, etc. (FATF, 2011; 
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Petrunov, 2011). Part of the money that was laundered and sent to 
the country of origin will be returned to the country of exploitation to 
address some of the costs of the ongoing trafficking business. This can 
be in the form of money to pay for rent and food, but also in the form 
of real estate, bought to facilitate subsequent exploitation (e.g. a shop or 
a bar) (Europol, 2015).
Most evidence suggests that in the human trafficking business investments 
in the legitimate economy rarely take place and traffickers generally use 
simple money laundering methods. Moreover, even these are rarely used, 
since most of the earnings are used for immediate consumption (Eglund 
et al., 2008; Petrunov, 2011). Existing empirical evidence suggests that 
about 8% of the traffickers eventually invest in legal businesses (Dank 
et al., 2014). However, when traffickers decide to invest – they usually 
follow two approaches. The first is to invest in property or business that 
will facilitate their criminal business such as apartments or nightlife venues 
either in the destination or country of origin. Thus, as property owners 
they are able to eliminate the need to pay rent for business facilities, which 
is a substantial expenditure. Nightlife economy venues could be used 
either to procure sex services or to recruit new “employees” (Petrunov, 
2011). The second approach is to invest the proceeds in legitimate 
business that will allow them to step out of the criminal business, when 
they are ready to retire. Investments in a variety of sectors of the 
legitimate economy were reported – agriculture, construction and real 
estate, logging, transport, retail and tourism, retail stores, hotels, coffee 
bars, restaurants, dance clubs, casinos, auto body shops, etc. (Dank et 
al., 2014; FATF, 2011; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Petrunov, 2011). Apart 
from investments in the legitimate industry, traffickers might invest part 
of their profits into other criminal businesses such as loan sharking, 
illegal gambling, and other betting games (Petrunov, 2011).
The current study explores how criminal actors involved in this illegal 
activity manage their criminal finances: how they access and raise capital 
for launching new or running their established criminal business, how 
they manage financial flows into and out of their criminal enterprises, 
how they settle payments, how and where they invest their profits. The 
study focuses on two forms of THB, namely trafficking for sexual and 
labour exploitation.
The study relied on in-depth country case studies for the primary data 
collection. The country case studies have been conducted in nine EU 
member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom) with the collaboration of 
country researchers with a good track-record in conducting field research 
and well-established contacts with relevant national authorities. The 
countries have been selected in a way that allows covering both major 
countries of origin and major end destinations. The selection of the 
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countries also responded to the need to assure both proper geographical 
coverage and inclusion of countries with diverse legal regimes of the 
sex markets – e.g. penalisation of sex buyers (France), legalisation and 
regulation of prostitution (Germany and the Netherlands) or criminalising 
only the organisation of prostitution (Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom).
Each of the country case studies was based on the data gathered from 
the following sources:
• Academic and grey literature on financing of organised crime generally 
and human trafficking specifically – the review included academic 
articles and reports by research institutes, reports by governments, 
national and international law enforcement (Europol, national crime 
agencies, etc.), international organisations (ILO, UNODC, FATF). The 
available literature reviewed was in a variety of languages such as 
English, Bulgarian, Romanian, Italian, Dutch, French, German, and 
Spanish.
• Statistical data – figures on human trafficking were gathered from 
sources at the international and national level. Wherever possible, 
data was collected from sources using a standardised methodology in 
order to ensure comparability.
• Semi-structured interviews with a variety of stakeholders related to 
human trafficking – experts (police officers, investigators, officials from 
national rapporteurs, prosecutors, lawyers, criminologists), victims of 
trafficking and perpetrators. A total of 197 interviews were carried out 
in the nine countries.
• Police and judicial case files (Bulgaria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom) and/or media reports (all countries).
The in-depth interviews were conducted implementing a common 
protocol, which was designed to facilitate consistency of data collection 
and subsequent analysis of the different aspects of criminal money 
management. The interview protocol was designed in 2 versions – 
one for law enforcement and judicial experts and one for criminal 
entrepreneurs. Both versions covered the same topics, including: initial 
capital for financing of THB activities (market entry thresholds, sources 
of capital, access to external capital), criminal money management (type 
and structure of costs, forms and settlement of payments, handling of 
profits), role of the internet and new ICT and their impact on criminal 
money management.
The respondents for the interviews were identified in three main ways. 
Most of the interviewed experts identified through official correspondence 
with government, judiciary, and law enforcement bodies, as well as non-
governmental organisations. Similarly, in order to conduct interviews 
with offenders in prison, official request to prison administrations were 
submitted and subsequently an informed consent from the prison inmates 
was obtained. Due to the long and burdensome procedures, country 
researchers in only half of the countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Spain) managed to arrange for such interviews. Secondly, respondents 
were usually asked to recommend other relevant experts and thus through 
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a snowball sampling new inter-
viewees were identified. The 
third method used was to ap-
proach participants in previous 
work in the field of organised 
crime and also through their 
recommendations to enlarge 
the sample of respondents. In 
many cases, the conducted 
interviews were supplemented 
and augmented through follow-
up meetings and additional 
information acquired via phone 
or email correspondence.
The country researchers also 
consulted public court case 
files. Some country researchers 
requested and were granted 
access to confidential police or 
prosecution files on THB cases 
(France, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom). Unlike 
court decisions that usually 
provide scarce information on the financial aspects of the crime, police 
files and indictments contain much more information, which during trials 
is often disregarded as irrelevant. This is why access to such documents 
proved quite valuable sources of information.
Data collection in each country followed the common ethical standards 
for studies of similar kind such as obtaining informed consent from each 
interviewee and protecting their anonymity. Human rights, dignity and 
fundamental freedoms of all respondents were respected and all personal 
data was handled according to national and the EU data-protection legal 
framework. The analytical outputs also do not contain any personal data. 
The data collected within the current study has informed two levels of 
analysis presented in this report – a general overview of the financing 
of human trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation and national-level 
analyses of THB for each of the covered nine EU countries.
The selected methods and data sources are not without constraints. 
Data retrieved through interviews with representatives of the official 
authorities (police officers and prosecutors) is often prone to limitations 
such as the level of competency and experience of the respondents, 
institutional priorities and broader political agendas. Another shortcoming 
of such official accounts reportedly is the stereotyping of “organised 
criminals,” which eventually disregards the broader social and cultural 
context in which they operate (Hobbs & Antonopoulos, 2014). Similarly, 
interviews with criminal offenders are often burdened with issues such as 
accountability and validity of the information shared, as well as selection 
bias due to impossibility to assure representativeness of the interview 
sample thus usually limiting the focus to criminal actors operating on 
Figure 2. the methodological approach
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small scale (e.g. Zhang & Chin, 2004; Zhang, 2014). Media sources 
are also susceptible to various biases – they usually cover cases which 
have been brought out to the public by the official authorities and 
therefore only portray success stories, not to mention the sensationalism 
and moralistic way of conveying the information. These characteristics 
substantially decrease the empirical value of media sources for analytical 
purposes (Antonopoulos & Hall, 2015). The efforts to overcome these 
limitations included cross-checking and triangulation of data through 
different sources. This allowed most dubious accounts to be eliminated 
and a certain level of data quality and robustness to be achieved.
Trafficking in human beings represents a serious crime and an abuse of 
the fundamental rights and dignity of individuals. Victims of trafficking, 
also defined as “modern day slaves” (OSCE, 2005), are children, women, 
men that suffer different forms of exploitation and are forced to work 
in prostitution, strip clubs, sweatshops, agricultural businesses, service 
industries. Specific factors point to the increase of trafficking in human 
beings. First, the high number of persons that make use of the services 
of traffickers due to poverty and lack of opportunities to improve their 
life conditions. Second, the presence of porous borders (such as the ones 
of the former Soviet Union); or, conversely, tighter controls, less chances 
for legal migration that force migrants to use illegal services (Salt, 2000; 
Di Nicola, 2014; Shelley, 2001; Aronowitz, 2001). Third, globalisation and 
advanced communication technologies. More recently, the consolidation 
of criminal networks and their increased sophistication of the methods 
used for trafficking (Aronowitz, 2001; 2009; Zhang, 2007; Di Nicola, 
2014). But what is trafficking in human beings? And what is its extent 
and nature? Furthermore, who are the criminal entrepreneurs involved in 
this criminal market and what are their social organisation and business 
models of exploitation in the EU?
Drawing from the extant literature and the country case studies developed 
during a research on financing of trafficking in human beings carried out 
in 2017 – 2018 in the nine EU countries, the present chapter deals with:
• the definition of trafficking in human beings at the international and 
European levels and with reference to two main forms (i.e., sexual 
and labour exploitation);
• the extent of trafficking also highlighting the challenges related to 
estimations;
• the organisation and structure of the actors involved in this criminal 
market;
• the business models of trafficking and exploitation in the countries of 
destination of the victims.
Starting from the year 2000, the number of publications on THB 
has increased rapidly in light of the political interest following the 
introduction of the UN Palermo Protocol, and of the growing national 
and international attention also reflected in the rise of the number of 
programmes to prevent and counter trafficking (Laczko, 2007). Data 
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANISATION 
OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS IN THE EU
2.1. ExTENT OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS wITHIN THE EU
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on the extent (numbers of victims and/or traffickers) of trafficking of 
human beings are collected at the EU level by various governmental 
and inter-governmental bodies, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as also reflected by the country 
case studies (Table 1). Eurostat has compiled the first two working papers 
with statistics on trafficking in human beings in all 28 EU member states, 
while at the EU level there is an EU anti-trafficking coordinator and a 
network of appointed national rapporteurs that are supposed to collect 
data at the national level (European Commission, 2015).
ТаBle 1. institutional sources oF data on traFFicking in human Beings 
in nine eu countries
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data of country case studies.
Country Source of data
The Netherlands Coordination Centre for Human Trafficking (CoMensha)
UK National Referral Mechanism (NRM), Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit 
(MSHTU)
Belgium Interdepartmental Coordination Cell (including all the actors
involved in the fight against trafficking in human beings),
private authorities (e.g., Myria)
France Central Office for Combating Human Trafficking (OCRTEH)
Italy Department of Equal Opportunities, NGOs, International Organisation
for Migration
Spain Central Unit for Illegal Immigration and Document Falsification Networks 
(UCRIF), Foreign Nationals Unit of the State Prosecution Office
Germany German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA)
Romania National Agency against Trafficking in persons (ANITP), Directorate
for Countering Organised Criminality (anti-organised crime prosecution
office – DIICOT)
Bulgaria National Commission for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings
Despite this, the scale of trafficking in human beings within the EU is 
difficult to estimate due to several reasons. As stated by Europol (2016, 
p. 9), “human exploitation can be hidden behind other criminal offences, 
such as prostitution, irregular migration, property crime or even labour 
disputes. Victims are often exploited in multiple ways or may be involved 
in other illicit activities, resulting in cases of THB not being investigated 
or recorded as human trafficking. Moreover, differences in national legal 
definitions of THB hinder the comparison and assessment of common 
trends and patterns across the EU”. Other factors, as underlined by 
some scholars (Di Nicola, 2007; Aromaa, 2007; ILO, 2012; Goździak, 
2015; Laczko, 2007; OSCE, 2005; Zhang, 2009; Tyldum 2010) and by 
all the country cases studies, are responsible not only for the lack of 
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precise estimations on THB but also for the almost impossibility to 
compare the collected data among regions. First, the clandestine nature 
of trafficking, which allows to measure only the tip of the iceberg, and 
the fact that data may reflect law enforcement agencies, prosecution, 
and non-profit organisations’ activities. Second, the lack of awareness 
and understanding of the signs of trafficking by institutions and police 
forces. Third, the weak legal status of victims in the legislations of 
most countries or the fear of intimidation and retaliation on the side of 
traffickers/exploiters, which prevent them from reporting or collaborating 
with the police. In the case of labour exploitation, in particular, victims 
may not even perceive themselves as such (Nicolae, 2018). Finally, the 
difficulty for researchers to access police databases both in the EU 
and in non-EU countries. As reported in the country case study of 
Belgium, also confirmed by the other studies, “seeing that [trafficking 
in human beings] is a gravely underreported phenomenon any claims 
regarding [its] incidence cannot be substantiated” (Raets & Janssens, 
2018). Consistently, limits in collected qualitative information have been 
underlined with reference to sampling and representativeness of results, 
data collection techniques (i.e. questionnaires, interviews) and source of 
data (i.e. victims, stakeholders, etc.) (Di Nicola, 2014). As a consequence, 
the data presented are indicative.
The last data available at the EU level for the period 2013 – 2014 
(European Commission, 2016), report a total of 15,846 (identified and 
presumed) registered victims per 100,000 inhabitants (EU-28), with 
65% of the registered victims being EU citizens, 76% women and 15% 
children. Consistently, in 2012 the majority of detected victims were 
females, 75% of whom in 24 member states (Eurostat, 2015), although 
the trend worldwide during the period 2004 – 2014 was of an overall 
decrease in the share of detected female victims and an increase 
in the share of detected male victims (more than 1 in 5 detected 
trafficking victims) (UNODC, 2016). In particular, the increase in the 
share of detected men has been registered mostly in Europe, Central 
Asia, and South America (25 countries). As for children victims of 
THB, data suggest that they are detected more often in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean, and less in wealthier 
countries of North America, Europe, and the Middle East (UNODC, 
2016). In the period 2013 – 2014, trafficking for sexual exploitation 
appears the most widespread form (67% of registered victims), while 
labour exploitation accounts for 21% and 12% for other forms of 
exploitation. The majority of victims trafficked for sexual exploitation 
were women (96%) and, conversely, the majority of trafficked victims 
for labour exploitation were men (74%). As for the nationalities of 
victims, the top five within the EU were Romanian, Bulgarian, Dutch, 
Hungarian, and Polish. The most represented non-EU nationalities 
were Nigerian, Chinese, Albanian, Vietnamese, and Moroccan.7 Similar 
7 Information about victims has been collected from various sources: police (as the main source), 
NGOs, immigration services, border guards and labour inspectors. In line with Directive 
2011/36/EU, “identified victims” are individuals formally identified by the relevant authorities 
as victims of THB. “Presumed victims” are trafficking victims that have met the criteria of 
the Directive but have not been formally identified by the relevant authorities or who have 
declined to be formally or legally identified as victims of THB. Data referring to “registered 
victims” include both types (Eurostat, 2015).
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estimations of the number of trafficked victims identified in Europe 
are provided by the US Department of State (2016) which reports a 
total of about: 11,905 victims in 2012; 10,374 in 2013; 11,910 in 2014, 
and 11,112 in 2015.
According to UNODC (2016), the majority of victims (57%) were 
trafficked transnationally (i.e. crossing at least one international border); 
the remaining were trafficked within national borders in the period 
2012 – 2014. As for the repatriated victims of trafficking, about 77% 
were trafficked to countries of the same region. The remaining 23% 
were trafficked to other regions, the countries of Western and Southern 
Europe and the Middle East being the most prominent destinations areas 
(UNODC, 2016). Victims coming from Europe, South America and West 
Africa are usually trafficked to Western and Southern Europe; while 
victims from Asia and East Africa are generally trafficked to the Middle 
East (Figure 3).
Figure 3. main destinations oF trans-regional Flows and their 
signiFicant origins, 2012 – 2014
Source: UNODC (2016).
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Western and southern regions of Europe are destinations for trafficking 
flows originating in many other regions. According to UNODC (2016, 
p. 75), “137 different citizenships from all regions were detected in or 
repatriated” from these areas and much of the trafficking flows were of 
domestic type. During the period 2012 – 2014, EU countries represented 
the main origin of trafficking and about 47% of the detected victims in 
Western and Southern Europe were trafficked from Central and South-
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Eastern Europe.8 Victims from Central Europe were found in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Figure 4).
In particular, main trafficking flows to Western and Southern Europe 
originate from: a) Central and South-Eastern Europe, with a significant 
number of Bulgarian and Romanian victims; b) West Africa, with Nigerian 
victims detected in Scandinavia, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and Southern Europe; c) East Asia, with victims from 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The trend in the 
trafficking flows of the last decade shows a decrease in the number of 
victims from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. More recently, also flows 
from West Africa have decreased in parallel with an increase of the flows 
of trafficking from East Africa. “If current trends continue over the next 
years, trafficking into Western and Southern Europe will become even 
more regional and local. Most trans-regional flows appear to be decreasing, 
while intraregional flows are growing. This is particularly true for the flows 
from Central and South-Eastern Europe” (UNODC, 2016, p. 77).
Within Europe, Italy represents one of the main entry points for trafficked 
victims – especially from Africa due to the key role of the Central 
8 The countries in Western and Southern Europe are: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, 
France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Malta, and Turkey. The countries in Central and South-
Eastern Europe are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia (Central 
Europe); Albania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (South-Eastern Europe) (UNODC, 2016).
Figure 4. origins oF detected traFFicking victims in western 
and southern europe, By suB-region
Source: UNODC (2016).
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Mediterranean route (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018) – who are either 
exploited in the country or further trafficked to other EU countries.
Data from Frontex (2017, p. 8) underline that since 2014 the number of 
detections of illegal migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean Sea has 
exceeded 100,000. This increase is driven by the pressure of migrants 
who arrive in Libya (the main point of gathering) and subsequently try 
to enter into Europe (both trafficked and illegal migrants). Even if the 
routes of migration change over time and quickly, also due to LEAs 
counteraction and/or political agreements among EU/third countries, at 
present three routes are used from Sub-Saharan Africa to Italy and then 
other European countries: a) the Western route where the main source 
countries are Mali, The Gambia, and Senegal; b) the Central route 
starting from Nigeria, and passing through Agadez in Niger or Chad 
and converging in Libya; c) the Eastern route for which source countries 
are mainly Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan and which usually cuts north 
through Sudan and Egypt and then along the coast of Africa (Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018). Similarly, Spain is another country used by traffickers 
as an entry point to Europe from Sub-Saharan Africa passing through 
Morocco (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018).
2.1.1. Sexual and labour exploitation: main definitions 
and trends at the EU level
Trafficking for sexual exploitation includes the exploitation of persons into 
prostitution and similar markets, such as pornography (UNODC, 2016; 
Hodge & Lietz, 2007). Forced labour is defined in Article 2 of the ILO 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 39) as “all work or service which 
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for 
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” It is estimated 
that in most regions worldwide, detected victims of sexual exploitation 
are mainly females (about 23,000 between 2012 and 2014), a trend which 
is decreasing compared to previous years and in line with estimations at 
the EU level (22 member states), where for the period 2010 – 2012, 95% 
victims were females, and 4% males (% of total number of registered 
victims). In this regard, the female victims exploited in the sex market 
are increasingly minors (see also Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 
2018; Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 
2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Nicolae, 2018). Trafficking for sexual exploitation 
is reported mostly in Western and Southern Europe (where also the few 
males were detected) and Central and South-Eastern Europe. In the sub-
regions of the latter, victims trafficked for forced labour range around 
20-30% of the total number of detected victims (UNODC 2016; Eurostat, 
2015) (Figure 5).
As underlined in the literature (Europol, 2016; US Department of State, 
2016; Smit, 2011; ILO, 2012) and the country case studies, labour 
exploitation within the EU is a current and increasing form of exploitation 
due to the high demand for services at low cost by producers and 
consumers. It seems, however, to remain under-recorded compared to 
sexual exploitation for reasons such as different priorities of the police 
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and the prosecution, lack of specific national laws, isolation of victims 
and their lack of awareness of being exploited or even reluctance to 
admit this condition. Thus, Romanian victims (especially men) hardly 
accept to consider themselves victims of trafficking (Nicolae, 2018). This 
type of abuse displays in different ways, where the common element is 
the violation of workers’ rights in terms of dignity and working conditions 
(e.g. intimidations and physical violence, extremely long hours of work, 
unhealthy conditions), done in order to maximise profits. Victims of 
labour exploitation are usually employed in less regulated industries which 
in many cases “require cheap and temporary manual labour [force]” 
(Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). As underlined in the Belgian country case 
study, “the posting of workers from low-wage in high-wage countries 
lends itself well to [this] purpose, as it enables the entrepreneur to 
employ workers in the country of destination under the conditions of the 
country of origin. These type of secondment schemes or social dumping 
practices are frequently accompanied by bogus self-employment ploys. 
By falsely declaring workers as self-employed, the enterprise is no longer 
bound by regular terms of employment” (Raets & Janssens, 2018).
The main economic sectors of employment, across Europe, are the 
following: agriculture, forestry, catering industry, construction and textile 
industries, manufacture, housework, logistics (transportation), wholesale 
and retail distribution, hospitality industry, service establishments (e.g., 
nails salon, car washes, garages, cleaning services, tanning salons, service 
stations), and restaurants. In Italy, for example, agriculture is one of the 
main sectors of labour exploitation both of nationals, trafficked victims 
Figure 5. shares oF exploitation types among detected traFFicking 
victims, By region oF detection, %
Source: UNODC (2016).
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and irregular migrants. This is due mainly to the need for farmers to 
have a flexible labour force in the very last minute and to cut harvesting 
and production costs in line with the very low prices at which major 
multinational corporations purchase agricultural products (Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018). In minor cases, other forms of labour exploitation have 
been reported as well (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018), 
such as forced begging or pickpocketing, forced criminality (for example 
drug dealing, theft), sham marriage.
As for the nationalities of trafficked victims within the EU, according 
to some country case studies (Table 2 and Table 3) sexual exploitation 
involves women and girls mainly from Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovakia, and more recently Lithuania (years 2013 – 2014) (Europol, 2016; 
Siegel and de Blank, 2010; UNODC, 2010b; Becucci, 2008). In the period 
2010 – 2012, Dutch and Polish victims were also registered. Flows are 
from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe (to countries such as 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom), although victims may be nationals exploited 
in their countries of origin as pointed out by some country case studies 
(Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 
2018). A significant number of victims have a non-EU nationality as well, 
ТаBle 2. main nationalities oF traFFicked victims For sexual and laBour 
exploitation in some eu countries
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data of national country case studies.
Country Sexual exploitation
The Netherlands Local (Dutch); East Europeans (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania); Greek;
West Africans
UK Local (English); East Europeans (Albania, Romania); Vietnamese
France Local (French); East Europeans (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary); Chinese; 
Africans (Nigeria, Cameron); South Americans (Ecuador, Brazil)
Italy East Europeans (Albania, Romania, Bulgaria); West Africans (Nigeria, Ghana, 
Senegal); Asian (Chinese)
Spain East Europeans (Romania, Bulgaria); Sub-Saharan Africans; Chinese;
Latin Americans
Germany Local (German); East Europeans (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary); Africans; Asian
Country labour exploitation
The Netherlands East Europeans; Asian; Turkish
UK Local (British); East Europeans (Albania, Romania); Vietnamese
Italy East Europeans (Albania, Poland, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia);
Sub-Saharan Africans; Asian
Germany East Europeans (Ukraine, Poland, Bulgaria)
market	structure	and	social	organisation	 37
and they come mainly from Albania, Brazil, China, Nigeria (one of the 
most persistent trafficking flow), and Vietnam. Member states located 
at the borders of the EU (such as Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom) are main entry point for this type of victims; whereas within 
the EU, Austria is increasingly becoming a transit point for victims coming 
from Central and Eastern Europe.
The Asia-Pacific region (11.7 million) and Africa (3.7 million) account 
for the highest numbers of victims of forced labour, whereas in the 
developed economies and the European Union, the total number of 
victims is 1.5 million, corresponding to 7%.9 As ILO (2012) has underlined, 
the major proportion of trafficking for forced labour occurs in the same 
region. According to Europol (2016), the majority of trafficked victims 
in 2013 and 2014, are citizens of EU member states, originating in 
particular from Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, followed by Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, and Estonia. Fewer victims are detected from countries 
at the border of the EU (Albania, Moldova, Morocco, Russia, Turkey, 
and Ukraine), and victims coming from Asia, China, India, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. These trafficking flows within 
the EU are mainly directed to Austria, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal.
According to some of the country case studies (Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Lalam, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018), the majority of offenders 
convicted for THB are male, while the offending rate of females is higher 
when compared to other crimes. This is probably due to decisions by 
women over time to become procurers as a mean to escape from the 
exploitative situation, or to the limited employment options available to 
previously trafficked women. The prevalence of female traffickers and/or 
exploiters characterises Nigerian and Chinese criminal networks, where 
the victims especially in the former case, manage “to move up the ranks 
and assume the position of madam” (Raets & Janssens, 2018). At the 
EU level, as pointed out by the extant literature and the majority of the 
country case studies, exploitation of victims is organised and managed 
by resident Nigerian women, referred to as “madams,” holding in some 
cases an independent entrepreneurship role (Mancuso, 2013; Siegel & de 
Blank, 2010; UNODC, 2011). In Spain, for example, out of 616 persons 
prosecuted and detained for trafficking, 40% were women in 2015 
(Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Consistently, many of these convicted 
women are former victims of sexual exploitation that collaborate with 
the criminal network as a means of earning profits. The variety of actors 
involved in human trafficking is wide, being a criminal activity that can 
be also managed by single individuals from recruitment to exploitation. As 
pointed out in the country studies, “trafficking may not always involve an 
9 For regional groupings, see the Employment Trends Report (ILO, 2012).
2.2. PROFIlES OF TRAFFICKERS: FROM INDIvIDUAl 
 ENTREPRENEURS TO lOOSE CRIMINAl NETwORKS
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organised crime group. […]. Although in the UK policy, law enforcement 
and non-governmental organisation rationale great emphasis is placed 
on human trafficking that is of transnational nature, it is important for 
one to remember that human trafficking is not always and necessarily a 
transnational crime” (Antonopoulos, 2018).
2.2.1. Different trafficking models: organisation, 
structure and roles
The organisation and structure of traffickers involved in trafficking in 
human beings is diversified depending on the situation, scale of the 
operations, and country. THB may involve single individuals in charge of 
recruiting, transporting, and exploiting one or two victims in the same 
city or region to highly sophisticated organised crime groups moving 
large numbers of victims in different countries, and arranging from the 
recruitment to the production of false documents, transportation, and 
exploitation (UNODC, 2014; Shelley, 2007; Di Nicola, 2014; Aronowitz, 
2001). “There is, however, little evidence of highly structured, hierarchical 
organised crime enterprises involved in human trafficking. Instead 
trafficking in human beings tends to be the domain of more loosely, 
organised, entrepreneurial organised crime networks” (Aronowitz, 2009, 
p. 66). This is also evident in all the country case studies.
ТаBle 3. typology oF the organisation oF traFFicking in human Beings
Source: Authors’ elaboration of UNODC (2014).
Small local
operations
Medium sub-regional
operations
large trans-regional
operations
Domestic or short-distance 
trafficking flows
Trafficking flows within
the sub-region or neighbourhood
sub-regions
Long distance trafficking flows 
involving different regions
One or few traffickers Small group of traffickers Traffickers involved
in organised crime
Small number of victims More than one victim Large number of victims
Intimate partner
exploitation
Some investments and
some profits depending
on the number of victims
High investments
and high profits
Limited investments
and profits
Border crossing with or
without travel documents
Border crossing (also in cases 
where documents are required) 
No travel documents
needed for border
crossing
Some organisation needed 
depending on the border 
crossings and number of victims
Sophisticated organisation 
needed to move large number 
of victims on long distance
No or very limited
organisation required
Endurance of the operation
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In trafficking in human beings, loose criminal networks are predominantly 
active, linked by ethnicity or kinship, with interchangeable roles among 
members, capable of adapting to mutating circumstances and exploiting 
new opportunities. These networks are likely to be organised in small 
groups that can operate independently or collaborate with other 
criminal groups. Cooperation usually occurs for the provision of specific 
services such as the recruitment of victims in certain countries or their 
transportation to the locations where they will be exploited (Europol, 
2016; Antonopoulos, 2008; Di Nicola, 2014; Smit & van der Laan, 
2014). “The level of the organisation in human trafficking operations 
varies widely. Human trafficking rings are largely part of a continuum 
ranging from single perpetrators over loose, self-supporting networks to 
complex, multinational conglomerates. […] Human trafficking operations 
are generally more organised in terms of their activities than they are 
organised in terms of structure” (Raets & Janssens, 2018). UNODC (2014) 
has suggested three main typologies of the organisation of trafficking 
in human beings, identifying related structure and modi operandi of 
criminal groups (Table 3).
2.2.1.1. Individual traffickers/entrepreneurs
These criminal entrepreneurs are usually low-profile actors managing 
the entire trafficking operation, from recruitment to exploitation (mainly 
at the domestic level), and with different degrees of organisation and 
specialisation. In the UK, for example, a network analysis of the cases 
of trafficking in human beings known to the Manchester police indicates 
that most suspects are individuals, also called “lone wolves” involved 
in just one crime concerning the exploitation of one single victim 
(Antonopoulos, 2018). In some cases, these actors may provide specific 
services to victims (e.g. traffickers of women to countries of the EU) 
or may be independent traders or brokers who sell their expertise and 
services to more or less organised criminal groups. According to the 
country case studies, practices vary. There are pimps operating in the 
Netherlands who manage 1-3 girls at a time, with acquaintances or 
friends active in the sex market and who are not part of an organised 
ring or network. Usually, they have a relationship with the exploited girl, 
who in turn is forced to have sex with their friends and progressively 
(through a process of psychological dependence and coercion) with 
other clients outside the networks of friends and “eventually ends up in 
a window prostitution area upon becoming 18 years old” (Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018). Similarly, in Germany, perpetrators are single individuals 
or pairs (pimps) who know each other and may also exchange women 
and girls. The latter are often treated as property of the pimps and may 
be even sold to others for a lump sum (Sirseloudi, 2018). In Bulgaria, 
couples (married or not) are active in the sex market, where the role of 
the woman is to solicit customers and provide sexual services, while the 
man provides protection and facilitation (Rusev et al., 2018). Similarly, 
in Romania, trafficking is justified “as a family matter between lovers or 
spouses […]. Traffickers do not just sentimentally overwhelm a victim, 
they marry her or have children with her, which is why receiving money 
from the victim’s prostitution activity (legal in the destination countries) 
becomes justified as money for family daily expenses” (Nicolae, 2018). 
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There are also independent traffickers who manage 2-3 girls and keep 
the earnings for themselves but who in many cases have to pay 
fixed fees to other criminal organisations as to be allowed to work in 
particular locations (Rusev et al., 2018). In France, such single actors are 
mainly active in deprived neighbourhoods located in big urban cities 
(e.g., Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Lille), a trend which has started to spread 
to other provincial areas (e.g., Avignon, Cannes, Clermont-Ferrand). They 
are also involved in common criminality such as theft, extortion, drug 
dealing, and in regard to sexual exploitation manage the logistics and 
controls prostitutes. They usually work alone, and in some occasions 
with two or three accomplices who are from the same deprived 
locations (Lalam, 2018).
2.2.1.2. Small-to-medium (family-based) organised 
criminal groups
These criminal groups deal with small-to-medium scale operations within 
national borders or crossing borders among different countries along 
short distances, and may be formed on the basis of ethnic, familial, 
kinship bonds, as well as opportunistic and functional reasons. They 
have a certain level or organisation and range from small groups with a 
basic organisation or loose groups with a limited number of members 
(specialised, for example, in the transportation of victims across countries 
using tested routes); to criminal networks of well-organised transnational 
groups or gangs (medium size), with a large number of members, contacts 
and connections, and displaying high levels of expertise (Di Nicola, 2014). 
In some cases, these criminal networks comprise legal entrepreneurs 
and are involved in different criminal activities. East Europeans are 
usually family based criminal groups, that can cooperate together in the 
countries of destination of the victims (e.g., Albanians and Romanians in 
managing sexual exploitation and forced prostitution in Italy) and with 
the bosses residing in the countries of origin (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018; Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Sirseloudi, 
2018; Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018).
In the Netherlands, for example, mainly women from Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Romania are victimised by criminal groups of their ethnicity involved 
in cross-border sexual exploitation. These criminal entrepreneurs have a 
certain level of organisation and some hierarchy, being characterised by 
a family business model, with exploitation of women and girls in the 
local sex market. Usually, the head of the family manages the business 
from the source country, while high level of flexibility allows for quick 
adaptation – in the event of arrest of members another family member 
(e.g. son, brother, nephew, son-in-law) takes over. “It is often a family. 
Father and son, uncle and who-knows-whom. Or they come from the 
same village, are neighbours and the brother of the one is married to 
the sister of the other, that kind of cross-connections. Brothers in law, 
yes, family relations. [Sometimes the victim has been] the girlfriend 
of one of them and there is also a child” (Oude Breuil et al., 2018). 
Criminal entrepreneurs with a similar structure and organisation are 
found in Bulgaria and have Romanian nationality. The members are 
usually part of extended families, and their trafficking activity involves 
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women of the same ethnicity, family members or women bought from 
other criminal groups (Rusev et al., 2018). In Romania, most of the 
criminal entrepreneurs interviewed reported that the network in which 
they operated was composed of relatives and friends (Nicolae, 2018).
2.2.1.3. large organised and loose criminal networks
These criminal entrepreneurs control the entire trafficking operations and 
provide services needed during the process (e.g. recruitment, provision 
of counterfeit documents, transportation, corruption of public officials, 
exploitation). They are organised in flexible, horizontal, and decentralised 
criminal networks made of a large number of affiliates divided into 
sub-units and run trafficking operations on a global scale, while their 
internal structure varies (Antonopoulos, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; 
Sirseloudi, 2018). There can be a certain internal hierarchy with a leader 
or coordinator and after some trafficking operations the criminal network 
may turn into a more hierarchical and rigid structure. A criminal activity, 
for example, may include various sub-activities carried out by a network 
of independent nodes in different regions, each supervised by a boss, 
with an overall coordinator supervising the entire operation. In general, 
their flexible nature allows for joint ventures with other criminal groups 
based on mutual trust and for quick adaptation to circumstances (e.g. 
changes in legislations and law enforcement activity) and new markets 
(i.e. diversification of criminal activities). When managing and facilitating 
the trafficking operations, these criminal entrepreneurs may turn to 
criminal specialists providing particular services (e.g., forged documents, 
counterfeit identities, cyber-money laundering), and increasingly recruited 
on the internet in the crime-as-a-service arena (Europol, 2016; Aronowitz, 
2009; Di Nicola, 2014).
Usually, the members of these criminal networks are linked by ethnic 
ties and share the same cultural and social background. In most cases, 
they come from the same villages or towns in the countries of origin, 
and affiliates (as also to facilitate the trafficking operations) may reside 
in origin, transit, and destination countries providing specific services, 
such as transportation or safe accommodations for victims during the 
journey. “The abuse of traditional cultural practices at one’s discretion is 
central to many international trafficking rings” (Raets & Janssens, 2018). 
At the European level, and with reference to the country case studies, 
the main ethnicities are East Europeans (from Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, 
and Hungary), Nigerians, Chinese, and Indians.
Chinese criminal networks are highly structured and based on several 
cells in charge of different trafficking stages (e.g. recruitment, arrangement 
of documents for victims, exploitation). Similarly, Nigerian OCGs are 
based on cellular structures, each operating independently, and using a 
large network of personal contacts within EU countries (Oude Breuil et 
al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Sirseloudi, 2018). As reported by the country case study of France, 
Nigerian OCGs are continuing to develop on the territory of the EU. 
After having settled first in Spain and Italy, which are the two main 
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entry points into Western Europe, these networks have started to root 
in France, then in Germany and Austria, using Greece and Turkey as 
main routes to enter into the Schengen area. Other European countries 
such as Denmark, Sweden, and Finland have been targeted by these 
criminal networks as well. These developments have been facilitated by 
the growth of Nigerian shops, hotels, and apartments functioning as a 
cover-up for indoor prostitution managed mainly via the internet (Lalam, 
2018). In Germany, for example, Nigerian OCGs operate at a highly 
organised level. They are characterised by a strict division of labour 
and specialisation, and they are able to react with flexibility to police 
counteractions. “The Europe-wide connections, which can be based either 
on family or business ties within ethnic communities in the countries 
[of destination] enable quick information flows” (Sirseloudi, 2018). In 
Italy, these groups have been defined during some trials, like mafia-type 
associations since their members have been sentenced under art. 416 bis 
of the Italian Penal Code. Indeed, their behaviour has been ascertained 
as that of “Mafiosi” in relation to the type of control exercised within 
Italian territories mainly through racketeering against other nationals. As 
for sexual exploitation, the structure and organisation of Nigerian OCGs 
has been described in one judicial case as follows: “Members active in 
Nigeria are involved in all the necessary stages to bring potential victims 
to Europe, such as obtaining visa, hosting girls in accommodations while 
waiting for documents, managing voodoo rites (named juju) on girls to 
formalise the obligation to settle their debts, arranging travels. While the 
members active in Italy, cooperate to obtain and assure illegal entries 
of victims to Italy or Europe, to find ‘mamans’ that manage women 
and girls and their prostitution activity, to arrange accommodations, to 
gather profits and to intimidate victims” (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). 
On the contrary, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Romanian, and Slovakian 
organised crime groups used to have a hierarchical structure in common 
that relies on a strict division of tasks, while operating with small and 
mobile groups of victims under the control of few members of the 
organisations (Zhang, 2007). These groups have gradually transformed into 
loose criminal networks, especially with the entering of some of these 
countries into the EU. In this regard, the evolution of Bulgarian OCGs 
especially with reference to two historical periods (before and after the 
entering of Bulgaria in the EU) exemplifies the characteristics of these 
type of criminal networks, the level and sophistication of involvement in 
trafficking in human beings (Rusev et al., 2018). The evolution in their 
modi operandi can be divided into three main stages:
– Mid 1990s, the first period of development in which the trafficking 
of women and girls for sexual exploitation was mainly of domestic 
type and represented a huge source of profiting for large criminal 
syndicates (the so called “violent insurers”) that detained control over 
the supply side, through the ownership of different prostitution venues 
(e.g., hotels, nightclubs, bars) in major cities and resorts.
– From 2001 up to 2008, when Bulgaria joined the UE, and especially 
since 2013 (with the access to the common EU labour market), an 
expansion of this business has occurred also due to the previous 
establishment of some of these criminal organisations in other European 
countries. “Initially it was the big criminal players – local units of 
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the so-called ‘violent insurers’ in Bulgarian cities – that made use of 
this opportunity. Later, some independent procurers and networks 
stepped in the cross-border trafficking as well” (Rusev et al., 2018). 
As a consequence, the country became the second biggest source 
country for trafficking and sexual exploitation.
– Since 2009, with the granting of full access to the EU labour market, 
the big criminal syndicates have been replaced by loose criminal 
networks in the trafficking and sexual exploitation, characterised 
by flexibility and frequent turnover of actors, together with more 
hierarchical organisations.
In contrast with the Italian context, where native OCGs are not involved 
in trafficking in human beings since considered to be riskier and less 
profitable compared to other criminal activities (e.g. drug trafficking), 
in other countries native criminal entrepreneurs with a high level of 
organisation are involved in this criminal market, managing all the trafficking 
process. These groups may exploit both nationals and/or foreign victims. 
In the Netherlands, for example, “Dutch perpetrators exhibit a larger 
degree of organisation and (more often) have an international component 
in the sense that [some of the victims] come from abroad. […] The 
trafficker who has a Dutch nationality or a residence permit employs 
third parties to facilitate part of the work” (Oude Breuil et al., 2018). This 
means recruiting girls from Eastern Europe, arranging their transportation 
to the Netherlands, providing support to acquire a tax number, to 
inscribe at the Chamber of Commerce, or a housing corporation or 
renting a window, driving the girls to the prostitution areas/windows, and 
other small services (e.g., acquiring condoms).
Similar to legal enterprises, the organisation of criminal businesses is 
based on rational evaluations about minimising risks and maximizing 
profits (Raets & Janssens, 2018). For this reason, and in order to increase 
efficiency, criminal networks differentiate within their organisation the 
roles and duties individuals perform to provide specific services. Examples 
of roles include arrangers/investors, recruiters, scouters/informers, corrupt 
public officials, document vendors, guides and crew members, debt 
collectors or money launderers, etc. (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Zhang, 2007; Antonopoulos, 
2008; Di Nicola, 2014; Aronowitz et al., 2010). The tasks performed 
within the process of human trafficking in general and supposedly within 
criminal networks involved in this criminal market are exemplified by the 
UK country case study (Antonopoulos, 2018) (Table 4).
The involvement of these OCGs in other criminal markets is still a matter 
of debate, as also underlined by some of the country case studies. In 
Italy, for example, Albanian and Nigerian criminal entrepreneurs are 
active in the drug trade and distribution at the national level as well, 
although from other evidence it seems that trafficking in human beings 
require a certain level of specialisation, is a time consuming activity 
and as a consequence there is little room for diversion (Raets & 
Janssens, 2018). As underlined in the UK country study (Antonopoulos, 
2018) and in line with other evidence (e.g. other country studies, 
police investigations, institutional reports), it seems that the involvement 
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of traffickers in other criminal markets is related to the level of the 
trafficking operations (small vs. large schemes) and the structure and 
organisation of criminal groups.
ТаBle 4. actors involved in the process oF human traFFicking
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data of the UK country case study.
Actors Roles/tasks
Organisers Persons in charge of planning the trafficking operations, establishing 
contacts with individuals, with a recruitment of actors into a collective.
In small schemes, organisers manage all the aspects from recruitment
and transportation to exploitation.
Recruiters Persons who live permanently in the countries of origin of potential 
victims and have good knowledge of the language, peculiarities of each 
country and/or specific locale, or even know the victims personally.
They may also be ex-sex workers or former employees of the exploiter
in the case of labour exploitation.
Transporters/escorts Persons who assist the movement of victims to the EU.
Enforcers Persons who supervise the victims in the venues of exploitation.
In some cases, they may even collect debts.
Corrupt public officials Persons who provide assistance and support during the trafficking
process through the payment of bribes (e.g. employees in embassies
and consulates or employees of local authorities).
Legal business owners Persons who own the places in which the exploitation occurs.
Enablers Persons with various expertise (e.g. lawyers, accountants) assisting
in the stages of the trafficking process as well as advising and
defending traffickers, or professionals who are integral part
of the management of the business.
Freelancers Persons linked peripherally to the trafficking scheme and in charge 
of facilitating the process. They may vary, for example, from business 
receptionists to teenagers delivering cards for escort services to venues 
(e.g. pubs), to taxi drivers and general helpers.
Trafficking and further sexual and labour exploitation of victims can be 
of domestic type (within the same countries or regions) or of cross-
border type, when it occurs between one or more countries (in Europe 
or outside it). The latter appears to be more common, especially when 
structured and organised OCGs are involved. In this case, the extant 
literature (Shelley, 2011; Di Nicola, 2014; Europol, 2016; Cho, 2012; Jac-
2.3. THE SOCIAl ORGANISATION OF TRAFFICKING 
 IN HUMAN BEINGS IN THE EU
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Kucharski, 2012) in line with some country studies (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Nicolae, 2018) point to the main factors driving 
the decision of victims to leave their countries of origin which, in turn, 
facilitate traffickers, especially during the recruitment stage: a) income 
inequality, limited employment opportunities, gender discrimination against 
women in employment; b) lack of education; c) family problems such as 
violence, homelessness, parental illness, death of a parent; d) migration 
policies of countries of origin and destination; e) socio-economic and/
or political unrest such as conflicts or wars, human rights violations; 
f) information about opportunities via media or informal contacts. The 
main pull factors include: a) employment opportunities and shortage of 
manpower; b) democratic systems of government; c) social and political 
stability and comprehensive social security.
Globalisation is considered to be another explanatory factor of THB, 
together with corruption (Zhang, 2007; Di Nicola, 2014; Shelley, 2011). 
Other contributing factors are: improvements in transportation, facilitating 
the international movement of persons in general and THB in particular; 
expansion of commerce globally and thus the awareness and perception 
of disparities in living standards and distribution of wealth, especially 
for those in developing countries; enhanced communications, such as 
internet, having major impact on trafficking activities (e.g. recruitment of 
victims, as well as sale of their services in case of sexual exploitation); 
the demand for cheap goods, services, labour, and sex. “Although the 
trade in human beings has existed on a global scale for centuries, 
globalisation has brought profound economic and demographic changes. 
With economic globalisation and growing international migration, human 
trafficking has become an increasingly important component of this larger 
movement of impoverished people” (Shelley, 2011, p. 135). In the case 
of labour exploitation, two factors have been particularly relevant: on 
the one hand, the high increase in world population, especially in poor 
nations that drives competition for work and low human work prices 
and, on the other, “rapid social and economic change in developing 
countries, which disrupts traditional ways of subsistence and social support 
system” (Zhang, 2012, p. 469). The role of corruption, which appears 
another facilitating factor for trafficking in human beings, is twofold. On 
one side, widespread corruption is detrimental to the economic and 
political well-being of countries (increases in poverty for the majority of 
individuals), undermines human security, and leave citizens more at risk 
of trafficking and exploitation. On the other, corruption facilitates the 
activities of THB. In different countries worldwide, custom or immigration 
officials, for example, overlook fraudulent documents in exchange of 
sexual services, or provide traffickers with fake or stolen documents, 
or are even clients of brothels where victims are exploited for sexual 
purposes (Antonopoulos, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Zhang, 2007; 
Siegel and de Blank, 2010; Aronowitz, 2009).
Trafficking in human beings is better understood as a process (i.e. 
consequential stages) instead of a single offence structured into three main 
stages (Antonopoulos, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Aronowitz, 2009; Aronowitz 
et al., 2010). The first stage regards the recruitment of individuals, usually 
using deception, coercion; the second involves the transportation and 
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entry into another country (in the case of cross-border trafficking). The 
third stage concerns the exploitation of victims that is when they are 
forced into sexual exploitation or forced labour. A further stage may 
occur, which consists in the laundering of criminal profits, and the 
reinvestment in legal/illegal activities (Table 5).
ТаBle 5. traFFicking in human Beings as a process 
and other related crimes
        * Includes all forms of exploitation: sexual exploitation, labour exploitation, organ removal, forced begging, and forced participation 
in other crimes.
Source: Aronowitz et al. (2010).
Recruitment/
Entry
Transportation Exploitation*
victim
disposal
Criminal 
proceeds
– Fraudulent 
promises
– Kidnapping
– Illegal adoption 
for purpose of 
exploiting
– Corruption of 
government 
officials
– Assault
– Illegal 
deprivation 
of liberty
– Rape
– Forced 
prostitution
– Corruption of 
government 
officials
– Document 
forgery
– Abuse of 
immigration 
laws
– Unlawful coercion
– Threat
– Extortion
– Sex and labour 
exploitation
– Illegal deprivation 
of liberty
– Theft of documents
– Sexual assault
– Aggravated assault 
(cruel and degrading 
treatment
– Forced participation 
in crimes 
(forced begging, 
transportation of 
drugs, organised theft)
– Rape/murder
– Removal of organs
– Corruption of 
government officials
– Assault
– Abandonment
– Murder
– Victim sold 
to another 
trafficker
– Money 
laundering
– Tax evasion
– Corruption of 
government 
officials
Aronowitz et al. (2010) have argued that, during the trafficking process, 
different crimes are committed, that can be instrumental and perpetrated 
“in direct furtherance of the trafficking activity […] or secondary as a result 
of the trafficking activity. Examples […] are falsification of documents, 
forced prostitution or other forms of sexual or labour exploitation, violence 
associated with maintaining the control over victims, and corruption of 
government officials” (Aronowitz et al. 2010, p. 18). Trafficking for sexual 
exploitation and forced labour share similar patterns when considering 
these aforementioned stages. A case in point is a Thai massage parlour 
in Belgium, where a criminal organisation was able, with the support of 
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an employee of the Thai embassy in Brussels, to acquire resident permits 
for all the exploited women and girls. Bribes to staff at the airport 
allowed for secure transportation of victims with fake documents by 
plane, while their accommodation “quite often backslides to rack-renting 
practices” (Raets & Janssens, 2018).
2.3.1. Recruitment stage
In most cases, individuals are recruited in their country of origin through 
the use of persuasion and deception by recruiters. Deception, in particular, 
is based on false promises of employment, good working conditions and 
salaries. The ethno-linguistic aspect is crucial for recruiting. Traffickers 
usually have links with the territories in which they are active and come 
from the same ethnic community or even hold familial ties with the 
victims as underlined by the extant literature (Brå, 2008; Hodge & Lietz, 
2007; Europol, 2016; Aronowitz et al., 2010; UNODC, 2014) and the 
country case studies. Some authors (Siegel & Yesilgoz, 2003; Aronowitz, 
2003) have pointed out that the recruitment of victims includes both 
voluntary and involuntary elements. With regard to trafficking for sexual 
exploitation, for example, the following two situations are possible: victims 
are completely unaware of the nature of the job they will perform; 
victims are aware of the nature of the work they are supposed to 
perform but unaware of the situation and level of control, intimidation, 
and exploitation. In both cases, victims accept to be recruited willingly 
and voluntarily, since believe traffickers to be agents, employers or 
organisers.
Although the methods used for recruitment may differ in respect to 
the countries of origin and the ethnicity of traffickers, according to the 
country studies and the extant literature (Hodge & Lietz, 2007; Brå, 
2008; Europol, 2016; Antonopoulos, 2008; Di Nicola, 2014; Zhang, 2007; 
Hughes, 2014; Latonero et al., 2015), there are some that are most 
recurrent. The use of legitimate employment agencies, job announcements 
in newspapers, magazines that offer well-paid jobs, especially to women 
and girls as nannies, au pairs, waitresses, models or dancers that do 
not require specific skills, qualifications or previous experience. For 
example, a form of organised labour exploitation exists in companies 
where temporary employment agencies are often (but not necessarily) 
used for recruitment and that operate both in the countries of origin 
of workers and in the countries of destination. This type of labour 
exploitation usually involves multiple victims, mainly from East European 
countries, and in the case of the Netherlands also Turkish ones. The 
method of recruitment can be defined as an “all-inclusive” package 
through which victims are approached offering transportation to the 
national locations or countries of destination, employment contracts, 
and different provisions and support in daily practicalities (Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). “Most of 
the Romanian people who come to the North of England for work are 
promised, apart from work on contractual basis, help with the process 
of claiming benefits, and health care (such as the services of dentists)” 
(Antonopoulos, 2018).
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The same job advertisements can be found on the internet as well as 
fictitious online travel agencies, although online methods of recruitment 
can also occur via social networks (e.g., private messaging services or 
fora).10 In this case, it is possible for single recruiters to approach victims 
not only with false promises of well-paid jobs but also through the lover-
boy method, which is exemplified by the Dutch case study. This (online 
and offline) strategy consists in grooming and socially isolating the victim 
that falls in love and becomes emotionally bonded to the exploiter. In 
general, victims fall pray easily due their young age and the lack of 
essential skills and experience, particular life events, social backgrounds 
(e.g. impoverished neighbourhoods, childcare institutions, etc.). The pimps 
specifically target this type of girls making them believe in a requited 
love. This is the first step to further involve them, in a coercive manner, 
into forced prostitution (Oude Breuil et al., 2018). Consistently, procurers 
(pimps) that recruit through this method are found in Spain, mainly of 
Romanian and Bulgarian nationality. In Belgium, there has been one 
case in which teenage runaways from juvenile institutions were targeted 
intentionally, and in UK where one individual, identified by the local 
police as being at risk of trafficking, tried to join on a voluntary basis 
a service project for sexually exploited children as to have access to 
potential victims (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018).
Shared ethnicity but also family and acquaintance relations, especially 
in small towns or rural villages, facilitate the recruitment of potential 
victims through “word of mouth” (Antonopoulos, 2018; Terenghi & Di 
Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Nicolae, 2018; 
Rusev et al., 2018), (Europol, 2016). When trafficking and exploitation is 
organised by Nigerian OCGs, the role of women who have made their 
way in Europe is crucial. Usually the recruiter is a well-dressed and 
wealthy woman, known to the victims and their families, able to promise 
better life opportunities in a credible manner (Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Similarly, the 
role of persons of spiritual authority is an effective means of recruitment 
both in Nigeria and among other ethnic communities. As reported by the 
UK country study in regard to a locality in the North of England where 
the majority of exploited victims is of Romanian origin, recruited “in the 
Pentecostal churches in specific villages or small towns in the country in 
which there is an over-representation of Roma people; villages such as 
Calaras, Bacau, Vrancea, Focsani” (Antonopoulos, 2018).
A similar scheme of recruitment can be found within East European 
communities, where family members or partners push for migration, 
10 The use of the internet, especially of social networks (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter) in 
trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants has been also underlined by a recent EU 
funded research project Surf&Sound (HOME/2013/ISEC/AG/THB) coordinated by the research 
group eCrime – Department “Faculty of Law” of the University of Trento in Italy, and carried 
out in partnership with the Center of the Study of Democracy in Bulgaria and the University of 
Teesside in the UK. Traffickers advertise to individuals willing to emigrate to Europe complete 
travel packages including transportation (i.e. type of journey) together with details on possible 
routes and documents. As for the latter, information on how to apply for asylum permits, how 
to obtain counterfeit visas or passports are posted online, and on the dark web a manual with 
instructions on how to start this illegal activity was also found. For further details on the role 
and impact of new technologies on THB, see Chapter 4 below.
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that can be even masked or agreed between family members and the 
potential victims (Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018), or in Chinese clans 
where the most promising individuals are selected and proposed to 
migrate. They are then exploited in the destination country, but once free 
they could become a point of reference for the settlement and economic 
expansion of this ethnic community in other EU countries, through the 
same trafficking and exploitation scheme (Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di 
Nicola, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018). The role of the intra-ethnic factor is 
relevant, for example, in the Netherlands in regard to the exploitation of 
au pairs or housekeeping jobs. In cases of one-on-one labour, recruiters 
and exploiters are either family members or acquaintances (Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018).
Contacts via individuals already employed in the economic sectors of 
further exploitation of the victims is a method used as well, and applies 
in particular to women or girls already working as prostitutes in nightclubs 
or brothels or ex-prostitutes used to persuade other women and girls 
to come and work in Europe (Antonopoulos, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018). In 
this case, moving victims to different sex markets in the EU may also 
regard structured and hierarchical OCGs with established presence over 
the market in the country of origin. In Bulgaria, for example, the newly 
recruited women and girls work previously in some big cities or resorts 
and after having proved their loyalty and accountability are brought to 
more profitable locations abroad. “The sex workers periodically return to 
work back in Bulgaria upon completion of a certain period or whenever 
some problems arise (e.g., extortion demands from other criminal groups, 
conflicts with competitors, police operations, etc.)” (Rusev et al., 2018). 
As for labour exploitation, recruitment is made by traffickers that already 
have contacts with employers in the countries of destination. In one Italian 
case, for example, a Chinese trafficker was in contact with two national 
representatives of a cooperative of job placement, compliant in delivering 
fictitious employment contracts and fake paycheques. The opposite may 
also occur, where there is no contact between the traffickers and the 
subsequent employers, although within the Chinese community there is 
a service of recruitment made of dedicated commercial activities (bars, 
restaurants) or newspapers (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
2.3.2. Travel and transportation stage
Most trafficking for sexual exploitation and forced labour is regional (i.e. 
involving short distances) or occurs within the EU or other countries 
worldwide (Europol, 2016; ILO, 2012; Shelley, 2010). For this reason, 
in most cases travel arrangements are very simple and cheap and are 
organised by the traffickers who are usually fellow nationals of the victims. 
When travels involve longer distances and the movement of victims 
from third countries to the EU, usually criminal networks are involved 
(e.g. Nigerians, Chinese) that arrange all the phases of transportation, 
having intermediaries (traffickers) in key countries of transit. For example, 
migrants who arrive from West Africa and in particular Nigeria, are 
accompanied and followed during their journey by the so called “boga 
man” (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018) or “boss” (Meneses-Falcón et al., 
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2018). The latter may be a person in search of leaving his country of 
origin and exchanges this service for free travel to Europe. Depending on 
the case, travel (and documents, if needed) expenses may be covered by 
traffickers, victims or their families/relatives or sponsors that are usually 
linked to OCGs/traffickers and are known by the victims or their families 
(Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón 
et al., 2018; Brå, 2008; Europol, 2016).
In most cases, victims travel by land (especially if moved within the 
EU), and less frequently by plane. The decision of traffickers to use one 
or the other option depends on the distance to be covered from the 
country of origin of victims and the country of destination in Europe. 
But it can also depend on other factors such as the economic availability 
of the victims/their families (if they anticipate the travel expenses), or 
the type of potential victim. When they are good-looking, traffickers 
prefer transportation by plane as a mean to preserve their health and 
appearance (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). For 
example, when Nigerian victims are involved, trafficking follows the main 
smuggling migration routes by land, sea or air. If Spain is their final 
destination, they can be moved by land passing through Mali, Algeria, 
and Morocco or through Guinea, then by plane to Ukraine and from 
there to Austria. Chinese victims usually travel by plane, entering the EU 
through airports with less traffic. Transportation by land is chosen mainly 
when entering the more permeable border of Slovakia. Usually, victims 
“are often accompanied by a Chinese male, who is responsible for the 
transportation. This man, whom they call ‘snakehead,’ will have a resident 
permit in the Schengen area, and tends to travel with around five Chinese 
women” (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). In general, the route by plane 
is more expensive and this turns into a higher debt to be paid back to 
exploiters (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018).
When the transportation involves non-EU victims, traffickers may provide 
false or counterfeit documents as to conceal the real identities and 
enable entry into the EU, or with fraudulently obtained visas as it occurs 
for example with Chinese victims who travel on study or touristic visas 
obtained also due to the connivance of travel agencies or embassies in 
the countries of origin (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Sirseloudi, 2018). “Another way is via licensed tour operators who 
are granted blanket visas and who seem to charge a fee for those that 
do not return after the expiration date” (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). 
Once in Europe, victims are persuaded to apply for asylum or to request 
a residence permit (in transit countries as well) as to be easily moved 
to other EU countries of the Schengen area where they will be further 
exploited. In some cases, following asylum applications, victims are 
placed in refugee centres where they are recovered by traffickers or their 
intermediaries (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Europol, 2016). When migrants 
are exploited for labour purposes, the use of legal documents is frequent 
in order to enter transit and destination countries, and usually reside in 
the EU with legal permits as to obtain employment contracts. Again, 
the connivance of key players in the countries of destination – lawyers, 
accountants, embassy and police officers – may play an important role 
(Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
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2.3.3. Exploitation stage
Once in the destination country victims are forced into prostitution or 
other types of forced labour and if they are unaware of their further 
exploitation, in most cases they recognise their dependent situation 
during their travel where they also experience some forms of violence 
(Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018). An example is that of 
a Bulgarian woman approached in a supermarket parking lot who “did 
not hesitate to join foreigners who had promised her a lucrative job in 
Germany. She did not realise the risk she was taking until they reached 
the border. When she tried to leave, she was forcefully prevented from 
doing so” (Sirseloudi, 2018). In particular, the transit through Libya for 
African migrants (adult and young females and males), often starts with 
a first phase when exploitation becomes a reality (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018). While waiting to reach Europe, they are confined into “connection 
or ghetto houses” managed by military or local criminal groups, where 
they suffer extreme violence and deprivation (Ratcliffe, 2017). In these 
places, women and girls are forced into prostitution, while men and 
young males are forced into different exploitative jobs. This may also 
serve to pay for their travel to Europe. Migrants can be even sold to 
other traffickers or criminal groups, in a cycle that can last months or 
years (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). In other cases, (aware) victims are 
initially exploited in the sex market in their country of origin (Rusev et al., 
2018), then at a later stage they are trafficked to other EU countries.
In any exploitation, as underlined in the majority of country studies, 
victims need to accept their slavery condition due to the debt bondage 
which usually consists in repaying back the money traffickers have 
advanced for their travel and/or documents (for travel and/or residence 
in the destination countries). In one case in France, 25,000 Chinese 
asylum seekers living in the north-eastern part of Paris and sharing 
cramped apartments were forced to work from 10 to 21 hours per day 
as garment workers in private houses or restaurants in very hard working 
conditions. These victims were all indebted, although the extent of the 
debt varied depending on the region of origin (OSCE, 2005). Nigerian 
traffickers, for example, require that women sign a contract as to have 
their trip arranged and paid, which is blessed by a priest in the juju ritual. 
When arrived at destinations, victims are already controlled by traffickers 
and forced into prostitution as to pay back their debt. Victims’ belief in 
the power of the juju ritual, together with threats to family members in 
the country of origin secure the loyalty and submission of the victims 
(Siegel & de Blank, 2010). Compared to labour exploitation, the amount 
of the debt bondage in sexual exploitation is higher and in many cases 
set completely arbitrarily by exploiters. Nigerians OCGs charge very high 
prices – also claiming to be have paid for travel themselves while in fact 
expenses have been covered by the families of the victims – as a result 
of which victims take very long time to free themselves.
In the majority of countries studied, at destination the documents of 
victims are withheld and retained by exploiters, thus making them even 
more vulnerable. Identity documents especially when labour exploitation 
is concerned, may be used to “obtain social benefits […], to open bank 
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accounts in the victims’ name, as well as to take out loans and make 
purchase agreements. Victims can be registered as directors of bogus 
companies, which are used by traffickers to launder the proceeds” 
(Europol, 2016, p. 26). In one Italian case, for example, the Chinese 
boss involved in labour exploitation opened bank accounts and acquired 
houses and apartments thanks also to the conspiracy of bank directors 
and notaries. “Using copies of the documents of exploited migrants he 
opened bank accounts, made notary deeds, and to put the signature 
(it was not the documented Chinese but another national), paid €200 
for this service” (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). Furthermore, the isolation 
of victims is enforced by traffickers by not allowing them to leave their 
accommodations if not accompanied. The main threat used is that of 
possible police operations as a strategy of exploiters to enforce their 
isolation and avoid the risk of any contacts that may support victims in 
exiting the exploitative situation (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Sirseloudi, 
2018). “The traffickers give precise instructions to their female victims 
concerning the Spanish police, what they should say to them, and they 
depict the police as just as corrupt as the police from their countries 
of origin. They usually deceive them, telling that if the Spanish police 
discovers them, they [will be put] in a CIE (Internment Center for Foreign 
Nationals)” (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). The isolation of victims is also 
enforced by the fact that many of them do not speak the language of 
the destination countries (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018; 
Sirseloudi, 2018).
According to the extant literature (Smit, 2011; UNODC, 2016; Di Nicola, 
2014; Shelley, 2010) and the country studies, control over victims and 
coercion of reluctant ones is also exercised through direct and severe 
violence (e.g. physical, verbal, and psychological) or the threat of violence 
against family members. Romanian family-based organised criminal groups 
are extremely violent and impulsive. As reported by some interviewed 
perpetrators, victims who do not obey are threatened, coerced, and 
beaten. Psychological pressure is another means of submission as well as 
making victims dependent on drugs/alcohol (Nicolae, 2018). In relation to 
sexual exploitation, for example, Becucci (2008) in line with some country 
studies (Antonopoulos, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018) has underlined 
that submissive strategies and the use of violence vary depending on the 
ethnicity of traffickers, i.e. their cultural background. In general, while 
East Europeans are more prone to use violence against victims, Nigerians 
turn more to forms of psychological suggestion. Despite this, in Italy 
and in regard to Albanians, for example, violence against victims has 
been used less as a strategy to protect the sex exploitative business (i.e. 
diminishing the risk that victims report to the police or NGOs).
The operations of trafficking in human beings have a high degree 
of rotation, dislocation of victims, and a high rate of replacement 
(Antonopoulos, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; 
Sirseloudi, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). This common method serves the 
scope to renew the supply and avoid detection of traffickers from law 
enforcement due to the possible reporting by victims. “More sophisticated 
transnational organisations are able to set up carousel structures which 
allow them to transfer victims from country to country” (Raets & Janssens, 
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2018). It can also happen that victims are managed by different traffickers 
before they reach their final destination and as a result their debt 
increases during the trafficking and exploitation process (Hodge & Lietz, 
2007; Europol, 2016; Aronowitz, 2009; Becucci, 2008). In particular, when 
victims are involved in the sex market, they usually work in areas distant 
from where they reside (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018) or are periodically 
moved to different places of the same country. Such translocation is 
undertaken also as a consequence of market opportunities, e.g. working 
in big urban cities during winter and in touristic areas during summer, 
as is the case in Bulgaria (Rusev et al., 2018). In labour exploitation, 
although it is not the rule, the movement and rotation of victims seems 
more linked to the harvesting seasons in agriculture: “Albanian men and 
women with forged Italian passports travel to the Republic of Ireland, 
where they are exploited in the construction industry and in agriculture, 
and then move up to Northern Ireland for the same activities. In fact, 
they move from one country to the other on the basis of available work 
and for short time projects. These workers live in rent caravans or even 
in sheds” (Antonopoulos, 2018).
Once they arrive at their final destinations, victims are accommodated 
in facilities managed by exploiters, and depending on the type of 
exploitation these premises can be apartments, small houses or flats, 
hotels, nightclubs, or other facilities such as industrial sheds or cramped 
buildings in abandoned lands, especially with reference to forced labour 
(Antonopoulos, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). 
As for sexual exploitation, victims (especially Nigerians) can be exploited 
into prostitution at the very beginning of their arrival inside or in the 
surrounding areas of open reception centres or temporary reception 
centres, places where migrants usually wait for residence permits 
(Terenghi and Di Nicola, 2018). During exploitation victims may be also 
forced to perpetrate other criminal activities, such as begging, stealing, 
transporting/selling drugs or other contraband products, benefit frauds 
(Aronowitz, 2001), or employed in cannabis plantations as it happens 
with Vietnamese, as reported by the country case study of Belgium 
(Raets & Janssens, 2018) and the UK (Antonopoulos, 2018).
Both in sexual and labour exploitation, victims work extremely long 
hours in poor health or dangerous conditions and for low or no salary 
(Aronowitz, 2001; Smit, 2011), a recurrent scheme also underlined by 
all the country studies. In general, their earnings are kept by exploiters 
but there are variations. Women and girls forced into prostitution can in 
some cases benefit from a percentage to cover personal expenses. This is 
a strategy, for example, of Albanians as to enforce the loyalty of victims 
and to make them more accommodating in their exploitative situation. 
Nigerian OCGs are gradually implementing such a scheme as well. In 
labour exploitation, usually victims receive a salary (but also no salary 
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depending on the discretion of the exploiters) which does not correspond 
to the amount fixed by law in national contracts and from which 
different expenses are subtracted, as for example transportation to the 
place of work, food, electricity used where they reside, etc. (Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Nicolae, 2018). Romanian OCGs, for 
example, use commercial facilities to place workers in other European 
countries and promise attractive salaries, good working conditions, free 
transportation and accommodation. Once victims arrive at destination, 
documents are seized under the pretext of preparing labour contracts 
and after having started to work the victims get no pay. The reasons, as 
stated by traffickers to the victims, are various expenses incurred (e.g. 
transport, accommodation, commissions, paper work) for which they 
demand reimbursement. In order to cover these initial expenses, the 
salaries of victims are not paid and they remain without money under 
the excuse by traffickers that they need to cover the costs of labourers’ 
living and staying, which are, however, overestimated. “Thus, the victim 
enters into a never ending cycle of dependence” (Nicolae, 2018).
At the EU level, the sex market is characterised by outdoor and indoor 
prostitution, despite the differences in legislation and regulation of this 
activity (Table 6).
ТаBle 6. schemes oF sexual exploitation at the eu level
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data of country studies.
Outdoor prostitution Indoor prostitution
Nigerians and East Europeans Natives, Chinese, East Europeans
Streets, parking lots, peripheral areas
of big urban cities
Brothels, apartments, flats, massage parlours, 
nightclubs, escort club services, (online)
Lower tariffs Higher tariffs
More working hours/clients Less working hours/clients
Strict policies push more prostitution into closed places (e.g., apartments, 
nightclubs), as exemplified by the country study of the Netherlands. 
After a long tradition of tolerance and progressive legalisation and the 
passing of the ban on brothels in 2000 which regulates prostitution with 
licences, the more recent framing in the public debate of a link between 
prostitution and trafficking in human beings (also as a consequence of 
two large and international trafficking signal crimes) has led to calls for 
the adoption of a strict regulation of all prostitution with the risk, as 
maintained by sex workers organisations, of more covert activity. At 
present and despite the presence of regulations, the Dutch sex market 
is based on “few legal (licensed and non-licensed, if a licence is not 
necessary) and monitored sex industries,11 and a supposedly numerically 
11 For example, window prostitution, sex clubs, and escort companies.
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bigger share of illegal or criminal sex enterprises” (Oude Breuil et 
al., 2018), in which most of the activity is exercised at homes or in 
apartments. In Germany, for example, the more recent trend for women 
and girls employed in private settings and hotels seems related to the 
increase in the use of the internet to enable contacts between clients 
and sex workers. In the city of Bremen, the majority of victims of forced 
prostitution work in private flats where healthcare is not available, and 
violence as well as regular and collective rape are often means of control 
(Sirseloudi, 2018). In some cases, traffickers/exploiters share housing with 
their victims. This model of accommodation pertains also to other EU 
contexts (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Nicolae, 2018). The indoor sex 
market in Bulgaria, which involves the largest number of exploited 
women and girls, is divided into three main segment: a) at the bottom 
of the market is apartment prostitution, where sex services are usually 
offered in rented flats at the first floors of residential buildings, with 
prices varying depending on the town; b) VIP or escort clubs/services, 
with higher prices and less control over sex workers; c) erotic bars and 
adult clubs, at the top end of the market, where female employees 
can have additional earnings for soliciting drinks to clients and dancing, 
and where prices for services are high. “The owners of such venues as 
a rule pre-select the sex workers before contracting them and tend to 
regularly replace them with new ones” (Rusev et al., 2018). A common 
trend at the EU level, as reported by the country studies, is that indoor 
prostitution characterises the exploitation of Chinese women and girls 
who work almost exclusively in apartments or massage parlours.
Outdoor prostitution is more widespread in some EU countries, such 
as France and Italy. In the latter, the type of exploitation in the sex 
market is linked to the nationality of victims (and exploiters). Nigerian 
and Romanian victims work on the streets, especially in the peripheral 
areas of large cities, while East Europeans provide sex services mainly 
in apartments and houses, although in some cases clients may be 
approached in open air locations or online.
While working, victims are usually supervised and controlled either 
directly by employers or members of the organisations, or remotely 
through the use of ICT technologies such as CCTV or mobiles (Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018). In one case in the Czech Republic, 
victims forced into prostitution were monitored via walkie-talkie and 
compelled to report to the exploiters about sex clients and earnings 
(Hughes, 2014). In general, street and covert prostitution differs in terms 
of tariffs and working hours. The women and girls that work outdoor 
earn less money and as a consequence are forced by exploiters to have 
a higher number of clients per day, while for the ones employed in 
closed places it is the opposite. Similar to the recruitment stage, internet 
serves the purpose to sell different services provided by victims of sexual 
exploitation. Websites, newsgroups, and forums are used by traffickers to 
transmit/supply pornography, child sexual abuse photos, and locations for 
commercial sex acts. ICT technologies and mobile devices have created 
a more fluid, quick, and easy access environment, where traffickers 
and buyers can communicate in real-time, to arrange appointments, 
to exchange updated materials, and services (Hughes, 2014; Shelley, 
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2007). Online, it is possible to “upload text advertisements, images, and 
videos to brothels, entertainment businesses, or prostitution businesses 
that operate only from the internet, such as escort services and online 
advertisement sites for prostitution” (Hughes, 2014, p. 5).
There are different ways in which victims leave their trafficking situation: 
escape or rescued in a police raid, freed by customers (in the case 
of trafficking for sexual exploitation), discarded by traffickers when 
they are no longer of any value (e.g. victims may have become too 
sick to work, or have become pregnant, or a child grows too old to 
appeal to paedophiles), death or murders (Brå, 2008; Aronowitz, 2009; 
Batsyukova, 2007).
* * *
At present estimations at the EU level on the number of victims of 
trafficking are far from precise due to various reasons, most of all as a 
result of the covert nature of this criminal activity. Thus, it is possible 
to estimate only the “tip of the iceberg” whereas data, according to the 
country studies, are collected from different sources, through different 
methods and rarely organised into national and updated centralised 
databases. Furthermore, estimations and information on trafficking for 
labour exploitation is still underdeveloped in different EU contexts, 
although investigative evidence and non-profit organisations have 
underlined the numerous economic sectors in which many people work 
in slavery and dangerous conditions.
A more recent trend at the EU level is the very young age of exploited 
victims, and the presence of recurrent nationalities such as East Europeans 
(Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Albania, Ukraine, Slovakia), West 
Africans (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal), Chinese, South Americans (Brazil, 
Ecuador).
Different actors are involved in trafficking in human beings that can be 
placed on a continuum ranging from single players, through small-to-
medium family-based criminal groups to OCGs structured mainly into 
fluid and horizontal networks. These types of criminal entrepreneurs with 
their related structure and organisation are found to coexist in all the 
nine EU countries studied (the Netherlands, the UK, Belgium, France, 
Italy, Spain, Germany, Romania, and Bulgaria), regardless of the forms of 
exploitation. Consistently, the trafficking process which relies on three 
main stages (i.e. recruitment, transportation and exploitation) can be 
easily managed also by single traffickers, underlying how this criminal 
market does not require a high level of organisation. Instead, “human 
trafficking operations are generally more organised in terms of their 
activities than they are organised in terms of structure” (Raets & Janssens, 
2018). Similarities are found in the business models of exploitation, both 
in the sex and labour markets at the EU level. For example, despite 
the different legislations and regulations, prostitution is exercised both in 
open-air places (e.g. streets of big urban cities, parking lots) and covert 
locations (e.g. apartments, flats, hotels, nightclubs) and is organised in 
low and high end segments. In some EU countries such as Germany 
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and France, the role of new technologies as a means to attract clients 
and sell services may be pushing towards more covert prostitution. The 
ethnicity of women and girls appears to be a discriminating variable with 
reference to the places of work (indoor vs. outdoor prostitution).
There is evidence of the difficulty for the victims to leave their exploitative 
situation, also due to the intentional strategies of exploiters aimed at 
keeping them frightened and isolated. The lack of alternatives for many 
victims adds to the risk of a self-perpetuating cycle, as it occurs for 
example with Nigerians. More often, they become madams and start to 
manage the exploitation of other women and girls. For these reasons, it is 
crucial to gain deep understanding and insights into trafficking of human 
beings, its nature and dynamics, criminal actors and modi operandi, 
and to implement data collection at the national and EU levels. In this 
way, given the transnational and quickly evolving criminal market it is 
possible to foster cooperation among key stakeholders at the national 
and EU levels (e.g. LEAs, prosecutors, governmental institutions, local 
non-profit organisations) to develop efficient preventive and countering 
actions to undermine traffickers, to dismantle criminal networks, and to 
implement tailored best practices for assisting and reintegrating victims 
after exploitation or for preventing them from becoming easy prey for 
traffickers.

Trafficking in human beings both for sexual and labour exploitation to a 
great extent is a profit-driven activity (Europol, 2015; FATF, 2011; OSCE, 
2010; UNODC, 2016) and as such it is best understood when its financial 
underpinnings are considered. As with many other organised and non-
organised crimes, the financial aspects of THB are often disregarded by 
law enforcement and judicial authorities, since they are usually irrelevant 
for establishing and proving the predicate offence in court (CSD, 2015). 
Thus, surprisingly scarce information is available on the financial aspects of 
trafficking. A handful of academic studies have shed some light on some 
financial aspects, primarily focusing on the underground commercial sex 
markets (see Chapter 1 for a detailed review). However, comprehensive 
analysis of financing models of trafficking across different modi operandi 
and countries is still lacking and this chapter strives to fill in this knowledge 
gap. The analysis below builds on the “business approach” (see OSCE, 
2010) and discusses issues such as the need for initial capital to enter the 
market, sources of financing, settlement of payments, costs and profits of 
trafficking operations, investment schemes, and money laundering.
Entering a criminal market or expanding a criminal operation usually 
requires some initial investment such as advance payments for certain 
goods or services or covering certain recurring costs before the operation 
actually begins to generate revenues (CSD, 2015). However, in the case 
of THB a widely shared notion among law enforcement and judicial 
practitioners is that this particular criminal activity does not require 
such investments or they are more or less negligible (Rusev et al., 2018; 
Raets & Janssens, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Antonopoulos, 
2018). A closer look into the career trajectories and modus operandi of 
traffickers reveals a lot more nuanced and complex reality. Thus, entering 
and operating in the illegal commercial sex market can have different 
forms and respectively entail different costs – from simple procuring of a 
victim to a close circle of acquaintances (or via online advertisements) to 
securing a profitable location on the street or in some brothel abroad. 
While domestic trafficking involving the infamous lover-boy scheme may 
not bear any financial costs, cross-border trafficking appears to require 
certain initial investment (see Figure 6).
Apparently, various factors come into play with regard to the need of 
start-up capital for traffickers in human beings – the distance between 
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country of origin and country of destination, visa and border control 
regimes and at the destination country, modus operandi of traffickers (e.g. 
exploitation in outdoor or indoor prostitution setting), presence of other 
organised crime actors that exercise control of the prostitution/labour 
market (or part of it) in the destination country (Lalam, 2018; Rusev et 
al., 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). For traffickers who bring victims 
from third countries outside EU the initial investment is bigger, since they 
incur larger costs related to transportation and arrangement of visa and 
residence documents (Lalam, 2018; Oude Breuil еt al., 2018; Meneses-
Falcón et al., 2018). Certainly larger investments are also needed if a 
trafficker aims at becoming an owner or manager of a brothel or other 
sex venue. An investment in such venue reportedly can reach from several 
thousand euro, when renting, up to €1,000,000 for purchase (Meneses-
Falcón et al., 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). Thus, the size of 
the initial capital needed for entering the prostitution market, especially 
when this involves cross-border trafficking, is somewhat comparable to 
the capital needed for entering other criminal markets – for comparison, 
the indicative investment for entering the retail cocaine market in the 
EU is about €5,000-€9,000 and for wholesale level €30,000-€50,000 
(see CSD, 2015, p. 41).
The data collected within the current study suggest that traffickers adopt 
different strategies to cope with the need for initial capital to kick-start 
their operations. Those operating independently tend to deliberately seek 
ways to minimise their initial investments (Raets & Janssens, 2018). One 
way to achieve is to keep it small – exploiting only 1 or 2 victims at 
a time (Rusev et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018), as well as to put the 
Figure 6. level oF initial capital needed in cases oF thB For sexual 
exploitation depending on the modus operandi oF traFFickers
Source: Author’s elaboration of data.
Cross-border trafficking
(Romania to Austria)
Domestic trafficking
(Netherlands)
Cross-border trafficking
(Nigeria to France)
Cross-border trafficking
(Bulgaria – Spain)
• Modus operandi: family-based group, brothel in Austria
• Start-up capital: ~ €5,000 per victim 
(transport, accommodation, facilitation of licensing, etc.)
• Modus operandi: highly organised, adult club in Spain
• Start-up capital: €1 million to buy an adult club
• Modus operandi: highly organised, street prostitution
• Start-up capital: €5,000-€10,000 per victim 
(transportation only, via Lybia)
• Modus operandi: Lover-boy method, online procurement
• Start-up capital: not needed
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victim straight to work in order to use her earnings as initial capital for 
expansion (Oude Breuil еt al., 2018; Rusev et al. 2018). This kind of 
strategy is common in lover-boy cases of domestic trafficking.
In cases where there is an actual investment of money in the trafficking 
business, reported sources of start-up capital include the use of personal 
savings, borrowing money from friends, family and relatives (Rusev et al., 
2018; Nicolae, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). 
In some cases, traffickers also turn to other people in the trafficking 
business or occasionally to loan sharks and obtain credit lines from them 
(Rusev et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018). However, borrowing money within their 
wider network appears to provide much more favourable conditions 
for loans, since the interest rates seem to be lower when compared to 
borrowing money from a usurer (Rusev et al., 2018). Other sources of 
start-up capital include revenues from legal business and proceeds from 
other diverse illegal activities – drug trade, counterfeited goods, various 
scams or social benefit fraud (Antonopoulos, 2018; Oude Breuil еt al., 
2018; Rusev et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
Another common strategy to minimise investments and secure start-up 
capital is through deception, manipulation or extortion of the victim 
or her family members to cover part or all of the initial costs for 
transportation, arrangement of documents, etc. (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Oude Breuil еt al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). In cases related to 
labour exploitation, it is quite typical all document and transportation 
costs to be borne by the victims. The money is usually demanded 
by the traffickers in advance as brokerage fee for arranging formalities 
and lodging, as well as securing the job placement. Thus, especially 
when it comes to irregular migrants that are third country nationals it 
often remains unclear whether the case should be classified as human 
smuggling or human trafficking, as well as at which point the latter had 
started (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018).
The social capital (i.e. connections and relationships) and symbolic 
capital (i.e. trust and reputation) of traffickers appears to play a major 
role in lowering market entry barriers as well as in reduction of the 
size of initial investments. Being connected to people in the business, 
which entails trust and mutual assistance for starting up appears to be 
a crucial element in decreasing initial expenditures, diminishing market 
risks and gaining certain competitive advantages such as access to 
profitable locations and protection from rivalry competition (Rusev et al.; 
2018; Nicolae, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). Social capital and specifically 
extended family structures also seem to facilitate recruitment of victims 
(Oude Breuil еt al., 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
Criminal entrepreneurs joining established trafficking networks or 
organisations do not need to cover all start-up costs by themselves, 
since the network or the group grants access to various assets. Being 
part of an established trafficking/procuring operation provides a number 
of advantages for pimps. Networks and groups have more available 
capital which can be channelled to serve different purposes as needed, 
such as established recruitment base, transport and lodging abroad, 
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connections and protection abroad, as well as access to a line of credit 
in case of urgencies. Certainly, joining an established network requires 
the newcomers to prove that they are trustworthy and accountable. 
Reportedly, being part of the wider network of traffickers also exposes 
the members to opportunities for lines of quick credit with preferential 
interest rates when borrowing from “colleagues.” The interest rates for 
such intra-industry/network lending are 10-20%. Rates may still be higher 
in cases of a novice who is yet to prove trustworthy. The loan is then 
repaid from the sex worker’s earnings (Rusev et al., 2018).
Traffickers are also not immune to various critical moments – both 
business-related and law-enforcement related. Perhaps most critical are 
police arrests and investigations. Raising money in such moments to 
cover litigation or other expenses can be covered by traffickers’ own 
funds or eventually legal business portfolios (Antonopoulos, 2018). An 
often favoured option is through forcing the victim to provide the money 
by working longer hours, taking more clients or engaging in sex services, 
which she usually avoids (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Oude Breuil еt al., 
2018). Traffickers also sometimes settle such situations through borrowing 
from other members of their network (Rusev et al., 2018).
The analysis of the data collected in all nine countries covered in 
the current study unequivocally indicates that human trafficking both 
for sexual and labour exploitation is almost exclusively cash-based 
activity (see Lalam, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018). It should be noted that trafficking usually takes 
place in а multi-actor environment where different roles have a different 
relationship to the overall money flows. Form of exploitation, modus 
operandi, level of sophistication of the trafficking network, and the socio-
cultural background of traffickers also shape direction and nature of 
money flows. The methods of settlements may further be categorised by 
distinguishing the major types of relational money flows and transactions 
among actors involved in a trafficking operation. As a matter of course, 
the organiser of the human trafficking operation sees to the redistribution 
of the takings among the actors involved.
The most common transaction is between client and victim. In cases 
related to sexual exploitation these are almost exclusively arranged in 
cash. Payments from clients usually are arranged as cash up-front 
(Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). Besides cash transactions, 
only a few venues where sexual services are traded accept credit card 
payments (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). Occasionally, 
jewels, handbags, and clothes are given as a kind of tip along with the 
regular payment. This is especially the case if there is more personal 
relationship between the victim and a regular client (Rusev et al., 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018). Often the client pays to an intermediary who 
is present at the spot, such as a big sister companion or the local 
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manager of the venue (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Oude Breuil еt al., 2018). 
Alternatively, the customer pays directly to the sex worker, who either 
immediately hands over the payment to the intermediary or, brings the 
earnings to the exploiters on a regular basis (Rusev et al., 2018, Nicolae, 
2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Oude Breuil еt al., 2018).
Exceptions do exist as sometimes clients can pay for sexual services 
via bank transfer/credit card, whereby such payments are registered 
as a legitimate service, e.g. massage (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et 
al., 2018). This is particularly the case whereby trusted clients based in 
Western European states order sex services from sex workers who may 
be currently based in another EU member state in Eastern Europe. The 
wired money is used for travel and advance payment for the sexual 
services (Rusev et al., 2018).
The high-end prostitution segment displays some subtle differences in 
the patterns of payment settlements as the country study in Bulgaria 
exemplifies. In many cases the pre-supposed exclusivity of sexual services 
performed by “models” and the parallel operation of the fashion agency 
as a cover business seem to keep a certain distance between the 
consumer and the sex worker, particularly in the financial flows (Rusev 
et al., 2018). The contacts between the customers and the clients are 
usually handled by a central figure inside the agency – the so called 
“booker.” The booker also often receives the payment directly or through 
trusted members of the network from the client. Therefore, in such cases 
the women would perform a pre-arranged and pre-paid service without 
coming into contact with money (Rusev et al., 2018).
Similarly, in labour trafficking cash transactions are preferred, although 
methods of payment may vary depending on the sector where the 
victims are exploited. Whereas in the agricultural sector and the car-wash 
business cash payments are predominant, in other business sectors (e.g. 
food-processing, construction) bank transfers are the norm. Therefore, it 
is not uncommon for employers to wire transfer the money to the bank 
accounts of the exploited workers. However, even in such cases usually 
bank accounts of workers are controlled by traffickers or intermediaries 
and money are immediately withdrawn by them in cash from the bank 
and workers receive a fraction of their earnings (Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018). In some extreme cases of labour exploitation all 
workers’ earnings are entirely withheld under the pretext of covering 
various fees, onsite trainings, cloths, accommodation or food (Oude 
Breuil еt al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018).
The second type of financial transactions are the ones between the 
victim and the trafficker. As it has been already mentioned in many 
cases related to sex trafficking, victims are charged with collecting the 
money from their clients. In such arrangements victims are expected to 
deliver their earnings (or part of them) to the traffickers on a regular 
basis. Such arrangements are common in lover-boy schemes, as well as 
when there is a pre-existing agreement between the traffickers and the 
victim about splitting the revenues according to a percentage determined 
in advance (Rusev et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018).
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In cases of domestic trafficking, the daily earnings of the victims are 
usually collected by the procurer or a trusted associate in cash from hand 
to hand (Rusev et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018). In other arrangements, such 
as with Chinese OCGs operating via the internet in Western Europe, the 
funds are gathered by collectors on a weekly basis. The earnings of the 
victims are strictly monitored, since all the in-coming calls by customers 
go through switchboards and the victim is expected to transfers a pre-
agreed percentage of everything earned (Lalam, 2018). In cases of cross-
border trafficking where the trafficker remains in the country of origin 
the sex workers are expected to transfer the money abroad on a regular 
basis. Sometimes these transfers are done by the victims, but there are 
also arrangements where they just hand the money to a trusted associate 
and he arranges these international settlements (Lalam, 2018; Rusev et 
al., 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018).
However, in order to ensure payments by the victims control is of critical 
importance to traffickers. Various methods are employed to achieve this. 
Certainly, lover-boys rely much on emotional control over their victims, 
but even they resort to other methods as well (Nicolae, 2018). Often 
victims are demanded to report and to account for their earnings to 
traffickers or their trusted associates on a daily basis, often via coded 
messages through messaging services or SMS Funds. Other technological 
developments can also be part of the daily monitoring such as video 
surveillance or monitoring of social media accounts (Raets & Janssens, 
2018). Threats of violence, blackmail, juju rituals (typical for Nigerian 
networks) and various forms of debt bondage are also part of the 
traffickers’ arsenal (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Lalam, 2018; Antonopoulos, 
2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
Financial transactions from the traffickers to the victims also take place. 
Often victims are forced into a position of financial dependence (Nicolae, 
2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). In some of these cases, a small financial flow 
exists from traffickers to victims, whereby small sustenance sums may be 
provided in cash by the trafficker. Thus, in cases of sexual exploitation 
the perpetrator takes all the money from the victim on daily basis, but 
provides weekly allowances for cigarettes and food, instead. Occasionally, 
the perpetrator may give the victim €150-€200 to send to her family in 
the country of origin, which creates an economic dependence (Nicolae, 
2018). In other arrangements, wherein there is no financial or debt 
dependence, sex workers may receive their shares periodically in cash 
by their traffickers/procurers or trusted persons – e.g. every three days, 
weekly, etc. (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Lalam, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018; 
Rusev et al., 2018; Oude Breuil еt al., 2018).
The data from the Bulgarian case study also shows that in the indoor 
and high-end prostitution segment, it is a common practice for victims 
to have fictitious contracts as office assistants, masseuses, waitresses, 
hostesses, barmaids, exotic dancers, receptionists, chambermaids, etc. 
The contracts are usually signed with bogus companies and fixed at 
minimum wage and for minimum working hours. However, they will 
still receive payments under these contracts and all respective social 
and healthcare contributions will also be covered. Some of the victims 
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reported that they receive these payments via bank transfers. In this way 
the traffickers try to conceal the true nature of their activities and not 
raise suspicion in the law enforcement and other regulatory agencies 
(Rusev et al., 2018).
Trafficking operations that require a more sophisticated organisation also 
involve financial transactions between the organiser and other members 
of the scheme or other traffickers. Such payments are made exclusively 
in cash and usually the organiser oversees the collection of the money 
from the victims and its subsequent re-distribution among the rest of 
the members involved in the operation, unless the business relationship 
takes place under the front of a legal business or service. In the latter 
case, payments are also made electronically. Cash proceeds are often 
transferred along the chain through trusted payment facilitators, which 
appear to be insiders rather than the typical money mule (Rusev et al., 
2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). In some cases, traffickers also have exchanges 
with other traffickers, typically when selling or re-selling victims. In these 
cases, transactions are also done in cash, except in some cases related to 
sexual exploitation when victims are simply exchanged without payment, 
provided that traffickers consider them having the same “sexual capital” 
(Antonopoulos, 2018).
The trafficking network cannot function effectively without external 
actors who provide supporting and ancillary services such as facilitation 
of certain administrative services, document forging and falsification, 
apartments/houses/windows, night/adult clubs, etc. Thus, traffickers also 
have various financial transactions with external actors and corrupted 
officials. Such payments to external actors and corrupted officials 
often have to be done in advance, hence the need for start-up capital 
for newcomers to the business (Rusev et al., 2018). All of these are paid 
almost exclusively in cash. When operating abroad, some traffickers are 
wary of getting directly involved in all payment settlement activities, as 
being seen around sex workers and in particular known clubs and hotels 
may arouse suspicion. Therefore, in some cases settlements with clubs, 
hotels, apartments, etc., are delegated to the women who may transact 
directly with the owners of the establishments where sex services are 
performed (Rusev et al., 2018). Settlements in the domestic market seem 
to be conducted in cash directly between the trafficker, or trusted person, 
and the owner of the club/hotel where sexual services are provided 
(Rusev et al., 2018). Similarly with corrupted officials, irrespectively of 
the service offered to the trafficker or simply turning a blind eye to the 
trafficking-related activities, the preferred form of payment is again cash, 
although occasionally, sex is provided as payment (Rusev et al., 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018, Nicolae, 2018). In some instances, trusted third 
parties are used to deliver the payment (Rusev et al., 2018).
In international trafficking schemes, particularly routes out of Africa, 
which may involve human smuggling as well, the most common method 
to settle payments are pre-agreed instalments (Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). This sometimes entails that 
an initial sum of money is provided to cover initial travel and documents 
expenses, and another sum of money once the victims reaches the 
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destination country and starts working in order to repay the incurred 
debt. These methods are used when paying individuals involved at the 
various stages and with different roles within the trafficking chain, such 
as the so called “trolley man” or “boga”12 or the so called “ticket man”13 
(Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). Financial transactions related to these 
services typically involve transfers of money abroad.
The analysis of available data shows that cross-border trafficking at some 
point or another involves international settlements of payments. This 
is the case with victims transferring money abroad to their traffickers 
residing in countries of origin (a common arrangement for traffickers from 
South-East Europe) and with traffickers paying smugglers who arrange 
transportation of victims from Sub-Saharan Africa or Asia, as well as the 
repatriation of profits to the country of origin. Apparently, the preferred 
method of international settlements of payment is cash smuggling 
(Raets & Janssens, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018; 
Rusev et al., 2018). Apart from cash smuggling, other popular methods 
used by trafficking networks for settling international payments include 
hawala, money transfer services such as MoneyGram and Western Union, 
and bank transfers (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). The methods for settling 
international payments are discussed in more detail in section 3.5. 
“Investment schemes and money laundering,” below.
From a business perspective, human trafficking can make for a relatively 
inexpensive undertaking, considering that the recruitment of victims costs 
close to nothing (Raets & Janssens, 2018). However, trafficking operations 
involve a variety of costs at each stage of the process – not only 
recruitment, but also transportation and exploitation (see Figure 7), 
wherein the last two stages appear to be most cost demanding. Some 
of these costs are one-off and might be categorised as investment costs, 
whereas others are recurring and rather fall under the operational costs 
category. It should be noted that this classification is somewhat arbitrary, 
since the line between the two is often blurred. The cost structure of 
trafficking operations varies depending on the modus operandi of the 
traffickers, logistical complexities, the “relative legality” of the business, 
as well as the number and types of actors involved.
Recruitment costs
Before anything else, exploitation requires resources. However, recruitment 
costs of traffickers appear to be negligible or none, if we do not count the 
time invested in identifying and attracting or grooming potential victims 
(Antonopoulos, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Oude Breuil et al., 2018). 
In order to attract victims interested in the job, traffickers may resort to 
12 This is the person accompanying the victims during their trip from Nigeria to Libya.
13 This is the person in charge of recovering victims in Italy.
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publishing advertisements on 
websites and social networks. 
Such advertisements are usually 
free or of little charge and 
traffickers would re-post them 
on a daily basis in order to 
reach a larger pool of potential 
victims (Antonopoulos, 2018; 
Oude Breuil et al., 2018). In cases 
related to labour trafficking, 
in many cases recruiters also 
rely on word of mouth. Similar 
methods are sometimes also 
applied in cases related to sex 
trafficking.
However, in cases related to 
sexual exploitation one of 
the most commonly applied 
methods is the infamous lover-
boy scheme, which involves 
emotional manipulation and 
deceit. This method includes 
courting, befriending and 
manipulating the potential 
victim by the recruiter into a 
relationship of trust. In some 
instances, the process of 
grooming may last up to nine 
or more months, thereby the 
lover-boy may incur sustained 
additional expenses (Rusev et 
al., 2018). Recruiters usually 
identify and pick good looking girls from poor backgrounds who can 
easily be impressed with a luxury lifestyle. The related costs in this 
approach may include expenditures for restaurants, vacations, clothes 
and other gifts. An often underestimated aspect of this method, which 
has been pointed out by some of the interviewed offenders, is that 
in order to display success and luxurious lifestyle, traffickers also have 
to spend money on their own image. This may include possession of 
an expensive brand automobile, branded clothing and accessories, an 
expensive smart phone and well maintained physique (Oude Breuil et 
al., 2018; Rusev et al., 2018).
Organised crime groups involved in trafficking operations sometimes 
tend to assign recruiting to specific members or subcontract it outside 
the organisation. The Bulgarian case study reports that in such cases 
recruiters receive a pre-agreed fee for each secured victim, which 
varies between €100 and €250 plus a bonus of up to €500 if she 
performs well (Rusev et al., 2018). Similarly, victims may be “purchased” 
from other OCG, networks or in some cases, the victim’s family (Rusev 
et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). 
Figure 7. types oF costs related to traFFicking in human Beings 
For sexual exploitation
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data.
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Costs vary with regard to the region of origin of the victim, but are 
estimated at as little as €100 to €8,000 for an East European sex worker 
(Rusev et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018), from €350 to €8,000 for an African 
sex worker, €500 to €3,500 for a South American sex worker, and at 
around €4,500 for sex workers from East Asia (Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018).
A typical cost item of the recruitment process for Nigerian networks is 
the juju ritual. These rituals are closely related to the indigenous religious 
traditions in South Western parts of Nigeria and co-exist alongside 
Christian and Islamic beliefs. The rituals include the taking of blood, 
pubic hair, etc., and swearing oaths to gods, who supposedly have 
power over the victims’ life and death. The victims also made to sign 
contracts, which are then “blessed” by the juju “priest.” These rituals 
provide traffickers with immense control over the victims, since they are 
convinced that breaking their contract or not repaying their debt may 
result in infertility or even death (Lalam, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). 
Reportedly the fee paid to a priest in Nigeria to perform such a ritual 
varies between €150 and €500 (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
Another expense that can arguably be classified as part of the recruitment 
stage in sex trafficking cases are the costs related to make-over and 
personal care of the newly recruited victims. Collected data suggests 
that these sums range from around €500 to €1,500, which is used for 
brand clothing, accessories, cosmetics and perfumery, among others. The 
sum varies, since it depends on the modus operandi of the traffickers 
(Rusev et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018). The outdoor 
segment is less demanding with regards to such expenses, whereas for 
the indoor and the high-end prostitution segments these expenses are 
integral. There are instances, wherein more expensive manipulations such 
as plastic surgery might be invested in for high-end sex workers (Rusev 
et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018).
Transportation costs
After the recruitment stage, traffickers need to transfer the victim to the 
country of destination or place of exploitation in domestic trafficking 
operations. The cost of transportation is naturally commensurate with 
the distance that is covered by the operation and with the applicable 
visa, labour, and residence restrictions, as well as the risk associated 
with the travel (Lalam, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018). Practically there 
is no difference in the size of transportation costs for sexual and labour 
exploitation. However, apparently in cases related to labour exploitation 
it is a relatively common practice these costs to be covered in advance 
by the victim, especially when the victims come from EU member states 
such as Poland, Bulgaria or Romania (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
As far as trafficking within Europe is concerned, transportation costs 
generally consist of plane, train, or bus fees or, as an alternative, the price 
of a second-hand car or mini-van and fuel. The approximate costs for 
this are reported to range from €40 to €250 per trip depending on the 
distance (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 
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2018; Nicolae, 2018). A big advantage for the traffickers from South-East 
and East European countries is the visa-free movement in the Schengen 
area. Practically all the major source countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, 
Western Balkan countries (except for Kosovo), Moldova and recently 
Ukraine enjoy a visa-free regime.14 Bulgarian and Romanian citizens also 
have rightful access to the labour markets of all EU countries.15
Networks in Sub-Saharan Africa have two main routes into Western 
Europe. The first option, which regards travelling by plane is the safest 
but also the more expensive – between €8,000 and €15,000. The reason 
for this is that travelling by air not only involves purchasing a ticket, but 
also payment either for forged documents or to corrupt consular officials 
to obtain a visa (Antonopoulos, 2018; Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Forged documents reportedly can 
cost between €1,000 and €3,000 (Antonopoulos, 2018; Meneses-Falcón 
et al., 2018). A second option is the overland route via Morocco or Libya 
and leaving the northern African coast on boat either to Spain or Italy. 
This route is cheapest, reportedly between €3,000 and €5,000, although 
much riskier. This amount covers the travel and the fee of the persons in 
charge of transportation called “passeurs” (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). 
There is a large number of criminal or insurgent groups operating in the 
region (especially on the route through Libya) who exact various tolls or 
could kidnap the victim and request a ransom for her release. It is also 
not uncommon to pay various amounts in bribes at the border check-
points during their land journey in Africa (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; 
Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
The latin American trafficking organisations usually originate from 
the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia or 
Venezuela, which are the countries with the greatest migrant flows towards 
Europe but also the biggest source countries for trafficking in human 
beings. The main destination country for victims from these countries is 
Spain, perhaps due to the similarity in language and culture. Reportedly, 
some victims of trafficking from these countries also end up in France 
(Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018). Most of these countries as of 
2018 have visa-free regime with the European Union except for Ecuador 
and the Dominican Republic,16 although, even if no visa is required, 
citizens from these states are supposed to provide at least an official 
invitation and a proof of minimum disposable money upon entering EU. 
Thus, the overall cost to transport a victim from Latin America – for the 
ticket, the documents and the minimal sum of money required at the 
border – is from €3,000 to €3,500 (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018).
Victims traveling from Far East Asia are almost always accompanied 
by a male who is responsible for overseeing the transportation of the 
victims, after which he returns to his country of origin. The reported 
14 See Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement.
15 See Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European 
Union.
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001,
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costs for transportation and obtaining necessary documents of a victim 
from China to Spain are about €2,000, half of which covers the 
fee for the accompanying person (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Other 
accounts indicate much bigger costs associated with transportation – 
€10,000-€15,000, including costs for securing tourist visa or fictitious 
enrolment in a university and a student’s visa, tickets and the fee for 
the accompanying person (Lalam, 2018).
ТаBle 7. cost oF transportation depending on the country 
oF origin oF victims
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from country reports.
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Costs related to exploitation
Traffickers also incur various and sometimes substantial costs during the 
exploitation stage. In the case of trafficking for sexual exploitation these 
costs include expenditures for client acquisition, lodging, monitoring and 
control of sex workers, protection, concealment of criminal activities, 
corruption, and facilitation of money laundering.
Securing access to clients is one of the most important things for 
trafficking operations. Client acquisition costs can vary a lot depending 
on the modus operandi of traffickers. These might include costs for 
acquiring access to a profitable location on the street, a window in a 
red light district or a place in a well-established adult club, brothel, or 
massage parlour. Online advertising costs and payments to taxi drivers 
and hotel concierges for referring clients can also be generally placed 
in this category (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Oude Breuil et 
al., 2018; Rusev et al., 2018).
Certainly the cheapest option is to rely on online advertising for 
solicitation of clients. Various websites, social platforms and online mobile 
applications are used to advertise sex services. Online advertising may 
cost from nothing to a few euro per ad, which is a negligent amount 
compared to the fees for placement at brothels or similar sex venues 
(Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). Other advertisement-related expenses 
may be incurred when a professional photographer is contracted to take 
high-quality photos of the victims, which subsequently will be placed 
on various sex sites. Such sessions could cost between €30 and €100, 
depending on the length of the shoot session (Antonopoulos, 2018; 
Nicolae, 2018). Precisely because of the low cost associated with this 
method for soliciting of clients it is preferred by independent traffickers 
and sex workers (Rusev et al., 2018). However, they are some more 
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sophisticated arrangements involving internet advertising adopted by 
organised crime groups. Thus, in the case of Chinese organised crime 
groups in France all internet advertisements of sex workers are managed 
in a centralised way and all incoming calls are handled by French-
speaking switchboard (telephone) operators, which charge €20 for each 
appointment with a client (Lalam, 2018).
Internet advertising usually is coupled with renting apartments or 
houses where victims could provide their services, the costs for which 
vary depending on the location. Apartments could be used solely for 
providing sex services or sometimes also for accommodation. In Bulgaria 
and Romania, accommodation for 2-4 persons costs around €400 per 
month (Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). Renting an apartment in West 
European cities or a small house in their vicinities varies between €700 
and €1,200 per month (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 
2018). In metropolitan and larger cities, the rents of apartments are twice 
higher; for example, it was reported that as of 2018 UK rents in cities 
such as Manchester or London amount to as much as €2,500 per month 
(Antonopoulos, 2018). However, if the landowner knows that his property 
is rented for prostitution purposes, the rent can get ten times higher. 
Thus, for Germany it was reported that a landowner was receiving €50 
per day from each sex worker (Sirseloudi, 2018).
Many traffickers prefer renting a window in a red-light district or 
placing the victim in a massage parlour or brothel. Unlike internet 
advertisements, such established venues can provide for a steady clientele 
and more predictable and high revenue (Rusev et al., 2018). The fees for 
windows in red light districts in Belgium or Netherlands vary between 
€100 and €300 per shift (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018), 
depending on the city and location. Facilitating access to profitable 
windows, brothels, massage parlours, and similar establishments in the 
red light districts of West European cities, where prostitution is legal, 
also often requires payment of certain fees in advance. Reportedly, 
such a one-off facilitation fee varies between €500 and €3,000 paid 
to an established broker who has been active in the business for 
a significant amount of time and possesses the necessary social and 
business connections (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Rusev at al., 2018). It is 
also reported that in order to secure a place in a well-located adult club 
in the big Bulgarian summer and winter resorts traffickers have to pay 
upfront €7,500 per sex worker for the whole season (3 months) to the 
owners of the sex venue (Rusev at al., 2018).
Similarly, access to profitable locations in hotels, motels, and clubs 
both in Bulgaria and Romania, but also in Western Europe, is also 
usually granted upon certain fee paid in advance (Rusev et al., 2018). 
Traffickers and pimps need to pay the managers or owners of hotels, 
motels, and various hospitality businesses in order to use their facilities 
for sexual services undisturbed. In some arrangements the fee is flat and 
irrespective of the victim’s earnings, whereas in other cases, the hotel 
owner or manager receives a fixed fee for each client brought in the 
hotel. Payments to such external actors vary depending on their position 
and role. In the case of the United Kingdom, managers of such venues, 
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receptionists, and security guards are paid a flat fee, reportedly between 
£50 and £100 per shift (Antonopoulos, 2018). The country study of 
Bulgaria reports that hotel managers in the big winter or summer resorts 
may require payment in advance from the traffickers, so that victims 
work in a “protected” environment with access to clients. The reported 
sums vary between €2,000 and €3,750, depending on the location and 
reputation of the establishment. Smaller Bulgarian hotels or motels which 
provide venue for the sex workers and their clients by the hour might 
charge as little as €10 per service (Rusev et al., 2018).
Monitoring, supervision and control of sex workers are the other type 
of costs associated with the exploitation stage, although they are not 
always easily quantifiable. These costs are primarily related to a strict 
accounting of the clients served and the due collection of the pre-
agreed portion of earnings from the sex workers. Depending on the 
complexity of the trafficking operation, these tasks may be performed 
by the traffickers themselves or by other trusted persons. In family-based 
organisations usually one of the family members takes care of these 
tasks. In other words, they do not directly incur financial costs for this, 
although they invest personal time. Hierarchically structured organisations 
usually have trusted persons that are managing the day-to-day schedule 
of the women, as well as the daily collection of the earnings. Use 
of such supervisors and money collectors also serves the purpose to 
conceal the direct link between the sex workers and the organisers of 
the trafficking operation. The data from Italy indicates that within the 
context of Nigerian networks, such persons receive €25 to €50 per day 
(Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). Similarly, in Germany the fee for persons 
in charge of money collection is €50 per day (Sirseloudi, M. 2018).
In the high-end prostitution segment, these tasks were carried out by 
the bookers, who are handling the contacts between the women and 
the customers. The amount of these costs remains somewhat unclear, 
although some respondents report that the supervisors are paid a pre-
agreed proportion from the earnings of the sex workers they look after 
(Rusev et al., 2018).
Closely related to monitoring and control are the costs for protection of 
sex workers. Independent traffickers and family-based groups personally 
take care of the safety of the women and their earnings from abusive 
clients and rival competition. However, especially in the outdoor segment 
they are often subjected to protection racket by larger organised crime 
groups specialised in the use of violence. In Bulgaria, such groups 
reportedly “toll” sex workers about €65 per month for working on the 
street (Rusev et al., 2018). Similar protection tolls have been reported in 
Italy – €50-150 per day for each sex worker, usually exacted by Albanian 
OCGs (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). The cost of the protection racket in 
Spain is reported to amount to €100 per month for a sex worker to be 
allowed to work on the street (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018).
When traffickers pay for placement of their sex workers at brothels or 
other sex venues, the protection is included in the price or at least part 
of the pre-agreed arrangements. Hierarchically structured groups usually 
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have members assigned with such tasks and, as mentioned above, they 
are often also responsible for monitoring and control of women, money 
collection, and transportation. A case reported in the Romanian country 
report indicates a monthly payroll of such a members amounting to 
€700 per month (Nicolae, 2018).
Expenses on corruption can also be generally classified into the category 
of protection costs. Typical targets of corruption by trafficking actors are 
law enforcement officers and, to a lesser extent, magistrates, especially in 
South-East Europe. The data from Bulgaria and Romania indicates regular 
extortion fees imposed by police officers to outdoor and indoor sex 
workers and their procurers, wherein such protection fees in Romania 
reportedly amount from €500 to €1,000 per month (Nicolae, 2018; 
Rusev et al., 2018). In order to avoid cash payments, traffickers can 
offer officials bribes in the form of sexual services rather than money 
(Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, G., 2018).
Hierarchically structured groups sustaining more sophisticated trafficking 
operations incur additional costs related to the concealment of their 
activities from the authorities. In the high-end prostitution segment such 
costs may include investing in elaborate schemes of legitimate business 
structures – appointment of straw persons as owners and managers, 
registering front businesses such as modelling or fashion agencies, and 
organising model castings, fashion shows, advertising campaigns, among 
others. Criminal groups, which invest in and control adult clubs, massage 
parlours, and similar establishments also employ similar methods and register 
bogus companies with straw persons appearing as owners and managers. 
Women working in such adult clubs, hotels and other establishments have 
labour contracts as dancers, masseuses, office assistants or housekeepers. 
Using such legitimate companies as a front also entails a number of other 
costs typical for all legitimate businesses – office rent, accounting and 
legal services, utilities, staff salaries, etc. (Rusev et al., 2018).
The comparison of the data on typical costs associated with the various 
sex trafficking operations reveals important differences in the cost 
structure depending on the country of origin of the perpetrators. 
Clearly, traffickers from the two biggest source countries in EU – 
Bulgaria and Romania, enjoy significant competitive advantage over 
their counterparts operating from Asia, Africa, and Latin America with 
regard to transportation costs. The lower costs of transportation are also 
coupled with the lower risks of apprehension during this stage of the 
trafficking operation, since both Bulgarian and Romanian citizens enjoy 
the rights of free movement and labour within the European Union. 
Furthermore, non-European perpetrators apparently prefer low-cost 
methods for acquisition of clients – solicitation of clients on the street 
or online (see Lalam, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018). On the contrary, apparently Bulgarian and Romanian 
traffickers are more often willing to incur additional costs in order to get 
access to more profitable locations and sex venues – red light district 
windows in Belgium or Netherlands, brothels or massage parlours in 
Germany and Austria, thus securing higher and more steady revenues 
from their victims (Rusev et al., 2018).
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ТаBle 8. examples oF costs associated with starting and running 
a traFFicking operation For Bulgarian traFFickers
Source: Rusev et al., 2018.
Cost type value Notes
Make-over costs I from €1,500 hairdresser; brand clothing; 
accessories; cosmetics, etc.
Make-over costs II €3,600 – 4,500 breast enlargement
Logistics I from ~ €100 airfare to a major West European 
city by a low-cost airline
Logistics II from ~ €250 fuel + one motel stop
for circa 2,000 km
Logistics III from ~ €120 single bus fare from Sofia 
to major West European city
Rent from €550/month multi-bedroom apartment
in the red-light district of
a major West European city
Interest rates I 10% to 20%
per week
when borrowed from the wider 
trafficking network
Interest rates II 50% to 250%
per week
when borrowed from
a loan shark
Money transfer fees €10-€100 per transaction, depending
on the amount sent
Advance payment for placement 
of one sex worker in adult club
€1,125 month Bulgaria, Black Sea resort, south
Use of a hotel room with
a client per hour
€3-5 session hotel, low segment, inner city
Advance payment for placement 
of one sex worker in adult club 
(top location)
€7,500 season Bulgaria, Black Sea resort, south
Advanced payment for placement 
of one sex worker in a hotel
with access to clients
€2,500 to
€3,125 month
Bulgaria, Black Sea
resort hotel
Broker’s fee for placement
of one sex worker at a red light 
district window
€2,000-€3,000
per sex worker
red-light district window
of a major Western European
city, one-time fee
Hotel room rental
(permission to do business)
€1,000 per week
per sex worker
In a major West European city, 
may vary depending on the hotel
Protection fee (racket) €2,500 per week
per person
Fee paid to the hotel in a major 
Western European city for access 
and undisturbed operation
Red-light district
window rental
from €500 per week red-light district (major Belgian 
and/or Dutch city)
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These differences in the cost structure of sex trafficking operations provide 
important additional insights about why Bulgaria and Romania still remain 
the top countries of origin for victims of trafficking in Western Europe, 
despite having many times smaller populations compared to countries such 
as Nigeria or China. The negligible costs for transportation of victims from 
South East Europe coupled with the right to free movement and labour 
also have important implications for the preferred method of control over 
victims. Apparently Bulgarian and Romanian traffickers have more or less 
moved away from the methods relying on debt bondage in sex trafficking, 
whereas these methods are still predominant among the trafficking networks 
from Africa, Asia, and Latin America (see Lalam, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et 
al., 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). Instead, they rather rely either 
on building emotional dependence in the victim (lover-boy method) or 
establishing business-like relations and acquiring some consent of the victim, 
wherein the revenues from the prostitution would be split between the 
trafficker and the sex worker according to a pre-agreed ratio (Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018; Rusev et al., 2018, Nicolae, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018).
Trafficking for labour exploitation appears to be a lower cost exercise than 
trafficking for sexual exploitation. Various costs come into play depending 
on whether the farm/company owner that benefits from the exploitation is 
involved in the overall trafficking operation or relies on external actors to 
recruit and deliver the labourers needed. The regular cost related to the 
exploitation phase will generally include housing, subsistence, work materials, 
and tools (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). In most 
cases all these costs are used as a pretext to force victims to pay much 
more than the actual value of these facilities. Thus exploiters/traffickers 
manage to additionally reduce the pre-agreed wages and perpetuate the 
debt bondage of victims (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Moreover, except housing, the infrastructure 
and equipment in labour trafficking cases are usually pre-existent, so no 
investment is required (Raets & Janssens, 2018). In many cases traffickers 
are of the same nationality as the victims and are contracted by the farm 
or company owners also to exert control and monitoring over victims 
(Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). Other costs 
related to this form of trafficking may include fines imposed by labour 
inspectorates for not providing sufficient health or safety labour conditions 
or other labour law infractions (Oude Breuil et al., 2018).
Trafficking in human beings generates a steady flow of profits for traffickers 
thanks to the constant demand both in the sex services and low-skilled 
labour sectors such as agriculture, construction, hospitality, and similar 
industries. As the nine EU country studies showed, the sex services 
segment is easier to estimate, as quantitative data is readily available (e.g. 
prices for services, estimated number of sex workers and of clients in 
a given market), while transactions involving labour exploitation are less 
transparent and profits are less clearly defined.
3.4. PROFITS AND PROFIT SHARING
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Pricing and revenues of traffickers vary substantially depending on a 
number of factors. Thus, in cases related to sexual exploitation important 
factors are the country where services are provided, the market segment 
served, the number of customers per day, and the average length of 
sessions. Price differences by country are correlated to the respective 
national income level. Thus, for example in low-income countries like 
Bulgaria or Romania, a session in the outdoor market segment (i.e. the 
lowest segment) can cost as low as €7-10 (Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 
2018). In high-income countries, the same services would cost at least 
€20-30, with an average of €50 and up (Lalam, 2018; Oude Breuil et 
al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018). The variances by segment in the sex 
services market start from an average of €20 to €30 in the outdoor 
segment, and go up to between €50 and €150 in the lower indoor 
segment to €200 to €300 in the higher indoor segment and several 
hundreds to €1,000-€2,000 in the luxury/private escort services segment 
(Rusev et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018). length of sex sessions (half an hour, 
an hour, overnight, weekend) is also a factor in pricing. Longer sessions 
are usually provided at a discount but are also more common in the 
high-end market segments (Rusev et al., 2018).
The ethnic background and physical appearance of victims also factor 
in the price of the sex services. Thus, in Italy Nigerian sex workers 
work mostly on the street and charge from €10-€30 and in France 
€20-40, whereas the ones from South-East Europe charge between €30 
and €50 in both countries (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Lalam, 2018). 
The number of customers served by one sex worker varies from two 
to six per day in the indoor segment, and can reach up to 20 in the 
outdoor segment. This number also depends on the pressure exercised 
by traffickers. In extreme circumstances (e.g. Nigerian women exploited 
under a debt repayment scheme), sex workers have been forced to work 
for 10-12 hours per day (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). Use of the internet 
for solicitation of clients also appears to result in lower number of clients 
(Rusev et al., 2018).
The expert estimates of average revenue generated by a sex worker 
vary from several thousand euro per week (e.g. €2,000 to €8,000 in 
Belgium) to tens of thousands of euro in the high-end segments (Raets 
& Janssens, 2018). Monthly estimates reported by interviewed traffickers 
range from €15,000 to €45,000 per sex worker (Rusev et al., 2018). 
In addition to the recurring revenue from sex services, in certain cases 
traffickers get one-time payments for “renting” or “selling” the victims 
they control to other trafficking networks (Antonopoulos, 2018; Nicolae, 
2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018). However, these practices are believed to 
be rare and the revenue they generate is insignificant compared to the 
daily flow from recurring services.
The detailed information on pricing, number of clients served per day, as 
well as the costs incurred by traffickers, allow also for relatively accurate 
reconstruction of their actual profits. Thus, if we take for example the 
case of Nigerian “mamas” and assume she has brought a woman via 
an overland route, her costs on an annual basis will amount to around 
€37,000 and she could expect a victim – when exploited as sex worker 
Financial	aspects	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	 77
on the street in Italy – to earn close to € 94,000 per year. In this case 
the net profit will amount at around €57,000.
17
Similarly, we can estimate the profits of East European traffickers. Thus, 
traffickers from Bulgaria often exploit women in the windows of red 
light districts in various cities in the Netherlands. The victims usually 
spend 3 to 4 months in the Netherlands, then come back to Bulgaria 
for a month and return for another round of 3-4 months. In order to 
secure a place in a profitable location, traffickers often pay to well-
established intermediaries a fee of between €2,000-€3,000. Lodging is 
usually shared with other victims and rent of the window is somewhere 
between €200-€250 per shift. The overall costs in such an arrangement 
reach close to €84 000 on an annual basis. The sex worker usually 
manages to generate a revenue of €187 000, making the net profit in 
this case around €103,000.
Revenues from trafficking for labour exploitation usually come from 
two sources: a) initial fees paid by victims to the recruiters in their 
country of origin (which may include the cost of travel and travel 
documents, in particular for third country nationals); and b) a share of 
the weekly or monthly remuneration of the victims which is paid by 
the employers to the traffickers or gangmasters (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018). The debt repayment scheme is widely applied in trafficking for 
17 Street spots for prostitution.
ТаBle 9. costs and proFits From a nigerian victim exploited 
as a sex worker in italy
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from Terenghi & Di Nicola (2018) and other country reports.
Type of costs Costs/Profit
Travel from Nigeria to Italy (via Libya) –
cost of transportation, tolls, passeur,
juju ritual, ticket man, etc.)
€5,000
Travel in Italy (train) €300
Supervisor of girls to/at “joints”17 €40 x 26 days → €1,040 (per month) → 
€12,480 for 1 year
Renting of joints/extortion fees €100 (per month) → €1,200 for 1 year
Housing (sharing apartment) €300 per month → €3,600 for 1 year
Subsistence costs
(meals, clothes, condoms, etc.)
€1,200 per month → €14,400 for 1 year
Overall costs 12 months: €36,980
Total earnings 12 months x 26 days x 15 clients x
€20 EUR → €93,600
Net profit (1 year): €56,620
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labour exploitation, in particular with Chinese or other victims of third 
countries who need permits to work and live in the EU. As a rule, 
victims’ remuneration is below the minimum hourly rate, and working 
hours are longer than allowed by national regulations – e.g. 12-14 hours 
per day in the agricultural sector in Italy. The net daily payment received 
by victims of trafficking has been reported to be as low as €10 for 
a 12-hour day, as employers deduct from the negotiated payment the 
arbitrarily assigned cost of transportation, food and water provided to the 
victims (Terenghi & Di Nicola).
Thus, in terms of profit margins, labour exploitation can achieve similar 
levels as sex exploitation, although the amounts in euro per victim of 
labour exploitation are usually much smaller due to the lower hourly rates 
in the sectors where most victims are employed (agriculture, construction, 
tourism, food processing). With trafficking for labour exploitation two 
aspects of the profit need to be considered: the profit from fees collected 
by the traffickers who connect employers and victims, and the profit of 
employers who benefit from the lower labour costs (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018). In some cases, one and the same victim can be exploited as a 
worker in a legal business establishment used as a cover (massage parlour, 
model agency or hotel) and become a victim of sexual exploitation.
Several factors determine the margin and volume of profits of traffickers. 
The most important of them seems to be the legal status and vulnerability 
of victims. Victims from third countries who need visas and permits 
to enter and reside in the EU are the ones who are most severely 
exploited, generating extremely high profit margins for the traffickers. On 
ТаBle 10. costs and proFits From a Bulgarian victim exploited 
as sex worker in the netherlands
Source: Rusev et al., 2018.
Type of costs Costs/Profit
Clothing, lingerie, accessories, cosmetics 3 trips x €500 → €1,500
Flight ticket (3 trips to the Netherlands) 3 trips x €100 → €300
Housing (sharing apartment) –
10 months in a year
€300 month x 10 months → €3,000
Broker fee for securing a window
in a red light district
€2,000
Rent for window for 10 months €250 day x 26 days x 10 months → €65,000
Subsistence costs (meals, telephone, etc.) €1,200 per month x 10 months → €12,000
Overall costs 1 year (stays for 10 months): €83,800
Total earnings 10 months x 26 days x 12 clients x €60 → 
€187,200
Net profit (1 year) €103,400
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the other hand, victims who are citizens of EU member states and can 
freely move and work within the EU usually work at more favourable 
terms and keep a larger share of their earnings. Depending on the legal 
status of the victims, profit margins can range from close to 100% in 
the case of sex workers smuggled into the EU from third countries 
such as Nigeria, to less than 50% in the case of sex workers from East 
European member states. In the case of labour exploitation, victims with 
mental health problems are paid insignificant wages or not paid at all 
(Antonopoulos, 2018).
Another factor widening profit margins is the type of organisation and 
the modus operandi of traffickers. Lover-boy traffickers and family/clan 
based groups tend to withhold all the revenue and to cover all the 
costs of sex workers (Rusev et al., 2018). Loose trafficking networks and 
hierarchical groups from South-East Europe prefer to operate with pre-
set shares, with traffickers retaining from 50% to 80% of the earnings 
(Nicolae, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). A third modus operandi, applied by 
traffickers who own brothels or other sex venues is charging a fixed 
amount in advance. For instance, hotels and erotic clubs in popular 
resorts in Bulgaria are reported to charge €7,500 per sex worker for 
the use of their premises (Rusev et al., 2018). Profit sharing schemes 
reportedly also vary by nationality of perpetrators and victims (Table 11). 
Thus, the typical share of earnings withheld from a victim by East 
European traffickers is 50-80%, for Chinese traffickers – 60-70%, for Latin 
American – 40%, for Nigerian – 100% (Lalam, 2018).
ТаBle 11. pricing, proFits, and proFit sharing in cases oF traFFicking 
For sexual exploitation in France
Source: Lalam, 2018.
Country of origin
Price range
(per service)
Trafficker/sex
worker shares
Earnings
Nigerian traffickers €10-30 close to 100%
for trafficker
€3,000 per month
East European traffickers 
(Roma)
€30-50 close to 100%
for trafficker
€100-300 per day
East European traffickers 
(non-Roma)
€50-80 80/20 to 50/50 €300-900 per month
South American
traffickers
€100-€150 40/60 €3,000-€5,000 per 
month/“sex tour”
Chinese traffickers €100-€150 70/30 to 60/40 €4,000-€7,000 per 
month/“sex tour”
Traffickers, especially those bringing victims from third countries, widely 
apply debt bondage as an instrument of control over victims, but also 
as a way to withhold and retain all their earnings. The repayment of 
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debt scheme is widely used in relation both to victims of sexual and 
labour exploitation (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Lalam, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). The debt is usually vaguely 
defined and supposedly consists of the costs for transferring the victims 
to the EU, and for providing lodging, food, clothes, and protection. 
Until the debt is fully repaid (which can take many years), the traffickers 
collect all or almost all of the victims’ earnings. In the debt bondage 
model traffickers usually also charge exorbitant prices for the real 
or alleged services they provide to their victims (e.g. lodging, food, 
clothes, transportation), thus increasing the debt and maximising their 
overall profits. The total amount of the debt can vary from €15,000 
to €20,000 in Chinese trafficking networks, to €30,000-€60,000 in 
Nigerian networks (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; 
Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). In one court case in Italy, the victim’s debt 
amounted to €90,000 (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
Investment and laundering of proceeds earned through human trafficking 
take different forms depending on the profits generated and the scale 
of operation. In general, the fewer victims are controlled by a trafficker, 
the less is earned and therefore a larger proportion of the money is 
immediately spent, reducing the potential for investment. The market 
segment (outdoor or indoor) where the trafficker operates also plays a 
part in determining the level of proceeds generated by the operation. In 
addition, the nationality of the traffickers determines to a large extent 
where money is invested and how it reaches the destination where the 
intended investment takes place. Most foreign traffickers operating in 
Western and Southern Europe, be they independent or part of a criminal 
organisation transfer differing degrees of their earnings back to their 
countries of origin. Despite the variety of investment and money laundry 
schemes, they remain relatively simple. Generally, unless all proceeds 
are reinvested in the trafficking business or immediately spent on lavish 
lifestyle expenses, traffickers opt for real estate or acquisition of cash 
intensive businesses (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018).
Traffickers in lover-boy and small-scale trafficking arrangements (one 
person controlling one to three women) will typically use the bulk of 
their proceeds to sustain a lavish lifestyle through buying designer 
clothing, jewellery, vacations, but also for partying, gambling or acquiring 
drugs (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Rusev et al., 
2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018; 
Nicolae, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). Beyond serving to satisfy the personal 
consumption pattern of traffickers, the exorbitant spending also has the 
function of presenting an image of success and of impressing other potential 
victims (Rusev et al., 2018; Oude Breuil et al., 2018). Nevertheless, small-
scale foreign traffickers operating in Western and Southern Europe often 
manage to move part of their earnings to their country of origin through 
different schemes of repatriation. Subsequently they might acquire, finish 
3.5. INvESTMENT SCHEMES AND MONEy lAUNDERING
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or renovate property, buy vehicles or use the funds to support family in 
their country of origin. Victims who manage to arrange a more beneficial 
arrangement and get to keep a larger portion of earnings for themselves 
might also be able to invest in houses for themselves or their families or 
to start a small business in their country of origin (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 
2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Rusev et al., 2018).
Networks and larger criminal groups with more sophisticated organisation 
that usually control larger number of victims can generate substantial 
revenues. Although part of it can also be spent on a lavish lifestyle, they 
can still afford to allocate substantial funds for investments in the licit 
economy. A common strategy is to invest in cash-intensive business 
ventures in their country of origin – restaurants, bars and night clubs, 
convenience or clothing stores, car washes, beauty salons, massage 
parlours (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Rusev et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 
2018; Lalam, 2018; Nicolae, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). In many 
cases such investments can both serve to conceal and enable the human 
trafficking operations, while at the same time facilitate the laundry of 
proceeds. Businesses in the hospitality sector are sometimes used as 
front for the human trafficking and prostitution, but more often (along 
with beauty salons) prove useful in identifying and recruiting other 
potential victims (Rusev et al., 2018). The business portfolios of large-
scale traffickers are even more diversified, including also businesses in 
construction, agriculture, jewellery trade, and gyms (Rusev et al., 2018; 
Nicolae, 2018).
The collected data in the studied nine EU countries does not indicate 
common use of trafficking proceeds for investments in other criminal 
activities. As already mentioned, the traffickers usually use their proceeds 
to sustain the trafficking operations by addressing running costs such as 
transport, advertising, communication, subsistence and lodging (Terenghi & 
Di Nicola, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018). However, 
there were some examples where perpetrators engaged in usury, lending 
money for interest to close acquaintances or other people from the 
procuring business (Nicolae, 2018). For Italy were also reported some 
cases of Albanian and Nigerian traffickers investing in drug trafficking 
(Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
Traffickers sometimes also make investments in the countries of 
exploitation. Thus, Chinese trafficking networks prefer to launder 
their revenues in the destination countries through already established 
licit enterprises, mostly Chinese restaurants and similar business, 
or acquiring real estate property. This not only helps them to root 
in local territories, but also to keep running both their legal and 
illegal enterprises (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 
2018). East European networks also invest both in their origin and 
destination countries. A recent tendency among Bulgarian trafficking 
networks is to invest their proceeds in real estate and businesses 
abroad, both as a cover (to establish a legitimate reason for residing 
abroad) and investment for trafficking sustainability and expansion. 
These may include bars, clubs, and cafes, used often for criminal social 
networking and/or as a place for selling sexual services (Rusev et al., 
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2018). Similar investments have been reported with regard both to 
Polish and Romanian traffickers (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Nicolae, 
2018). Nigerian traffickers, apparently, invest to a very limited extent in 
destination countries where they operate and in such cases often opt 
for stores selling ethnic goods (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
While significant commonalities exist with regard to the methods used 
to repatriate money to traffickers’ countries of origin, there are also 
specificities related to where the trafficking networks originate from. Cash 
smuggling is preferred and widely utilised by all traffickers, independent 
of their sophistication and origin. The smuggling might either be done 
through participants in the network or intermediaries, providing this 
service to trafficking networks. Cash couriers are often used, with East 
European networks generally transferring cash through couriers travelling 
on land routes (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018; Nicolae, 2018). 
Similarly, Chinese and Nigerian networks use cash couriers to smuggle 
cash through airports. Reportedly the price paid for such service is 6% 
of the smuggled amount (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón 
et al., 2018). Alternatively, victims or sometimes even traffickers might 
carry cash with them on planes and busses (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; 
Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018, Oude Breuil et al., 2018). Nigerian networks 
would sometimes ship cash in containers (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018).
Bank transfers are generally less often employed due to their traceability. 
When the banking system is used, the amounts wired are broken down 
into smaller sums and often are transferred by and to persons other than 
the traffickers, such as family members, victims, intermediaries or dummy 
accounts (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018, Raets & Janssens, 2018). East 
European trafficking networks are more often involved in the laundry 
of money through the use of schemes with straw men and a string of 
shell companies, involving family members, intermediaries or associates 
to transfer and launder money (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Rusev et al., 
2018). Similar methods are employed when remittances are done through 
money transfer companies such as Western Union or MoneyGram in 
order to minimise risks to traffickers (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018; Rusev et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). However, the most 
recent developments show that East European traffickers have started 
to increasingly avoid use of money transfer services due to the ease of 
traceability and rely mostly on cash smuggling instead (Rusev et al., 2018; 
Nicolae, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Oude Breuil et al., 2018).
Middle Eastern, Nigerian, and to a lesser extent Chinese networks also 
utilise the informal money transfer systems such as hawala, where money 
does not cross borders physically and the transactions are based on 
established relations of trustworthiness of the participants in the hawala 
network (El Qorchi et al., 2003; Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018; 
Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018, Raets & Janssens, 2018). The informal 
transfer system utilised by the Nigerian networks is known as “euro-to-
euro” and involves the parallel money transfer through grocery stores 
and other retailers. The fee for transferring money through this informal 
system is reported as 1-2% of the amount (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 
2014; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018).
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Another method for repatriation and laundering of proceeds utilised 
by Bulgarian, Nigerian, and Chinese networks is the use of simple 
trade-based money laundering including purchase and re-sell of easily 
tradable goods. Bulgarian networks generally prefer cars and gold for this 
purpose. Alternatively, stolen goods like electronics are bought cheaply 
and subsequently resold in Bulgaria (Rusev et al., 2018). In the case of 
Nigerian networks, the goods shipped back to Nigeria and subsequently 
resold are more diverse, including electrical appliances, clothes, butane 
canisters (Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Chinese networks tend to purchase 
luxury goods (e.g. designer clothes and accessories) and subsequently 
send them to China (Lalam, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018).

As society proceeds ever further into the information age, innovations 
in information and communication technology have grown to become 
an indispensable part of everyday life (Stalans & Finn, 2016). While the 
internet and assorted technological advancements continue to shape our 
standard of living, so too are the opportunities for crime in general 
and serious and organised crime in particular on a track of continuous 
evolvement (Wall, 2017). Criminal entrepreneurs are popularly believed 
to turn to digital communication technologies in order to make their 
activities even more profitable, in par with their legitimate counterparts 
(Broadhurst et al., 2014; Wall, 2005/2015). Within this framework, the 
nexus between human trafficking and technology is an emerging area of 
public and policy concern (Mendel & Sharapov, 2016; Musto & boyd, 
2014; Milivojevic & Segrave, 2017). Numerous fears and anxieties crop up 
out of concern that things inevitably will take a turn for the worse as a 
result of the use of new technologies (Hillman, Hooper, & Choo, 2014; 
Kloess et al., 2014; Thakor & boyd, 2013). This increasing alertness towards 
“the threats that lurk online” (Milivojevic & Segrave, 2017, p. 34) has 
resulted in sweeping claims about the intersection between trafficking and 
technology, foreboding nothing less than imminent disaster (Milivojevic & 
Segrave, 2017). On that note, the general consensus appears to be that 
the use of technology has had some impact on the crime of trafficking in 
persons. The question of what that impact has been or how crimes have 
been transformed in terms of their mediation by technology, however, 
is still a matter for debate (Wall, 2005; 2015). In fact, our understanding 
of how and to what extent technology is used in trafficking operations 
is rather limited (Milivojevic & Segrave, 2017). How the incorporation of 
technological developments in turn affects the business model of human 
trafficking networks is, quite possibly, even more under-considered.
With this in mind, the aim of the present chapter is to unpack some of 
the abovementioned assumptions that currently define this budding area 
of inquiry. More specifically, the central focus of this chapter is, on the 
one hand, the supposed alignment between advancements in technology 
and the business interests of trafficking offenders, on the other. Based on 
the empirical findings of the nine country studies conducted as part of an 
EU-wide study on the financing of human trafficking carried out in 2017 – 
2018, supplemented by a literature review concerning the trafficking-
technology nexus, this chapter intends to flesh out the connections 
between the operational, technological, and financial dimensions of 
trafficking in human beings. The first section maps the role of technology 
in the human trafficking modus operandi. Following this, the implications 
of the use of digital communication technologies for the human trafficking 
business model are discussed. The concluding section will reflect on the 
main findings that were presented throughout this chapter.
4. THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
IN A DIGITISED AGE
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Considering the cyber-component of the human trafficking modus 
operandi, the use of technology cannot be viewed separately from the 
traditional workings of the trafficking offence. The crime of trafficking 
in human beings, by its very nature, involves a planned series of steps 
rather than a singular criminal act. In this sense, trafficking operations 
generally follow a distinct course of action. According to Aronowitz (2009; 
see also: Campana, 2016), trafficking in persons can be understood as a 
process composed of four stages, namely the recruitment, transportation 
and exploitation of human beings and the subsequent management of 
illicit proceeds. Accordingly, technology is used as a facilitator from one 
end of the trafficking cycle to the other (Antonopoulos, 2018). Against 
this background, the discussion of the role of the internet and assorted 
technological advancements in the following section is structured around 
the different stages of the human trafficking process.
4.1.1. Recruitment
To start from what is most commonly referred to as the beginning of 
the human trafficking cycle, technology has added a whole new level 
to the process of recruitment (boyd et al., 2011; Di Nicola et al., 2017). 
The internet in particular has amplified the recruiting efforts of trafficking 
networks by bringing a wider pool of potential targets from various 
socio-economic and geographic backgrounds within their reach (Yu, 
2014; Verham, 2015; Malby et al., 2015). Broadly speaking, e-recruitment 
practices are adopted both in cases of labour exploitation as well as in 
trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation (Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018). Quite a few online platforms present opportunities 
for singling out, contacting and ensnaring suitable targets, most notably 
social networking sites, online classifieds, dating sites, and chat rooms 
(Latonero et al., 2011; Di Nicola et al., 2017).
The ubiquity of personal information on social media and other 
sites facilitates the identification and selection of potential victims 
appreciably (Watson et al., 2015; Lavorgna, 2015; Di Nicola et al., 
2017). Recruiters usually apply crude selection criteria to potential 
trafficking candidates. Most often, these criteria revolve around physical 
attractiveness, psychological vulnerability, and accessibility (Kloess et 
al., 2014; Lavorgna, 2013). Concerning the ease of access to potential 
targets, technological features such as the geotagging of images and 
postings on social media (Malby et al., 2015) or the use of location-
based dating apps of a similar kind as Tinder (Powell & Henry, 
2017) enable offenders to determine the proximity of their prospective 
recruits. In addition, skilled recruiters are able to read into their 
subject’s mental state through their online presence and quickly pick 
up whether a target is in a vulnerable position or not (Vanderschaaf, 
2013). Alternatively, social media profiles and other sources of personal 
data allow for the identification of specific targets, as the purposive 
4.1. THE USE OF DIGITAl COMMUNICATION TECHNOlOGIES
 IN HUMAN TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS
the	economics	oF	human	traFFicking	in	a	digitised	age	 87
targeting of independent sex workers by trafficking rings in Bulgaria 
demonstrates (Rusev et al., 2018).
The identification of suitable targets is logically followed by attempts to 
contact the selected individuals. In general terms, strategies to get in touch 
with potential victims range from generic and impersonal approaches 
such as the posting of deceptive job offers (Vanderschaaf, 2013) to highly 
individualised plots. In case of the former strategy, recruiters essentially 
cast their net wide and wait until an unsuspecting target takes the bait 
(Yu, 2014). On this account, trafficking offenders do not always need to 
go after vulnerable targets or set up wildly deceitful schemes. In some 
cases, victims approach recruiters on their own initiative. The offering of 
package deals to those looking to travel to Europe (see Terenghi & Di 
Nicola, 2018) is a clear example of this type of indirect recruitment. In 
the same spirit, “double role girls” (Lavorgna, 2013, p. 121) – victims who 
managed to climb the ranks of the trafficking organisation – can serve 
to intrigue and incentivise other potential recruits by showcasing a life 
of luxury on social media outlets. Some recruiters, on the other hand, 
prefer a more direct approach, characterised by chasing targets of choice 
rather than targets of chance. Handpicking vulnerable individuals and 
zeroing in on those potential victims leaves room for a more personal 
touch. While more time-sapping and labour-intensive, a personalised 
recruitment strategy is generally more compelling and effective (Yu, 2014). 
When it comes to approaching suitable targets, digital communication 
technologies lower the threshold to make contact with prospective 
recruits. Increased disinhibition is a well-known side effect of interacting 
in cyberspace (Lavorgna, 2013). Online communications easily cut across 
social barriers, bend the rules of interpersonal conduct and generally 
speed up contacts (Suler, 2004; Kloess et al., 2014). Virtual associations 
thus prompt accelerated self-disclosure, which naturally paves the way 
for victim subjection. The wide availability of personal information 
on the internet assists the progress of online recruitment efforts in 
a similar way. Keeping tabs on somebody through their social media 
postings, learning about an individual’s concerns, day-to-day activities, 
or other personal details and converting this knowledge into a form of 
customised deceit is undoubtedly conducive to the swift establishment 
of a connection with one’s victims (Di Nicola et al., 2017; Lavorgna, 
2015). Likewise, imprudently shared private information enables recruiters 
to pick up the personality of potential sex trafficking victims, making 
it possible for imaginative offenders to adopt a fabricated persona for 
the purpose of presenting themselves to their chosen targets by means 
of a fake, and thoroughly engineered, online profile (Europol, 2017; 
Kloess et al., 2014).
Touching on the subject of bringing potential victims under one’s 
control, recruitment for the purpose of sexual exploitation occasionally 
involves a grooming process aimed at gaining the victim’s confidence 
(boyd et al., 2011; Hughes, 2014; Latonero et al., 2011). The term 
“grooming” generally refers to the process whereby an offender prepares 
a prospective victim for one or multiple episodes of abuse (Kloess et 
al., 2014; Malby et al., 2015). This preparatory work basically revolves 
around the building, and subsequent abuse, of trust (Kloess et al., 2014). 
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Remarkably, the online grooming processes of sexual offenders who 
target children and the subcategory of lover-boy traffickers show great 
similarity. Then again, both types of offenders share the same criminal 
objectives, to wit: obtaining access to victims, ensuring compliance, and 
maintaining the victim’s secrecy (Malby et al., 2015). If successful, the 
grooming process ultimately culminates into a perverted relationship 
defined by a deeply distorted balance of power (Kloess et al., 2014; Di 
Nicola et al., 2017). To this end, offenders largely resort to a carrot-and-
stick approach where pleasant inducements and sweet talking alternate 
with violent threats and blunt coercion. This dual strategy of providing 
attention and appreciation in conjunction with establishing control and 
isolating the targeted individual from any protective significant others 
serves to force victims into a position whence there is no clear escape 
(Vanderschaaf, 2013; Kloess et al., 2014). On that account, the creation 
of a state of emotional dependency by making pretence of amorous 
interest is a trademark of the lover-boy modus operandi (Di Nicola et 
al., 2017).
4.1.2. Transportation
In order to proceed from drawing in suitable targets to actually exploiting 
them, many, if not most trafficking rings need to move their recruits 
from the source country to their respective country of destination. 
Accordingly, the phase of transportation necessarily involves logistical and 
travel arrangements intended to bridge the operational distance between 
recruitment efforts and the final cause of exploitation (Watson et al., 2015; 
Di Nicola et al., 2017). In this context, criminal entrepreneurs, not unlike 
their legitimate counterparts, often rely on technological developments 
to execute these kinds of ancillary activities in a smooth and efficient 
way (Choo & Grabosky, 2014). Digital communication technologies can 
facilitate the transportation of trafficking victims either by simplifying 
the procurement of travel documents or through the online booking 
of train, plane, and bus tickets (Lavorgna, 2013). The same goes for 
counterfeit documents, as advancements in technology open the door for 
higher quality fraudulent imitations at lower prices (Antonopoulos, 2018). 
Moreover, aligning concurrent processes of recruiting, transporting, and 
exploiting presupposes close coordination among the different nodes of 
a trafficking organisation (boyd et al., 2011). Under these circumstances, 
the internet and assorted technologies offer new opportunities for 
criminal collaboration and organisation (Konrad et al., 2017; Latonero 
et al., 2015). Furthermore, digital communication technologies greatly 
facilitate coordination across dispersed sites of activity, which means 
that criminal operations can be run from a distance without much 
difficulty (Broadhurst et al., 2014). Other than that, a number of trafficking 
networks wield the internet as an enhanced communication tool because 
these technologies pose less of a risk in terms of wiretapping or the 
interception of potentially damning conversations in comparison to more 
traditional methods of communication such as phone calls (Bijlenga & 
Kleemans, 2017; Wall, 2005/2015; Europol, 2017). In short, technology 
offers considerable managerial and organisational opportunities for human 
trafficking operations (Lavorgna, 2015).
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4.1.3. Exploitation
Continuing on this line, the transferring of victims is ordinarily followed 
by the phase of exploitation. Considering trafficking for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation, victims need to advertised in one way or another 
in order to sell and consequently profit from their services. In this 
connection, technological developments have modified the ways in 
which trafficking victims are marketed (Europol, 2016; Greiman & Bain, 
2013; Mitchell et al., 2011). The World Wide Web provides a way to 
advertise anything to a wide audience, all with a minimum of effort 
(Mitchell & boyd, 2014; Latonero et al., 2012; Di Nicola et al., 2017). 
At the same time, due to this expanded advertising reach, technology 
may also provide an efficient means of reaching more obscure target 
audiences (Mitchell & boyd, 2014). Because of its discreetness, relative 
anonymity and general effortlessness, online soliciting can be considered 
as a particularly sex buyer-friendly marketing strategy (Farley et al., 2013; 
Verham, 2015; Ibanez & Gazan, 2016). The accessibility and convenience 
of online soliciting encourages “virtual cruising,” in which clients can 
make a choice in the comfort of their own home while retaining a 
sense of privacy (Sanders et al., 2018; Yu, 2014; Perer, 2012). For the 
most part, criminal entrepreneurs are quite flexible in how they advertise 
their “commodities” (Hughes, 2014). Advertising venues range from major 
public websites to underground online platforms (boyd et al., 2011). 
To specify, the marketing of trafficking victims is associated with social 
media (Europol, 2016; Di Nicola et al., 2017; Finn & Stalans, 2016), online 
classifieds (Ibanez & Gazan, 2016; Portnoff et al., 2017), dating sites 
(Europol, 2016; Finn & Stalans, 2016), dedicated escort websites (Europol, 
2016; Di Nicola et al., 2017), specialised websites that provide a forum 
for clients to review the sex workers they visited (Di Nicola et al., 2017; 
Finn & Stalans, 2016), niche sites tailored to certain paraphilias (Finn & 
Stalans, 2016), and darknet markets. However, the latter category appears 
to be reserved for child sexual exploitation material (Europol, 2017) and 
the selling of sexual services by minors (Di Nicola et al., 2017). To note, 
the darknet is used by a comparatively small number of people, which 
severely limits its potential as a marketing platform (Howell, 2016). In 
contrary to the wide variety of online advertising venues, it is important 
to mention the importance of a handful of major market leading websites 
(Sanders et al., 2018), such as redlights.be, hookers.nl or vivastreet.fr. 
Online promotional platforms regularly employ the freemium business 
model, which entails that advertising is free, but upgrades which bring 
more visibility and thus more clients are paid (Sanders et al., 2018). Beyond 
catching the attention of potential buyers, communication technologies 
are a convenient tool to talk terms and arrange appointments with clients 
(Mitchell & boyd, 2014; Hughes, 2014; Europol, 2016). In a few well-
organised trafficking networks, this type of customer interaction can take 
the form of online platforms set up to handle clients (see Antonopoulos, 
2018) or even entire organisational departments specialised in online 
promotion and web design (see Nicolae, 2018).
Over and above online soliciting, new technologies can be leveraged 
as a means to exercise control (Greiman & Bain, 2013; Mitchell & 
boyd, 2014). In some cases, trafficking offenders induce compliance 
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by obtaining sexually explicit images (whether taken with or without 
consent) and subsequently threatening to distribute these pictures to 
friends or family members (Powell & Henry, 2017; Hughes, 2014). This 
type of blackmail is also known as sextortion (Di Nicola et al., 2017) or 
image-based sexual abuse (Powell & Henry, 2017). Aside from emotional 
wire-pulling, digital surveillance systems (Hughes, 2014; Europol, 2016; 
Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018) and location tracking services (Gerry et al., 
2016; Europol, 2016) permit traffickers to keep a close watch on their 
victims. Some apps are in fact specifically marketed for the purpose of 
monitoring. Examples are spy cams and camera apps, or perpetrators 
can choose to install spyware in order to monitor locations and 
communications (Powell & Henry, 2017). Another technology-mediated 
method of control is to make victims report back to their exploiters 
by demanding messages via mobile after each service or by sending 
pictures in order to verify their location (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; 
Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018). More broadly speaking, technology can be 
used to communicate with victims, to boss them around, and to issue 
threats (Hughes, 2014), all with the benefit of remaining distanced from 
the site of exploitation (Europol, 2016). On occasion, traffickers impose 
restrictions on the use of technology with the aim of further isolating 
their victims (boyd et al., 2011; Latonero et al., 2015; Hughes, 2014). In 
certain cases, these restrictions assume the form of taking control over 
social media accounts and profiles, both in the interest of supervision 
and for marketing purposes (Rusev et al., 2018).
More than that, technology in and of itself can be leveraged as a 
modality of exploitation (Oude Breuil et al., 2018). The digital revolution 
has resulted in a medium through which sexual services are sold online 
purely in the form of indirect contact (Sanders et al., 2018). In this 
context, the term “coerced cybersex” (Greiman & Bain, 2013) denotes a 
relatively new form of exploitation that relies entirely upon the use of 
digital communication technologies (Malby et al., 2015). Video hosting 
services can for instance be employed in order to broadcast sexual acts, 
while allowing access only to users who have paid to watch (boyd et 
al., 2011). As regards webcam platforms, customers are usually charged 
in per minute increments (Sanders et al., 2018; Bach & Dohy, 2015). 
That being said, the proceeds from online sexual services are generally 
much lower than those in other segments of the sex industry (Sanders 
et al., 2018).
4.1.4. Financial management
Ultimately, most trafficking operations are set up with an eye towards 
making a profit. As far as the process of financial management is concerned, 
criminal entrepreneurs have been found to place their confidence in 
technological solutions, albeit only sporadically. For instance, certain 
financial transactions can take place over the internet, thereby involving 
digital monetary services or alternative payment markets (Broadhurst 
et al., 2014; boyd et al., 2011). As follows, cyberspace may be used 
to move illicit funds abroad in a relatively fast and economical way 
(Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Online banking in particular increases the 
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ease with which new accounts can be opened, thus indirectly facilitating 
the use of money mules (Bijlenga & Kleemans, 2017; Europol, 2017; 
Mitchell & boyd, 2014). In this sense, technological advancements can 
also be instrumental in the laundering of criminal proceeds resulting from 
exploitation (Hughes, 2014). Relevant to the subject of money laundering, 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are readily associated with the issue 
of criminal money management. These alternative payment instruments 
have attracted the attention of various criminal enterprises by reason 
of their decentralised configuration, which essentially means that virtual 
currencies operate independently of the traditional banking system and 
thus outside the boundaries of governmental and regulatory oversight 
(Brenig et al., 2015; Hoyer, 2017). For this reason, cryptocurrencies could 
be leveraged as a tool to conceal criminal profits, or as a conduit for 
the payment of bribes (Watson et al., 2015). However, despite the 
apparent advantages of cryptocurrency-based or cyber-mediated money 
laundering, human traffickers seemingly stick to more traditional methods 
such as cash (Brenig et al., 2015). One could argue that the apparent 
unpopularity of virtual currencies in human trafficking circles might be 
rooted in unfamiliarity or a general lack of expertise. If anything, financial 
management is a high-stakes phase of the trafficking cycle, and this in 
itself might explain why offenders prefer to cling to the methods they 
know and are familiar with. Accordingly, technological advancements 
like Bitcoin, while facilitative of trafficking activities, are not necessarily 
promptly incorporated into the human trafficking modus operandi 
(Watson et al., 2015).
As made apparent above, the contours of the crime of trafficking in 
persons are gradually being reshaped through technological developments 
(Milivojevic & Segrave, 2017). Most importantly, digital communication 
technologies bear on many facets of the trafficking business. Human 
trafficking is, by and large, a multidimensional and highly adaptive 
criminal venture and the role of technology can be widely different as 
a result of this variegation (boyd et al., 2011; Di Nicola et al., 2017; 
Latonero et al., 2012). From this perspective, the trafficking-technology 
nexus presents a rather diffuse image (Latonero et al., 2012). Having 
established that the role of new technologies in trafficking operations 
is a lot more diversified than it was originally made out to be, in turn, 
raises the question of how these diverse technological applications affect 
the human trafficking business model. On that account, the next section 
considers the structural and financial implications associated with the 
adoption of technology.
First off, digital and networked technologies have a bearing on the 
organisation of human trafficking operations (Latonero et al., 2012). On 
the whole, the embracement of technology enhances flexibility and 
allows offenders to effectively streamline the trafficking process (Hughes, 
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2014; Farley et al., 2013). As a result of this increased flexibility, the 
need to have local intermediaries or emissaries in source countries 
becomes largely avoidable, thereby erasing a layer of the criminal 
organisation (Lavorgna, 2015; Lavorgna, 2013). The calculated usage of 
new technologies could potentially supplant certain roles in trafficking 
networks (Raets & Janssens, 2018), notably the functions of recruiter, 
transporter, and enforcer. In addition, the reduced need to be physically 
present as the site of operation enables offenders to distance themselves 
from the criminal transactions (Malby et al., 2015; Di Nicola et al., 
2017; Latonero et al., 2011). Having the ability to offend from afar also 
implies that the geographical location of criminal actors and co-offenders 
is less significant than it was before (Wall, 2005/2015; Lavorgna, 2015). 
Whereas technology obviates the need for certain roles, other criminal 
actors become more important, to wit external facilitators in the form of 
IT experts. The connections between members of a trafficking ring can 
often be highly clustered. If necessary, individuals who hold technical 
expertise or have specific capacities can therefore be sought outside the 
confines of the criminal network (Bijlenga & Kleemans, 2017). Furthermore, 
technological advancements might capacitate both individual offenders 
and smaller criminal groups to set up their own trafficking venture 
(Lavorgna, 2015; Lavorgna, 2013). Digital communication technologies 
have particularly empowered individuals in a way that has never been 
possible before (Broadhurst et al., 2014). Simply put, technology acts as 
a “force multiplier” (Powell & Henry, 2017, p. 246), providing motivated 
single agents with the means to reach a virtually inexhaustible pool of 
potential targets while requiring an absolute minimum in terms of efforts 
or capabilities. In other words, these “empowered” individuals might find 
themselves in a position where they are able to control every aspect of 
the trafficking process, which previously necessitated a range of criminal 
actors with various skill sets (Wall, 2017; Lavorgna, 2013). This means 
that the organisational and business models that were once developed 
with a view to carrying out criminal operations in the real world are 
not necessarily reflected in the organisation of cyber-mediated trafficking 
activities (Lavorgna, 2013). In this way, the adoption of technological 
advancements has only added to the diversification of the human 
trafficking landscape. Moreover, the fact that one or even a handful of 
people can control entire criminal processes has certain implications for 
our comprehension of the organisation of crime as such (Wall, 2017). 
That is, the impact of a criminal network does not always correspond to 
its size, nor is “organised” by definition synonymous with more “serious” 
or “dangerous” (Leukfeldt et al., 2017). So, in some respects, the use 
of technology has levelled the playing field for individual offenders and 
smaller, looser criminal networks (Lavorgna, 2013). A case in point is how 
the internet effectively contributed to the gradual erosion of the existing 
cartelisation and monopolisation of the sex market by organised crime 
syndicates in Bulgaria (Rusev et al., 2018).
Secondly, regarding the financial impact related to the use of new 
technologies, just as technology enhances structural flexibility, so too it 
heightens the efficiency of criminal operations (Broadhurst et al., 2014). 
In general terms, the adoption of technological developments goes hand 
in hand with a reduction in operating costs and investments (Malby et 
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al., 2015). By way of illustration, the costs of recruitment can be kept 
to an absolute minimum through the use of the internet. Deceptive 
ads can for instance be disseminated across various online platforms 
at once in order to lure and recruit potential victims at no cost (see 
also Antonopoulos, 2018). Besides that, online recruitment is less risky 
in terms of backtracking, given that it is much easier and less of an 
issue for recruiters to back out once they realise that the situation is 
not working out as planned (Lavorgna, 2013). Beyond recruitment, digital 
communication technologies can lower the costs for advertisement and 
customer acquisition (Malby et al., 2015). Overall, online solicitation is 
cheaper and more instantly effective when compared to more traditional 
methods of marketing such as buying ads in a local newspaper (Sanders 
et al., 2018). New technologies also provide the means for broader 
flexibility in the acquisition of clients, thereby increasing the expediency 
of this commercial pursuit (Latonero et al., 2011; Sirseloudi, 2018). 
Likewise, the use of technology can have an impact on the costs related 
to supervision and control, as technological advancements mitigate the 
need for a member of the criminal network to be physically present 
on the premises at all times (Antonopoulos, 2018; Rusev et al., 2018). 
Lastly, technologies let trafficking offenders cut back on transaction costs 
in the form of expenditure on accommodation, and more specifically 
on window fees (Raets & Janssens, 2018). In this connection, a relevant 
example is the recent phenomenon of sexual transactions taking place 
in accommodations rented through the online platform Airbnb (Lalam, 
2018), also known as “pop-up brothels” (see Sanders et al., 2018). In 
general, the internet has augmented the regular sex industry in that a 
great part of sex workers are now advertising online and, accordingly, sex 
work is increasingly relocated into private residences and hotels (Finn & 
Stalans, 2016; Sanders et al., 2018; Greiman & Bain, 2013). Street corners 
and windows correspond to marketplaces that are by definition restricted 
in size (Farley et al., 2013). By contrast, through the internet, sex workers 
are able to flexibly employ themselves in more than one sector and 
move between segments of the industry according to need (Sanders 
et al., 2018). In this way, the internet can broaden the opportunities 
to make money. Online solicitation and the increasing privatisation of 
sex work also reduce the competitive advantage of having access to 
established and profitable locations (Rusev et al., 2018). Consequently, 
as far as costs and investments are concerned, cyber-enabled trafficking 
operations demand little investments in terms of man hours or financial 
capital, nor is there a need for much technical skills, as these activities 
amount to simple “’point and click’ crimes” (Viano, 2017, p. 4). The 
potential return on effort, on the other hand, is high, largely through the 
wide availability of potential targets (Powell & Henry, 2017; Greiman & 
Bain, 2013) and the reachability of an expanded customer base (Ibanez & 
Gazan, 2016; Lavorgna, 2015). More than that, digital technologies present 
new opportunities for making a profit by opening doors to new markets, 
clients, and sectors that were previously untapped (Nicolae, 2018). In 
other words, technology can render the notoriously cost-effective crime 
of trafficking in human beings even more cost-effective.
In connection with the financial implications tied to the use of technology, 
the internet and related technological developments have a bearing on 
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the longer-term cost of detection. That is, relying on technology comes at 
the cost of heightened visibility (boyd et al., 2011; Latonero et al., 2011; 
Thakor & boyd, 2013). This is due to the fact that online activity inevitably 
leaves traces (Wall, 2005/2015; boyd et al., 2011). The online exposure 
of trafficking activities is therefore closely connected to two conflicting 
objectives: hiding one’s illegal operation from law enforcement agencies and 
disclosing one’s business to customers (Lavorgna, 2015). In consequence, 
offenders are forced to balance security risks with operational necessities 
(Ibanez & Gazan, 2016). Whereas some offenders opt for more overt 
and wide-reaching marketing methods, others avoid using technology 
altogether as part of a deliberate risk-averse strategy (Rusev et al., 2018). 
As mentioned above, the reluctance to leave digital traces behind is 
particularly pervasive in the field of money management simply because 
of the high risks that are involved in this part of the scheme.
However, trafficking offenders are obviously aware that they are vulnerable 
to law enforcement as a result of online exposure, and adjust their 
tactics accordingly (Konrad et al., 2017). Offenders learn to leverage 
technology in creative ways in order to lower the risk of being uncovered 
(Stalans & Finn, 2016). For instance, maintaining anonymity or assuming 
false identities during the commission of crimes is much easier in 
cyberspace than in the real world (Stalans & Finn, 2016). Apart from fake 
profiles and the accompanying bogus identities, anonymity can also be 
safeguarded with the help of technological solution such as encryption, 
VPN’s, proxies or other anonymising features designed to obfuscate 
digital trails (Europol, 2017). Another possibility is to boldly hide in plain 
sight (Finn & Stalans, 2016). Common countermeasures in this sense are 
the use of coded language and cryptic terms, both in advertising and 
in-group communication (Yu, 2014; Malby et al., 2015; Ibanez & Gazan, 
2016). By way of example, certain keywords are reputedly meant to serve 
as signals for the purchasers of sex with minors (Latonero et al., 2011). 
Alternatively, perpetrators mask the criminal nature of their undertakings 
by presenting their activities as legitimate services such as massaging 
or dating services (Finn & Stalans, 2016; Di Nicola et al., 2017). Online 
soliciting can thus be done in a more covert and surreptitious way 
(Sanders et al., 2018). A last resort in evading detection is to relocate 
all online activity from risky, high-profile venues to more covert and 
clandestine platforms (Finn & Stalans, 2016). This suggests that cracking 
down on certain sites of activity just drives trafficking activity further 
underground (Sanders et al., 2018).
In this concluding section, the main points of this chapter will be 
recapitulated, with an eye towards drawing our findings about the 
financial, operational, and technological dimensions of human trafficking 
together. First and foremost, the main rationale behind the adoption and 
incorporation of technology in the human trafficking modus operandi is 
essentially rooted in financial logic, more specifically the pursuance of a 
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more favourable cost-to-benefit ratio (Wall, 2005/2015). The same holds 
true for the decision to avoid the internet and its derivatives. In effect, 
technology is a double-edged sword, generating heightened efficiency as 
well as heightened visibility (Musto & boyd, 2014). In this connection, the 
use of new technologies principally affects the logistics of the criminal 
operation rather than the core of the trafficking business. Even after the 
integration of technological aspects, the bottom-line of any trafficking 
enterprise stays very much the same. In other words, only the method 
of operation shows contrast, whereas the underlying principles and 
vested interests remain practically unchanged (Viano, 2017). As follows, 
embracing technology brings about “differences of degree rather than 
kind” (Powell & Henry, 2017, p. 246). On this account, the role of digital 
communication technologies should be kept in perspective (Mitchell et 
al., 2011; Stalans & Finn, 2016).
Furthermore, the image of cyber-mediated trafficking as presented 
throughout this chapter does not seem to confirm the almost apocalyptic 
claims made with regard to the nexus between trafficking and technology 
(Hillman et al., 2014; Kloess et al., 2014; Thakor & boyd, 2013). As far 
as a “cyber-lift” is concerned (Wall, 2005/2015), the general trend is 
not one of scaling up, setting up ever bigger operations, or exploiting 
unseen numbers of victims. In fact, there is no conclusive data as to 
whether the adoption of technology increases experiences of exploitation 
(Musto & boyd, 2014). Rather than escalating matters, technology has 
seemingly added to the diversification of the human trafficking landscape. 
When looking at the effect of technology on the structure of trafficking 
networks, traditional, hierarchical organisations are expanding their 
field of operation to the digital domain apace with smaller and more 
flexible criminal networks (Choo & Grabosky, 2014; Broadhurst et al., 
2014). Attitudes toward the online environment nevertheless vary widely 
according to the risks that are perceived to be involved in this digitising 
exercise (boyd et al., 2011), which is why the level of online exposure 
in trafficking operations ranges from no use whatsoever to exclusive 
reliance on the internet and virtually everything in between (cf. Rusev 
et al., 2018).
On a final note, it should be remarked that technology can be exploited 
for all manner of purposes, as is the case with any tool or instrument 
(Howell, 2016). In this respect, technological developments have been 
framed both “as part of the problem (…) and part of the solution” 
(Milivojevic & Segrave, 2017, pp. 29-30). In a sense, the same technologies 
that are modifying crime are also modifying police work (Wall, 2017). 
As reported by recent studies (see for example Oude Breuil et al., 
2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018), law enforcement agencies across different 
nations are gradually following suit in adopting new technologies. 
However, the issue is not whether law enforcement agencies make 
use of technologies, but rather if these responses correctly reflect 
the changing threat landscape (Europol, 2017). With this in mind, it is 
important to take the complicated and multifaceted nature of human 
trafficking into consideration. The crime of trafficking in human beings 
inherently touches upon many different dimensions and aspects, which 
implies that information about trafficking cases is often fragmented 
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(Konrad et al., 2017). Investigating trafficking cases therefore presupposes 
an increasing level of sophistication and a wide range of investigative 
skills in law enforcement agents (Aiken & Chan, 2015; Mitchell & boyd, 
2014; Hillman et al., 2014). In view of this complexity, the mainstreaming 
and routinisation of both technological and financial knowledge into 
human trafficking investigations is nothing short of imperative (Wall, 
2017; Hillman, Hooper, & Choo, 2014; Mitchell, Jones, Finkelhor, & 
Wolak, 2011). Conversely, siloing various forms of expertise from one 
another comes at the risk of compartmentalising the investigation of 
the different arms of the trafficking business that are de facto part of 
the same offence (Farley et al., 2013). To conclude, in coming to grips 
with the nexus between trafficking and technology, the ultimate aim 
should be to deal with the crime of trafficking in persons in a more 
constructive way. A nuanced and connected approach (Wall, 2017) 
that mirrors the true nature of the connections between technology, 
trafficking, and finances is, for this reason, absolutely essential.
Buying plane and train tickets, renting accommodation, moving funds 
abroad and reinvesting profits – not only do all these activities make the 
crime of trafficking in human beings possible, they also in many cases 
leave indelible financial traces. Human trafficking operations commonly 
take the form of a business-like logistics chain, and each and every 
one of these logistical steps is, to some degree, mirrored in financial 
transactions. It is therefore difficult for organised crime groups to carry 
out their undertakings without leaving some kind of pecuniary mark, 
as both the perpetration of the offence and the enjoyment of its 
proceeds can result in a trail of financial breadcrumbs (Wood, 2017). 
On this premise, finances are principally at the very front and centre of 
trafficking operations. Yet, the financial aspects of human trafficking are, 
to all appearances, not central to law enforcement responses. For the 
most part, attempts to combat trafficking in human beings stay focused 
on the crime of trafficking itself and not on the proceeds (OSCE, 
2014). Money is nevertheless often imagined as the be-all and end-all 
of serious and organised crime and this includes human trafficking. 
In point of fact, the financial approach towards human trafficking is 
expressly based on the presumption that human trafficking offenders 
are ultimately driven by profit. Without the prospect of profitability, 
there is seemingly no warrant for its exercise (Lalam, 2018). Thus, money 
is, in more ways than one, a weak spot for trafficking organisations. 
Against this background, the question begs to be answered: which role 
do financial approaches play in mounting an effective response against 
trafficking in persons?
The current chapter reflects on the use of finance-oriented approaches in 
dealing with human trafficking. The first section describes the adoption 
of financial measures in the anti-trafficking field, depicting in what 
ways financial investigations can be leveraged in the context of human 
trafficking and subsequently comparing this range of functionalities 
with how financial investigations are actually used. Following this is a 
section which looks into the effectiveness of the financial approach. 
More specifically, the variety of factors which affect the degree to 
which monetary measures are successful in stemming human trafficking 
activity, as well as some of the implicit assumptions which lie at the 
root of financial approaches, will be considered. To conclude this 
chapter, a number of good practices with regard to the practical 
implementation of financial approaches towards human trafficking rings 
are highlighted.
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When it comes to targeting human trafficking operations through their 
monetary resources, financial investigation is the mainstay of any and 
all finance-oriented approaches. Financial investigation as such can be 
understood as the “enquiry into the financial affairs related to criminal 
conduct” (FATF, 2012, p. 3). As an investigative discipline, financial 
investigations basically imply “the collection, analysis and use of financial 
information, in its broadest sense, by law enforcement organisations” 
(Slot et al., 2015, p. 18). However, it should be noted that financial 
investigations make for an exercise than can be carried out by a variety 
of different agents, both within and beyond law enforcement. Actors 
that typically have a part in this matter are police forces and dedicated 
financial intelligence services (Slot et al., 2015), yet agencies such as social 
inspection services, administrative bodies and private financial institutions 
can also be brought into play (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 
2018). In this context, it is important to recognise the differing levels of 
knowledge and expertise in the field of financial investigations (Slot et 
al., 2015). Financial investigative attitudes and abilities present themselves 
in various forms throughout the law enforcement and judicial system, 
starting with an elementary notion of asset-oriented approaches at the 
level of local police forces, up to the highly specialist skillset needed to 
crack the more complex or puzzling financial elements of a criminal case 
(Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Slot et al., 2015).
As follows from the above, financial investigation is to be considered 
“first and foremost an investigation method” (Slot et al., 2015, p. 9). 
In this sense, financial investigations can be conducted with a wide 
variety of inquisitorial purposes in mind. In the first place, looking into 
financial trails is a possible avenue for detecting and correctly identifying 
incidences of human trafficking (Brown, 2013; Leman & Janssens, 2015). 
More than that, financial investigation inherently carries potential in terms 
of building cases and providing evidence (Oude Breuil et al., 2018, 2018; 
Raets & Janssens, 2018). Financial intelligence complements and supports 
more traditional forms of fact-finding, such as the questioning of victims 
or other witnesses (Wood, 2017; Wright, 2017). In other words, following 
the money can bolster investigations into the underlying offence (Wood, 
2017). Direct proceeds, for example, constitute proof of the predicate 
criminal activities (Golobinek, 2006). Moreover, financial evidence can 
pave the way for an array of additional charges, notably in the sphere of 
financial and economic crime (Wright, 2017; Wood, 2017). On a similar 
note, prying into suspicious transactions can reveal inordinately luxurious 
lifestyles as well as personal connections and cooperative links, thereby 
allowing investigators to connect the dots between places, people and 
illicit acts (Wood, 2017). Financial investigations may thus be of use in 
laying bare the structure of trafficking organisations (Raets & Janssens, 
2018). After all, money is what ties these networks together. In this sense, 
gaining insight into the financial flows of a trafficking operation may very 
well shed a light on the power structure between the different members 
of a group (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Wright, 2017). Furthermore, by 
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tracing the financial breadcrumbs, investigators might uncover previously 
unknown victims or even co-offenders, including the relatively elusive top-
tiers of the human trafficking business which merely handle the finances 
rather than involving themselves in the actual exploitation (OSCE, 2014; 
Wright, 2017; Bell, 2001). As a result, along the lines of identifying the 
different nodes of a network and determining their respective financial 
position, financial inquiries likely aid in revealing the full picture of 
trafficking operations (Oude Breuil et al., 2018).
Aside from evidentiary contributions, financial investigations have 
significance for the confiscation of illegally obtained profits (Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018; Brown, 2013; Wright, 2017). Whereas financial intelligence is 
a pre-eminent route to locating criminal assets and ascertaining ownership 
(Wood, 2017), financial investigation tools equally hold value with regard 
to getting a measure of the amounts involved (Sirseloudi, 2018). In 
effect, there are many different ways to assess the proceeds of a human 
trafficking ring. The most basic method entails a direct calculation of 
the profits of the criminal enterprise (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Raets & 
Janssens, 2018). In cases of sexual exploitation, the overall revenues 
are typically equated to a sum of the number of victims, the average 
price of sexual services, and the typical number of clients the victims 
would receive (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Lalam, 2018). Additionally, the 
duration of the criminal undertaking is taken into consideration (Lalam, 
2018). Estimating the proceeds of labour exploitation, on the other hand, 
is less straightforward. As regards the financial gains from exploiting a 
vulnerable workforce, profits largely correspond to the costs the exploiter 
avoids having to make (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; see also Wright, 2017). 
As such, calculating the revenues of labour trafficking operations centres 
around quantifying the amount of unpaid wages and salaries as well as 
outstanding taxes and social contributions (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Oude 
Breuil et al., 2018). Factors such as the duration of the employment, 
working hours, and the type of labour can further shape the assessment 
figure (Raets & Janssens, 2018). As an alternative to the direct calculation 
of criminal proceeds, unlawfully obtained assets can be estimated by 
comparing the total sum of funds one has accumulated over a suspicious 
period of time with one’s supposed legal income (Raets & Janssens, 
2018; Oude Breuil et al., 2018). Funds that cannot be legally accounted 
for are thus inferred to be the result of criminal activity (Oude Breuil et 
al., 2018). However, reasoning from the foregoing, there is a striking lack 
of agreement on how criminal profits should be defined or measured 
(Kruisbergen et al., 2016). Additionally, calculations oftentimes rest on 
extrapolations and assumptions, thereby widening the scope of possible 
disagreement. The question whether to take operating expenses into 
account is a typical point of contention in this matter (cf. Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Sirseloudi, 2018).
Nevertheless, the concept of financial investigation is routinely miscon-
strued, widely misunderstood and repeatedly misapplied (Slot et al., 
2015; Wood, 2017). That is, despite its merit as a generic method of in-
vestigation, financial investigations are still, in large part, confined to the 
realms of financial crime and asset confiscation (Wood, 2017; Slot et al., 
2015; Soudijn, 2014). This rather myopic view on the why and wherefore 
100 Financing	oF	organised	crime:	human	traFFicking	in	Focus
of a financial inquiry is, to some extent, symptomatic of the develop-
ment of a dogmatic asset recovery culture in law enforcement over the 
last few years (Slot et al., 2015; Levi, 2015; Lalam, 2018). Against this 
background, ‘follow the money’ strategies are all too often elevated to 
an end in and of itself as opposed to a means to an end (Wood, 2017). 
Not only is the application of financial investigations more often than 
not restricted to the purpose of confiscation (Roudaut, 2011; Raets & 
Janssens, 2018), financial investigations are also predominantly conducted 
based on case-by-case assessments rather than as part of a systematic 
response to organised crime or human trafficking (Rusev et al., 2018; 
Slot et al., 2015; Atkinson et al., 2017). Thus, while some progress has 
been made in bringing financial approaches out of the unknown and 
into the mainstream, financial investigation remains, in many instances, 
a peripheral issue, something seen as an add-on to criminal investiga-
tions and not as an integral part of police work (Wood, 2017). In sum, 
notwithstanding the increasing awareness of the matter, as it stands, the 
instrument of financial investigation is hardly being used to its full poten-
tial (Kruisbergen et al., 2016).
Simply put, while on the one hand the appreciation of a financial 
approach towards trafficking in human beings seems to be developing in 
a positive direction, its actual application, on the other hand, is proving 
somewhat problematic (Lalam, 2018). A possible explanation for this 
discrepancy might be found in the panoply of challenges practitioners 
and policy makers are faced with when translating the idea of asset-
focussed interventions into practice. First off, the implementation of 
financial investigations is frequently bogged down by bureaucratic hurdles 
and procedural issues (Sirseloudi, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018). Adding to 
that, financial investigations are, by their very nature, notoriously time-
consuming endeavours (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018; 
Raets & Janssens, 2018). Time is, however, of the essence in tracking the 
flow of financial transactions (OSCE, 2014). Moreover, against a backdrop 
of severe budgetary constraints on the law enforcement apparatus, 
the implementation of financial investigations, as time-devouring and 
resource-intensive investigative instruments, might easily come under 
pressure (Raets & Janssens, 2018; OSCE, 2014). By the same token, the 
professional resources and subject-specific expertise necessary to properly 
carry out financial inquiries are not always met with (Rusev et al., 2018; 
Oude Breuil et al., 2018). More specifically, criminal investigators are 
often ill-equipped to deal with trafficking-related financial intelligence, in 
part due to a lack of cross-topic training (OSCE, 2014; Raets & Janssens, 
2018). Financial investigators, conversely, are largely unfamiliar with the 
particularities of the crime of trafficking in human beings (OSCE, 2014). 
In more general terms, the cultivation of finance-oriented approaches 
runs against certain occupational and cultural law enforcement practices 
(Antonopoulos, 2018). The financial affairs of human traffickers are 
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trifling matters to law enforcement bodies, whose principal focus lies 
with evidencing criminal conduct and securing trafficking convictions 
(Antonopoulos, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2014). Likewise, in the grand 
scheme of organised crime activity, human trafficking offenders are far 
from the biggest fish in the pond, making them less of a priority for 
financial investigations (Antonopoulos, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; 
Nicolae, 2018). The mainstreaming of financial enquiries is further stymied 
by the fact that investigative methods relating to money matters still carry 
the connotation of a high-wire act – a strenuous and complex task best 
left to specialists (Soudijn, 2014). In this respect, unravelling the economics 
a trafficking enterprise is popularly considered to be an encumbrance 
rather than an effective response to this crime (Slot et al., 2015).
The piecemeal adoption of financial investigative measures is thus, to 
some extent, traceable to practical and attitudinal obstacles within law 
enforcement. However, financial investigation, as a multi-agency issue, 
necessarily transcends the traditional criminal justice system. Close 
cooperation between the different actors involved is, from this perspective, 
a critical success factor. That being said, inter-agency collaboration and 
the exchange of information have, quite predictably, been identified as 
major bottlenecks in the proceeding of financial investigations, both with 
reference to domestic (FATF-APG, 2018; OSCE, 2014) and transnational 
partnerships (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; Slot et 
al., 2015). On the whole, international collaboration in human trafficking 
cases knows greatly differing degrees of success and is particularly limited 
with respect to the financial component (Raets & Janssens, 2018; Nicolae, 
2018; OSCE, 2014). For one thing, the traditional approach of written 
requests for mutual legal assistance is widely regarded by practitioners 
as a sluggish and cumbersome process (Brown & Gillespie, 2015; Wood, 
2017; Slot et al., 2015). At the same time, a principal stumbling block 
to cross-border investigations lies in the cooperation with third countries 
(Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Slot et al., 2015). While linguistic barriers 
and procedural disparities certainly can complicate matters (Oude Breuil 
et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018; Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018), a very specific and 
serious difficulty arises when the trail of criminal finances leads investigators 
to a country with which there is no agreement to cooperate and which 
flat-out refuses to share information, or is unable to do so due to a lack 
of basic infrastructure (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Slot et al., 2015). 
Stashing illicit funds abroad is, for this reason, close to standard practice 
in the field of human trafficking (Lalam, 2018; Brown & Gillespie, 2015). 
Generally speaking, in response to the widespread adoption of follow-
the-money approaches, trafficking offenders have recourse to a number 
of conceivable counterstrategies (Nicolae, 2018; Raets & Janssens, 2018; 
Sittlington & Harvey, 2018). Supplementary to covering one’s monetary 
tracks, two rather antithetical modes of money management likely serve 
the purpose of frustrating the confiscation process. More specifically, 
lower-level offenders typically blow their profits on frivolous pursuits, 
whereas higher-ranking criminal entrepreneurs are more inclined to seek 
out ways to successfully hide their lucre (Sittlington & Harvey, 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018). In either case, the same end result is achieved – 
there is no more money left to confiscate (Sirseloudi, 2018). On that 
account, the level of attrition between the aggregate amount of funds 
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eligible for confiscation and the sum of funds actually recovered can 
be considered as another sticking point in the use of asset-focussed 
interventions (Brown, 2013; Kruisbergen et al., 2016). The problem posed 
by attrition is further exacerbated by the nature of the money laundering 
schemes most commonly adopted in human trafficking operations, which 
are marked by a reliance on high volumes of cash and the comingling 
of finances, thereby making it difficult to ferret out criminal funds 
(FATF-APG, 2018; Antonopoulos, 2018; Oude Breuil et al., 2018).
Insofar as the actual deployment of financial measures is not quite up to 
par, a significant part of the difficulties that trouble financial investigations 
of human trafficking appear to be inherent to the crime of trafficking 
itself (Lalam, 2018). Above all, the money laundering risk associated with 
trafficking in human beings is an area which remains relatively opaque 
(FATF-APG, 2018). The fact that the financial aspects of this phenomenon 
are far from fully elucidated is, at least in part, attributable to the sheer 
complexity of these cases (Raets & Janssens, 2018). For one thing, the 
monetary flows tied to trafficking operations may take different forms 
throughout the course of the offense. For another, dissimilar modes of 
operation bring about dissimilar organisational and financial arrangements. 
In this regard, the financial blueprint of a trafficking enterprise can 
vary considerably from case to case (FATF-APG, 2018). Intrinsically, the 
proceeds from this crime come in equally varying shapes and forms, 
ranging from cash payments to the underhand enrichment of corporate 
entities, both of which are notoriously difficult to detect (FATF-APG, 
2018; Antonopoulos, 2018; Oude Breuil et al., 2018), as pointed out 
above. In addition, the at times deep-rooted tie-ups between exploitative 
undertakings and legitimate businesses or the legal economy add another 
layer of complexity to the question of finances (Antonopoulos, 2018). 
Moreover, the investigation of human trafficking offences, including their 
financial component, is still heavily reliant on the testimonies of victims 
(Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018; Lalam, 2018). Victims, however, are most 
often rather hesitant and disinclined to cooperate with law enforcement 
(Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; Meneses-Falcón et al., 2018). Consequently, 
regardless of the presence of a well-developed legal framework or the 
level of expertise in frontline practitioners, trafficking in human beings 
can be a particularly tough nut to crack (Terenghi & Di Nicola, 2018; 
Antonopoulos, 2018).
To counterbalance some of the aforementioned issues, a number of 
measures have been put in place. Notable headway has been made 
on the institutional level, namely through the establishment of cross-
cutting entities that assist the progress of asset-focussed interventions 
against human trafficking (Lalam, 2018). Structures that broadly serve the 
purpose of promoting international cooperation are the ARO,18 CARIN,19 
EMPACT,20 and SIENA21 networks, which enable direct and uncomplicated 
contact with investigators in other countries in furtherance of exchanging 
18 Asset Recovery Office.
19 Camden Assets Recovery Interagency Network.
20 European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats.
21 Secure Information Exchange Network Application.
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operational intelligence and experience (Lalam, 2018; Golobinek, 2006; 
Slot et al., 2015). In a similar vein, the added value of the medium 
of Joint Investigations Teams lies in the facilitation of collaboration 
(Raets & Janssens, 2018). Through the use of JITs, investigative efforts 
of different states are drawn together and coordinated so that, in this 
manner, investigators are able to see the full picture with regard to the 
transnational ambit of a criminal operation (Leman & Janssens, 2015). 
On the whole, JITs are reputed to be quite effective once established, 
even though the process of getting a JIT up and running can be a fairly 
troublesome and thorny issue (Slot et al., 2015).
In spite of these and other opportunities, the implementation of financial 
approaches against human trafficking networks remains fraught with 
difficulties. Iterating this large range of challenges begs the question 
whether the pursuit of finance-oriented stratagems really makes for a 
worthwhile endeavour in the end. Put differently, to what extent do 
the results of asset-minded interventions justify the time, money and 
efforts spent toward this purpose? In order to get an impression of 
the presumed effectiveness of financial approaches, one needs to look 
no further than the logics and rationales that underpin the targeting 
of criminal proceeds. The main idea is that by going after the fruits 
of criminal activity, both the means and the motivation to commit 
future crimes should be truncated (Levi, 2015; Atkinson et al., 2017; 
Kilchling, 2014). Seizing illicit earnings discourages crime by reducing 
its profitability, thereby removing the prime incentive for and appeal 
of offending (Kilchling, 2014; Bell, 2001; Kruisbergen et al., 2016). In 
addition, asset-focussed interventions are imagined to take a bite out 
of the monetary resources available to criminal entrepreneurs, thus 
decreasing the ability of offenders to finance other operations (Atkinson 
et al., 2017; Kilchling, 2014; Kruisbergen et al., 2016). Incidentally, stripping 
human traffickers of their illegitimate profits also reasserts the principle 
that crime should not pay (Kruisbergen et al., 2016). In this regard, the 
underlying assumptions as to how follow-the-money approaches would 
impinge on organised crime itself centre around two basic mechanisms, 
namely the deterrence and disruption of criminal activity (Atkinson et 
al., 2017; Kruisbergen et al., 2016). The deterrent effect of confiscation, 
however, can be called into doubt (Atkinson et al., 2017). At this point, 
it is unclear whether upping the ante in terms of financial risk is actually 
deterring offenders and not just strengthening their resolve to avoid 
getting caught (Sittlington & Harvey, 2018). Besides, discouraging crime 
by denying perpetrators the possibility to enjoy their profits presupposes 
a level of rationality that does not necessarily correspond with reality. 
Weighing the benefits from criminal activities against the possible costs 
is, as a rule, a bounded and error-prone exercise. For example, the 
prospect of immediate gains often takes precedence over other concerns 
(Sittlington & Harvey, 2018). Social pressures and contextual factors, in 
addition to financial considerations, equally weigh on those decisions 
(Atkinson et al., 2017). As regards the disruptive impact of depriving 
offenders of their proceedings, although confiscation can be rather 
upsetting and damaging to one’s bluster and bravado, in many instances 
it is not enough to force the individual or their criminal network out of 
business (Atkinson et al., 2017; Sittlington & Harvey, 2018). The relatively 
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low financial threshold associated with setting up a human trafficking 
ring implies that removing monetary resources is not always synonymous 
with rendering these criminal organisations inoperable (Raets & Janssens, 
2018). Moreover, bearing in mind the significant amount of attrition that 
plagues pecuniary measures, recovered assets are a bad indicator of the 
wider degree of disruption to criminal activity (Sittlington & Harvey, 2018). 
From this perspective, the effectiveness of intercepting criminal revenue 
in tackling trafficking in human beings remains uncertain (Atkinson 
et al., 2017; Araujo & Belchior, 2012). It seems that success, either in 
disheartening or disempowering offenders, is very much dependent 
on the target of the intervention (Sittlington & Harvey, 2018). For this 
reason, an overly narrow focus on asset confiscation alone might mean 
that the outcomes of financial strategies may be found missing the mark 
(Slot et al., 2015).
Summarizing the above, the pattern of results effectuated by financial 
approaches does not quite match expectations. Overall, the implementation 
of financial strategies is still encountering major obstacles, the main 
impediments being an unduly restricted understanding of the purpose 
of asset-oriented measures, a lack of prioritisation in terms of financial 
backing and other resources as well as a dearth of field-specific expertise 
and experience (Slot et al., 2015; OSCE, 2014). That being said, traditional 
criminal interventions are not as potent without the accompaniment of 
pecuniary steps (Nicolae, 2018). Seeing that many members of human 
trafficking networks are often but replaceable cogs in the criminal wheel, 
individual prosecution is likely insufficient to accomplish the objectives 
of deterrence or disruption (Kilchling, 2014). At the same time, criminal 
investigations commonly fall short of implicating organisations in their 
entirety, often failing to reach the heads of human trafficking rings. In this 
regard, traditional legal proceedings hardly interfere with the ability of 
trafficking organisations to carry out their business (Atkinson et al., 2017). 
A key recommendation, therefore, is that every criminal investigation 
into suspected human trafficking activity should be complemented by 
a financial investigation (Oude Breuil et al., 2018; OSCE, 2014). The 
instrument of financial investigation generally holds most value when 
used as an investigative tool. Its operational worth principally lies in 
the building of cases, the developing of intelligence and the securing 
of convictions, rather than in the seizing of criminal assets (Slot et al., 
2015). For that matter, financial enquiries are most advantageous when 
used in conjunction with other investigative methods (Brown, et al., 2012; 
Slot et al., 2015). On the whole, a dual strategy which twins criminal 
proceedings with asset-oriented measures should yield a more significant 
effect by delivering a double blow to trafficking offenders (Kilchling, 
2014; Araujo & Belchior, 2012; Sittlington & Harvey, 2018). In this sense, 
the adoption of a financial approach to human trafficking ought to be 
embedded in a wider, comprehensive strategy which makes use of other 
forms of intervention (Bell, 2001; Atkinson et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
5.3. MAINSTREAMING THE FINANCIAl APPROACH
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financial enquiry bears relevance for all stages of the criminal investigation 
(Slot et al., 2015; Atkinson et al., 2017). Financial investigations should 
consequently be initiated as soon as practicable, as opposed to being 
used as a fall-back or last resort in cases where conventional investigative 
methods proved inadequate (Soudijn, 2014; Sittlington & Harvey, 2018; 
Wright, 2017).
Accordingly, following the money can be a dependable strategy when 
combined with classical methods of fact-finding (Slot et al., 2015; Wood, 
2017). Financial approaches, for that reason, deserve serious consideration 
in dealing with human trafficking activity. However, as stated above, 
strategic plans will remain no more than empty words if they are not 
matched with the necessary resources and proper conditions to conduct 
financial enquiries (Slot et al., 2015). In other words, for proceeds-
oriented approaches to be successful there needs to be full commitment 
both from legislators and frontline practitioners. Once involved, settling 
for half-measures is simply ineffectual (Wood, 2017). As human trafficking 
operations frequently transcend borders, so too does the need for clear 
and unequivocal policy commitment. In view of this, there is a shared 
EU responsibility in redressing the balance between member states and 
promoting a finance-minded law enforcement culture. In the interest 
of longer-term harmonisation, national strategies regarding the financial 
investigation of human trafficking and other organised crime activities 
should also be implemented in a more consistent and non-conflicting 
way across EU member states (Slot et al., 2015).
As a general principle, the exchange of experiences and good practices 
between countries throughout the EU is vital in developing a results-
oriented policy. Other initiatives, carrying potentially transferable insights, 
can serve as a source of inspiration for improved, and possibly more 
effective, solutions. To that end, a number of lessons can be drawn 
from the knowledge gained in different European countries through the 
real-world application of a financial approach to trafficking in persons. 
First of all, a very well-thought-of strategy concerns the Dutch integrated 
approach (Oude Breuil et al., 2018). As affirmed by the multidisciplinary 
manners of working adopted in other countries (Antonopoulos, 2018; 
Raets & Janssens, 2018), inter-agency platforms, spanning public-private 
partnerships as well as other inter-sectoral forms of cooperation, can act 
as a conduit for the incorporation of a financial perspective into regular 
criminal investigations (Slot et al., 2015; OSCE, 2014; FATF-APG, 2018). 
Above all else, human trafficking is a multi-faceted crime that bears 
upon a diverse range of disciplines and sectors and, in this vein, calls for 
joined-up thinking. Inter-agency collaboration and coordination, alongside 
information sharing among those partners seeking to address this offence, 
can thus be considered as a requisite for the fruitful deployment of 
asset-focussed measures (Keatinge & Barry, 2017; Lalam, 2018; FATF-
APG, 2018). Ideally, partnerships are not formed purely on an ad-hoc 
or impromptu basis. Rather, in order to maximise the effectiveness of 
collaborative efforts, cooperation should be approached in a much 
more structured manner. With that end in view, the J-CAT model, a 
collaborative platform designed with the intention to forge successful 
interconnections and alliances across multiple borders and to facilitate the 
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coordination of international cybercrime investigations between different 
partners, could prove inspiring (Reitano et al., 2015).
To reiterate one of the points above, human trafficking perforates the 
legal economy in a variety of ways (Shelley & Bain, 2015). Over and 
above financial strategies, the possibility of uprooting these critical points 
of intersection, and in so doing effectively disrupting criminal networks, 
brings us to another frontier of the current fight against trafficking in human 
beings (Roudaut, 2011). The administrative approach towards organised 
crime, which generally hinges on the screening of prospective licensees 
and the ability to refuse or withdraw permits when confronted with 
mala fide undertakings, seems to be an opportune, alternative strategy 
to target the business-side of trafficking operations (Aronowitz et al., 
2010; Bell, 2001). In addition to local administrations and municipalities, 
another possible partner in the fight against trafficking finances can 
be found in tax authorities. Taxing away illegal profits, also known as 
the ‘Al Capone approach’, answers the purpose of intensifying asset 
recovery (Kilchling, 2014; Sproat, 2012). In this connection, the ability to 
demonstrate the existence of unexplained wealth in cases where it has 
not been possible to prove a direct connection with criminal activity 
would appear to provide a noteworthy window of opportunity with 
regard to the skimming of criminal proceeds (Brown, 2013).
In other aspects, the advancement of both specialist and generalist 
training can be considered as an evident good practice within the 
framework of financial approaches (FATF-APG, 2018). Essentially, for 
financial investigations to be conventionalised, all criminal investigators 
should have a basic understanding of financial methods (Slot et al., 2015; 
Golobinek, 2006). Conversely, specialist financial knowledge should be 
broadened to include the modes of operation in human trafficking rings, 
for the clear reason that criminal finances and criminal workings are 
inextricably bound up with each other (Atkinson et al., 2017). On top of 
training front-line investigators, developing a sense of knowledgeableness 
in prosecutors and judges with respect to financial matters is just as 
essential in bringing financial investigations into the mainstream. Generally 
speaking, the implementation of finance-oriented strategies benefits 
from a competency-driven approach to building investigative teams, and 
especially from the cultivation of specialised in-house expertise (Slot et 
al., 2015). Above and beyond the augmentation of expert knowledge, it 
is also desirable to foster a robust financial culture in the criminal justice 
system (Lalam, 2018; Soudijn, 2014; Wood, 2017). Consolidating the use 
of financial investigation thus requires modifying and expanding current 
law enforcement customs and working methods (Slot et al., 2015).
A distinct area of interest is the promotion of proactive financial 
investigations (Slot et al., 2015). Financial transactions are, in effect, a 
point of vulnerability in the chain of criminal logistics, as certain patterns 
of suspicious activity can be recognised (Finance Against Trafficking, 
2014; Wood, 2017). As follows, by identifying patterns and establishing 
subsequent red flags, one should be able to identify instances of human 
trafficking (Shelley & Bain, 2015). To this extent, financial institutions find 
themselves in a unique position when it comes to spotting worrying signs 
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in transaction activity and disclosing them to law enforcement agencies 
(Finance Against Trafficking, 2014). Having the built-in capacity to monitor 
transactions as well as the necessary analytic capabilities, financial 
institutions hold the means to produce more elaborated evidence, which 
could add impetus to trafficking-related prosecutions (van Dijk et al., 
2018). On a related note, the proactive and critical observation of 
financial transactions is also relevant with respect to the possibility of 
beginning investigations on the suspicion of money laundering, whereby 
the offence of money laundering is to be regarded as an anchoring point 
for financial and other investigative measures (Antonopoulos, 2018; Slot 
et al., 2015; Kilchling, 2014). At any rate, in order to make sense of the 
conundrum of financial dealings, technological solutions play an important 
role in filtering and analysing the vast pool of transaction data (Demetis, 
2018; Slot et al., 2015). Moreover, through technological advancements 
such as big data approaches, data mining techniques and predictive 
analytics, it would be possible to string together transacting behaviour 
with lifestyle and criminal behaviour in an effort to uncover trends and 
noticeable patterns in trafficking activity (Demetis, 2018). However, the 
technological tools currently available to criminal and financial investigators 
are usually less sophisticated. As financial crimes are increasingly linked 
with innovative ideas and methods, it is nevertheless crucial to keep up 
with offenders in terms of technological capabilities (Slot et al., 2015; 
see also FATF-APG, 2018). After all, trafficking in human beings is a 
notoriously adaptive criminal trade, rendering alertness towards changing 
trends vitally important (Keatinge & Barry, 2017).
Lastly, while our understanding of the financial aspects of human 
trafficking has certainly been improved, the subject is far from fully 
clarified. Even so, profiling the expenses and proceeds associated with 
trafficking activity constitutes an important first step in identifying 
and tracking the monetary flows from trafficking operations. Further 
research into the criminal modus operandi and the financial movements 
underlying the predicate crime with a view to expanding the current 
level of knowledge is, in other words, indispensable (FATF-APG, 2018). 
On these grounds, the issues of criminal financing and the management 
of criminal proceeds should become part and parcel of the study and 
analysis of the organisation of trafficking in human beings, both with 
regard to academia and law enforcement (Levi, 2015). Ultimately, more 
than the proverbial lifeblood of criminal organisations, finances make 
for an enlightening prism through which to view the crime of human 
trafficking (Kopp, 2012).

As the current analysis demonstrates, human trafficking – besides being 
a heinous crime – is also an important criminal market which generates 
substantial profits. The related costs of and profits from human trafficking 
vary substantially depending on the form of trafficking (labour or sexual), 
the modus operandi of perpetrators, the countries of origin and destination 
of victims, as well as the market sector or segment in which the 
victims are exploited. The criminal actors involved vary substantially with 
regard to the sophistication of their organisation. Generally, the market 
is dominated by sole “players,” small-to-medium (often family-based) 
organisations, and loosely structured networks, whereas highly organised, 
hierarchical groups are rather the exception. The number of victims 
under the control of a single trafficker also differs but rarely goes beyond 
ten. Indeed, both independent traffickers and those operating as part 
of a network often prefer to keep operations relatively circumscribed, 
with a view of reducing upkeep costs and avoiding law enforcement 
attention.
On the other hand, the current research partly refutes the general 
perception that the costs for entering the business are very low. Low 
entry costs apply mostly to domestic and intra-Community trafficking in 
the EU and in cases where perpetrators control one to three victims. 
A typical example are lover-boys exploiting one or two victims in 
prostitution, wherein they work either outdoors or in the lower segments 
of in-door prostitution and acquire customers online. Costs might be 
particularly high with regard to victims that have to cover large distances 
to get to the country of exploitation. In such cases, beyond paying 
for transportation costs, there are added expenses such as corruption 
payments to officials, securing counterfeit or forged documentation, and 
sometimes even ransom costs. Despite the fact that these expenses are 
usually imposed as a debt onto the victim and, subsequently, are more 
or less quickly recovered by the traffickers, the money nevertheless needs 
to be advanced by them in order to ensure that victims can reach the 
destination. In addition, extra start-up costs can be required, especially 
in prostitution markets, if traffickers want to pursue more profitable 
locations, which guarantee steady and higher revenue. Notably, criminal 
entrepreneurs investing in brothels or other sex venues need to raise 
substantial start-up capital, which – depending on the country where 
they invest – may require from tens of thousands to several hundred 
thousand euros.
The analysis of cost structure for different trafficking actors also reveals 
some important insights. Apparently, trafficking for labour exploitation 
is less demanding than sexual exploitation in terms of market entry 
threshold and operational costs, along with lower risks of detection and 
criminal sanctions. Traffickers operating within the EU – such as Bulgarian 
and Romanian criminal entrepreneurs and domestic traffickers – have 
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the competitive advantage of low transportation costs and absence 
of visa and labour restrictions. With regard to trafficking for sexual 
exploitation this has an obvious impact on their business models. Thus, 
East European traffickers tend to spend money for acquiring access 
to more lucrative locations such as red light windows, brothels, and 
massage parlours and in the end generate higher profits. Conversely, for 
Nigerian, Latin American, and Chinese networks costs for transportation 
and obtaining travel and residence documents seem to dominate their 
expenses. Therefore, they tend to exploit victims either outdoor or via 
online soliciting of clients, which provides for lower operational costs, but 
also generate less revenue.
The observed differences in cost structure and cost-benefit ratios are 
part of the explanation why East European countries such as Bulgaria 
and Romania still remain among the top countries of origin of victims, 
despite having much smaller population than Nigeria or China. These 
differences also offer insights into the preferred modus operandi of 
traffickers in terms of exerting control. As East Europeans enjoy lower 
start-up costs and relatively higher revenue, they more often rely on 
building business-like relations with sex workers, wherein they would 
secure more profitable locations and share part of the revenue with 
the victims. The geographical proximity of Western Europe and the free 
movement of people practically render controlling routes of migration 
obsolete, so East European traffickers rather focus on controlling access 
to profitable locations. Conversely, the high transportation costs, entry, 
labour, and residence restrictions for third country nationals make control 
over routes of migration a primary asset of traffickers from China and 
Nigeria. Arguably, this provides a possible explanation why traffickers 
from Africa and Asia more often rely on debt bondage and tend to 
withhold all or the bulk of the earnings of their victims. The above 
arguments are also largely applicable both to cases of trafficking for 
sexual and labour exploitation.
Settlement of payments in human trafficking remains largely cash based, 
especially in the case of trafficking for sexual exploitation. This is true for 
practically all types of transactions in cases related to sexual exploitation – 
between customer and sex worker, sex worker and trafficker, between 
different participants in trafficking networks, and between traffickers and 
any intermediaries. Less frequently, payments might be made in kind to 
intermediaries and associates, or customers might pay through credits 
cards under the pretext of paying for other services (e.g. massage). Bank 
transfers are generally avoided, except for some remittances abroad. In 
the case of labour trafficking settlement of payments depends on the 
cash-intensity of the sector which the workers are exploited in. But 
even in sectors in which bank transfers are the norm, usually workers’ 
accounts are controlled by traffickers and their wages are immediately 
withdrawn in cash.
In terms of the money laundering techniques, the current analysis shows 
that these are mostly rudimentary. Most traffickers use the bulk of the 
proceeds to sustain a lavish lifestyle and spend profits on luxury goods, 
partying, vacations etc. When there is а surplus, it is often invested 
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into real estate and expensive vehicles. More sophisticated trafficking 
networks, which retain larger portions of the profit also invest in different 
cash intensive businesses in home countries, choosing predominantly the 
hospitality sector. These businesses can serve to expand the trafficking 
by identifying and recruiting new victims, obscuring trafficking operations 
behind the ostensible provision of other services, and facilitating the 
further laundering of profits. Proceeds are also used to cover the running 
costs of the trafficking operation and may sometimes be channelled to 
an expansion of the business. A notable recent trend for East European 
traffickers are investments for acquiring or long-term renting of adult 
clubs and other sex venues in the destination countries. However, the 
data indicates that investment into other illicit enterprises is rare.
Traffickers operating abroad tend to transfer all profit surpluses from the 
destination to their country of origin. Transportation of cash is a particularly 
popular method, carried out either by the traffickers themselves, victims, 
associates or money couriers. Money transfer companies are also used, 
although the recent trends rather indicate that traffickers resort to them 
less often due to the easy traceability of transactions. In order to minimise 
risks of detection and hinder any possible investigations, the money is first 
broken down into smaller sums and then transferred not by traffickers but 
by others, i.e. victims, associates, friends, family or intermediaries. Bank 
transfers are generally avoided and in case they are employed, similar 
risk minimisation techniques are used. Some traffickers also employ 
one or more shell companies to facilitate money laundry. Alternatively, 
a trade-based money laundering technique might be used with goods 
being purchased in the country of exploitation and subsequently resold 
in the country of origin of traffickers. Trafficking networks from Asia 
and Africa also widely employ hawala or similar informal value transfer 
systems to move their proceeds from the countries where they exploit 
the victims to their home countries. In this case money does not cross 
borders physically and the transactions are based on established relations 
of trust among the participants in the hawala network.
The internet is used in numerous ways to facilitate human trafficking. On 
the one hand, recruitment can be carried out online or supplemented 
through online communication. In the case of the trafficking for sexual 
exploitation, the internet also presents a useful platform for advertising 
the services offered by the victims and is actively used by both organised 
criminal groups and independent traffickers. In addition, the internet 
can present an additional medium of control over victims, whose 
communication and agreements with clients can be monitored. On the 
other hand, it allows independent traffickers and sex workers to operate 
and acquire customers without having to pay for costly work spaces. 
Thus, the internet generally represents a cost-effective way to initiate, 
facilitate or even sustain a trafficking operation. The downside of the 
new technologies is heightened visibility, hence a higher risk of detection 
and apprehension by law enforcement authorities, as well as increased 
vulnerability to rivals.
The biggest change that new technologies and the internet have brought, 
especially in the case of trafficking for sexual exploitation, is that they 
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have put sole players and more sophisticated organisations on equal 
footing. But the effect is not straightforward. On the one hand, low 
market entry costs and easier access to clients via the internet for 
selling sex services imminently increase competition and put downward 
pressure on prices and revenues of all market actors. On the other, a 
more competitive market and the language barrier incline some criminal 
operators to adhere to traditional business models which rely on high 
turnover locations that guarantee a steady flow of customers.
In terms of investigation, the follow-the-money approach with regard 
to crime more generally and trafficking in human beings in particular, 
is recognised as essential on the national, EU, and international 
levels. Nevertheless, the degree to which financial investigations are 
undertaken and their success varies substantially among countries. As 
the present analysis demonstrates, significant impediments remain, 
which the hinder investigation of THB and related financial flows. Since 
payments in trafficking are mostly made in cash, much of money is spent 
immediately or transported outside of destination countries in cash. Thus, 
the lack of a paper trail can be a significant impediment in ascertaining 
and confiscating proceeds. Similarly, while the proactive approach to 
investigation of human trafficking should be prioritised, lack of victim 
cooperation can still impede investigations. With regard to labour 
trafficking there is an added difficulty in distinguishing the offence from 
other labour infractions, which often is due to vague or narrow definition 
of labour trafficking applied in many national legislative frameworks. 
Most often lack of sufficient expertise and necessary tools for analysis of 
financial data hinder the investigation of financial flows. Limited capacity 
to conduct financial investigations and lack of prioritisation of financial 
aspects are also problematic in many of the countries covered in the 
current study. Nevertheless, especially for destination countries, various 
difficulties in international cooperation are perhaps the main obstacle. 
The latter is particularly the case for countries from sub-Saharan Africa 
and Asia.
The analysis revealed that many European countries still have many 
deficits with regard to financial investigations of trafficking in human 
beings. There are some general recommendations that are relevant to all 
forms of trafficking regardless of the modus operandi or nationality of 
traffickers. Thus the following actions can strengthen the prosecution of 
THB and the confiscation of related financial flows:
• Improve capacity to investigate financial flows. Recruiting and training 
additional financial investigators is key to supporting the investigation 
of financial flows in a number of EU countries. These financial 
specialists can be embedded within specialised human trafficking units, 
allowing the two investigations streams to run in parallel, to have the 
financial expertise in-house as well as to develop specific financial 
expertise on proceeds generated by human trafficking. Alternatively, 
if financial specialists are part of separate units, a better coordination 
with officers working on predicate offences needs to be fostered. In 
addition, tools facilitating the analysis of financial data need to be 
developed and respective officers trained to work with them.
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• Prioritise financial investigations and undertake them together with 
investigations of the predicate offence. Another important step is to 
raise awareness and underscore the importance of financial aspects 
in investigating the predicate offence, as financial flows allow to 
better map and understand the trafficking networks, especially if this 
is done at an early stage. Prioritising the financial investigations is 
particularly important with regard to trafficking where organised crime 
is suspected, as the profits will likely be large enough to make a 
parallel investigation worthwhile.
• Develop and adopt methodologies for calculation of perpetrator’s 
proceeds as part of financial investigations. Calculation of the illicit 
proceeds of perpetrators would allow better guiding of asset tracing 
and improving the outcome of asset recovery. A good example in 
this regard is the Dutch model for financial investigations, where this 
approach is widely applied. In this regard victims are particularly 
important witnesses, who besides filing claims against their traffickers, 
can provide important information about the financial side of the 
business. Certainly, while the success of the investigation should 
not hinge on victim testimonies, it is important that they (and their 
families, if necessary) are afforded sufficient support and protection in 
both the destination and countries of origin.
• Improve knowledge of labour trafficking and harmonise definitions 
adopted across European Union. In order to improve investigation of 
human trafficking for labour exploitation, better cooperation is needed 
between labour inspectorates and police forces. Furthermore, both 
labour inspectors and police officers need to be trained to recognise 
red flags and to distinguish the offence from other less serious labour 
infractions. There is also a need to harmonise definitions adopted 
on the national level in order to streamline police and judicial 
cooperation in cross-border investigations.
• Improve knowledge on the role of ICT in all forms of human 
trafficking. Training should be provided on the modalities of use of 
ICT technologies and their role in different trafficking arrangements, 
allowing police to monitor more effectively websites, applications, and 
other relevant technologies in the investigation of trafficking cases.
The analysis of the financial models of different trafficking actors also 
suggests that more targeted approaches are needed in order to be 
more effective in tackling perpetrators by raising the costs and risks for 
them. Apparently, in the last few years the cost of smuggling of persons 
from sub-Saharan Africa has substantially decreased and, as a result, 
trafficking of Nigerian citizens is also flourishing. In this regard, measures 
to strengthen border and immigration control will likely have a most 
significant impact on Nigerian criminal organisations.
The other major issue in countering traffickers from third countries 
(African, Asian, Latin American) is international cooperation in police and 
judicial matters. Human trafficking is a crime which often involves an 
international element, with either victims, traffickers or both coming from 
countries other than the destination, where the exploitation takes place. 
Thus, strengthening international cooperation can make a big difference. 
Currently, cross-border investigations involving third countries often halt 
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or fall apart because of issues such as slow procedures, divergence in 
applicable regulations (including with regard to asset confiscation) or 
because of practical impediments such as translation issues. Developing 
and nurturing more durable ties of operational police cooperation with 
key third countries of origin will allow for more effective investigation 
and prosecution of cross-border THB cases.
A more active use of EU tools such as JITs is largely praised in all countries 
studied, as is the support and coordination provided by Eurojust and 
Europol, despite the fact that certain issues remain. However, judging 
from the business and financial models for intra-community trafficking in 
the EU, more significant impact on perpetrators from other EU countries 
such as Bulgaria and Romania could be expected if interventions are 
focused on the exploitation phase. In this regard, the administrative 
approach towards serious and organised crime employed in the 
Netherlands and Belgium seems particularly promising. Targeted and well-
coordinated administrative measures implemented by local authorities, 
labour inspectorates, and tax authorities can help raise costs and risk for 
traffickers and thus narrow down illicit market opportunities.
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FINANCING OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 
IN BElGIUM
In the early 1990s, a scandalous story about what became known as the 
Belgian Billionaire Gang running one of the biggest women trafficking 
rings in Western Europe (De Stoop, 1992) roused the nation. The ensuing 
public outrage promptly gave rise to a parliamentary committee of inquiry, 
set with the task of scrutinising the prevalent criminal policy on trafficking 
in persons (BE-E2; BE-E5) (Boels & Ponsaers, 2011). The multidisciplinary 
policy direction that to date typifies the Belgian response to the issue of 
human trafficking has its origin in the work of this committee of inquiry 
(BE-E2). On account of this early awareness of the issue, Belgium has 
taken on a pioneering role in dealing with this transgression (Boels & 
Ponsaers, 2011).
Following the law of 13 April 1995 on trafficking in human beings (THB), 
the legal framework on this type of misconduct has gone through 
a number of developments (DSB, 2015; GRETA, 2016). Contrary to 
the definition introduced by the UN Palermo Protocol (Efrat, 2016), 
the method of operation is not part of the Belgian delineation of 
human trafficking. Only the act and intent of exploitation are constituent 
elements of the crime, whereas the means of exploitation are considered 
as an aggravating factor (CGKRB, 2011). Using a relatively open concept 
in preference to an exhaustive list of illicit behaviours, the Belgian 
definition of human trafficking hinges on the exploitation itself rather 
than on the methods of exploitation (GRETA, 2016). Another point of 
divergence is the demarcation of labour exploitation. Labour exploitation 
is defined in a much broader sense than the term ”forced labour,” as 
labour exploitation is described in terms of working below the level 
of human dignity (GRETA, 2016; Leman & Janssens, 2015). As a matter 
of course, the qualification of inhumane circumstances leaves a broad 
margin of interpretation (CGKRB, 2011). Consequently, the distinction 
between bad employment practices and labour exploitation is at times 
far from clear-cut (de Jager, Hassani, & Pennings, 2016). Similarly, seeing 
that prostitution offences are generally de facto tolerated, an ambivalent 
legal situation is intrinsic to the matter of sexual exploitation as well 
(BE-E6; BE-E13).
As mentioned before, Belgium has broken ground in terms of implementing 
a multidisciplinary approach towards trafficking in persons (BE-E2; BE-E5) 
(OSCE, 2013). As a general rule, sexual exploitation is handled by the 
public prosecutor and the police forces. Conversely, the social inspection 
services and the labour prosecutor, a specialised branch of the public 
prosecution office, cover labour exploitation cases (BE-E2; BE-E3; BE-E11; 
BE-E13). As follows, social and labour inspectorates play an important 
role in tackling the issue of human trafficking, notably because they carry 
far-reaching investigative powers and significant expertise and experience 
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in this matter (de Jager et al., 2016; Leman & Janssens, 2015). The 
substantial involvement of these actors is indicative of Belgium’s distinct 
focus on labour exploitation (BE-E2; BE-E5). Going beyond pure law 
enforcement, a noteworthy materialisation of Belgium’s multidisciplinary 
approach is the Interdepartmental Coordination Cell embracing all actors 
involved in the fight against trafficking in persons, which is entrusted with 
the coordination of the policy on human trafficking (DSB, 2015).
Belgium is primarily known as a destination country and, to a lesser 
extent, as a transit country for human trafficking operations (Akee et 
al., 2014). As a source country, Belgium plays a minimal part (Shelley, 
2010), but on the whole is widely regarded as one of the most targeted 
countries by human traffickers (Balarezo, 2013; Europol, 2016). Conversely, 
Belgium also stands among the countries taking most action against 
human trafficking (Walk Free Foundation, 2016).
Trafficking in persons is an issue that has been brought into focus 
over twenty years ago, yet our understanding of the subject is far 
from complete. One facet that has been largely neglected is the 
financial dimension of human trafficking operations. In response to 
this knowledge gap, the present research report explores the financial 
management of trafficking in human beings in Belgium on the basis of 
a literature review, a document analysis of the human trafficking cases 
described by the Federal Migration Centre, which functions as the 
National Reporter on trafficking in human beings for Belgium, and face-
to-face interviews with both professionals who are well-informed on the 
subject of trafficking in persons and perpetrators convicted of trafficking 
offences.1 As regards the latter method, respondents were selected 
with a view to reflecting the diversity of the frontline practitioners, 
who are confronted with human trafficking cases on a day-to-day basis. 
The interviews were conducted by aid of a standardized interview 
protocol and subsequently analysed using computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software.
Like most forms of organised crime, trafficking in human beings crops 
up against a backdrop of envisioned profitability (Petrunov, 2011; 
Wheaton et al., 2010). To illustrate this point, the federal judicial police 
has estimated that the proceeds of human trafficking in Belgium writ 
large amount to nearly a billion euros per year (Delepière et al., 2013). 
In a related manner, sexual exploitation is deeply rooted in the sex 
industry, which has an estimated overall value of between €617 and 
€688 million (Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Labour exploitation, on the 
other hand, is intrinsic to a wide variety of economic sectors. Table 1 
1 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of 
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert, while “C” means criminal entrepreneur. 
The description of the background of the individual sources referenced can be found in the 
list of interviewees in the references section.
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indicates the most prominent sectors uncovered by the social inspection 
services in Belgium. Generally, industries that are on the nether side of 
the so called “three Ds’” touchstone, meaning they involve work that 
is dirty, difficult, or dangerous, and industries that are less regulated 
are more exposed to labour exploitation (Davies, 2017; Europol, 2017). 
The sectors most serviceable for the purpose of exploitation are the 
logistics business (e.g. transportation), labour intensive businesses (e.g. 
agriculture), and the hospitality, entertainment, services, and retail 
sector (e.g. menial work) (Finance Against Trafficking, 2014). Having 
said that, labour exploitation is virtually ubiquitous in the licit economy 
(ILO, 2014; Kara, 2011). Consequently, labour trafficking manifests itself 
in many different ways (Efrat, 2016).
By the same token, a number 
of business sectors are highly 
functional for the commis-
sion of human trafficking of-
fences. Generally speaking, 
the ties between the human 
trafficking business and the le-
gitimate market are wide-rang-
ing (Bravo, 2008; Parmentier, 
2010). This nexus between the 
shadow and legitimate econo-
my reflects a general trend of 
increasing proximity between 
organised crime operations 
and legal business structures 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015; Van 
Duyne, 1993, 1993b). As for 
the purpose of this proximity, 
legitimate ventures provide the 
means for the fabrication of a 
legal façade (Aronowitz et al., 
2010). By definition, corporate 
structures are utilized more in labour trafficking than in sex trafficking 
operations2 (BE-E1). Tucking away criminal activities within a legal busi-
ness scheme by dint of opaque, non-transparent corporate structures 
and empty shell or fictitious companies is a common practice in the 
human trafficking industry (BE-E2; BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E9; BE-E10). As a 
consequence, human trafficking operations routinely cut across the 
divide between upper world and underground economy, blending the 
boundary between legal and illegal ventures (Europol, 2015). As such, 
a strict distinction between mala fide and bona fide entrepreneurship 
is at variance with the brass tacks of the trafficking business (BE-E5). 
In addition to harbouring human trafficking activities, legal business 
structures facilitate various aspects of the criminal process, such as 
transportation and money laundering (Aronowitz et al., 2010; Finance 
Against Trafficking, 2014; Leman & Janssens, 2015).
2 Although there are legal establishments in which sexual and labour exploitation of women 
takes place simultaneously.
ТаBle 1. numBer oF initial recorded reports oF traFFicking in human 
Beings in Belgium in 2016 By economic sector
Source: Myria (2017).
Sector Number of reports
Hospitality/Horeca 9
Construction 5
Service stations 5
Retail 5
Domestic help 2
Cleaning services 1
Wholesale 1
Other 4
Total 32
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As follows, human trafficking operations mostly hide in plain sight or, in 
rare instances such as household service, are fully sequestered (Bravo, 
2008). The masking of exploitative practices, among other things, renders 
detecting and identifying human trafficking cases notoriously difficult 
(DSB, 2015; Kleemans & Smit, 2014). Seeing that human trafficking is 
a gravely underreported phenomenon (Goodey, 2008; Guia, 2015), any 
claims regarding the incidence of trafficking in human beings cannot be 
substantiated (Kopp, 2012; Parmentier, 2010; Weitzer, 2014a). Consequently, 
the figures presented hereafter are more suggestive of law enforcement 
activity than they reflect criminal activity (Kleemans & Smit, 2014; Levi et 
al., 2013). As Table 2 reveals, the number of human trafficking offences 
identified by Belgian police forces has steadily decreased over the last 
few years. About two thirds of these registered infractions relate to 
sexual exploitation, whereas labour exploitation makes up roughly one 
third of all recorded infringements. The UNODC (2016) has reported 
similar findings among registered victims. This is in stark contrast to the 
assertion made by Europol (2016) that a striking 90% of organised crime 
networks associated with human trafficking activities are involved in 
sexual exploitation. Accordingly, estimates regarding the type of human 
trafficking that is most prevalent are manifestly conflicting (Weitzer, 
2014a). As territory is of very little concern in the human trafficking 
business (BE-E4) (Kopp, 2012), the reports on human trafficking cases 
do not point to the presence of hotspots, with the exception of certain 
forms of prostitution (Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007; Mancuso, 2014). For 
instance, window prostitution is limited to certain areas (Adriaenssens et 
al., 2015), which can spark a power struggle between competing crime 
groups over those vice districts (BE-E11).
ТаBle 2. numBer oF traFFicking in human Beings inFractions, organized 
By type oF exploitation in Belgium, 2012 – 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Sexual exploitation 466 586 460 467 396
Economic exploitation 321 273 166 160 168
Forced begging 44 33 38 33 13
Forced criminality 13 14 15 9 11
Organ harvesting 1 1 1 0 1
Total 845 907 680 669 589
Whereas the number of reported infractions has dwindled, Table 3 
shows that the number of convictions is clearly on the rise. In fact, 
Belgium has a relatively high number of convictions in comparison 
to other countries (DSB, 2015). Consistent with international findings 
(Eurostat, 2015; UNODC, 2016), one in five persons convicted of human 
trafficking offences in Belgium is a woman. The involvement of women 
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in the human trafficking trade is thus comparatively large (Kleemans & 
Smit, 2014). The gendered dimension of trafficking in human beings is 
particularly pervasive with respect to the victims of exploitation (Guia, 
2015; Hughes, 2014; Shelley, 2010), as illustrated by Table 4. In essence, 
the greater part of victims of sexual exploitation are female, whereas 
victims of labour exploitation are predominantly male (Eurostat, 2015). 
As regards sexual exploitation, the registered victims are scattered across 
different age categories. Labour exploitation, on the other hand, seems 
to affect an older target group. On the whole, minors appear to be an 
exception among registered victims (Eurostat, 2015).
ТаBle 3. numBer oF convictions For human traFFicking oFFences 
in Belgium, organized By gender, 2009 – 2016
Source: DSB (2017).
Gender 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Unknown 2 5 5 6 7 2 2 0
Male 111 75 76 71 59 59 63 37
Female 28 20 21 14 17 23 19 10
Total 141 100 102 91 83 84 84 47
ТаBle 4. numBer oF registered victims oF human traFFicking in Belgium, 
organized By gender, age and type oF exploitation, 2013 – 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
Total
Sexual exploitation labour exploitation Other exploitation Total
2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2015
<18 4 1 5 4 0 1 3 2 0 3 6 0 4 5 14 6
18-25 15 19 22 23 19 18 9 9 0 1 1 2 34 38 32 34
26-30 8 12 7 7 13 26 6 13 0 0 0 3 21 38 13 23
>30 10 11 10 14 47 41 43 38 0 5 5 4 57 57 58 56
Total 37 43 44 48 79 86 61 62 0 9 12 9 116 138 117 119
Male 1 5 2 0 67 74 52 51 0 5 9 8 68 84 63 59
Female 36 38 42 48 12 12 9 11 0 4 3 1 48 54 54 60
Aside from a distinctive gender profile, human traffickers make for a 
diversified group in many other respects (Viukho, 2017). Perpetrators of 
human trafficking offences range from the very rich (BE-E2; BE-E8; BE-E10) 
down to the very poor (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E8). Strictly speaking, those who 
know their way around the sex trade (BE-E6) or any other implicated sector 
are in the capacity to take advantage of their pre-existing knowledge, 
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contacts, or even resources. A 
case in point is the involvement 
of business operators with a 
military, state security, or law 
enforcement background in 
human trafficking operations 
(BE-E13) (Leman & Janssens, 
2015; Shelley, 2010). Moving 
individuals from point A to point 
B in order to exploit them at 
their journey’s end is the sum 
and substance of any human 
trafficking operation (Efrat, 2016; 
Kleemans & Smit, 2014). As a 
result, the human trafficking 
business relies on people who 
are capable of bridging the 
gap between a certain country 
of origin and the country of 
destination (BE-E13) (Kleemans, 
2012). In essence, members of 
certain diaspora communities 
are in a position to capitalize on 
their transnational connections 
by means of human trafficking 
schemes (Arhin, 2016; Shelley, 
2010). Nationality is thus an important connecting thread in the 
phenomenon of trafficking in human beings. In this respect, Table 5 reveals 
a variegated picture of perpetrators of human trafficking. EU-nationals, 
by and large, make up the greater part of human trafficking offenders 
(Europol, 2016; Eurostat, 2015; Savona & Riccardi, 2015; UNODC, 2016; 
Walk Free Foundation, 2016). In addition, the main organised crime groups 
implicated in human trafficking activities are east European, Nigerian 
and Chinese networks (Europol, 2016; OSCE, 2013; Savona & Riccardi, 
2015). In sum, human traffickers are part of a remarkably heterogeneous 
whole (Aronowitz, 2009; Feingold, 2005). Attempting to delineate a profile 
would therefore negate the vast diversity of human trafficking operations 
(Weitzer, 2014a).
Much like the profile of human traffickers, the level of organisation 
in human trafficking operations varies widely (Aronowitz, 2001). 
Human trafficking rings are largely part of a continuum ranging from 
single perpetrators over loose, self-supporting networks to complex, 
multinational conglomerates (Aronowitz et al., 2010; Campana, 2015; 
Kleemans & Smit, 2014). As the logistics for trafficking in persons 
are fairly straightforward, there is no need for the instalment of a 
ТаBle 5. top 10 oF the most important nationalities oF persons 
convicted For human traFFicking oFFences in Belgium in 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
Nationality Number of convicted persons
Belgium 37
Romania 11
Unknown/unregistered 8
Albania 8
Bulgaria 8
France 6
The Netherlands 6
China 5
Portugal 4
United Kingdom 3
Other 29
Total 125
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANISATION 
 OF TRAFFICKING NETwORKS
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colossal organised crime syndicate (BE-E15) (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 
2004; Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Alternatively, groups formed 
on an ad hoc basis (BE-E4) (Kopp, 2012), networks built on familial or 
clan ties (Europol, 2015; OSCE, 2013) (BE-C2; BE-C3) or even one-man 
operations (BE-C1) seem to get the job done without the encumbrance 
of a monolithic corporate structure. In essence, human trafficking 
operations are generally more organised in terms of their activities 
than they are organised in terms of structure (Leman & Janssens, 2008; 
Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Human trafficking operations can thus 
be surprisingly disorganised (Feingold, 2005). At any rate, less organised 
does not necessarily mean less serious (BE-E2; BE-E9; BE-E10). On the 
whole, human trafficking operations tend to be rather small scale. That 
is, exponentially increasing the volume of trafficked persons poses the 
network for the organisational challenge of effectively monitoring this 
mass of people. Consequently, economies of scale are practically non-
existent in the human trafficking business (Campana, 2015). Moreover, 
it is in the interest of criminal entrepreneurs to curb the number 
of associates who have compromising knowledge of the criminal 
undertaking as to keep the lid on the whole trafficking operation 
(Schloenhardt, 1999; Van Duyne et al., 2007). Not only are trafficking 
networks typically limited in size (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Kopp, 
2012), these organisations are further marked by their flexible structure 
(Aronowitz, 2001; Europol, 2016). The decentralized business structure 
of human trafficking groups reminds one, perhaps unsurprisingly, of the 
loosely tied business structure of human smuggling rings (BE-E5) (Europol, 
2016). This high degree of decentralization and flexibility allows for 
the continuous optimisation of their business model (BE-E13). By their 
very nature, human trafficking networks are learning organisations, able 
and willing to adapt their business to ever-changing circumstances 
(Aronowitz et al., 2010; Leman & Janssens, 2008). Those who fail to do 
so are inevitably headed for failure.
As mentioned before, the arrangement of relations between the different 
nodes of a human trafficking operation favours functionality over unduly 
complicated forms of organisation. Depending on the nationality and 
size of the group, some networks bear great resemblance to a pyramidal 
organisation structure (BE-E4; BE-E5). Human trafficking operations 
often incorporate a rudimental form of hierarchy, which is essentially a 
crystallization of any present division of roles (Aronowitz, 2001). Central to 
the human trafficking business structure is the creation of an intermediate 
level between the organizers and the victims of exploitation (BE-E10) 
(Leman & Janssens, 2015). In larger, multinational organisations, this 
principle takes the form of a management unit and smaller, specialised 
subunits (Aronowitz et al., 2010). Notwithstanding the wide variety of 
human trafficking operations and the wide variety of actors involved 
(Vermeulen et al., 2010), a number of roles seem to be inherent to 
the trafficking trade. At the top are the organisers or coordinators, who 
function as the brain of the human trafficking operation (BE-E4; BE-E5; 
BE-E10; BE-E12). Organizers are assisted by their right-hand men, also 
known as lieutenants (BE-E4) (Leman & Janssens, 2015). Business operators 
(Wheaton et al., 2010) tasked with the day-to-day management of human 
trafficking activities can fulfil a variety of functions, including the roles of 
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recruiter (BE-E7; BE-E10; BE-E11), transporter (BE-E6; BE-E7), and enforcer 
or supervisor (BE-E12; BE-E13). Women often play a special part in 
human trafficking schemes. One notable example is the role of dame de 
compagnie or big sister companion (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E7), who serves as 
an intermediary between the victim and the exploiter (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). Supplementary to the roles fulfilled by the core group, certain tasks 
that require specific knowledge or skills can be outsourced to service 
providers or facilitators (Leman & Janssens, 2008; Soudijn, 2014; Tijhuis, 
2006). Notable examples are accountants (BE-E1; BE-E3; BE-E5; BE-E11), 
employment agencies (BE-E1; BE-E13) (BE-C2), and professional money 
launderers (BE-E3; BE-E5).
As regards the workings of human trafficking operations, trafficking in 
persons unfolds itself as a cycle of actions rather than a single offence 
(Guia, 2015). The process of human trafficking spans the consecutive 
phases of recruitment, transportation, and exploitation (Aronowitz et al., 
2010; Salt & Stein, 1997). Before anything else, one needs to find people 
that are going to fuel the trafficking business (BE-E10; BE-10). To this end, 
a prospective workforce is round up, in most cases through traditional 
forms of recruitment (BE-E10) such as classified ads or word-of-mouth 
marketing (BE-E4; BE-E11; BE-E13). Recruitment almost always involves 
a certain level of deceit (Shelley, 2010). Most are recruited under false 
pretences (BE-E6; BE-E9; BE-E11), but in exceptional cases the victims 
are forced from the very beginning to go to Western Europe (BE-E6). 
For the recruitment to succeed, the recruiter should be someone who 
seems to inspire trust, possibly an acquaintance of the victim (Korsell 
et al., 2011; Shelley, 2010). Occasionally, the recruitment process can 
run in two directions, seeing that individuals who “view (…) prostitution 
as a logical option compared to other work alternatives” (García, 2016, 
p. 149) at times deliberately look for intermediaries or souteneurs in 
the interest of easing their debut into the sex trade (BE-C1). Once a 
person is won over by hook or by crook, the victim is transferred to 
the country of destination by any means conceivable (Shelley, 2010). 
Planes, trains, buses and cars are all recurrent forms of transportation 
(BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E11). If possible, legal documents are used as not 
to arouse suspicion (BE-E1) (Kleemans & Smit, 2014). Intercontinental 
trafficking, on the contrary, often calls for smuggling practices (BE-E7; 
BE-E9). After arrival, the actual exploitation can take place. Victims are 
usually accommodated in small houses or flats (BE-E11), more often 
than not in substandard living conditions (BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E10; BE-E13). 
Imposing some form of control and forcing victims into a position of 
utter dependency is central to the practice of exploitation (BE-E2; BE-E11; 
BE-E13). To this end, human traffickers frequently make use of the system 
of debt bondage. In essence, victims are coerced to repay large sums of 
money for their transportation, accommodation, and so on (BE-E5; BE-E7; 
BE-E9; BE-E11). After a while, the cycle repeats itself with new victims 
(BE-E1; BE-E11). Previous victims either get out, move up the criminal 
ladder or become an object of barter between the initial group and 
other trafficking networks (BE-E1; BE-E6). Human trafficking operations 
are principally characterised by rotation, dislocation, and a high rate 
of victim replacement (Europol, 2016; Kleemans & Smit, 2014). More 
sophisticated, transnational organisations are able to set up carousel 
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structures, which allow them to transfer victims from country to country 
(BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7).
For the most part, the archetypal equation of human trafficking with 
coerced prostitution or forced labour is somewhat misguided. At 
present, downright coercion seems to be the exception rather than the 
rule in trafficking operations (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014; García, 
2016; Guia, 2015). As it happens, keeping a crowd of resentful victims 
under one’s thumb is nothing short of a logistical nightmare (Zhang, 
2011). Conversely, by offering victims a win-win situation in the spirit 
of professionalisation (BE-E3; BE-E5; BE-E6) (Leman & Janssens, 2015), 
perpetrators avoid the major level of commitment intrinsic to extracting 
forced services. Lastly, the abuse of traditional cultural practices at one’s 
discretion is central to many international trafficking rings, notably in 
Albanian, Romanian, Nigerian, Chinese or even Indian circles (BE-E5; 
BE-E12) (Leman & Janssens, 2015).
Over and above this general method of operating, there are countless ways 
of carrying out human trafficking activities (OSCE, 2013). In the matter 
of sexual exploitation, two specific modi operandi are highlighted. First 
off, Nigerian networks are specialised in criminal exchange programmes 
or carousel setups (BE-E5) (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). Nigerian 
human trafficking operations are by definition intercontinental. Victims 
are smuggled via the Libya route to Italy, where they are picked up and 
brought to Western Europe (BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7). The debt incurred by 
this journey can be as much as €60,000 per trafficked victim (BE-E5). In 
conjunction with debt bondage, victims are controlled through voodoo 
rituals and violence (BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E12). Some victims manage to 
move up the ranks and assume the position of “madam” (BE-E5; BE-E7) 
(Europol, 2016). In this way, the system of exploitation preserves itself 
(BE-E7) (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). The lover-boy method, on the 
other hand, revolves around emotional manipulation and the perversion 
of social relationships (Kleemans, 2012; OSCE, 2013). Lover-boys prey on 
vulnerable girls or women (BE-E5; BE-E12). In the case of respondent 
BE-C3, for example, teenage runaways from juvenile institutions were 
deliberately targeted (Myria, 2016). By means of an intense grooming 
process, the perpetrators isolate their victims, bind them to themselves 
and subsequently pressure them into doing sex work (BE-E12) (Federaal 
Migratiecentrum, 2014; OSCE, 2013). As regards labour trafficking, the 
workings of economic exploitation are quite diverse. The whole idea 
of labour trafficking is to keep labour costs at a minimum with a view 
to maximising profits (Kara, 2011; Wheaton et al., 2010). The posting of 
workers from low-wage in high-wage countries lends itself well to that 
purpose (Delepière et al., 2013), as it enables the entrepreneur to employ 
workers in the country of destination under the conditions of the country 
of origin (BE-E1; BE-E9). These types of secondment schemes or social 
dumping practices (BE-E9; BE-E10) are frequently accompanied by bogus 
self-employment ploys (BE-E2; BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E9; BE-E13). By falsely 
declaring workers as self-employed, the enterprise is no longer bound by 
regular terms of employment (CGKRB, 2011) and, in turn, manages to evade 
certain social security contributions (BE-E2). Additionally, subcontracting 
arrangements, sometimes in the form of elaborate subcontracting cascades, 
138 Financing	oF	organised	crime:	human	traFFicking	in	Focus
can be put into place as a way to distance the organiser from the actual 
exploitation (Delepière et al., 2013). Moreover, operating from within the 
framework of a legitimate corporate structure provides opportunities for 
coating exploitative practices with a veneer of legality (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). In order to sustain this pretence of legitimacy, entrepreneurs can 
for instance declare a minimal amount of work hours (BE-E4). In the 
same vein, victims of sexual exploitation working in bars or windows 
are sometimes registered under horeca contracts for tax purposes, yet 
worked hours and earnings are routinely under-declared (Boels, 2015; 
Weitzer, 2014b; Weitzer & Boels, 2015). Another avenue is to simply take 
advantage of legislative loopholes (BE-E5). On this point, perpetrators use 
the ambiguity of the legal framework on human trafficking for their own 
ends by deliberately framing the work of their victims in such a way that 
is possible to denounce the charge of human trafficking (Europol, 2017; 
Leman & Janssens, 2015). In this context, human trafficking for labour 
exploitation has more to do with structural labour market vulnerabilities 
than it bears upon the “aberrant criminal actions of deviant traffickers” 
(Davies, 2017; Shamir, 2012, p. 112).
That being said, trafficking in human beings often coincides with plenty 
of other transgressions. Depending on the modus operandi concerned, 
human trafficking operations regularly draw on a string of ancillary or 
instrumental offences (Vermeulen et al., 2010). Evidently, human trafficking 
and human smuggling activities can be very much interconnected 
(Kleemans & Smit, 2014). In order to move victims to where they are 
needed, some networks resort to the ticket of document forgery (Europol, 
2017) or corruption (BE-E5). One illustrative example is an elaborate 
human trafficking case involving Thai massage parlours. With the help of 
an employee of the Thai embassy in Brussels, the criminal organisation 
managed to obtain residence permits for all the girls. The staff member 
concerned charged no less than €6,000 per person for her services. 
As for the transportation of Thai girls, airport staff was bribed into 
turning a blind eye to their false documents (CGKRB, 2012). Parallel to 
transferring victims, the accommodation of victims quite often backslides 
to rack-renting practices (BE-E4; BE-E8; BE-E9; BE-E10). The extent to 
which organisations engage in criminal activities that do not add to the 
commission of the human trafficking offence, on the other hand, widely 
differs from profile to profile (BE-E5). In respect to other organised 
criminal activities, trafficking in human beings is often associated with 
drug trafficking (Dank et al., 2014). However, a connection to the drug 
trade can also be contributory to the commission of human trafficking, 
as drugging victims of sexual exploitation is a tried and tested method 
of inducing compliance (BE-E7; BE-E11) (Boels, 2015; Leman & Janssens, 
2015). In other instances, human trafficking is linked to other criminal 
activities by the use of victims in other criminal activities (Europol, 
2015), such as the case of Vietnamese labourers working on cannabis 
plantations (BE-E11). To all appearances, human trafficking operations 
verge on specialisation, as the perpetrators generally do not expand 
their criminal portfolio beyond their core business (BE-E1; BE-E10; BE-E13). 
Holding the reins over a human trafficking business is a time-consuming 
engagement that leaves little room for diversion. Moreover, having the 
means and opportunities to set up a human trafficking ring does not 
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necessarily mean that one also has access to alternative illicit trades 
(Kleemans, 2012).
It follows that interfaces between trafficking in human beings and other 
empirical manifestations of organised crime are far from systematic 
(BE-E1; BE-E12). To be accurate, some interconnections have in fact 
been uncovered, as in mutual connections between organised human 
trafficking rings (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-E11), links with human smuggling rings 
(BE-E4) or links with the Chinese Triads (BE-E3) (Federaal Migratiecen-
trum, 2014) and motorcycle gangs (BE-E11) (Myria, 2017). Most of these 
relationships are based on either kinship and friendship (BE-E1) or on 
the principle of reciprocity (Tijhuis, 2006). The system of compensation 
between drug trafficking and human trafficking networks to launder 
money is a remarkable example of this type of symbiotic collusion (see 
section 3.4).
3.1. Source of capital for initiating/sustaining 
criminal operations
Much like the aforementioned cross-criminal collaborations, trafficking in 
human beings is firmly rooted in blatant opportunism. On the whole, 
the initial investments put into setting up human trafficking activities are 
minimal. As a matter of fact, criminal entrepreneurs deliberately search 
for ways to start up their business with as little capital as possible (BE-E3). 
In actuality, very little is needed to set up a human trafficking business, 
though this can depend on the particular method of operation. Concerning 
the business model of lover-boys, no launch capital whatsoever is needed 
(BE-E5). In entering the human trafficking business, having the necessary 
knowledge and the right connections takes precedence over sitting on a 
sizable reserve of money (BE-E4; BE-E6; BE-C3).
As law enforcement agencies rarely trouble themselves over the question 
of start-up capital (BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E13), not much is known about 
the source of financing. In view of the fact that one can get a human 
trafficking operation off the ground with limited funds, own resources 
are a major source of financing (BE-E10). A case in point are former 
victims, who use the little money they have earned to set up their 
own business (BE-E4). Additionally, human trafficking operations can be 
funded by pooling resources together (BE-E3; BE-E4) or by turning to 
relatives (BE-E3). To illustrate, respondent BE-C2 claimed that €5,000 
was all it took to establish his car wash venture, a sum which he easily 
secured by taking out a business loan.
By the same token, keeping a human trafficking business up and 
running in the face of critical moments is more of a challenge than 
launching said operation. Pivotal moments, such as apprehension by 
law enforcement authorities, put the offenders in what is essentially 
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a sink-or-swim situation. One way of dealing with this adversity is by 
maintaining control over victims in one way or another, even from 
behind bars (BE-E6; BE-E12). Victims who willingly bear the litigation 
expenses of their alleged exploiters are a grim example of this type 
of boundless manipulation (BE-E12). Related to this survival strategy, 
respondent BE-C2’s family members willingly stepped in to take care of 
business while he served his prison sentence, thus ensuring the continuity 
of his undertaking. Yet, in preference to responding to crises, criminal 
entrepreneurs principally act in advance of law enforcement interventions. 
To this end, human traffickers have a whole range of counterstrategies 
at their disposal. If push comes to shove, human trafficking operations 
are quite easily uprooted and relocated elsewhere (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E6; 
BE-E7). In lieu of dislodging their entire operation, human trafficking 
organisations usually opt for moving their criminal assets as far as 
possible from the spot where the exploitation takes place (FATF & 
MENAFATF, 2015; Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014; Kopp, 2012). In order 
to mitigate the risk of losing everything, criminal proceeds should be 
translocated as soon as possible (BE-E4; BE-E5). Considering the deep-
seated familial and international dimension of human trafficking, it is 
not uncommon to hide one’s revenues with relatives (BE-E1; Dank et 
al., 2014), both in the country of origin and in third countries (BE-E5). 
Spreading the risk of confiscation (Aronowitz et al., 2010), for instance 
through various investments abroad (BE-E10), also occurs. In addition 
to hauling the proceeds a long way from their illicit origins, corporate 
structures embroiled in human trafficking activities have recourse to 
bankruptcy abuse and fraud (BE-E10) (Leman & Janssens, 2015). In this 
sense, implicated companies are suddenly insolvent on the occasion of 
a conviction (BE-E5; BE-E7). Furthermore, criminal entrepreneurs often 
go to great lengths to avoid leaving incriminating trails (BE-E5; BE-E13; 
Aronowitz et al., 2010), to which end various strategies are suitable. 
Straw men schemes (BE-E5), using the internet to sidestep wiretapping or 
even adopting nicknames (BE-E9) all answer this purpose.
On account of the fact that hardly any start-up capital is needed, 
it follows that human trafficking operations do rebound after critical 
episodes (BE-E4; BE-E12). However, this low market entry threshold 
also means that competitors eager to fill the market void are abundant 
(BE-E1; Leman & Janssens, 2015). In case of such a criminal coup d’état, 
the complete lack of territoriality in the human trafficking business 
means that the opportunities to reinstate one’s business elsewhere 
are abundant (BE-E4). Whereas some organisations inevitably crumble, 
others manage to pull through. Consequently, the latter category 
is in a position to learn from its mistakes and adapt accordingly 
(BE-E5). Moreover, because of the rather modest initial investment, 
stripping a human trafficking networks of its assets is not enough to 
permanently incapacitate the operation (BE-E4). On the contrary, a 
convicted human trafficker is still endowed with relevant experience 
and the right connections. A loss of reserves or revenue might not 
leave one much choice but to simply take up where one previously 
left off (Naylor, 1999).
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3.2. Settlement of payments
Aside from the occasional moment of crisis, human trafficking organisations 
have to deal with the everyday issue of working out a payment system. 
As concerns sexual exploitation, the sex trade is conventionally a cash-
up-front business (BE-E1; Europol Financial Intelligence Group, 2015; 
Finance Against Trafficking, 2014; Korsell et al., 2011). Besides cash 
transactions, only a few venues accept credit card payments (BE-E1; 
BE-E13). Most often, the client pays to an intermediary who is present 
at the spot (Petrunov, 2011), such as a “big sister” companion (BE-E5; 
Leman & Janssens, 2015) or the local manager of the venue. Alternatively, 
the customer pays directly to the victim (BE-E1; BE-E7), who either 
immediately hands over the payment to the intermediary (BE-E11) or, 
more infrequently, compliantly brings the earnings to the exploiters 
(BE-E1; BE-E6; BE-E12; BE-E13). These types of settlements permit the 
criminal organisation to sever the cash flow from their commodity, in 
this case trafficked human beings (Kopp, 2012). As a matter of course, 
the organiser of the human trafficking operation sees to the redistribution 
of the takings among the different ranks of the organisation (BE-E11). 
Ordinarily, this allotment involves a fifty-fifty arrangement between the 
victim and the exploiter. However, one should bear in mind that all 
expenses are subtracted from the victim’s share (BE-E1; BE-E11; Leman & 
Janssens, 2015).
As for labour exploitation, a different pattern emerges. As a rule, the 
customer pays the employer for the work that has been done. The 
method of payment is largely subject to the sector of operation (BE-E1; 
BE-E4; BE-E11). Bank transfers are a common payment system in a number 
of businesses, whereas other undertakings such as carwashes are primarily 
cash-based. Wire transfers are usually quickly followed by a withdrawal 
in cash (BE-E4; Delepière et al., 2013). The employer gives money to the 
intermediary, who in turn pays the workers (BE-E1). For the most part, 
workers are paid in cash (BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E12; Delepière et al., 2013). 
Again, all incurred expenses are deducted from the victims’ wages (BE-E11). 
In essence, the exploiter receives the payments and subsequently handles 
the apportionment of the organisation’s revenues (BE-E11).
Incidentally, control is of critical importance in ensuring payments from 
victims (BE-E5; BE-E13; Campana, 2015). Moreover, it is in the interest 
of the exploiter to have a clear picture of the earnings of his or her 
victims (BE-E13). To that end, the ways and means to keep a tight rein 
on trafficked victims are virtually limitless. As a matter of usual practice, 
victims are forced into a position of financial dependence (BE-E11). 
The system of debt bondage, as pointed out before, compels people 
to work off their debt burden (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E12). Accumulating 
wage arrears or withholding money further (BE-E2) binds the victim 
to the trafficking network, for fear of suffering the loss of these due 
payments. Likewise, exploiters sometimes hold on to the victims’ first 
earnings as a sort of security deposit (BE-E11). In distinction to keeping 
back victims’ payments, some human trafficking operations implement 
a crude penalty system, basically imposing a fine on all types of minor 
transgressions (BE-E1; BE-E10). Another aspect of control is restricting 
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and supervising every movement of trafficking victims. Isolating or even 
sequestrating workers principally corresponds to this need (BE-E1; BE-E7; 
BE-E9; BE-E11). Under other conditions, human trafficking networks make 
use of technological developments such as cameras (BE-E1; BE-E13), 
mobile phones (BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7) or tachographs in lorries (BE-E10) 
in conjunction with ”low-tech” surveillance in the form of on-the-spot 
supervisors (BE-E13). By taking away identity papers (BE-E6; BE-E11) or 
abusing the person’s illegal status (BE-E4; BE-E10; BE-E12) exploiters 
effectively limit their victim’s freedom of movement to the confines of 
the human trafficking operation.
In the case of a sham marriage (BE-E1) or domestic servitude, one’s 
mobility rarely extends beyond the front door. Alongside physical 
restraints, psychological terror is a favoured method of control. In this 
respect, branding victims by means of tattoos (BE-E1; BE-E6) or outright 
mutilation (BE-E9) conveys an unequivocal message. On the subject of 
instilling fear, violence or threats thereof towards both the victim and his 
or her relatives are ever-present (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-E9). Or rather, violence 
is not as common as more subtle means of control such as extortion, as 
the use of violence implies less profit and harsher punishment (Englund 
et al., 2008; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Vermeulen et al., 2007).
3.3. Costs of doing business
By its very nature, trafficking in human beings is a cost-saving exercise 
(BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E5). From a business point of view, human trafficking 
makes for a relatively inexpensive undertaking considering that a trafficked 
individual is a remarkably low-cost ”commodity” (Europol, 2015; Wheaton 
et al., 2010). As one would expect, the operating costs of a human 
trafficking organisation vary widely according to the network’s method 
of operation (BE-E5). Ultimately, exploiters recoup any costs or expenses 
incurred during the operation directly from their victims (BE-E4; BE-E9; 
BE-E10; BE-E11).
Each stage in the process of human trafficking entails different costs. 
Before anything else, exploitation requires people. Getting a hold of 
those people mainly involves advertisement costs (BE-E1; Portnoff et 
al., 2017). Accordingly, the costs of recruitment are in effect next to 
nothing (Leman & Janssens, 2008). After ensnaring one or several victims, 
the prospective labour force needs to be transferred to their country 
of destination. Evidently, the cost of transportation is commensurate 
with the distance that is covered by the operation. As far as trafficking 
within Europe is concerned, transportation costs generally consist of 
plane, train, or bus fees (BE-E1; BE-E11) or, as an alternative, the price 
of a second-hand car or mini-van and fuel (BE-E1), as well as obtaining 
travel documents, whether counterfeit or not (BE-E3; BE-E13). So, in 
spite of appearance, transporting victims is generally a minimal cost of 
doing business (Kara, 2011). On the contrary, the expenditure item of 
transportation is conveniently turned into a source of profit. By way of 
illustration, a trip from Eastern Europe usually costs about €40 or roughly 
the price of low-budget flight (BE-E1; BE-E11). Victims, on the other 
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hand, are ordered to repay the traffickers upwards of €800 for their 
travel expenses (BE-E11). The same goes for human trafficking operations 
involving long-distance smuggling. Trafficked individuals incur a debt of 
€15,000, €30,000, or even €60,000 (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014), 
a sum that is eagerly inflated in light of perceived risks of traversing 
borders but is in no way proportional to the real costs of transportation 
(BE-E5; BE-E9; BE-E11). Hence, the system of debt bondage or coerced 
indebtedness is a patently overblown contract (Kara, 2011).
Next, as concerns the accommodation of victims, networks frequently 
pay around €800 in monthly rent for a small house or apartment (BE-E1; 
BE-E11). In order to secure a lease agreement, human traffickers often 
turn to their web of contacts (Korsell et al., 2011). In preference to 
paying rent, in exceptional cases the cost of accommodation is avoided 
altogether by housing labourers in their respective workplace (BE-E10; 
BE-E16). Contrarily, accommodation is a cost item that is increasingly 
remodelled into a money-spinning scheme through the practice of rack-
renting (BE-E10). If the monthly rent is €800, the exploiter simply 
harbours five to ten victims in the same place and charges each of them 
a fee of roughly €250 (BE-E11).
Furthermore, exploitation necessitates a certain infrastructure, such 
as a workplace, working clothes and all kinds of implements (BE-C2; 
BE-E1; BE-E13; Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Setting up basic organisational 
structures can be a substantial investment. It would, therefore, be 
worthwhile to look into such cases from a money laundering angle. 
On the other hand, if the infrastructure is pre-existent to the human 
trafficking activities, as is often the case with labour exploitation (BE-
E4), then no investment whatsoever is required. In addition to the 
infrastructure of trafficking in human beings, criminal organisations 
are confronted with a number of operating expenses. These costs 
are primarily connected to the everyday management of a trafficking 
venture. Mobile communication and internet access are, of course, 
rather unexceptional business expenses (BE-E1; BE-E7). A more atypical 
cost item is the repatriation of criminal assets (Soudijn & Reuter, 2016), 
as for instance money transfer services charge a ten percent commission 
on transactions (BE-E13) (Brenig et al., 2015).
Other costs related to exploitation include the rent for windows, which 
is specific to red light districts3 (BE-E1; BE-E5) (Adriaenssens et al., 
2015). Window fees normally fluctuate between €100 and €200 per 
shift (Adriaenssens et al., 2015; Boels, 2016), though there are large 
regional differences (BE-E6; BE-E12; BE-E13). Advertising sexual services 
on-line is typically free of charge. Bumping these ads in order to draw 
in more customers, on the other hand, requires payment, for instance 
via text message (BE-E6) (Portnoff et al., 2017). As for wage costs, since 
3 While on the subject of renting windows for sex work, the means of gaining access to these 
venues, incidental to the involvement of third parties in window prostitution, vary from place 
to place. As Weitzer and Boels (2015, p. 252) note: “In Antwerp, the sex workers rent window 
space directly from a building owner. In Brussels, madams rent a window unit from the building 
owner and supervise the prostitutes who work for them. In Ghent, prostitution café managers/
barkeepers rent space from the building owner, and sex workers typically enter into written 
contracts with managers in order to occupy the space for a specific period of time.”
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trafficked workers are axiomatically paid well below the legal minima, 
labour exploitation represents an immense saving in labour costs. 
Labour trafficking implies a saving of at least fifty percent, and in the 
worst case this cost-item is eliminated altogether (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E9; 
BE-E10). Lastly, control has an evident decisive relevance to the matter 
of exploitation. Monitoring or control-related costs are considerable, as 
keeping people in check takes a lot of time and resources (Campana, 
2015; Korsell et al., 2011).
3.4. Profits and profit sharing
Proceeding from this low-cost business model perspective, trafficking 
in human beings is often believed to generate immense profits. On 
average, the overall revenues of a human trafficking operation easily 
add up to several tens or even hundreds of thousands of euros (BE-E2; 
BE-E5; BE-E12; BE-E14), not to mention the outliers who rake up millions 
of euros in profit (BE-E1; BE-E10). Throughout the human trafficking 
business, profits are subject to large fluctuations (Englund et al., 2008; 
OSCE, 2013). As a matter of course, trafficking in persons involves 
services that are provided on a continuous basis. Subsequently, the 
proceeds of human trafficking are patterned by a steady flow of 
relatively small takings (FinCen, 2014; Korsell et al., 2011). Weighed 
against the nominal investment required to get a human trafficking 
operation up and running, trafficking in human beings yields a quick 
and considerable profit (Kara, 2011; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 
Petrunov, 2011). In point of fact, a criminal entrepreneur can normally 
regain his initial investments in a matter of days (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). Trafficking in persons is nevertheless far from the limitless source 
of profit it is commonly made out to be (Campana, 2015; Marcus et 
al., 2016). On the whole, human trafficking seems to be less profitable 
than other criminal undertakings, such as drug trafficking (Bruinsma & 
Bernasco, 2004; Levi & Reuter, 2006). Adding to that, the relative 
absence of economies of scale significantly limits the profit potential 
(Campana, 2015).
Trafficking in persons can be financially rewarding in several different 
ways. That is, exploiters either extort services from their victims or 
trade in trafficked persons (Bravo, 2008; OSCE, 2013). The latter option 
appears to be more and more exceptional nowadays (BE-E5; Leman & 
Janssens, 2008), as renting out or selling individuals is less lucrative 
than exploiting them over a longer period of time (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). Deducting travel and living expenses, imposing fines, and wielding 
extortionate interest rates (Kara, 2011) increases the margin of profit 
as well. Concerning sexual exploitation, estimates on the proceeds 
vary considerably. One victim is reckoned to yield somewhere in the 
ballpark of €2,000 to €8,000 a week (BE-E1; BE-E6; BE-E11; Boels, 2015; 
Roudaut, 2011). Similarly, the number of trafficked persons stretches 
from a single individual (BE-E13) up to dozens of victims (BE-E5). In order 
to keep the operation at a manageable scale, the number of victims rarely 
exceeds that of a handful (BE-E1). The estimated number of clients for 
window workers clusters around five a day, give or take a few (BE-E6; 
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	belgium	 145
BE-E7; BE-E11), though sex workers can expand their clientele by engaging 
in other prostitution segments such as internet-based or private services 
(BE-E6). As for the price range of sexual services, rates are mainly 
contingent on the type of prostitution (BE-E6; BE-E7; BE-E12). The average 
price for window prostitution is €50 (BE-E6; Boels, 2015), whereas escort 
services are usually paid €150 (BE-E1; BE-E6). On the whole, sex workers 
charge somewhere around €50 to €100 for their services (Adriaenssens et 
al., 2015; Boels, 2015). Victims of human trafficking, however, are prone 
to working at a cut-rate as they are in no position to refuse clients 
(BE-E6; BE-E12). Specifically, victims oftentimes procure services below 
the standard rate in order to meet revenue quotas imposed by their 
exploiters (Boels, 2015). In this connection, sex workers who have no 
say in their working conditions also have little control over the number 
of clients they receive (García, 2016), let alone the prices they charge. 
Offering services at a cut-price nonetheless affects the market for sex 
work and, as a consequence, creates tensions with other prostitutes 
(Boels, 2015). With reference to economic exploitation, the term profit 
takes on various meanings. By way of explanation, profits can be 
regarded as all direct gains from human trafficking activities. Contrarily, 
the profit can also be equated to all wages, social contributions, and 
other expenses that have been evaded in the process (BE-E9; BE-E11). In 
other words, the issue of sizing up profit in labour trafficking is rather 
muddled. The proceeds of labour trafficking largely depend on the 
duration and gravity of the exploitative practices (BE-E2). Moreover, low 
labour costs increase profits as they allow for more competitive pricing 
(BE-E4; BE-E11).
When it comes to divvying up the proceeds, shares are generally in 
accordance with the respective contribution of that member to the 
human trafficking operation (BE-E1; BE-E4; Petrunov, 2011). As mentioned 
earlier, the organiser is the one who is responsible for the redistribution 
of profits. This apportionment is seemingly reflective of the hierarchy 
present in a criminal organisation, provided that a certain degree of 
organisation is in fact existent in the trafficking operation. Principally, the 
organiser takes the lion’s share of the profit, his lieutenants get a smaller 
piece of the pie, and so on (BE-E4; BE-E11). Interestingly, respondent 
BE-C3, as a more peripheral member of the operation, considered going 
out with the girls along with casual sexual encounters to be a form 
of payment in kind. In fact, he declared that he had no real financial 
motive to take part in these activities because he was already employed 
on a full time basis somewhere else and, in consequence, did not view 
the pin money he received for his services as the group’s driver as the 
main perquisite of this job. On the occasion that trafficking networks 
externalize some of their activities, service providers or brokers are paid 
on a freelance basis (Leman & Janssens, 2008). As one might imagine, 
the trafficked workers are quite literally at the bottom of the “food 
chain.”
By and large, offending and spending are closely connected. The greater 
part of criminal proceeds is blown on luxury goods as to keep up a 
lavish lifestyle (CGKRB, 2012). Prodigal spending sprees and conspicuous 
wealth are, of course, flagrant measures of the economic power one has 
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managed to accumulate (Petrunov, 2011). Remaining assets, if any, are 
usually invested (FATF, 2011; Kopp, 2012; Korsell et al., 2011; Leman & 
Janssens, 2015; Petrunov, 2011). Investments are predominantly made in 
the real estate sector, both domestically and in other countries (BE-E3; 
BE-E7; BE-E12). In turn, investments mostly involve legal opportunities. 
Respondent BE-C2, for one, dipped into the proceeds of his car 
wash business to set up two supplementary convenience stores. The 
revenues from human trafficking operations, however, can also be used 
to embark upon other criminal enterprises, such as drug trafficking 
(BE-E4). Depending on the profile and background of the offender, 
investments can take place in Belgium as well as abroad (BE-E4; BE-E7; 
BE-E8; BE-E10). Investment choices are thus marked by their notable 
proximity to the criminal entrepreneur. In general, investments stay close 
to home (Kruisbergen et al., 2015; Levi & Reuter, 2006). Lastly, part of 
the profits flows right back into the trafficking business with a view to 
sustaining subsequent cycles of operation (BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E11; BE-E13) 
or, on rare occasions, to increase the scale of the illicit undertaking 
(BE-E1; BE-E11).
In a related manner, investing abroad points to the cross-border move-
ment of human trafficking proceeds. As mentioned before, offenders 
primarily send criminal proceeds to their country of origin (Europol, 
2016; Europol Financial Intelligence Group, 2015) in a bid to safeguard 
their financial assets. Transferring illicit earnings on a regular basis would 
be a sensible strategy (Korsell et al., 2011), as letting large sums of 
money accumulate in the country of operation runs the risk of losing 
the full amount of criminal proceedings at the hand of law enforcement 
interventions. The physical transportation of cash by cash couriers is a 
prevalent way of moving assets abroad which, perhaps, could be expected 
given the finding that trafficking in human beings, for a great part, is 
a cash-based economy (BE-E5; BE-E12; Europol, 2015). An illustrative 
example is the case of the white van courier, who was assigned the 
task of collecting the sex trafficking scene’s filthy lucre along a set 
route, crossing Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany before delivering 
the stacks of cash to Bulgaria. The cash courier did not only move 
human trafficking profits in exchange for a certain commission fee, but 
worked for the entire Bulgarian criminal circuit in Western Europe (BE-E5; 
Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). Secondly, wire transfers are increasingly 
avoided as a cross-border conduit for criminal assets on account of their 
traceability (BE-E6; Europol, 2015; Petrunov, 2011). On the off-chance that 
bank transfers are being used, this is usually realised by breaking down 
the funds into smaller transactions, by wiring money through third-party 
bank accounts, by having victims transfer the assets (BE-E1) or through the 
medium of money mules (BE-E4). Outside the traditional banking system, 
money service businesses such as Western Union, MoneyGram and 
Moneytrans are frequently used by non-Belgian offenders to repatriate 
profits (BE-E1; BE-E3; BE-E15). Yet again, these financial transactions are 
carried out under a different name with the aim of bypassing any active 
identification systems (BE-E5; BE-E13; Leman & Janssens, 2015). On the 
subject of underground banking, hawala money transfers are restricted to 
certain nationalities (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E10; Europol, 2015), such as Afghani 
and Pakistani ethnic groups (Soudijn, 2015). Similar to the method of 
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hawala banking is the Black Western Union system specific to Nigerian 
networks (BE-E5). In essence, criminal assets are send to Nigeria by 
means of parallel money transfers run through grocery stores or other 
retailers (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014).
Transferring profits and subsequently reinserting criminal capital in the 
regular circuit can be considered as the most prominent method of 
money laundering in human trafficking operations (BE-E4; BE-E5; BE-E12; 
BE-E13) (FATF, 2011). It stands to reason that this method is a rampant 
approach to criminal money management as it is a very easy way 
to integrate illicit funds into the legal economy (Europol Financial 
Intelligence Group, 2015). However, the laundering of trafficking profits 
does not necessarily follow the same fixed pattern. Rather, offenders 
launder their illicit profits by any means possible (BE-E13), for example 
through purchasing alcohol cheaply and reselling it at inflated prices 
(BE-E4). In as much as human trafficking operations are principally 
clandestine enterprises (Weitzer, 2014a), the incidence of money 
laundering is largely uncharted territory. However, the figures presented 
by the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (FIU) are, to a 
certain degree, indicative of the scale of this issue. Between 2010 and 
2015, a total of 866 cases of money laundering connected to human 
trafficking activities were reported to the public prosecutor’s office 
(CTIF-CFI, 2015). As Table 6 reveals, substantial amounts of money are 
involved.
The bottom line of any money 
laundering scheme is to provide 
criminal proceeds with a legal 
façade (BE-E14; Levi & Reuter, 
2006). As explained above, hu-
man trafficking operations, and 
labour trafficking operations in 
particular, routinely take advan-
tage of legitimate companies. 
For this reason, trafficking in 
persons lends itself particu-
larly well to money laundering 
(Delepière et al., 2013; Europol, 
2015; Levi, 2015). Provided that 
a human trafficking network operates within a bona fide business struc-
ture, the comingling of legitimate and illegitimate assets is inherent to 
the workings of the criminal enterprise (BE-E1; BE-E14; Europol Financial 
Intelligence Group, 2015). As a further laundering procedure, corporate 
structures easily allow for trade-based money laundering (BE-E3; BE-E5), 
for instance through invoice fraud (BE-E4; BE-E7; BE-E10) or bogus con-
sultancy fees (BE-E10). A striking example is the compensation system 
between drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings. Essentially, 
human trafficking organisations need hard cash to pay their workers, 
whereas drug traffickers need to get rid of their cash supplies. This 
cross-criminal exchange between two front companies is subsequently 
covered by false invoices (BE-E3; BE-E15; CTIF-CFI, 2016). More generally, 
profits are passed from one transit bank account to another (BE-E9). Not 
ТаBle 6. scale oF Files linked to traFFicking in human Beings 
and Forwarded to judicial authorities By the Belgian Fiu 
(2014 – 2016)
Source: CTIF-CFI (2016).
year Number of files Total (€ million)
2014 29 17.69
2015 17 13.22
2016 20 14.63
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only are obfuscated business structures consisting of many interconnect-
ing firms conducive to the harbouring of trafficking activities, they also 
enable offenders to let the proceedings circle between several accounts 
of their own companies. Similarly, chains of subcontractors can double 
as pipelines for criminal assets (BE-E4). Alternatively, the accounts of 
victims or money mules are put to use as transit bank accounts (BE-
E13; BE-E14). After passing the proceeds around, the rule of thumb is 
to break the paper trail by turning the profits into cash, often through 
smurfing techniques4 (BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E15; CTIF-CFI, 2016; Delepière 
et al., 2013). As a consequence, the last steps of the money laundering 
process take effect outside the regular banking system (Delepière et al., 
2013; Shelley, 2010). Overall, money laundering schemes tied to human 
trafficking operations rarely get more complex than this (Petrunov, 2011). 
In fact, the methods by which human traffickers launder their earnings 
are markedly similar to those used for other criminal activities (CGKRB, 
2011; OSCE, 2014).
3.5. The role and impact of the internet 
on human trafficking activities and finances
Likewise, the internet and accompanying technological advancements 
constitute powerful drivers for all manner of illicit trades (Europol, 2017; 
Lavorgna, 2015). As regards trafficking in human beings, the Internet 
fulfils three main functions (Myria, 2017). First off, online classified 
ads, social networking sites, and dating sites all serve as recruitment 
hubs for trafficking victims (Hughes, 2014; Latonero, 2011; Myria, 
2017). Next, the Internet is of great use to the management of human 
trafficking rings (BE-E5) (Myria, 2017), as it facilitates communication 
(BE-E1; BE-E10; BE-E13) and capacitates organisers to coordinate 
trafficking activities from a distance (BE-E10). Moreover, concerning 
the management of victims in particular, recent technologies have 
significantly expanded the arsenal of methods of control (BE-E1; BE-E5; 
BE-E7), for instance through so-called sextortion practices (Di Nicola et 
al., 2017; Lavorgna, 2015) or by remotely monitoring trafficked persons 
(Hughes, 2014). Lastly, sex trafficking victims are increasingly advertised 
online (Korsell et al., 2011; Myria, 2017).
Hitherto, the use of digital communication technologies has been 
reported more for sexual exploitation than for cases of labour trafficking 
(Hughes, 2014; Latonero, 2011). It appears that more traditional methods 
of recruitment are preferred for select target audiences, such as 
labourers who are located in rural areas (Latonero, 2011). The internet 
has nevertheless left its mark on the recruitment process of human 
traffickers. Above all, ICTs lower the threshold for making contact with 
4 By way of explanation: “One of the ways that criminals can overcome some of the transaction 
regulation is by using external allies to circumvent restrictions on deposit amounts or add 
confusion to the financial trail. The classic method is to take a large cash sum, for example 
100,000, and to break this down into smaller sums of between 8,000 and 9,000. A number of 
members of the gang or outside members such as family or friends are given batches of the 
money and ordered to deposit it from different banks locally to arrive at the same destination 
bank. This process is known as smurfing and it was devised to avoid detection when large 
sums of cash needed to be deposited” (Naheem, 2015, p. 518).
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potential victims (BE-E1; BE-E17; Myria, 2017). In this regard, detailed 
social networking profiles provide the means for victim selection, social 
engineering, and tailored deceit (Lavorgna, 2015; Myria, 2017; Watson 
et al., 2015). Correspondingly, a calculated employment of ICTs can 
potentially replace the position of recruiter or transporter abroad in 
specific cases, notably one-to-one exploitation and sham marriages 
(BE-E4; BE-E7). Hence, social media and other technologies present an 
unparalleled opportunity for individual traffickers to set up their own 
operation (Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Furthermore, technological 
developments have left a marked impact on the working conditions 
and areas of activity of sex work in general (García, 2016). After all, 
online classified ads and specialised websites provide a relatively covert 
and discrete way of advertising sexual services and accessing clients 
compared to the alternative of publicly displaying prostitutes in red 
light districts (BE-E11). Sex trafficking networks have accordingly shifted 
their main fields of operation from bars and windows to private and 
clandestine soliciting (BE-E4; BE-E11; Di Nicola et al., 2017). Against this 
background, the present surge of private forms of prostitution in the 
wake of the ongoing digital revolution is something of a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, web-based soliciting grants sex workers a 
certain level of freedom, independence, and concealment from the 
public view. From the opposed point of view, this clandestineness could 
lead to precarious situations (García, 2016). For example, the presence 
of police officers in Belgian vice districts serves as a tool to enhance 
social control (Weitzer, 2014b). Yet, when sexual encounters take place 
in apartments or disreputable hotel rooms, this type of external oversight 
is virtually absent. On top of promoting anonymity, new communication 
technologies have drastically cut the transaction costs of private prostitution 
and escort services, in particular by cutting back the expenditure on 
accommodation (Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Conversely, the impact of 
cryptocurrencies on the human trafficking business model has been far 
less extensive (BE-E3; Europol, 2015). As bearer negotiable instruments, 
decentralised and encrypted virtual currencies such as bitcoin can be 
regarded as perfectly legal facilitators of money laundering (BE-E14; 
Brenig et al., 2015). What has kept this inexpensive system of transferring 
from taking off, is the limited acceptability of cryptocurrencies and the 
fact that cashing outside the system is still a problem (Brenig et al., 2015). 
Cryptocurrencies nevertheless embody an insidious trend in managing 
criminal finances (BE-E14). Law enforcement agencies should therefore be 
alert to the possibility of recent technological advancements gaining a 
firmer foothold in the human trafficking business model.
Notwithstanding the glaring advantages set out above, the use of internet 
and assorted technologies bears a number of drawbacks for human 
trafficking organisations. As the online outposts of human trafficking 
activities form a rare instance where criminal operations do actually 
surface, websites such as redlights.be (BE-E5; BE-E6) or backpage.com 
(Portnoff et al., 2017) provide an interesting avenue to identify human 
trafficking cases (Di Nicola et al., 2017; Latonero, 2011; Myria, 2017; 
Watson et al., 2015). By and of itself, online classified ads selling sex 
are rife with potentially inculpatory information (Portnoff et al., 2017). 
Tracing back these ads to the exploiters behind them constitutes a major 
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step in countering human trafficking for sexual exploitation and, more 
importantly, this same alertness is gradually seeping through the law 
enforcement spectrum (BE-E5; BE-E6; Myria, 2017). Additionally, websites 
where clients discuss the sex workers they have visited can be used to 
single out trafficking cases (Adriaenssens et al., 2015; Korsell et al., 2011). 
Moreover, through the use of digital communication technologies, all 
kinds of transactions and communications are registered (Hughes, 2014). 
Antithetically to the deceptive opportunities of the internet, websites (e.g. 
Etransport.pl) where truck drivers exchange experiences and information 
about their employers enable potential victims to warn each other for 
trafficking practices (BE-E10; Myria, 2017).
Going from “digital smoke signals” (Latonero, 2011, p. 37) to the financial 
footprints of human trafficking offences, financial investigations are widely 
regarded as an essential tool of an effective response to the criminal 
threat of trafficking in persons. In Belgium, financial investigations can be 
categorised as either minimal or maximal (BE-E1). Financial investigations 
adhering to the minimal approach are essentially a matter of calculating 
or tracing criminally obtained assets with a view to confiscation (BE-
E2; BE-E4; BE-E10; BE-E11). In this sense, minimal financial investigations 
are quasi standard practice in human trafficking cases (BE-E1; BE-E6; 
BE-E12; BE-E13). More profound financial investigations that go beyond 
the purpose of sheer confiscation, on the contrary, are relatively 
infrequent and seem to be limited to bigger cases (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-
E8). Whichever option is deemed suitable in a concrete case is at the 
consideration of the prosecutor’s office (BE-E1; BE-E4). In spite of this 
fractional application, profound financial investigations are paramount 
to laying bare the structure of trafficking organisations (CGKRB, 2012; 
FATF, 2012; Shelley, 2010). Likewise, an effective financial investigation 
mirrors the findings of the principal criminal investigation (BE-E10). 
Accordingly, thorough financial inquiries are highly relevant to the issue 
of providing evidence (BE-E5; BE-E14; Brown et al., 2012). As yet, this 
case building potential is clearly underused (Kruisbergen et al., 2016). In 
effect, financial investigations have demonstrated their added value in 
supporting the charge of criminal conspiracy or criminal organisation 
(BE-E5; CGKRB, 2012; Leman & Janssens, 2015). As specified above, 
money is what ties the different parts of a human trafficking operation 
together. Consequently, delving into those finances is one of the few 
ways to take hold of the elusive men behind the curtain or top tiers 
of the human trafficking business when dealing with more sophisticated 
trafficking rings (BE-E5). Ultimately, knowing where the funds come from 
and where they go sheds a different light on a traffic that is difficult to 
chart directly (Kopp, 2012).
With regard to the purpose of confiscation, two methods can be used 
to determine the size of a trafficker’s illicit fortune (BE-E14). The method 
4. FINANCIAl INvESTIGATIONS OF THB CRIMES: 
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of asset evaluation consists of stacking up the capital one has amassed 
over a suspicious period of time against the defendant’s legal income in 
pursuance of demonstrating unexplained wealth (Brown, 2013). Alternatively, 
investigators turn to the direct calculation of criminally obtained assets. 
As far as sexual exploitation is concerned, the asset investigation and 
recovery unit of the Belgian Federal police is disposed to working out 
the total of criminal earnings or assisting human trafficking investigators 
in this calculation. Though conventionally, the calculation of criminal 
proceeds is seen as a standard investigative practice (BE-E6; BE-E14). 
The overall takings of a sex trafficking operation typically correspond 
to the sum of the number of identified victims, how much the victims 
have earned, and how much these trafficked individuals had to hand 
over to their exploiters (BE-E6). In the case of labour exploitation, social 
inspection services are usually entrusted with calculating the proceeds 
(BE-E1; BE-E2; BE-E4). The criminal financial gain in labour trafficking 
rests on two key elements, namely unpaid wages and unpaid social 
contributions (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E9). The total proceeds of a labour 
trafficking business are further shaped by factors such as the duration 
of employment, working hours, the type of labour involved, and so on 
(BE-E9). Parenthetically, the calculation of criminal proceeds is a telling 
way of quantifying the infraction (BE-E4). As a rule, operating costs are 
not brought into the equation (BE-E3), for the reason that confiscation is 
the first and foremost reason for calculating criminal assets.
Although invaluable to disrupting human trafficking operations, financial 
investigations are bound by considerable challenges and numerous practical 
problems. Going down the rabbit hole of criminal finances is an inherently 
time-consuming endeavour (BE-E4; BE-E7; BE-E8; BE-E14). However, lengthy 
investigations run counter to the principle of reasonable delay and the 
fact that a lot of non-resident defendants are held in temporary custody 
implies that human trafficking investigations are regularly conducted under 
pressure of time (BE-E4; BE-E7). In a similar vein, financial investigations are 
hampered by a general lack of resources (BE-E4; BE-E8; BE-E10; Delepière 
et al., 2013). This problem is exacerbated by the oftentimes complicated 
nature of human trafficking cases (BE-E1; BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E5; BE-E7), 
which require the involvement of specialised investigators (BE-E1; BE-E4; 
BE-E7) and by the extensive use of counter-strategies. Whereas financial 
investigations move slow, the flow of financial transactions is immensely 
faster than the ability of investigative authorities to track them (BE-E4; 
OSCE, 2014).
The international aspect integral to most human trafficking operations 
complicates matters even more (Brown et al., 2012; Delepière et al., 2013; 
Soudijn, 2014). Over the years, the response to human trafficking has 
been raised to an transnational level in order to meet this complexity (de 
Jager et al., 2016; Goodey, 2008). Traditionally, international cooperation 
takes the form of written requests for mutual legal assistance or letters 
rogatory. However, this approach is virtually impracticable in the face 
of complex cross-border cases (Spapens, 2011). That is, requests for 
judicial assistance tend to be rather laborious (BE-E11; BE-E13). Parallel 
investigations and joined investigation teams (JITs), on the contrary, are 
intended to cut back on this tedious to-ing and fro-ing. The added value 
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of JITs in particular lies in the facilitation of exchanging information and 
expertise (BE-E12) (OSCE, 2013). In addition, JITs enable investigators 
to follow the money trail beyond national borders, thus expediting the 
confiscation of criminal assets abroad (BE-E5; BE-E11). The last few years 
have shown a marked increase in the use of JITs in human trafficking 
cases (Eurojust, 2017). In turn, the use of JITs is only gradually gaining 
foothold in Belgium (BE-E1). On the whole, international collaboration 
in human trafficking investigations has known widely varying degrees of 
success (BE-E10; BE-E11; BE-E12). Even so, transnational cooperation is 
of vital importance, as one could seriously question the effectiveness of 
tackling a phenomenon that essentially drifts between nations on a local 
level (BE-E5; BE-E9; BE-E13). Besides, increasing international collaboration 
advances a better understanding of the transnational dimension of the 
human trafficking business (Leman & Janssens, 2015).
All things considered, the adage that trafficking in human beings is a 
low risk, high pay-off crime still stands (FATF, 2011; Finance Against 
Trafficking, 2014; OSCE, 2013). In the first place, the human trafficking 
business is set apart by a remarkably low market entry barrier (Kopp, 
2012; Wheaton et al., 2010). Whereas exploitative practices yield 
considerable profits, the associated risks are close to negligible. Seeing 
that trafficking in human beings offences are notoriously difficult to 
prove (Balarezo, 2013; Eurojust, 2015; UNODC, 2016), the conviction 
rates for this type of transgression are relatively low (Kara, 2011; OSCE, 
2013; Wheaton et al., 2010). Furthermore, those who are convicted 
for trafficking offences are usually met with rather feeble prison terms 
(Balarezo, 2013; Kara, 2011). In general, the bulk of human trafficking 
convicts received no prison time or a partially or fully suspended 
prison sentence (U.S. Department of State, 2017). As for Belgium, half 
of the prison sentences for human trafficking offences in 2016 ranged 
between one and three years (Myria, 2017). Accordingly, increasing the 
risks should be regarded as a fundamental policy direction (Bouché & 
Shady, 2017). Per contra, raising the costs of human trafficking would 
be to no avail, as passing on expenditures to victims and clients is 
ingrained in the trafficking business model. Related to the low risk 
nature of this criminal enterprise is the fact that human trafficking is a 
severely under-detected offence (Goodey, 2008; Guia, 2015; Kleemans 
& Smit, 2014). There are a number of conceivable ways to counteract 
this problem. Raising awareness, educating frontline practitioners, and 
building expertise among investigative authorities is pivotal in uncovering 
a crime that hides in plain sight (BE-E2; BE-E6; Aronowitz et al., 2010). 
Bearing in mind that a number of trafficking modalities rely on public 
venues, such as bars and massage parlours, which require a permit 
from the local municipality (Weitzer, 2014b), an administrative approach 
to trafficking in human beings would undoubtedly reinforce efforts to 
expose exploitative practices (BE-E11; Aronowitz et al., 2010). Against 
this background, it is important to note that, under the influence 
5. CONClUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	belgium	 153
of technological advancements, the market of sex trafficking has 
broadly shifted from public to more private forms of prostitution. This 
displacement evidently broadens the issue of detection from patrolling 
red light districts to monitoring websites and private venues. More 
generally, advancements in communication and technology have shaped 
the current human trafficking business model to a certain extent and 
will continue to do so in the future. In this irrevocable evolution lies 
a considerable challenge for investigative authorities and policy makers 
(BE-E13; BE-E14).
On the subject of investigating human trafficking offences, law enforcement 
agencies often lack the incentive to peg away at financial data, whereas 
financial investigators are generally pressed for knowledge of human 
trafficking operations (OSCE, 2014). Traditionally, investigators have been 
more interested in the criminal activity itself rather than its financial 
bearings (Kruisbergen et al., 2016; Soudijn, 2014). The two are nevertheless 
inherently linked. As a consequence, creating synergies between human 
trafficking investigators and financial investigators is crucial in terms of 
assuring a comprehensive response (BE-E12; BE-E14). Efforts to combat 
human trafficking should not only transcend law enforcement bounds, 
but also national borders where needed (BE-E3; BE-E9). International 
cooperation is pivotal in connection with preventing displacement effects 
(Aronowitz, 2001) and confiscating criminal assets abroad (Kruisbergen et 
al., 2016; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). One should, however, bear in mind 
that, even though depriving a trafficking ring from its criminal proceedings 
can have a disrupting or disheartening effect, the low monetary threshold 
associated with starting a human trafficking operation implies that taking 
away financial resources does not necessarily serve the purpose of taking 
out these criminal organisations indefinitely.
The issue of trafficking in persons is in fact a composite of multifarious 
networks and manners of operating. Turning the tables on human 
traffickers, therefore, requires a tailored response (Efrat, 2016). Knowing 
when to wield the scalpel and when the elephant gun lies at the very 
heart of posing multifaceted solutions to an equally diversified problem 
(Shelley, 2010). Accordingly, the response to human trafficking should 
cover more of a nuanced approach than mere criminal prosecution 
(Davies, 2017; Efrat, 2016). In this context, a convenient point of entry is 
the interlacing between upper- and underworld. By means of dislodging 
criminal infiltration of the licit economy, financial investigations present 
opportunities for disrupting criminal organisations beyond asset recovery 
(Brown, 2013; Roudaut, 2011).
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lIST OF INTERvIEwEES
Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
BE-E1 Head of Central Human
Trafficking Unit
Belgian Federal Police
BE-E2 Head of Human Trafficking 
Directorate
Inspectorate of the National Social Security
Office, Belgium
BE-E3 Strategic Analyst Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit
(CTIF-CFI)
BE-E4 Head of Human Trafficking Unit Inspectorate of the National Social Security
Office, Belgium
BE-E5 Policy Analyst Federal Migration Centre Myria, Belgium
BE-E6 Head of Prostitution Unit Belgian Local Police
BE-E7 Legal Expert Specialized Reception Centre for Victims
of Human Trafficking, Belgium
BE-E8 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E9 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E10 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E11 Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E12 Head of Human Trafficking Unit Belgian Federal Police
BE-E13 Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E14 Head of Asset Investigation
and Recovery Unit
Belgian Federal Police
BE-E15 Strategic Analyst Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit
(CTIF-CFI)
BE-E16 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-C1 Criminal Entrepreneur Souteneur
BE-C2 Criminal Entrepreneur Employer
BE-C3 Criminal Entrepreneur Souteneur
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Trafficking in human beings (THB) for the purpose of sexual exploitation 
is considered one of the largest Bulgarian criminal markets since the 
beginning of the new millennium (CSD, 2012). After the lifting of 
Schengen visas for Bulgarian nationals in 2001, Bulgaria became a major 
country of origin for the trafficking in human beings exploited in the EU. 
The existing research on THB and prostitution in Bulgaria indicates that 
these criminal activities not only generate huge incomes for Bulgarian 
organised crime but also have detrimental social and economic impact 
on local communities (Bezlov et al., 2016, CSD, 2007, CSD, 2012). The 
victims of THB in Bulgaria are mainly women trafficked for sexual 
exploitation, but other enduring criminal networks involved in trafficking 
for forced labour, sham marriages, forced begging and pickpocketing 
have also been detected, as well as criminal networks involved in 
trafficking of pregnant women for the purpose of selling their new-born 
babies (GRETA, 2016).
Recognising the extent of the problem of trafficking, Bulgaria has 
expanded and sharpened its legislation during the last 15 years. Human 
trafficking was first introduced as а separate offence in the Criminal 
Code for the first time in 2002, following the ratification of the Palermo 
Protocol.1 The new articles generally adhered to the definition laid down 
in the protocol and addressed both national and trans-border trafficking 
in human beings. However, in contrast to many European countries, 
Bulgaria criminalises trafficking irrespective of the consent of the victim, 
viewing the use of any special means such as coercion or the giving of 
benefits as aggravating circumstances (ПРБ, 2010). On the other hand, 
labour trafficking definition is strictly narrowed down only to instances 
of “forced labour”. Since their adoption, the Criminal Code articles have 
been amended and complemented in 2009 and 2013 to incorporate 
additional types of trafficking such as trafficking of pregnant women with 
the purpose of selling their new-born babies and trafficking for forced 
begging. The latest amendments were introduced as a result of the 
harmonisation of the Bulgarian legislation with the 2011 EU Directive on 
Human Trafficking.2
Since 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union, 
and especially since 2013, when the restrictions on the access of the 
two countries to the common EU labour market were removed, THB 
1 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 
and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 
15 November 2000.
2 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011.
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related processes have undergone a significant transformation. The 
freedom to travel to and legally work in EU member states has barred 
criminal networks from controlling victims’ access to the common 
European labour market, including that of sexual services. In addition, 
as European and Bulgarian law enforcement and judiciary bodies have 
stepped up cooperation with their counterparts on an international 
scale, criminal networks have become less likely to use violence 
against THB victims and, therefore, less efficient in recruiting new 
victims or exploiting already recruited victims. The socio-demographic 
changes such as the smaller number of children born after 1990 and 
migration towards big cities have also contributed to shrinking the pool 
of persons vulnerable to THB, as has the almost double growth of 
incomes even in smaller settlements in the post-accession years (Bezlov 
et al., 2016).
The criminal networks evolved also in their attempt to adapt to the 
changing environment, going through several stages shaping their 
characteristics. The first period of criminal networks’ development began 
in the mid-1990s when the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation 
was strongly linked to the domestic prostitution market. During this 
period, the large criminal syndicates of the so called “violent insurers”3 
turned the sex market into an important source of revenue, establishing 
control over supply through ownership of hotels, nightclubs and bars in 
major cities and resorts. Use of violence, often in extreme forms, was 
widespread (CSD, 2007).
With the lifting of Schengen visas, which marks the start of the second 
period, Bulgarian criminal organisations already established in some of 
the member states could dramatically expand their prostitution business. 
Initially, it was the big criminal players – local units of the so called 
“violent insurers” in Bulgarian cities – that made use of this opportunity. 
Later, some independent procurers and networks stepped in the cross-
border trafficking as well. In this period, THB for sexual exploitation 
became the largest source of revenue for organised crime and Bulgaria, 
albeit a small country, became the second or third biggest country of 
origin for THB victims in a number of EU states (Bezlov et al., 2016, 
CSD, 2012).
The third period started after the initial post-accession period (2007 – 
2009). Bulgarian criminal networks rapidly adapted to changing conditions. 
Patterns for controlling THB victims started to rely primarily on non-
violent methods and economic inducement. The big criminal syndicates 
were largely replaced by loose networks with flexible arrangements 
and frequently changing composition of actors, although hierarchically 
structured organisations did not disappear. On the other hand, sex workers 
in the different EU member states became less and less dependent on 
organised crime infrastructure and logistics (Bezlov et al., 2016).
3 The so called “violent insurers” or grupirovki were the first powerful organised crime groups in 
Bulgaria, which emerged in the early 1990s and started their criminal activities with a wide use 
of violence and extortion. Most of them established private security and insurance companies 
as fronts for their extortion. Subsequently, most of them developed extensive crime portfolios 
including drug distribution, prostitution, contraband, etc.
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Given the overwhelming prevalence of the trafficking for sexual exploitation 
in Bulgaria, the analysis below focuses exclusively on this type of trafficking 
inside and outside the country. The THB for sexual exploitation is deeply 
interwoven with the domestic and foreign prostitution markets and during 
the collection of data and its analysis it became apparent that it is almost 
impossible to distinguish between these two phenomena. Much has been 
written on the problem of trafficking in human beings in Bulgaria. However, 
one of the least explored aspects of this nefarious phenomenon remains 
its financial aspect, as well as the business models of the criminal groups 
behind it. The current report examines in detail the initial capital needed 
to kick-start or expand trafficking business, costs and profits related to this 
criminal activity, settlement of payments between the different criminal 
actors involved and the investment of proceeds. The report draws on 
review of publicly available data and reports, 23 interviews with traffickers 
and victims of trafficking and 19 interviews with law enforcement officers 
and prosecutors.4 The full list of the respondents is provided in the end 
of the report. The data has been additionally complemented with an 
analysis of court cases and media reports.
According to the Prosecutor’s Office of Bulgaria, 90% of the victims of 
trafficking for the period 2005 – 2016 have been female (ПРБ, 2017). 
Trafficking for labour exploitation is the second most common type 
of THB, but it is significantly less common, with only 12% of pre-
trial proceedings in the period 2011 – 2015 dealing with this type of 
trafficking (GRETA, 2016). The data from Bulgaria corresponds to the 
Europol assessment for EU countries whereby organised crime groups 
(OCGs) involved in THB for purposes other than sexual exploitation is 
about 10% (Europol, 2016).
During the last 10 years, there were several attempts to estimate the 
number of sex workers and respectively the scale of both cross-border 
and domestic trafficking in human beings. The first assessment of cross-
border THB estimated that the number of Bulgarian sex workers abroad 
was between 8,000 and 18,000 in the period 2003 – 2007 (CSD, 
2007). The most recent estimates on the scale of cross-border trafficking 
referred to the period 2005 – 2009 and indicated that between 11,000 
and 21,000 sex workers from Bulgaria worked in other EU countries and 
generated about €1.5 billion, which is roughly equal to 2.6-2.7% of the 
national GDP for the same period (CSD, 2012). Revenues of the domestic 
sex market also vary – according to the estimations in 2007, the number 
of sex workers in Bulgaria was 5,000 – 6,000 and the generated revenues 
amounted at €115-120 million (CSD, 2007). The more recent assessment 
estimated the internal market at EUR 123-205 million generated by 
6,000 – 10,000 sex workers (CSD, 2012).
4 The full list of the interviewees is provided in the references section. They have been coded 
in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of the code indicate the country, 
“E” indicates an expert, while “C” means criminal entrepreneur.
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However, public data from several EU member states reveal a dwindling 
number of victims from Bulgaria since 2012. The Dutch and German 
data on recorded THB victims indicate that the number of victims from 
Bulgaria in 2016 was 50% lower than in 2012 (Nationaal Rapporteur, 
2017). Similarly, the German data shows that the number of Bulgarian 
victims of THB for sexual exploitation have decreased by 49% in 2015 
compared to 2012 (BKA, 2016). At the same time, the number of victims 
identified by the Bulgarian authorities remains stable (see Figure 1). 
According to the latest GRETA report, for the period 2011 – 2015 the 
number of victims of domestic trafficking in Bulgaria is roughly equal to 
the number of victims of cross-border trafficking (GRETA, 2016).
However it should be noted 
that domestic trafficking and 
cross-border trafficking are 
interlinked and in many cases 
appear to be simply stages of 
one and the same criminal 
activity (CSD, 2007, CSD, 2012, 
Риск Монитор, 2010). Often, 
following the recruitment, the 
victims are initially exploited 
within the country. Common 
destinations for newly recruited 
victims are Sofia, Varna and 
Bourgas or some of the 
summer or winter resorts 
depending on the season. At 
a later stage they are trafficked 
and exploited abroad, but their 
traffickers periodically return 
and exploit them at home as 
well. Nevertheless, due to the 
increasingly easier access to the sex market in the EU, a growing number 
of victims start working abroad, without prior exploitation at the domestic 
prostitution market (see next section for further details).
At the time the interviews for this report were conducted, the number 
of THB victims was deemed to be on the decline judging from the 
observed significant decrease in the new investigations initiated by the 
Prosecutor’s Office. The number of the new proceedings plummeted from 
141 in 2012 to 85 in 2015, although slightly increased to 104 in 2016 
(ПРБ, 2013, 2017). However, closer examination of the factors behind this 
suggested a somewhat different dynamic. Apparently, several factors related 
to law enforcement institutions have contributed to this significant drop 
in the investigations in the last 5 years. In 2013, the Directorate General 
Countering Organised Crime (GDCOC), the agency most actively involved 
in THB investigations, was merged with the State Agency National Security 
(SANS). The internal reorganisations after the merger led to the suspension 
of a number of cases, the dismissal and retirement of many senior 
officers experienced in THB. Two years later GDCOC was reinstituted 
as a specialised Ministry of Interior (MoI) directorate, but its staff was 
Figure 1. victims oF traFFicking involved in pre-trial proceedings, 
2005 – 2017
Source: Prosecutor’s Office data.
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cut by half and many of its regional units have not been re-established 
and thus their overall number was reduced from 28 to 12. Some of the 
regional directorates that seized to exist used to cover regions with a long 
tradition in the trafficking in human beings. Cities such as Pazardzhik, 
Dobrich, Razgrad, Pernik, Yambol, Shumen, etc., currently do not have 
any local units dispatched, despite the large number of victims and OCGs 
involved in THB. Moreover, most of the current GDCOC’s regional units 
are understaffed and often only a single officer is responsible for tackling 
THB (BG-E12, BG-E14, BG-E20, BG-E23, BG-E24).
Another institutional setback 
identified during the data col-
lection was that in 2012 all 
organised crime investigations 
were removed from the remit 
of the regional prosecutor’s of-
fices in order that the newly 
established Specialised Prose-
cutor’s Office takes over them. 
One of the unintended con-
sequences of this institutional 
reform was that it disrupted 
the close cooperation between 
GDCOC officers and prosecu-
tors on regional level. In order 
to have sustained working col-
laboration with the Specialised 
Prosecutor’s Office, GDCOC 
officers from remote regional 
directorates would need to 
commute to Sofia or vice ver-
sa – prosecutors would need 
to visit them on a regular 
basis. For this reason, many 
GDCOC officers from the regional directorates refrain from initiating 
investigations and transfer them to the local criminal police units. Prac-
tically, after 2012 regional GDCOC units rarely start investigations on 
their own initiative. They typically work on investigations initiated by 
the agency’s headquarters or by foreign police services in which local 
cooperation is needed. Most of these investigations are about offences 
committed abroad and the effort invested by the Bulgarian units is 
rather limited. The local criminal networks, and in particular those that 
effectively control their victims, thus operate unobstructed by Bulgar-
ian law enforcement institutions (BG-E12, BG-E14, BG-E20, BG-E23, 
BG-E24). According to the law enforcement officials interviewed, all 
cross-border investigations are handled directly by GDCOC’s head-
quarters in Sofia. Thus regional units are not in a position to develop 
local capacity and expertise and have limited access to the respective 
operational intelligence about the cases they work on (BG-E12, BG-E21, 
BG-E24, BG-E25).
Figure 2. registered crimes, pre-trial proceedings and convicted 
oFFenders For thB, 2010 – 2016
Source: Prosecutor’s Office annual reports, MoI annual statistics (2010 – 2017).
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Once extensively controlled by organised crime and practically cartelised 
in all big cities and resorts, the prostitution market in Bulgaria is now rather 
fragmented and decentralised. Similar tendencies have been reported for 
cross-border trafficking (Bezlov et al., 2016, CSD, 2012, Стойчев, 2016). 
Despite the fragmentation of the prostitution market and the increased 
share of independent actors, the human trafficking business in the 
country and abroad still remains largely controlled by Bulgarian organised 
crime. Since the 1990s, no criminals from other nationalities have ever 
had noticeable presence in the country or played any role in cross-
border trafficking. Generally, the following profiles of sets of actors can 
be distinguished: hierarchically structured organisations; loose networks 
of collaborating independent traffickers; family/clan-based organisations; 
independent traffickers (Bezlov et al., 2016, Petrunov, 2014).
The hierarchically structured organisations are usually remnants of 
the formidable violent entrepreneurship syndicates that emerged in the 
early 1990s also known as grupirovki, as well as robust regional criminal 
organisations that emerged in the beginning of the 21st century (CSD, 
2007). Unlike their predecessors, nowadays these organisations rarely 
resort to violence and instead extensively use legal business structures 
as a cover up for their operations and various soft methods to control 
the sex workers (BG-E5, BG-E19). Their structure has a great deal of 
specialisation and separation of specific functions and roles among 
members. Depending on the sophistication of the organisation, the 
specific roles might include one or several of the following – organisers 
(“the boss”), recruiters, drivers, money collectors, bodyguards/enforcers, 
supervisors, money carriers and straw persons acting as legal business 
owners (BG-E5, BG-E11). They can also have 3-4 layers of control 
between the ultimate organiser, or boss, and the sex workers. Before 
2012, several such groups have split and cartelised the market in Sofia 
and in some of the big regional cities and resorts and operated the so 
called “chains” of brothels and sex venues (BG-E5, BG-E6).
The accession of Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, the targeted law enforcement 
pressure on the market in the period 2010-2012, and the increasing use 
of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the prostitution 
markets have to a large extend reduced the opportunities for cartelisation 
and control over the prostitution markets. Whereas in the past these 
organisations were exerting control on the access to the market by 
coercion and enforcing protection fees to all independent actors, 
nowadays they would rather contract the sex workers as employees and 
exert control through the use of market mechanisms, such as providing 
access to profitable locations or venues, and securing protection against 
rival competition and police authorities (BG-E17, BG-E25). Other similar 
arrangements include striking deals with independent traffickers for 
granting access to their locations or venues for a fee. The fee may 
include advanced payment and a commission based on the earnings of 
the sex workers, who are allowed to work in their venues. Depending 
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANISATION 
 OF TRAFFICKING NETwORKS
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on the size and sophistication of the organisation, its leaders might have 
invested in venues both in Bulgaria and abroad, while other have opted 
only for a single venue either in Bulgaria or abroad (BG-E11, BG-E21).
The loose networks usually comprise of several independent traffickers, 
wherein each of them independently recruits women from Bulgaria or 
elsewhere, as a rule with their consent, and secure a location for them. 
Each procurer would also provide his sex workers with protection from 
violent clients, secure lodging and clients, arrange residence permits, 
licenses and resolve other administrative issues. Lately, traffickers have 
even been communicating with clients online, mostly via social networks. 
To ward off competition, the procurer resorts to his network of friends 
and compatriots. Under this modus operandi, each trafficker takes care 
of all aspects related to the business and this allows him to recruit two 
or three girls at a time. There are also some examples of procurers 
managing 3-4 girls in different EU countries who are not aware of each 
other. When looking for new girls, he entrusts guardianship over the 
prostitute to friends from his network and returns the favour when asked 
by another network member (BG-E20, BG-E27, and BG-E29). Procurers 
often marry the prostitute to avoid getting involved with the police 
(BG-E5). However, this type of arrangement works out rarely as conflicts 
often arise among traffickers, since competition for better venues and 
high-earning sex workers is fierce (BG-E19, BG-E20).
Family/clan based organisations are typical for traffickers from the 
Roma community, where usually members of the organised crime group 
are part of the extended family. The structure usually follows the familial 
links with an elder authority at the top of the organisation and specific 
tasks divided between the members of the family. These organisations 
usually traffic women from the same ethnic group and even other family 
members. In some cases, they also resort to buying women from other 
groups or networks (BG-E5, BG-E11, BG-E13, BG-E14).
The independent traffickers are usually a couple (married or not) or a 
trafficker with 2-3 sex workers, who operate as a family/small business. 
The women solicit customers and provide sexual services, while the men 
provide protection and facilitation. Independent traffickers do not share 
their earnings with some criminal organisation but may pay a fixed fee to 
them in order to obtain the right to work at a particular location. Thus 
they keep all the revenues for themselves, but risk extortion demands 
and violent assaults from other competitors or being reported to local 
authorities as there is no group or network to protect them (BG-E17, 
BG-E26).
All types of trafficking organisations use the same strategy to reduce risk 
of detection and apprehension by the police, which involves acquiring 
consent of the exploited women and pre-negotiating the division of their 
earnings, using violence in exceptional cases, and often posing as their 
friends or spouses. On the other hand, the collected data indicates that 
criminal networks involved in trafficking offer sex workers both economic 
and safety advantages. Women who try to work on their own appear 
to be more likely to become victims of violent incidents or to earn less 
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because of their limited access to profitable locations in central and 
western Europe where demand for sex services is high (BG-E19, BG-E22).
Structure of the domestic sex market
The extent of involvement and modus operandi of these sets of 
trafficking actors both at the domestic prostitution market and 
the prostitution markets abroad varies among the different market 
segments. The domestic prostitution market in Bulgaria can generally 
be divided among three main segments – outdoor, indoor and high-
end prostitution (Bezlov et al., 2016, CSD, 2012). The market segments 
can be distinguished based on the place where the sex services are 
provided, the price range, and the clientele. Similar division can also be 
applied to the prostitution markets abroad, although the price brackets 
differ from country to country.
The lowest market segment in Bulgaria is outdoor prostitution, which 
comprises of sex workers who offer sex services mostly in public, open 
spaces. One group focuses on frequented places in big cities such as 
railway and bus stations, bridges, shoddy hotels, byways and side alleys 
parallel to main streets. Some of them migrate to the outskirts of resorts 
during the tourist seasons. The second group works along highways, 
main roads and the roads close to border crossings, mostly at parking 
lots, motels, crossroads and the like. Their main clients are truck drivers. 
The prices of both groups are rather low, ranging from BGN 10 to 30 
(€5-€15) per client. Depending on the locations, prostitutes can service 
from 3-5 to 10-20 clients daily. The sex workers in this segment are 
recruited from various socially disadvantaged groups, mostly from Roma 
neighbourhoods (CSD, 2007; Стойчев, 2016). Each neighbourhood serves 
as a supply source for a particular region in Bulgaria. Other such pools 
are heroin addicts, young women raised at institutions or extremely poor 
families.
This segment is mostly occupied by the family-based organisations 
from the Roma ethnicity, as well as some independent traffickers. In 
the past, some hierarchically structured organisations that strived to 
monopolise or at least cartelise the prostitution market in their cities 
were imposing protection fees on the procurers operating in this segment 
for the right to operate at a given location. Currently the practice for 
levying protection fees continues, although monopolies and oligopolies 
at prostitution markets in the capital and in the regional cities seized 
to exist. This niche is taken over in some regions by poly-criminal 
organisations that are involved in a variety of other criminal activities 
such as drug dealing, extortion, human smuggling, etc. Procurers and 
the sex workers are usually charged a set fee, which has ranged from 
BGN 20-30 (€10-€15) per day to BGN 100-200 (€50-€100) per week 
at different times (BG-E19, BG-E22).
The largest number of sex workers operates in the indoor prostitution 
segment, which can be provisionally divided in several substrata. The 
bottom one is occupied by the so called “apartment prostitution” named 
after the habitual locations where sex services are preformed – rented 
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flats on the first floors of residential buildings. Prices vary depending on 
the town from BGN 60 to 1005 (€30-€50) per hour of standard sex. 
VIP or escort clubs occupy the next substratum at which prices are 
higher and control over prostitutes is more lenient. The segment also 
includes the escort services. The average prices range from BGN 100 to 
150 (€50-€75) per hour of standard sex. The most luxurious substratum 
comprises erotic bars and adult clubs. Sex workers at such erotic bars 
take in additional revenue in the form of soliciting drinks from customers 
and dancing. The owners of such venues as a rule pre-select the sex 
workers before contracting them and tend to regularly replace them with 
new ones. Standard sex average prices range between BGN 300 and 500 
(€150-€250) per hour.
Brothels and other sex venues are usually located in big cities, although 
other popular locations are resorts and border towns. Part of the sex 
workers who work in the biggest cities migrate to coastal resorts from 
June to September and to mountain ones from December to March. 
Usually owners of sex venues in some of the big cities also keep such 
venues at the resorts, so the sex workers are moved from the big cities 
to the resorts and back. Border prostitution in towns such as Svilengrad 
at the Turkish border and Sandanski and Petrich near the Greek border 
also takes place predominantly in various bars and hotels and the clients 
are predominantly foreigners.
The sex venues have their own internal rules and the workers that 
breach them bear financial penalties. The number of sites belonging 
to the indoor prostitution segment in Sofia, for example, has varied 
throughout the years depending on the demand for sex services and the 
extent of law enforcement pressure over criminal groups. The number of 
flats and clubs in Sofia, for instance, has ranged between 100 and 300, 
of VIP clubs from 20 to 30, and of erotic bars from 10 to 20 (BG-E19, 
BG-E22).
This market segment is dominated by hierarchical groups, who usually 
invest in sex venues at lucrative locations – in the city centre of Sofia or 
some of the big cities, as well as in the coastal and mountain resorts. 
However, in the period 2010 – 2012 the controlled chains of apartment 
brothels in big cities disappeared giving way to independently working 
(mostly in pairs) prostitutes renting their own living space, increasingly 
offering their services online, and occasionally paying criminal networks 
security fees to guard them against possible threats from clients. Many 
independent procurers have also started to operate in this market 
segment running apartments with their own sex workers or providing 
call girl services with extensive use of online advertising. Hierarchical 
groups used to levy protection fees on such actors in the past but after 
2012 a significant number of independent procurers ceased paying for 
protection. The attempts to re-establish monopoly over certain markets, 
e.g. Varna, have not succeeded due to law enforcement pressure and 
resistance from the other local groups (BG-E12, BG-E18).
5 These prices are given as an example but in the last couple of years prices have consistently 
increased countrywide.
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The high-end prostitution market segment accommodates various legal 
business structures that are used as cover for offering exclusive sex 
services. Typical businesses used in this market segment include fashion, 
model and advertising agencies, as well as talent managing companies 
working with dance troupes and pop folk performers. These bogus 
fashion agencies hire young women as models under a permanent or 
temporary contract to participate in fashion shows, advertising campaigns, 
TV shows, product promotions, movies, magazine photo sessions, etc., for 
a particular fee. However, many of the women are enticed to perform 
sex services and thus the line between their duties as fashion models 
and escorts becomes blurred. The price of sex is BGN 1,000 (€500) 
and over, but as collected data indicates, the financial side is often less 
important for the criminal organisations compared to the opportunity to 
influence the political and business elites in Bulgaria. This segment is also 
dominated by hierarchical organisations, which in many cases also have 
presence in the indoor segment (BG-E6, BG-E12, BG-E18).
The organisation of the cross-border trafficking
The structure and functioning of the cross-border trafficking closely 
resembles the domestic prostitution market. Street sex workers would 
be commissioned to work on selected streets, parking lots and open 
spaces in large European cities. Sex workers in the indoor segment are 
exploited in a variety of sex venues such as brothels, hotels, sex clubs, 
bars and windows, and the like after traffickers negotiate access with the 
respective owners or criminal organisations that controls them. Criminal 
organisations operating at the high-end prostitution level solicit foreign 
clients during the modelling agencies’ tours abroad, usually in neighbouring 
countries such as Greece and Turkey, more exclusive destinations such as 
Dubai, and less often in Italy and France. Subsequently the sex workers 
are secured engagements in thematic or weekend parties, and business 
conferences (BG-E19, BG-E22).
Some of the big hierarchical organisations operate both at the domestic 
and foreign prostitution markets. However, the regional trafficking 
networks in most cases do not have presence at the domestic market, 
but prefer to organise only cross-border trafficking to EU countries, 
Switzerland or Norway. They recruit sex workers from the towns they are 
based or the nearby smaller towns and commission them to particular 
European cities. Criminal organisations and networks from Bulgarian 
cities such as Sliven, Pazardzhik, Stara Zagora, Haskovo, Pleven, Ruse, 
Dobrich, Vidin, etc., have established trafficking channels to Brussels, 
Strasbourg, Rotterdam, Oslo, Cologne, Vienna, Valencia, Rome, Koblenz, 
etc. To escape dependence and payment of protection fees, the regional 
procurement networks operate independently from the big hierarchical 
organisations, when supplying sex workers to the EU (BG-E20, BG-E29).
The big hierarchical organisations with established presence on the 
domestic market, on the other hand, have a different business model 
that guarantees better control over the sex workers. The newly recruited 
women first work in some of the bigger Bulgarian cities or resorts and 
after proving their loyalty and accountability are commissioned to more 
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profitable locations abroad (BG-E19, BG-E27, BG-E29). The sex workers 
periodically return to work back in Bulgaria upon completion of a certain 
period or whenever some problem arises (e.g. extortion demands from 
other criminal groups, conflicts with competitors, police operations, etc.). 
In contrast, the sex workers trafficked by the regional networks would 
usually have between-jobs spells at home or sometimes work at a 
brothel owned by the group with domestic presence.
As the interviews suggest, the opportunities of the Bulgarian traffickers 
to participate in the EU sex market and specifically in the outdoor and 
the indoor segment have widened with time. At the start of the century 
the newly formed regional hierarchical groups and loose networks would 
stick to a certain European city or region, which they get to know well 
and subsequently they started to expand to new cities, thus doubling 
the number of trafficking destinations in recent years (BG-E19, BG-E21). 
Whereas in the past, a few big organisations and networks controlled the 
trafficking channels, currently various trafficking organisations started to 
invest abroad in order to exert direct control of the victim’s workplace 
by purchasing/renting sites such as bars, restaurants, hotels, night clubs, 
windows, escort websites, escort companies, etc. This strategy involves 
establishing of legal business structures as a front of their operations and 
along with the advantages of enhanced form of control over the victims, 
it also offers them the opportunity to better shield their activities from 
police scrutiny (BG-E19, BG-E22).
3.1. Source of capital for initiating/sustaining criminal 
operations. Access to capital in critical moments
Many of the interviewed traffickers and sex workers in the present study 
claim that no initial investment is needed to enter the market of THB 
for sexual purposes (BG-C13, BG-С14, BG-C17. BG-C20, BG-C3, BG-E9). 
However, entering the prostitution market can have different forms – 
from simple procuring of a victim to a close circle of acquaintances to 
securing a profitable location in some brothel abroad. While the former 
may not bear any financial costs, the latter appears to require initial 
investments. For example, some of the interviewed offenders mention 
that in the indoor segment securing access to a profitable location for a 
sex worker in Bulgaria can cost from €1,000 to €3,700 (BG-C3, BG-C7) 
and abroad from €2,000 to €4,000 (BG-C4, BG-C7).6 In addition to 
that they also disclose costs for recruitment, transportation and lodging. 
Certainly larger investments are needed if a trafficker aims at becoming 
an owner or manager of a brothel or other sex venue. For example, 
one of the interviewees indicated that the rent of an adult club at 
the Bulgarian coast for the summer season amounts at €60,000, due 
6 The quoted sums are requested as advanced payments for renting a place. The period of 
renting can vary from three months to one year.
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in advance (BG-E3). More profitable establishments in western Europe 
certainly cost a lot more; for example, one of the interviewed police 
officer reported that a trafficker invested one million euros to purchase 
an adult club in Spain (BG-E21).
Collected data indicates that in many cases social ties and networks 
are being converted into quantifiable value, whereby initial capital for a 
market entry, or a market expansion is loaned to the newcomer from 
actors who are already established in the trafficking for sexual exploitation, 
be it friends or extended family members (BG-C10 and BG-C7 for 
expansion; BG-C2 for entry). Accounts of social ties, connections, friends 
and extended family that factor in the genesis of human trafficking 
endeavours abound in the data collected from the respondents. At 
least three instances reveal that being part of the wider network of 
traffickers for sexual purposes exposes the members to opportunities 
for lines of quick credit with preferential interest rates when borrowing 
from “colleagues” (BG-C8; BG-C6 BG-C5). Being connected to people 
in the business, which entails trust and mutual assistance for starting 
up appears to be a crucial element in facilitating initial expenditures 
and diminishing or removing altogether barriers to market entry. The 
prevailing model for starting up is epitomised by a statement from one 
of the respondents that highlights the importance of social networks and 
social capital: “if you have a girl ready to go right from the start, every 
trusted person will help you out” (BG-C10).
In this regard collected data is in line of the existing literature on the 
importance of social capital for a market entry. Whereas opportunities 
for most conventional crimes are countless, the sophistication of its 
activities makes organised crime opportunities less evident. Therefore, 
the market entry barriers for organised crime are far greater than most 
general crimes, and operations require close cooperation between 
offenders (van Koppen, 2013). Cross-border trafficking of human beings 
often involves complex processes of coordination, whereby finding 
suitable co-offenders requires building of sufficient trust. Therefore, 
organised crime offenders in human trafficking use social ties and 
networks to establish trust before any cooperation and collusion takes 
place (van Koppen, 2013; von Lampe & Johansen, 2004). Social relations 
and network dynamics ensure that the recruitment of new offenders 
and the creation of new partnerships are not the same as traditional 
models claim. Family, friends and acquaintances work together and are 
the base of criminal entrepreneurship and expansion (Kleemans & van 
de Bunt, 1999).
The observed differences in the source of initial capital appear to be 
contingent on the type of market entry, i.e. independently or through an 
already established network or criminal organization, as well as on the 
type of market segment – outdoor, indoor and high-end. Independent 
traffickers may need to raise initial capital to secure access to clients 
(e.g. place on the street or in a brothel, window in a red light district, 
etc.), logistics (e.g. transportation, lodging, work permit, etc.) and visual 
make-over of the trafficked person, e.g. high-end clothing, accessories, 
cosmetics, hair and body care, etc. Some of them initially start in 
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Bulgaria and re-invest the generated proceeds to fund cross-border 
trafficking (BG-E4).
Criminal entrepreneurs joining established trafficking networks or or-
ganisations do not need to cover all these cost by themselves, since the 
network or the group grants the access to these assets or at least they 
may receive initial capital for related expenses through the network or 
from the boss of the group. The investment is then repaid from the 
sex worker’s earnings (BG-C10, BG-C1). Nevertheless, joining an estab-
lished network requires the newcomers to prove they are trustworthy 
and accountable. This is also indicative that market entry for prostitut-
ing girls and women is heavily contingent of social connections and 
networks. Among the possible sources of start-up capital mentioned 
by the interviewed respondents were borrowing money from friends, 
family and relatives (BG-C11; BG-C12; BG-C13; BG-E1); revenues from 
legal business (BG-C10), proceeds from another illegal activity (BG-C16; 
BG-E14) and loans from usurers (BG-C7).
Joining an established trafficking/procuring operation provides a number 
of advantages for both sex workers and pimps. Networks and groups have 
more available capital which can be channelled to serve different purposes 
as needed, such as recruitment activities, transport and accommodation 
abroad, as well as connections and a line of credit in case of urgencies. 
The advantage is most noticeable with regard to recruitment and starting 
costs. Apart from everything, starting an independent operation entails 
a number of risks. Independent sex workers are vulnerable to violent or 
fraudulent customers or to networks or groups trying to subdue them 
to their control. Procurers and traffickers not part of a group also have 
less resources and therefore have to carry out all activities associated 
with the business. Independent pimps and traffickers thus often choose 
to have or appear to have a limited number of sex workers under their 
control (up to 3) as with more women “the problems are bigger and are 
related to more costs” (BG-C20, BG-C11, BG-C12).
Borrowing money is also a tactic used to weather out difficult moments. 
However, borrowing from loan sharks is considered as highly risky due to 
the exorbitant interest rates and both pimps and sex workers try to avoid 
it. Generally, traffickers prefer to settle such situations through borrowing 
from other members of their network (BG-C3, BG-C13, BG-C20). Sex 
workers appear to have a broad creditor base, that includes pimps, 
colleagues and in some cases clients (BG-C16, BG-C23). There is a general 
arrangement that there are loan options for persons in the trafficking 
business with more favourable interest rates than those of loan sharks. The 
interest rates for such intra-industry/network lending are 10-20% (BG-C5, 
BG-C6, BG-C8). Rates may still be higher in cases of a novice who is yet 
to prove trustworthy.
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3.2. Settlement of payments
Data indicates that there are various modes for the settlement of payments 
within the trafficking network and with outside actors, wherein the sole 
common denominator is the pre-eminence of cash transactions. Most 
payments are done in cash – clients pay cash to sex workers (variably 
before or after the service) and the money is subsequently transferred 
to the higher levels of the organisation in cash as well (BG-C1, BG-C10). 
Women report and account for their earnings to pimps “day by day” 
(BG-C6, BG-E19, BG-C4), often via coded messages through messaging 
services (BG-E17). Sex workers may receive their shares periodically in 
cash by their traffickers/procurers or trusted persons (BG-C3). Cash 
proceeds are then usually transferred up the chain through trusted 
payment facilitators, which appear to be insiders rather than the typical 
money mule (BG-C10). Exceptions do exist as sometimes clients can pay 
for sexual services via bank transfer/credit card, whereby such payments 
are registered as a legitimate service, e.g. massage. This is particularly 
the case when trusted clients based in western European states order 
services from sex workers that may be currently based in Bulgaria. The 
wired money is used for travel and advance payment for the services 
(BG-C5, BG-C16).
It should also be noted that in the domestic indoor and high-end 
prostitution segment, many sex workers have also fictitious contracts 
as office assistants, masseuses, waitresses, hostesses, barmaids, exotic 
dancers, receptionists, hotel maids, etc. The contracts are usually signed 
with bogus companies and fixed at minimum wage and for minimum 
working hours. However, they will still receive payments under these 
contracts and all respective social and healthcare contributions will also 
be covered. Some respondents report that they receive these payments 
via bank transfers (BG-C4, BG-C9). In this way the traffickers try to 
conceal the true nature of their activities and not raise suspicion in the 
law enforcement and other regulatory agencies (BG-E3, BG-E9).
Procurers and traffickers transferring profits from abroad may use 
money transfer services, such as Western Union (BG-C1). However, 
they will take a number of precautions, such as using intermediaries 
(money mules) to withdraw the money and deliver the amounts to 
the intended recipients (BG-C10). Western Union is also a preferred 
method for sex workers, who send small sums to their families (BG-C7, 
BG-C8, BG-C9). Another method for sending money to Bulgaria is 
through van drivers servicing routes from Bulgaria to western Europe, 
some of which may be part of other – irrelevant to sex – trafficking 
and/or smuggling networks, e.g. cannabis from the Netherlands (BG-C7, 
BG-E1, BG-E8).
Procurers and traffickers may use trusted third parties for settling pay-
ments with facilitators outside of the networks such as club owners 
or corrupt police. There is at least one account that describes a more 
sophisticated system of settling transactions. In this case the trafficking 
ring-leader uses a multitude of bank accounts under his control, which 
are registered to dummy entities or shell companies in order to transfer 
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payments to external actors. The dummy accounts are employed on a 
rotating basis so as to avoid suspicion (BG-C1). Cash mules are also used, 
particularly for international payment settlements (BG-C10).
When operating abroad some traffickers are wary of getting directly 
involved in all payment settlement activities, as being seen around 
sex workers and in particular known clubs and hotels may arouse 
suspicion. Therefore, in some cases settlements with clubs and hotels are 
delegated to the women who transact directly with the owners of the 
establishments where sexual services are performed (BG-C13). Settlements 
in the domestic market seem to be conducted in cash directly between 
the trafficker, or trusted person, and the owner of the club/hotel where 
the sexual services are provided (BG-C1; BG-C20).
The high-end prostitution segment displays some subtle differences in 
the patterns of payment settlements. In many cases the pre-supposed 
exclusivity of sexual services performed by “models” and the parallel 
operation of the fashion agency as a cover business seem to keep a 
certain distance between the consumer and the sex worker, particularly 
in the financial flows. The contacts between the customers and the 
clients are usually handled by a central figure inside the agency – the 
so called “booker.” The booker also often receives the payment directly 
or through trusted members of the network from the client. Therefore, 
in such cases the women would perform a pre-arranged and pre-paid 
service without coming into contact with money. Exceptions seem to be 
the case, wherein established and known clients pay directly to the sex 
workers (BG-E6).
3.3. Costs of doing business
Trafficking operations involve a variety of different costs at each 
stage of the process – recruitment, transportation and exploitation, 
wherein the last stage appears to be most cost demanding. Some of 
these costs are one-off and might be categorised as investment costs, 
whereas others are recurring and rather fall under the operational 
costs category. It should be noted that this classification is somewhat 
arbitrary, since the line between the two is blurred. The costs structure 
of trafficking operations varies depending on the modus operandi of 
the traffickers.
Recruitment of new sex workers in most cases entails an investment of 
both financial resources and time. Independent traffickers, family-based 
organisations and loose networks often employ the so called “lover-
boy” method or similar strategies involving deceit and manipulation. This 
method includes courting, befriending and manipulating the potential 
victim by the recruiter into a relationship of trust (BG-C1, BG-C7, BG-C14). 
While traffickers often rationalise their actions as helping the women earn 
good money (BG-E11), different degrees of manipulation are involved. 
Aside from poverty, other vulnerability factors play an important role as 
well – dysfunctional family background, lack of experience with adult 
relationships, recent emotional trauma due to relationship break-ups, 
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and periods of stay in orphanages or other institutions for disadvantaged 
young adults (BG-C1, BG-C2).
In some instances, the process of trust-building may last up to nine or 
more months, thereby the lover-boy incurs sustained additional expenses 
(BG-C14). Very often recruiters identify and pick good looking women 
from poor backgrounds who can easily be impressed with a luxury lifestyle. 
The related costs in this sense include expenditures for restaurants, 
vacations, clothes and other gifts (BG-C1, BG-C7, BG-C14). On the 
other hand, to take advantage of the lover-boy routine in recruitment, 
the recruiter may increase the chance for successful manipulation by 
displaying a luxurious lifestyle, which includes an expensive brand 
automobile, branded clothing and accessories, an expensive smart phone 
and well maintained physique (BG-C10).
Hierarchically structured organisations usually pay to specialised members 
of the organisation to perform these activities or pay to external actors 
on fee-for-service base. Persons in charge of recruitment receive a 
specific sum per new recruit and a bonus if she does well. The sums 
reported were between €100-€250 and the bonus amounted at €500 
(BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C4). The money invested in recruitment activities 
are considered as running costs for the business and are covered out of 
the generated revenue (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3 BG-C5, BG-C6, BG-C8, 
BG-C10). Still, in some cases, sex workers can be “acquired” without any 
direct financial cost – such as coercing or manipulating an independent 
prostitute to work for the network (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C4) or in cases 
where women seek out such employment themselves.
A common expense that is closely related to the recruitment stage are 
the costs for make-over and personal care of the newly recruited victims. 
Collected data suggests that these sums range from around €500 to 
€1,500, which is used for brand clothing, accessories, cosmetics and 
perfumery, among others (BG-C8, BG-C10, BG-C9, BG-C22, BG-C7). The 
sum varies, since it depends on the modus operandi of the traffickers. 
The outdoor segment is less demanding with regards to such expenses, 
whereas for the indoor and the high-end prostitution segments these 
expenses are integral. There are instances, wherein more expensive 
manipulations such as plastic surgery might be invested in for high-end 
sex workers (BG-C18).
Transportation costs, both domestically and abroad, apparently play 
a minor role for the operations of Bulgarian traffickers, since Bulgarian 
citizens are entitled to a visa-free travel in the EU and the costs of intra-
community travel have significantly decreased with the advent of low-
cost flights. At the domestic market, if the provision of the sexual service 
necessitates transportation to another location, it is either covered by 
the sex worker, or the procurer or is paid by the client on top of the 
price for the session. Procurers might enter into specific arrangements with 
taxi drivers or provide transportation themselves (BG-C17, BG-Е3, BG-E6, 
BG-E10). Regarding the transportation costs in cross-border trafficking all 
interviewed respondents reported that these are usually covered by the 
traffickers.
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The most substantial costs sustained by the traffickers are related to 
the exploitation stage. These costs include lodging, expenditures for 
client acquisition, monitoring and control of sex workers, protection, 
concealment of criminal activities, corruption, and facilitation of money 
laundering.
Client acquisition costs or in other words securing access to clients is 
one of the most significant costs for trafficking operations. Depending on 
the modus operandi these costs might include costs for acquiring access 
to a profitable location on the street, a window in a red light district or a 
place in a well-established adult club, brothel, and massage parlour. Online 
advertising costs and payments to taxi drivers, hotel porters or concierges 
for referring clients can also be generally put in this category.
Profitable locations in hotels, motels and clubs abroad and in Bulgaria 
are often controlled by hierarchically structured groups and access to 
these for other trafficking actors is usually granted upon certain fee 
paid in advance (BG-C1, BG-C4, BG-C19, BG-C20, BG-E17). Even if the 
location is not controlled by some organised crime group, traffickers 
and pimps have to pay the hotels, motels and various hospitality 
businesses in order to use their facilities for sexual services undisturbed 
(BG-C15, BG-C17, BG-C4). In some arrangements the fee is flat and 
irrespective of the prostitute’s earnings (BG-C4), whereas in other cases, 
the hotel’s owner or manager receives a fixed fee (in one of the cases 
€5 per client) for each client brought in the hotel (BG-C17).
Seasonal prostitution at hotels in resorts on the Black Sea coast seems 
to be characterised by strong competition, which drives prices up, 
while at the same time some hotel managers may require payment in 
advance for the prostitutes to work in a protected environment with 
access to clients. The fee for one prostitute to work in a Black Sea resort 
hotel may vary between €2,500 and €3,125 (or €125 per night for a 
beachfront hotel) per sex worker per month in advance (BG-C1, BG-C3). 
The closer the hotel is to the beachfront, the higher the fee (BG-C3). 
The fee for working in adult clubs is around €1,125 per sex worker per 
month (BG-C6). Different payment modalities exist, depending on the 
arrangement. In some cases, traffickers are required to pay a fixed fee 
upfront. This might be entry fee which is followed by a monthly or 
weekly payments (BG-C4). Alternatively, the lump sum covers stay for 
a certain amount of time – e.g. on seasonal basis (BG-C19, BG-E3). 
The amount differs depending mainly on the location and reputation 
of the establishment. Hotels and clubs in top Bulgarian summer resorts 
have been reported to cost BGN 4,000-7,500 (€2,000-€3,750) per 
month (BG-C1, BG-C3, BG-C4, BG-C7). Smaller Bulgarian hotels or 
motels which provide terrain by the hour for the outdoor segment of 
the prostitution market might charge as little as BGN 5-10 (€2.5-€5) 
per service (BG-C12, BG-C17).
Securing access to profitable windows, brothels, massage parlours and 
similar establishments in the red light districts of western European cities, 
where prostitution is legal, also often entails payment of fees in advance. 
Some of the respondents indicated that in order to secure placement 
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of a sex worker in such establishments traffickers have to pay a one-off 
fee of €2,000-€3,000 to an established broker who has been active in 
the business for a significant amount of time and possess the necessary 
social and business connections (BG-E17, BG-E6).
Another option for traffickers is to rent apartments or houses where 
the women can work, wherein costs vary depending on the location. 
According to one of the respondents, an apartment in Cologne, close to 
the red light district, rented for several girls to provide sexual services 
may cost around €550 per month (BG-C6). This option is more prevalent 
in the indoor and high-end prostitution segments, and may be used in 
both domestic and cross-border trafficking (BG-E3, BG-C6, BG-E6).
Finally, many trafficking organisations rely extensively on online adver-
tising for solicitation of clients. Various websites, social platforms and 
online mobile applications are used to advertise the sex services. Online 
advertising may cost from nothing to a few euro per week, which is 
negligent compared to the fees for placement at brothels or similar sex 
venues. Thus, the sex worker can provide the sex services in any rented 
apartment, at the place of residence of the client or in any hotel. How-
ever, in high-end prostitution organisations, organisers may also invest 
in marketing their “models”, i.e. increase their popularity, hence market-
ability, through investing in professional photo sessions, magazine covers 
appearances, fashion shows, beauty pageants, among others (BG-E6).
Other client acquisition costs may also include payments to external 
facilitators that refer clients. There is evidence that in a Bulgarian summer 
resort, a trafficking network would pay €15 per secured client to taxi 
drivers, hotel porters and casino workers (BG-E30).
Monitoring, supervision and control of sex workers are the other 
type of costs associated with the exploitation stage, although they are 
not always easily quantifiable. These costs are primarily related to the 
strict accounting of the clients served and the due collection of the 
pre-agreed portion of earnings from the sex workers. In more coercive 
arrangements the tasks for monitoring and control also involve preventing 
the victim to run away or turn to the authorities. Depending on the 
complexity of the trafficking operation, these tasks may be performed 
by the traffickers themselves or by other trusted persons. Independent 
traffickers and members of loose networks often carry out these tasks 
by themselves (BG-C10, BG-C13, BG-C17), although in loose networks 
members could help each other from time to time (BG-C13). In family-
based organisations usually one of the family members is tasked with 
this (BG-C14). In other words, they do not directly incur financial costs 
for this, although they invest personal time.
Hierarchically structured organisations usually have trusted persons that 
are managing the day-to-day schedule of the women, as well as the 
daily collection of the earnings. Use of such supervisors and money 
collectors also serves the purpose to conceal the direct link between the 
sex workers and the organisers of the trafficking operation. In Bulgaria 
the money that has been earned by the women is usually collected in 
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cash daily by the persons in charge of protection and transportation of 
women (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3, BG-C4, BG-C6, Bg-C8, BG-C9, BG-C10, 
BG-C20). In the high-end prostitution segment, these tasks were carried 
out by the bookers, who are handling the contacts between the women 
and the customers (BG-E6). Different modus operandi is used by Bulgarian 
traffickers in western Europe, where this role is often assigned to some 
of the trusted sex workers (the so called “first girl”), the managers of the 
sex establishment where the victims are placed or the “madams” at the 
windows at red light districts in Belgium and the Netherlands (BG-C5, 
BG-C18, BG-C21, BG-C22, BG-C23, BG-E29). The amount of these costs 
remains somewhat unclear, although some of the respondents reported 
that the supervisors are paid a pre-agreed proportion from the earnings of 
the sex workers they look after (BG-E6, BG-C3, BG-C5).
Closely related to monitoring and control are the costs for protection of 
sex workers. Independent traffickers and family-based groups personally 
take care of the safety of the women and their earnings from abusive 
clients and rival competition (BG-C17). However, especially in the outdoor 
segment they are often subjected to protection racket by larger organised 
crime groups specialised in the use of violence (BG-12, BG-C14) and 
one of the interviewed offenders reported that he pays about €8 per 
night (or €60-€65 monthly) for each of his six workers working on the 
street (BG-C17).
Similarly, members in loose networks are responsible for the sex works 
they control but cooperate when they have to deal with rival competition. 
Rather rare are occasions, when they pay for protection to external 
persons (BG-C4). It should also be noted that, when traffickers pay for 
placement of their sex workers at brothels or other sex venues, the 
protection is included in the price or at least part of the pre-agreed 
arrangements. Hierarchically structured groups usually have members 
assigned with such tasks and, as mentioned above, they are often 
also responsible also for monitoring and control of women, money 
collection and transportation. Reportedly in such arrangements for every 
five to six sex workers there are two persons performing the day-to-day 
management, coordination, supervision and money collection (BG-C1, 
BG-C2). Most of the hierarchical groups also seem to retain within their 
ranks the so called “punitive brigades” that are part of the operating 
group and on the monthly payroll and are specialised in use of violence 
(BG-C7, BG-C10; BG-C18, BG-C19).
Corruption costs also generally fall into the category of cost of protection. 
Different trafficking actors make use of corruption to different degrees, 
corresponding to their specific needs. Corruption payments become much 
more necessary in cases of incidents, complaints by family members and 
initiation of investigations by the police and judicial authorities. Such 
payments are made either directly or through the help of intermediaries. 
Typical targets of corruption are law enforcement officers and to a 
lesser extent judicial authorities (Bezlov et al., 2016). Many respondents 
reported regular extortion fees imposed by police officers to outdoor 
and indoor sex workers and their procurers in Bulgaria (BG-C12, BG-C15, 
BG-C16, BG-C17, BG-C19).
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ТаBle 1. examples oF costs associated with starting and running 
a traFFicking operation
Source: Interviews and authors’ online research.
Cost type value Notes
Make-over costs I from €1,500 Hairdresser, brand clothing, 
accessories, cosmetics, etc.
Make-over costs II €3,600-€4,500 Breast enlargement
Logistics I from ~ €100 Airfare to a major western 
European city with
a low-cost airline
Logistics II from ~ €250 Fuel and one motel stop
for circa 2,000 km
Logistics III from ~ €120 Single bus fare from Sofia to 
major western European city
Rent from €550/month Multi-bedroom apartment in 
the red-light district of a major 
western European city
Interest rates I 10% to 20%
per week
When borrowed from the wider 
trafficking network
Interest rates II 50% to 250%
per week
When borrowed from
a loan shark
Money transfer fees €10-€100 Per transaction, depending
on the amount sent
Advanced payment for placement 
of one sex worker in adult club
€1,125/month Bulgaria, Black Sea resort, south
Use of a hotel room with
a client per hour
€3-€5 per session hotel, low segment, inner city
Advanced payment for placement 
of one sex worker in adult club 
(top location)
€7,500/season Bulgaria, Black Sea resort, south
Advanced payment for placement 
of one sex worker in a hotel
with access to clients
€2,500 to
€3,125 per month
Bulgaria, Black Sea resort hotel
Broker’s fee for placement
of one sex worker at a red light 
district window
€2,000-€3,000/
per prostitute
Red-light district window
of a major western European
city, one-time fee
Hotel rooms rental
(permission to do business)
€1,000 per week
per sex worker
In major western European city, 
depending on the hotel
Protection fee (racket) €2,500 per week
per person
Hotel in major western
European city
Red-light district window rental from €500 per week Red-light district (major Belgian 
and/or Dutch city)
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Hierarchically structured groups sustaining more sophisticated trafficking 
operations incur additional costs related to the concealment of their 
activities from the authorities. In the high-end prostitution segment such 
costs may include investing in elaborate schemes of legitimate business 
structures – appointment of straw persons for owners and managers, 
registering front businesses such modelling or fashion agencies, and 
organizing model castings, fashion shows, advertising campaigns, among 
others (BG-E6). However, use of legitimate business structures is not 
limited to this segment. Criminal groups, which invest in and control 
adult clubs, massage parlours and similar establishments employ similar 
methods and register bogus companies with straw persons appearing as 
owners and managers. Women working in such adult clubs, hotels and 
other establishments have labour contracts as dancers, masseuses, office 
assistants or housekeepers (BG-C1, BG-C5, BG-C9). Using such legitimate 
companies as a front also entails a number of other costs typical for all 
normal legitimate businesses – office rents, accounting and legal services, 
utilities, staff salaries, etc. In recent years, trafficking networks that have 
established a foothold abroad also exhibit trends of attempting to use 
legitimate business structures through renting or investing in bars, clubs, 
restaurants and sex establishments in various western European cities 
(BG-E16, BG-17, BG-E19).
As with the costs for doing business, the revenues from trafficking 
operations vary depending on the modus operandi of the traffickers 
and the market segment in which they operate. Prices for sex services 
fluctuate from one market segment to the other, as well as on the 
domestic prostitution market and abroad. Sex workers in the different 
market segments also tend to handle different number of customers. 
Furthermore, the profit sharing arrangements between the traffickers and 
the sex workers also vary depending on the modus operandi.
The prices in the domestic market are significantly lower compared to 
the prices abroad. The sex workers in the domestic outdoor segment, 
which work on the street or bring their clients in low-end motels or 
hostels, charge between €7–€15 depending on the service (BG-C12, 
BG-C17). Services in the indoor segment performed in clubs, hotels, 
rented apartments and private residences cost between €50 and €200. 
In summer and winter resorts the prices might go up to €200 per 
session. The high-end prostitution segment, which includes women 
procured to rich clients by model agencies can range from €300-€500 
(BG-E6), depending on the length of sessions (e.g. 2-4 hours, overnight 
stay or weekend). Abroad, the prices vary in the different countries 
(e.g. prices in Greece are lower than prices in Germany) and depending 
on the location (e.g. window prostitution vs. call girl services). The 
prices in the outdoor segment are €30-€50 per session depending 
on the type of services provided (BG-C7, BG-C23). The prices in the 
indoor segment fluctuate significantly – from €50-€100 per hour for 
3.4. PROFITS AND PROFIT SHARING
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low-end motels or hotels (BG-C1, BG-C4, BG-C11, BG-C16, BG-C22) 
to €150-€400 for red light district windows, rented apartments and 
well-placed hotels (BG-E6, BG-C6, BG-C7, BG-C8). Prices of high-end 
sex workers abroad start from €400 up to €3,000 but they also have 
longer engagements – e.g. over-night stay, weekend, etc. (BG-C9, BG-C18). 
Regular customers can receive discounts on sex services, usually about 5% 
(BG-C5, BG-C9).
Sex workers in different market segments also handle different number 
of clients. Whereas a sex worker in the outdoor segment will handle 
7-20 clients per day (BG-C7, BG-C8), clients in the indoor segment are 
usually between two and six men per day (BG-C4, BG-C6, BG-C7, 
BG-C20). High-end escorts work with between one and six clients per 
week (BG-E6, BG-C9, BG-C18). The women usually work five-six days 
per week (BG-C16, BG-C19, BG-C23). The number of clients fluctuates 
from sex worker to sex worker but also depends on a number of other 
factors – location, day of the week, season; therefore, traffickers are 
constantly looking for more profitable locations or better performing sex 
workers. Nevertheless, according to the accounts of several interviewed 
traffickers operating in the indoor segment abroad, the average monthly 
revenue from a sex worker is in the range of €15,000-€45,000 (BG-E8, 
BG-C1, BG-C3, BG-C4, BG-C7, BG-C9).
Revenue sharing arrangements differ depending on the type of the 
trafficking organisation and the modus operandi of the traffickers. 
Independent traffickers and family based groups more often tend to 
withhold all earnings from the sex workers under different pretexts – 
either because the trafficker and the victim have some kind of intimate 
relation and he pretends to look after the “family money,” or because 
the traffickers pretend to collect and safeguard the money on behalf 
of the victim until she returns to Bulgaria (BG-C14, BG-C15, BG-C21, 
BG-C22, BG-C23). In many of these cases deception, manipulation, 
coercion and even physical violence against the victim are also used 
by the traffickers. The procurer in this case will cover all costs of the 
trafficking operation from the earnings of the sex workers and keep the 
profit for himself.
Hierarchical groups and loose networks as a rule employ less often 
coercive methods and pre-negotiate the split of the revenues with the 
sex workers. The interviewed respondents reported different proportions 
of earnings, which the sex workers are allowed to keep. The share of 
earnings remaining in the sex workers oscillated between 20% and 50%. 
Most respondents report that the traffickers are supposed to cover all 
related expenses from their share – acquisition of clients, protection and 
monitoring, transport and lodging. In general, gifts and tips received by 
the sex workers are usually kept by them (BG-C4, BG-C6, BG-C8). Sex 
workers who generate more revenue can also be rewarded with a bonus 
by the traffickers – either with an increase in the share of earnings they 
are allowed to keep (although this never goes above 50%), or other 
perks such as an extra holiday (BG-C9). In some of the hierarchically 
structured organisations, some of the key members of the group are also 
allowed to receive a share of the revenues generated by the sex workers. 
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For example, in one of the cases involving a modelling agency used as 
a cover for prostitution, the person who handled the contacts between 
the women and the customers received 10% of all earnings (BG-E6). 
Another respondent reported that as a supervisor of six sex workers, he 
was receiving 20% of their earnings (BG-C3).
Hierarchically structured organisations, which controlled brothels or other 
sex venues (especially such in a profitable location), follow a different 
arrangement for profit sharing. Instead of pre-agreeing on the split of 
the earnings, they demand a fixed advanced payment. For example, 
organisations controlling erotic clubs at Sunny Beach resort in Bulgaria 
demanded an advanced payment of €7,500 per sex worker for three 
months during the summer season (BG-E3, BG-C20). Similar arrangements 
based on advanced payments ranging from €2,500 to €7,000 on a 
monthly basis were reported about hotels, adult clubs in other resort 
areas and abroad (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3, BG-E6, BG-E17). The advanced 
payments supposedly cover their costs for renting the venue, providing 
protection against violent clients, rival groups and state authorities. The 
beneficial owners of such well-located adult clubs at the Bulgarian sea 
coast reportedly receive about €30,000 on a monthly basis in the form 
of rent (BG-E3).
The enforcement of the revenue sharing arrangements are very strict and 
traffickers often impose tight daily accounting and control. For example, 
when the appointments with clients are made through the internet, 
the persons in charge of protection and revenue collection are granted 
access to the profiles of the women and sometimes communicate with 
the customers directly (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3, BG-C5, BG-C8). In other 
arrangements, sex workers have supervisors who closely account for their 
clients and earnings on a daily basis. Women who are caught trying to 
hide revenue are penalised with working for a certain amount of time 
without receiving any compensation (BG-C1, BG-C3, BG-C5, BG-C20). In 
rare cases they might be subject to physical violence, although it appears 
that this method is generally avoided, as well as the withholding of all 
earnings of the women. One trafficker, who used to be part of a larger 
network, notes: “There should be control but never through violence. I 
have always managed through conversations, good treatment and money, 
50/50, always. If the girl wants, she can let you have all the money, but 
it is advisable to go 50/50” (BG-C10). The use of violence might prompt 
sex workers to go to the authorities (BG-C22).
The methods for money laundering and the re-investment of 
proceeds from human trafficking are rarely sophisticated, especially 
in the case of independent traffickers and loose networks. Moreover, 
much of the money is spent on a lavish lifestyle or supporting a drug 
habit. Money is returned to the country and laundered through the 
purchase of designer clothing, electronics and automobiles, often of 
luxury brands (BG-E10; BG-E13; BG-E14). The traffickers operating in 
the outdoor and low-priced indoor segments of the prostitution market 
and many independent traffickers appear to use simple trade-base 
money laundering such as purchasing and re-selling of easily tradable 
goods. These include mostly cars and gold, which are brought in and 
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sold in Bulgaria (BG-C7, BG-C10, BG-C11, BG-C12, BG-C13, BG-C15). 
Other consumer goods, e.g. stolen electronics, are also bought cheaply 
and subsequently resold (BG-C7). Purchasing real estate and land in 
Bulgaria remains popular both for traffickers and sex workers, and most 
of the interviewed offenders and sex workers reported such.
Traffickers who are part of more sophisticated organisations reportedly 
often invest in various commercial establishments such as restaurants, small 
shops, hair salons (BG-C1, BG-C6, BG-C11). Investments into legitimate 
enterprises can serve a number of purposes – laundering of proceeds, 
providing a legitimate reason for residing abroad, recruitment of new sex 
workers – e.g. hair salons and massage parlours (BG-C1, BG-C10). Value 
transfers in the form of multiple donations and/or re-sales through a ring 
of dummy recipients are also reported to be employed in laundering 
proceeds from trafficking (BG-C10). Organisers in hierarchically structured 
Figure 3. typical Flows oF the proceeds oF traFFicking
Family
Sex workers
Dummy accounts
Hotels, clubs,
landlords
Money laundering
Bank
Clients
Traffickers
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	bulgaria	 185
groups, on the other hand, engage in developing more sophisticated and 
diversified legitimate business portfolios with multiple stakes in sectors 
such as hospitality, construction, agriculture, jewellery trade, fitness gyms, 
etc. (BG-C1, BG-C3, BG-C9). Construction works in and around popular 
winter and summer resorts as well as larger cities is a widely used 
method of laundering (BG-C6, BG-C16).
Generally, most of the proceeds are invested and laundered in Bulgaria 
but a tendency to invest abroad is beginning to be discerned (BG-E5). 
Previous research showed that in the first half of the 2010s there had 
been many instances of investment in real estate in Greece, Cyprus, 
Spain, Italy, and Germany (Bezlov, et al., 2016). There are strong 
indications of a positive relationship between the sophistication of an 
OCG and its propensity to invest in real estate and businesses abroad, 
both as cover and investment for trafficking sustainability and expansion. 
These may include bars, clubs, and cafes, used often for criminal social 
networking and/or provision of sexual services (BG-E5, BG-E6, BG-E7, 
BG-E17, BG-E19). Some experts opined that there is development of a 
similar trend among independent traffickers as well (BG-E8).
The extensive penetration of internet-based services such as (anonymised) 
instant messaging and social networking websites, has impacted on sex 
trafficking in Bulgaria and abroad in a variety of ways. First of all, 
online advertising has created opportunities to lower costs for client 
acquisition, since it reduced the competitive advantage of having access 
to established and profitable locations. Thus, especially in Sofia and 
abroad, it effectively contributed to the gradual disintegration of the 
existing cartelisation and control of the sex service market by organised 
crime and the increasing share of independent procurers and sex workers 
(CSD, 2012). Furthermore, it also allowed to expand the pool of potential 
new recruits, since it provided a whole new bundle of opportunities to 
target and reach out to potential victims (CSD, 2017). However, internet 
has also increased the risk for independent traffickers and sex workers, 
since they can be easily traced and eventually targeted by hierarchically 
structured groups, other rival competitors or law enforcement authorities. 
The latter is especially true for cities with relatively small prostitution 
markets (BG-C1, BG-C4, BG-C8).
Data from the interviews suggests that the reliance on and use of 
the internet for sex trafficking, including recruiting and customer 
base development, is anchored in the interplay of assessments for 
trustworthiness, opportunism and caution of exposure. For example, 
whereas the internet may present countless opportunities for recruitment 
and clientele expansion it is void of the typical offline mechanisms for 
establishing trust. This is why, it is not surprising that both traffickers 
and sex workers among interviewed respondents exhibit diverse attitudes 
4. THE ROlE AND IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HUMAN 
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toward the online environment depending on subjective preferences and 
risk perceptions, as well as experiences with rival competitors and law 
enforcement encounters (BG-C10, BG-C13). Utilisation of online services 
such as dating sites, social media and specialised websites differs greatly 
among the respondents, whereby both extremes of the spectrum are 
involved, e.g. no use versus exclusive use. Apparently, for some operations 
the internet proves sufficiently valuable so as to expand the network by 
including external facilitators, such as IT experts, thereby ensuring that 
the traffickers are able to fully enjoy the benefits and minimise the risks 
of internet exposure.
Internet services are primarily used for client acquisition and interviewed 
respondents provided a variety of examples how they are utilised. Many 
independent traffickers and sex workers rely on various online channels 
to market their services and solicit clients. One of the respondents 
reported extensive use of social networks to expand clientele, although 
new clients were usually accepted upon prior reference by already 
known clients (BG-C16). Data suggests that social media accounts 
(usually with fake names) are used for customer solicitation, whereby 
sex workers engage in maintaining flirtatious communication with their 
clients (BG-C16, BG-E10). At least one account shows that sex workers 
may organise themselves into Facebook groups, wherein sexual services 
are negotiated and arranged with customers within the social media 
service (BG-C17). There are also reports that Facebook pages are being 
created where girls advertise their legal front business, such as massage 
services (BG-C5, BG-E10). In online offering and negotiating of sexual 
services the details of the transaction are usually carried out through a 
conversation over Skype or anther medium which allows the customer 
to be seen and assessed for reliability (BG-C2, BG-C4).
Organised trafficking and prostitution networks also tend to use the 
internet for client acquisition, as well as for sex worker supervision and 
control. Victims may be instructed to register accounts and profiles on 
online dating sites that are popular in the country where they work, such 
as Badoo, eLove Dates, Tinder (for Western Europe) and Gepime, Elmaz, 
Adam and Eva (for Bulgaria) (BG-C8, BG-C2, BG-C1). The accounts are 
controlled by the traffickers, whereby in some instances the organiser will 
hire an expert to deal with the technical details of account management, 
including for profiles in social media such as Facebook (BG-C8, BG-C6, 
BG-C1, BG-C5). Such experts are usually external to the network and are 
not involved on a full-time basis (BG-C5). The control and supervision 
activities include operating with the sex workers’ accounts, messaging on 
their behalf, instructions not to delete chat messages with clients, regular 
inspection of the contents of chats, among others (BG-C8, BG-C1, BG-C3). 
Thus, apart from everything, ICT technologies have also reduced costs for 
supervision and control.
Hierarchical organisations, are also known to take advantage of internet 
to trace and recruit independent sex workers who use online dating 
sites to increase their exposure and popularity. The recruiters would 
regularly scan the known websites used for offering incognito sexual 
services and identify potential new recruits to be convinced to join the 
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	bulgaria	 187
network. Once a victim is identified then the typical recruitment tactics 
of manipulation and coercion will ensue (BG-C1, BG-C4). Some of the 
interviewees were of the opinion that independent offering of sexual 
service through online dating and other sites is a short-term experience 
lasting up to several months. Then the independent sex worker is usually 
spotted by some local criminal group or network and they will instantly 
make efforts to recruit her/him (BG-C8, BG-C3).
This is why a large group of traffickers and sex workers are cautious about 
using the internet actively for their operations because of uncontrollable 
exposure to the public, including rival competitors and law enforcement, 
and the perceived benefits of their own proven offline business model. 
Therefore, many consider face-to-face arrangements and negotiations to 
be more trusted, safe and reliable than internet-based communications, 
and therefore avoid online activities as a part of their risk-aversion 
strategy (BG-C10, BG-C12, BG-C13, BG-C14, BG-C15, BG-C21, BG-C22, 
BG-C23).
Trafficking in human beings is a highly profitable criminal activity, 
which is driven by both profit and demand, thereby yielding significant 
proceeds. This has prompted the European Commission to emphasise 
to members states the need to follow the money in THB investigations. 
Article 9 of the Anti-trafficking Directive provides that member states 
shall take all the necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative 
tools are available to investigation and prosecution authorities, and that 
investigation and prosecution should not be dependent on reporting or 
accusation by the victims.7
Nevertheless, the deficiencies in the Bulgarian authorities’ investigative 
capacity to tackle complex financial crimes and conduct effective 
financial investigation remain endemic in the responsible enforcement, 
investigative and prosecuting structures. The insufficiencies have been 
ascertained in external evaluations, as well as recognised internally. With 
regard to investigating and prosecuting money laundering (ML) offences, 
the Prosecutor’s Office concedes in its 2017 annual report that such 
cases are problematic due to infective prosecutorial supervision over 
ML investigations; transfer of cases to the regional prosecution offices, 
which leads to re-assignment and delays of investigations; difficulties in 
evidencing the predicate offences and submitting indictments to the 
courts; insufficient efforts toward the thorough and timely identification 
and seizure of the assets of the investigated entities and/or natural 
persons (ПРБ, 2017). A study by the Structural Reform and Support 
Service (SRSS) of the European Commission in 2016 concluded that “there 
7 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011.
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is a big gap in expertise in modern financial investigative techniques in 
Bulgaria by law enforcement” (SRSS, 2017, p. 23). With regard to police 
investigations related to ML, the report further notes that the police lack 
their own financial experts and often rely of external specialists with 
minimal financial qualifications and experience sufficient to “translate” 
and interpret financial documents, but inadequate to conduct or facilitate 
a full-fledged financial investigation (SRSS, 2017).
The difficulties with conducting financial investigations and bringing 
complex financial crimes to court are reflected in the national judicial 
statistics. Sentencing ML in Bulgaria remains low when compared to 
other types of crime (see Table 2). It should be noted that the practice 
of initiating the financial investigation simultaneously with the criminal 
investigation, remains rarely used in the country (CSD, 2017). At the same 
time, investigating and proving ML offences in court remains challenging. 
This is confirmed by the low volume of ML sentences, compared to 
other types of crimes, despite the fact that the majority of crimes are 
profit-driven and employ ML mechanisms in the various stages of the 
laundering process (CSD, 2017).
ТаBle 2. sentencing oF select oFFenses in Bulgarian courts in 2016
Source: Prosecutor’s Office, 2016.
Types of criminal
activity
Type of sentence
Effective Suspended Probation Fine Other
Corruption 26 225 103 113 63
Organised crime 52 68 1 4 6
Human trafficking 12 23 1 8 0
Drug trafficking 556 1,136 62 1,486 111
Money laundering 7 6 1 7 0
Crimes against
the tax system
84 943 65 298 67
Counterfeit currency and
payment instruments
65 207 5 64 7
Misuse of EU funds 7 23 2 45 0
Total 809 2,631 240 2,025 254
The volume of suspicious transaction reports received by the country’s 
financial intelligence unit – the Financial Intelligence Directorate at 
the State Agency National Security – and the number of registered 
money laundering indictments in a year may be cautiously considered 
as another proxy indicator for the effectiveness of the financial 
investigation environment in a country. In 2016, the Directorate registered 
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2,987 suspicious transaction reports, while in the same year 14 ML 
indictments were registered in Bulgarian courts by the prosecution 
(SANS, 2017; ПРБ, 2017).
Data from the conducted interviews largely depicts a general environment 
of deficiency in financial investigations, while adding valuable specific 
insights into the particulars of THB investigations. As a rule, financial 
investigations are mostly conducted on a case-by-case basis, rather than 
systematically and are often limited to asset recovery investigations, 
which fall under the remit of the Commission for Combatting Corruption 
and Illegal Assets Forfeiture.8 Most often financial investigations arise out 
of joint investigation teams and other international frameworks for law 
enforcement assistance. Financial investigation is still considered as an 
area for specialised experts, rather than an integrated method to be used 
within the investigating authorities.
Many of the above mentioned deficiencies are rooted in the current 
structural and functional models of the responsible institutions and 
specifically GDCOC and the Prosecutor’s Office. Following the series 
of re-structuring of the GDCOC, currently the Directorate has a highly 
centralised structure with limited resources for carrying out independent 
investigations at the local level. The investigative powers and expertise 
remain centralised in Sofia, thereby resulting in most major and complex 
cases being investigated from Sofia, wherein many investigations lose the 
advantage of having on-site specialists with expert local knowledge and 
situational awareness (BG-E5).
All ML expert operatives of the agency are concentrated at the GDCOC 
HQ in Sofia, wherein a limited number of experts have to cover ML 
investigations related to all organised crime activities. Reportedly the 
financial investigations related to THB cases are two or three annually 
and usually are conducted within joint investigation teams or within other 
international mutual police assistance arrangements (BG-E2). Generally, 
the assumption is that financial investigations have a role in cases 
related to cross-border trafficking, whereas the cases related to domestic 
trafficking fall in the remit of the Commission for Combatting Corruption 
and Illegal Assets Forfeiture (BG-E2). In many cases, the lack of sufficient 
resources and in-house expertise at GDCOC limit the scope of financial 
investigations, particularly those with strong international dimensions, to 
simple network analysis such as tracing cross-border payments via money 
transfer services. Usually, no further analysis is undertaken (BG-E2). 
Investigations on the use of legitimate business structures for concealing 
criminal activities and proceeds of crime is also hampered due to the 
legal restrictions on access to tax information by law enforcement officers 
(BG-E2). Insufficient staffing and lack of specialisation of investigating 
police officers generally leads to disregarding the financial aspects of 
THB (BG-E5).
Structural and functional impediments impact also the work of the 
Prosecutor’s Office. Currently, cases related to money laundering 
8 Operational since 19.01.2018, previously Commission for Illegal Assets Forfeiture.
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involving organised crime are handled by the Specialised Prosecutor’s 
Office, whereas all other cases fall into the remit of the Regional 
Prosecutor’s Offices. However, the most recent data indicates that for 
2016 the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office had initiated only five new pre-
trial investigations on money laundering, whereas the biggest portion 
of such investigations is handled by the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office 
(ПРБ, 2017).
Part of the problem is the functional division of tasks within the 
prosecution in Bulgaria, wherein cases of human trafficking are usually 
handled by the District Prosecutor’s Offices and money laundering cases 
by the Regional Prosecutor’s Offices. Similarly, in the Special Prosecutor’s 
Office usually the ML investigation is separated from the one for the 
predicate offence and tasked to a different prosecutor. The Specialised 
Prosecutor’s Office, like GDCOC, is a centralised structure and does 
not have any regional offices, which among other things ensues various 
logistical and practical impediments, when pre-trial investigations outside 
Sofia need to be handled.
The usual practice during pre-trial investigations is that the financial 
investigation materials are separated by the materials on trafficking in 
human beings and compiled into a separate file. The ML file is then 
handled by a different prosecutor at the Regional Prosecutor’s Office or 
at the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office, as per the functional and structural 
requirements of the workflow in the prosecution (BG-E2, BG-E3, ПРБ, 
2017). This leads to interruption in the investigative work, which results in 
a low number of completed ML investigations. Moreover, the structural 
requirement of separating the prosecutorial authority over the predicate 
and the ML cases, from the regional to the district prosecution office, may 
decrease the incentive for collecting evidence for financial investigation in 
the original predicate prosecution. To further complicate the situation, in 
many cases judges require a conviction for the predicate offence in order 
to consider a ML case (BG-E3).
The system for random assignment of cases in the prosecution has 
also had the unintended consequence of hampering efficiency of ML 
investigations. This system was implemented with the main purpose 
of preventing corruption, conflicts of interest and influence trading. 
However, in terms of the quality of investigating practices the random 
assignment system may prove to have a detrimental effect as it appears 
to hinder specialisation among the magistrates. Firstly, the system allows 
for highly complex and sophisticated cases to be randomly assigned to 
inexperienced prosecutors, thereby jeopardising a successful investigation 
(SRSS, 2016). Secondly, the random assignment means that a prosecutor 
may not be able to develop practical experience and expertise in ML 
cases, as there is no assurance that the prosecutor would continue to 
work in that specific crime field. This also proves particularly important 
in financial investigations, e.g. money laundering, which may require 
specific skills and expertise often gained exclusively through experience 
(BG-E15).
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Human trafficking remains one of the most important sources of revenues 
for the Bulgarian organised crime. Although in the last decade the market 
has fragmented and decentralised, and the share of the independent 
traffickers and sex workers increased, it still remains largely controlled by 
organised crime. However, the modus operandi of all trafficking actors 
has shifted away from the violence and coercion towards the use of 
subtler methods involving economic incentives. The extensive penetration 
of the ICT and the steady growth of internet use have played an 
important role for these recent developments. Among other things, they 
have contributed to a significant reduction of client acquisition cost for 
trafficking operations.
The current analysis examined in-depth the financial underpinnings of 
the human trafficking both at the domestic market and abroad. There 
is a widely shared belief that human trafficking is practically low-cost 
criminal activity bringing huge profits, wherein market entry does not 
require any particular investment. The collected information to a large 
degree refutes this common myth at least in the Bulgarian context. 
Certainly, recruitment and transportation costs can be negligent to none, 
but the exploitation stage does require initial investment, especially if it 
is expected to generate sufficient revenue. A big competitive advantage 
of Bulgarian traffickers is that being EU citizens they can enjoy visa free 
travel and low-cost transportation. However, client acquisition costs can 
be substantial, particularly for access to high profitable locations such as 
placement in an adult club at the sea coast resorts. Internet does provide 
an alternative and can significantly lower costs for client acquisition, 
but on the other hand it raises risks related to encountering abusive 
clients or coming across with rival competitors or extortionists. Thus, 
it also increases cost for protection. Expanding business is also related 
to additional costs for monitoring and control a larger number of sex 
workers, as well as costs for concealment of criminal activities, for example 
through establishing legitimate businesses as a cover. Nevertheless, the 
collected data indicates that social capital can alleviate or significantly 
reduce many of these costs for new-starters or provide them with the 
needed credit line to enter the business.
The extensive penetration of ICT services in prostitution markets 
have not changed much with regard to settlement of payments. Cash 
transactions still dominate trafficking business, whereas both payments 
from clients and within trafficking groups or networks remain in cash. 
The character of the money flows to a large extent predetermines the 
low sophistication of money laundering methods used by traffickers – 
money is moved across borders via non-bank money transfers and 
recently more often via money couriers. Subsequently, the money 
is invested in real estate and cash-intensive businesses. Trade-based 
money laundering is also commonly used. The analysis also shows a 
newly emerged trend of criminal entrepreneurs investing their proceeds 
in the destination countries, especially in assets that allow them to 
expand their business – brothels or various hospitality businesses that 
6. CONClUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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are used as a cover for provision of sexual services (e.g. restaurants, 
cafes, hotels, etc.).
The changing nature and growing sophistication of trafficking operations 
is posing new challenges to the law enforcement and judicial authorities 
of the country and apparently the latter are not fully equipped to meet 
them. This is particularly true with regard to financial investigations, 
which lags behind due to a variety of impediments, such as the lack 
of sufficient resources and existing functional and structural gaps in the 
institutional setup.
Drawing on the analysis the following recommendations could be drawn:
1. A side effect of the growing use of legal business structures to 
enable and facilitate THB for sexual purposes is a higher level of 
sophistication of criminal finances as licit and illicit financial flows 
become intertwined in the process of money laundering. These new 
trends are coupled with lack of financial investigation expertise in law 
enforcement, which is currently compensated by contracting of external 
experts with uncertain expertise and efficiency (SRSS, 2017). In order 
to address this, recruitment, training, and deployment of additional 
police officers able to conduct complex financial investigations is 
much needed.
2. The current institutional setup and particularly the functional division 
of tasks within the prosecution, whereby investigations of predicate 
and ML offence are usually handled by different prosecutors, hinders 
parallel financial investigations, which are paramount for the timely 
tracing and freezing of criminal assets. In this regard, the follow-the-
money doctrine should be institutionalised so that ML investigations 
are conducted in parallel with all THB investigations. This could 
be achieved through establishing working mechanisms for better 
coordination within the prosecution, as well as with other relevant 
institutions such as the Commission for Countering Corruption and 
Illegal Assets Forfeiture.
3. Furthermore, a modification of the random allocation principle at the 
Prosecutor’s Office should be considered to ensure that casework 
on ML offences is managed and supervised by prosecutors with the 
appropriate experience and skill-set.
4. To ensure the early identification and freezing of relevant assets, 
especially in organised crime cases, the lead prosecutors at the 
Specialised Prosecutor’s Office need to supervise both criminal and 
financial investigations more proactively by instructing suitably trained 
officers to collect the relevant financial evidence and ascertain the 
full extent of the assets of suspects. Where appropriate, this should 
be undertaken in conjunction with the Commission for Countering 
Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture. Establishing regional departments 
of the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office is also advisable to speed up 
collection of evidence and improve coordination and monitoring.
5. Forfeiture of illegal assets is a major and indispensable tool in the 
combating of organised crime. The international experience shows that 
structures with a remit to investigate illegally acquired assets are best 
institutionally and operationally situated within the prosecution or the 
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	bulgaria	 193
police. In Bulgaria, the structural approach to illegal asset seizure has 
shifted sharply away from best practices and into an unprecedented 
and ambiguous merger of responsibilities to include assets forfeiture, 
conflict of interest and anticorruption into one mega structure. 
Consideration should be given to bringing assets forfeiture within the 
remit of institutions charged with investigating and prosecuting the 
predicate offences supposedly yielding the proceeds to be seized.
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ICT information and communication technologies
GDCOC Directorate General Countering Organised Crime
GDP gross domestic product
GRETA Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking 
 in Human Beings
MoI Ministry of Interior
Ml money laundering
OCG organised crime group
SANS State Agency National Security
THB trafficking in human beings
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lIST OF INTERvIEwEES
Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
BG-C1 Pimp (male) Recruitment, client acquisition, money mule
BG-C2 Prostitute (female) Worked in Pazardzhik and on the Bulgarian 
seaside
BG-C3 Pimp (male) Security, money collection, customer acquisition 
and sometimes recruitment
BG-C4 Pimp (female) Recruitment (previously for a group);
money collection, securing working terrain,
buying protection (currently)
BG-C5 Prostitute (female) Worked in Plovdiv, on a Bulgarian winter resort 
and at seaside
BG-C6 Prostitute (male) Worked in Pazardzhik, on the Bulgarian seaside 
and Cologne, Germany
BG-C7 Pimp (female) Recruitment, security (but not muscle)
BG-C8 Prostitute (female) Worked in Pazardzhik, Innsbruck, Austria
and Madrid, Spain
BG-C9 Prostitute (female) Worked in Plovdiv and Saint-Tropez, France
BG-C10 Pimp (male) Money collection, securing accommodation, 
recruitment
BG-C11 Pimp (multiple, male) Recruitment, transportation, money laundering, 
corruption payments
BG-C12 Pimp (male) Security, money collection, organisation of 
accommodation abroad, transportation, money 
laundering, corruption payments
BG-C13 Pimp (male) Security, money collection, organisation
of accommodation abroad, transportation,
money laundering, corruption payments
BG-C14 Pimps (three, male) Recruitment, securing working terrain,
money collection, money laundry
BG-C15 Pimps (male and female) Securing working terrain, recruitment,
money collection, corruption payments
BG-C16 Prostitute (female) Worked in Bulgaria, the Netherlands, currently 
France and Belgium
BG-C17 Pimp (male) Security, securing working terrain, money 
collection, corruption payments
BG-C18 Pimps (numerous, male) Recruitment, transportation, securing working 
terrain, corruption payments, money laundering
BG-C19 Prostitute (female) Worked in Sofia
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Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
BG-C20 Prostitute (female) Worked in Sofia and at the Bulgarian seaside; 
dabbled briefly in recruitment
BG-C21 Prostitute (female) Worked in Germany and France
BG-C22 Prostitute (female) Worked in Bulgaria and Norway
BG-C23 Prostitute (female) Worked in Bulgaria and abroad (unknown where)
BG-E1 Police officers Regional Directorate Combatting Organised Crime, 
Rousse
BG-E2 Police officer Money laundering Sector, General Directorate 
Combatting Organised Crime
BG-E3 Prosecutor; police officer Regional Prosecution, Regional Directorate 
Combatting Organised Crime, Bourgas
BG-E4 Police officer SANS
BG-E5 Police officer Head of sector, General Directorate Combatting 
Organised Crime
BG-E6 Prosecutor Specialised Prosecution
BG-E7 Prosecutor Specialised Prosecution
BG-E8 Prosecutor Regional Prosecution Rousse
BG-E9 Prosecutor District Prosecution Plovdiv
BG-E10 Prosecutor Regional Prosecution Plovdiv
BG-E11 Social worker NGO, Pazardzhik
BG-E12 Police officer Regional Directorate Combatting Organised Crime
BG-E13 Prosecutor District Prosecution, Dobrich
BG-E14 Prosecutor Head of District Prosecution, Dobrich
BG-E15 Prosecutor Regional Prosecution, Dobrich
BG-E16 Prosecutor Regional Prosecution, Dobrich
BG-E17 Police officer Regional Directorate Combatting Organised Crime; 
Sliven
BG-E18 Police officer Regional Directorate Combatting Organised Crime 
Varna
BG-E19 Former police officer Retired Director of Directorate Combatting 
Organised Crime
BG-E20 Former police officer Regional Directorate Combatting Organised Crime, 
Pazardzhik
BG-E21 Former police officer Deputy Director, Regional Directorate Combatting 
Organised Crime, Varna
BG-E22 Former prosecutor Specialised Prosecution
BG-E23 Prosecutor Regional Prosecution Pazardzhik
BG-E24 Prosecutor District Prosecution Pazardzhik
BG-E25 Police officer Police Internal Investigations Directorate
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Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
BG-E26 Police officer Regional Directorate Combatting Organised Crime, 
Plovdiv
BG-E27 Prosecutor District Prosecution Sliven
BG-E28 Prosecutor District Prosecution Sliven
BG-E29 Retired police officer Regional Directorate Combatting Organised Sliven
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Trafficking in human beings (THB) for sexual exploitation1 is one of the 
most prevalent types of individual exploitation and it is a major concern 
in France. Despite the long existing awareness of this phenomenon, 
often linked to increasingly structured criminal organisations, it has not 
stopped evolving and adapting to ensure its permanence (FR-E2). Taking 
advantage of the pauperisation of some populations throughout the world 
and allowing victims to hope for quick earnings, criminal structures hire, 
transport, handle and profit more and more from the sexual exploitation 
of their victims. France is both a country of destination and a country of 
transit for these organised groups, “who use the free movement of people 
principle within the Schengen area to enable the circulation of their 
victims throughout a large part of the Europe” (SIRASCO, 2016; FR-E1).
Since its creation in 1958, the Central Office for Combating Human 
Trafficking (OCRTEH) of the judicial police conducts investigations on 
acts of procuring and human trafficking for sexual exploitation and draws 
up, from the data gathered by services dealing with this phenomenon, its 
evolution and main trends. According to these trends, in the last decades 
transnational criminal organisations have specialised in the trafficking 
of human beings for the purpose of prostitution, thus occupying the 
place left vacant by the French “traditional milieu” (FR-E3). Being highly 
structured, they recruit the victims in their country of origin. Young 
women, most of whom have no family ties and do not speak the French 
language, when in France most often live without any residence permit. 
They must pay back to the criminal network the very high cost of their 
irregular immigration (FR-E4). The women are forced, sometimes through 
physical violence, to prostitute themselves at extremely low rates and 
under very precarious material and sanitary conditions. This is particularly 
the case for Nigerian networks or for criminal organisations from the 
Roma community (Romanian and Bulgarian), who then repatriate all 
profits generated in their respective countries, by money transfers, by 
money couriers or other informal value transfer systems working in their 
community (FR-E3).
The offense of trafficking in human beings is indeed not much utilised 
by the magistrates who prefer to pursue for aggravated procuring, which 
is considered simpler to identify and better defined by the case law 
(FR-E11).
1 Provisions implementing Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting 
victims. The French law is too recent to reflect the reality of THB linked with the exploitation 
of forced labour. Thus, it is complicated to evaluate the magnitude of that phenomenon. 
Unsurprisingly, there is no official data. The Committee Against Modern Slavery, a French 
NGO, is trying to set up a database but it suffers from methodological weaknesses. Likewise, 
the central office combating illegal labour is struggling to gather robust data (GRETA, 2017).
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If the French legal framework, de facto authorises prostitution by not 
mentioning it in the Penal Code (Mainsant, 2008), it enforces the ban of 
procuring and recently the prosecution of the clientele.
From procuring to aggravated procuring:
• The act of procuring alone is the offence provided for in article 225-5 of the Penal Code, without 
the addition of at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in article 225-7.
• Insofar as only one circumstance is enough to cause the aggravation of the penalty, there are 
very few simple procuring cases. Thus it is extremely common that an investigation opened on 
the basis of procuring continues on the basis of aggravated procuring. The most frequent causes of 
aggravation and the easiest ones to demonstrate are the plurality of perpetrators or victims, the use 
of a telecommunications network and the use of force or fraudulent manoeuvres.
The definition of human trafficking (article 225-4-1 of the Penal Code):
• It is defined as the act performed in exchange for remuneration, promise of remuneration or any 
other advantage, to hire a person, transport, transfer, and host or accommodate said person to 
make them available to oneself or to a third party, even unidentified, in order to either allow to 
be committed against this person offenses of procuring, aggression, sexual violence, exploitation of 
panhandling, working or living conditions counter to their dignity, organ trafficking, or to force this 
person to commit any crime or offense.
Since the Second World War, France has adopted several international 
conventions regarding human trafficking for sexual exploitation purposes:
• The 1950 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic 
in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others;
• The year 2000 additional protocol (the Palermo Protocol) to the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
(UNTOC);
• The 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism (the Warsaw Convention).
More recently, the European Directive 2011/36/UE on human trafficking 
and its prevention has led France to define the components of the THB 
offence. Thus, the August 5, 2013 laws transposed in the Penal Code 
under article 225-4-1, the definition of the offence as the act of “hiring a 
person, transporting, transferring, hosting or welcoming her for purposes 
of sexual exploitation.”
A circular letter of the Minister of Justice of January 22, 2015 defining 
the penal policy in the fight against trafficking in human beings has been 
sent to the prosecutors and transmitted, for information, to the presidents 
of the various courts competent in criminal matters. This circular letter 
reaffirms the need to use the qualification of trafficking during criminal 
proceedings to dismantle the networks more effectively, to facilitate the 
implementation of international cooperation tools.
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The July 13, 2016 law came to complete the French legislative system 
regarding human trafficking and specifically provides:
• The strengthening of the protection of the victims of sexual 
exploitation: the law alters the dispositions of the Code on the 
entry and residence of foreigners and right of asylum (CESEDA) in 
France and allows for granting of a six-months residence permit to 
individuals who had been identified as victims of trafficking and 
engaged into sexual exploitation, without preconditions for the 
denunciation of the trafficking networks exploiting them. The law 
also stipulates the accessibility of the “penitent” system of article 
706-63-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for THB victims as 
well as family members “for having prevented the commission 
of offences, for stopping or limiting the damage caused by an 
offence”.
• The incrimination of the purchase of sexual acts: the act of seeking, 
accepting or obtaining sexual relations from a person engaged in pros-
titution in exchange for remuneration or some advantage is punishable 
by a fifth class fine. The offence becomes a crime in the event of 
repetition over a timeframe lesser than or equal to one year.
• The repeal of the offense of solicitation.
“France has the most repressive arsenal against procuring” (FR-E12). 
While prostitution is not incriminated, the exploitation of prostitution 
is severely punished. The repression of procuring has the unique 
characteristic of punishing an activity that is not, in itself, illegal. In 
2010, the Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons showed that 
in the cases of aggravated procuring the prison sentences amounted 
to an average of 27.2 months. Of those convicted, 78% were older 
than 25, 28% were women, and 56% were foreigners, still in regards 
of only aggravated procuring. The average fine amounted to €13,080 
(FR-E4). Even if the legal framework for procuring violations seems to be 
complete, the offense of trafficking remains, to this day, rarely applied 
(3 cases in France in 2009, 3 cases as well in 2010). Few judges 
use the cumulative nature of the procuring and trafficking violations. 
However, current legal texts allow, in theory, to incriminate human 
trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation as a whole. While 
France has managed to limit the development of prostitution compared 
to its Spanish and German neighbours, sex trafficking and prostitution 
nevertheless remains a lucrative industry in France where networks 
continue to invest. As people become vulnerable to exploitation and 
businesses continually seek the lowest cost for labour sources (Wheaton 
et al., 2010).
The main aim of this report is to offer an account of the financial 
aspects of trafficking in human beings in France. The majority of 
respondents who were interviewed for this report come from the 
ministries of justice and interior, at the central and local level. Experts 
from the following institutions have been approached – the Central 
Office against THB based in Nanterre from the French Judicial Police, 
the Brigade Against Procuring (Prefecture of Police of Paris), the Brigade 
for Protection of Minors (Prefecture of Police of Paris), and the Penal 
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Court of Paris (General Prosecution – section C2). All these institutions 
are specialised in countering THB and procuring. Moreover, we had 
the opportunity to interview the head of the department of regional 
intervention (Prefecture of Police of Paris) involved in the tracing of 
criminal assets and their seizure.2
In 2016, 65 networks (38 in 2015) of aggravated procuring, including 
35 (17 in 2015) that can be qualified as human trafficking, were 
dismantled by police services and the Gendarmerie. Of these networks, 
38 pertained to street prostitution and 24 to internet prostitution; 
816 respondents were taken in for questioning in the course of this 
same year (611 in 2015) (FR-E3). China has become the most important 
country for France in terms of the origin of structured networks (15), 
followed by Nigeria (11) and Romania (9). Still in 2016, 1,118 victims 
(712 in 2015) were identified by French services during the procedures 
carried out against procuring, aggravated procuring and THB. With 
323 victims, France has become the most represented source country 
in terms of numbers of victims identified, surpassing China (202), 
Nigeria (114) and Romania (104). Lastly, as of December 31, 2016, 
586 clients were prosecuted for engaging in prostitution within the 
framework of the new law3 (FR-E18).
The number of people suspected 
of procuring as well as the 
number of identified victims 
mainly reflect law enforcement 
activity, which tends to vary 
from one year to another 
considering the discovery of 
new trends and guidelines.
“We need to take into ac-
count the absence of a verified 
number of prostitutes in France, 
even though some NGOs (e.g. 
Amicale du nid, Médecins du 
Monde, Hors les Murs) try to 
provide some estimations, but 
without a robust methodologi-
cal approach” (FR-E17).
2 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of 
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert, while “C” means criminal entrepreneur. 
The description of the background of the individual sources referenced can be found in the 
list of interviewees in the references section.
3 LOI No. 2016-444 du 13 avril 2016 visant à renforcer la lutte contre le système prostitutionnel 
et à accompagner les personnes prostituées.
ТаBle 1. evolution oF police investigations and results
Source: OCRTEH, 2017.
2015 2016
Change
(%)
Investigations of procuring 224 259 +16
Suspected individuals 611 816 +34
Identified victims 712 1,118 +57
Share of male victims (%) 4 7 /
Share of suspected male 
procurers (%)
64 66 /
1. MARKET OvERvIEw
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Specifically, law enforcement activity has produced the following results 
(OCRTEH, 2017):
• 40 investigations of acts of simple procuring (42 in 2015):
– 43 suspects (29 French men, 4 Brazilians, 2 Romanians, 2 Moroccans, 
2 Cameroonians) compared to 46 in 2015;
– 46 victims (26 French women, 6 Romanians, 3 Dominicans, 3 Came-
roonians, 2 Bulgarians) compared to 49 in 2015.
• 154 investigations were geared towards acts of aggravated procuring 
(148 in 2015):
– 343 suspects (229 French men, 28 Chinese men, 13 Romanians, 
8 Algerians, 7 Tunisians, 6 Nigerians) compared to 324 in 2015;
– 465 victims (262 French women [140 in 2015], 46 Chinese women, 
33 Cameroonians, 23 Romanians) compared to 411 in 2015.
• 30 investigations of networks of aggravated procuring (without being 
qualified as human trafficking) (21 in 2015):
– 177 suspects (55 French men [31 in 2015], 33 Chinese men, 22 Ro-
manians, 11 Bulgarians, 11 Ecuadorians) compared to 112 in 2015;
– 221 victims (70 Chinese women [29 in 2015], 31 Frenchwomen 
[4 in 2015], 20 Romanians, 18 Ecuadorians, 16 Brazilians) compared 
to 112 in 2015.
• 35 investigations of networks involved in human trafficking (17 in 2015):
– 253 suspects (70 Nigerians [10 in 2015], 41 Romanians, 32 Chinese 
men, 31 Frenchmen [4 in 2015], 27 Hungarians) compared to 129 
in 2015;
– 386 victims (109 Nigerians [12 in 2015], 86 Chinese women [6 in 
2015], 60 Hungarians, 55 Romanians) compared to 150 in 2015.
1.1. The victims
Since 2014, “an increase in the prostitution of minors has been observed 
on French soil” (FR-E6), and more particularly concerning victims of French 
nationality. In 2016, out of 120 identified minors victims of prostitution, 
100 had the French nationality (98 females and 2 males), or a 50% increase 
compared to 2015. This new trend is to be linked with the development 
of the phenomenon of sexual exploitation carried out by youths from the 
banlieues – large city suburbs notorious for their criminality (FR-E9).
Young victims, oftentimes minors, appear to be easy prey for young “gang 
leaders” from urban areas, who force them into prostitution (FR-E10). The 
average age of these young girls is around 15 years old and the extreme 
instability of their personal situation (runaways or school dropouts) of-
ten drives them to great mobility throughout the territory, and notably 
in big urban areas (Marseille, Lille, the Paris region). Left without fam-
ily support and personal financial resources, they prostitute themselves 
in cheap hotels via ads posted online by their procurers. This type of 
exploitation tends to structure itself in networks, with regards to the 
new means of hiring, managing and sexually exploiting these young 
minors, and thus tends to be similar to the modus operandi used by 
sexual exploitation criminal groups. Moreover, for a year now, France 
has been confronted with the regular arrivals of increasingly young 
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females exploited by Nigerian prostitution networks. However, the real 
age of these victims remains difficult to establish due to the false pa-
pers they present, provided to them by the networks, as well as the 
lack of verification by Nigerian authorities.
ТаBle 2. victims under 18 years oF age (2015 – 2016)
Source: OCRTEH, 2017.
Males Females Total
France 3 155 158
Nigeria 0 6 6
Romania 0 6 6
Bulgaria 2 2
Cameroon 0 3 3
Algeria 0 3 3
Belgium 0 1 1
Hungary 0 1 1
Morocco 0 2 2
Ivory Coast 0 1 1
Gabon 0 1 1
Guinea 0 1 1
Senegal 0 1 1
Total 3 183 186
The figures:
The statistics about the number of suspects and identified victims reflect the annual activity of law 
enforcement and gendarmerie services, taking into account new trends and guidelines. Indeed, unlike 
in other European Union countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, where prostitution is paid, 
declared and controlled employment, France can only rely on criteria linked to law enforcement activity 
in order to try and estimate the number of victims on its soil. The so-called number of identified 
victims and perpetrators nevertheless remains an effective indicator to grasp the general trends of 
prostitution in France (FR-E16).
Of the 1,118 victims identified in 2016 by the law-enforcement authori-
ties in France, 46 were involved in simple procuring, 466 in aggravated 
procuring, 221 in networks without THB and 386 in THB networks 
(FR-E16). French women represent 29% of the total number of identi-
fied victims (323), ahead of Chinese women who account for 18% 
(202), Nigerian women for 10% (114) and Romanian women for 9.2% 
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(104). In terms of source regions, east Europeans represent 20.2% of 
the total, followed by Asians (18.14%), Africans (16.62%) and South 
Americans (10.10%). France has thus become the most represented 
source country concerning active prostitution on French territory, fol-
lowed by east European countries (FR-E3).
1.2. Dismantled networks in 2016
Police and gendarmerie services’ activity has strongly increased throughout 
2016. With 65 dismantled networks, it reached a record peak, higher than 
2015 (38 networks) and twice the registered activity for the years 2006 
to 2008. This evolution illustrates the experience of criminal investigation 
services in carrying out complex inquiries on certain types of networks 
such as those of the Nigerian or Chinese community (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. dismantled networks including the recent oFFence 
oF human traFFicking (2006 – 2016)
Source: OCRTEH, 2017.
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The THB offence has been gradually supplanting the simple procuring 
offence in the French criminal justice system. Thus the number of dis-
mantled networks qualified as THB has increased from 38% in 2014 to 
54% in 2016.
The statistics from OCRETH show that when all offences are taken into 
account, the networks from eastern Europe remain the most numer-
ous (18). Romania alone represents half of them (see tables 3 and 4). 
Fourteen out of fifteen dismantled African networks were qualified as 
THB, 11 of which were Nigerian. This particularity demonstrates, if it still 
needed to be done, that these structures have high level of organisation 
that fully pertains to organised crime. The number of dismantled Chi-
nese networks remains high, but the similarity between networks with 
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THB (8) and without THB (7) is 
a sign that for this community 
it remains difficult to establish 
the elements defining human 
trafficking. The development of 
judicial and police cooperation 
with China could help reverse 
this trend in the course of the 
coming years.
These figures illustrate the rap-
id evolution of the phenom-
enon, which tends to increas-
ingly organise itself in order to 
exploit more and more victims 
and thus multiply its financial 
gain. One can also note the 
emergence of “multinational” 
procuring. It consists of oppor-
tunity alliances between several 
individuals of different nation-
alities, exploiting victims of dif-
ferent nationalities as well. For 
example, the network referred 
to as “multinational” in Table 4 
was organised by two Algerians 
allied to two Tunisians, exploit-
ing Romanian and Italian vic-
tims. These opportunity allianc-
es also appear within networks 
ran by a national community 
(FR-E18). This state of things 
thus needs to lead to a modu-
lation of the intra-community 
dimension that had until now 
been attributed to THB (see 
Tables 3 and 4).
National Police services have 
dismantled 58 out of 65 net-
works in 2016. Twenty-five of 
these networks pertained to ag-
gravated procuring and 33 to 
human trafficking. The National 
Gendarmerie units have disman-
tled 6 networks, 4 of which per-
tained to aggravated procuring 
and 2 to human trafficking. One 
network of aggravated procuring 
investigation was the result of 
cooperation between the police 
and the gendarmerie.
ТаBle 3. procuring networks By nationality
Source: OCRTEH, 2017.
Eastern Europe 10
Romania 5
Bulgaria 2
Albania 2
Hungary 2
Asia 7
China 7
western Europe 6
France 5
Multinational 1
South America 5
Brazil 4
Ecuador 1
North America 1
Dominican Republic 1
Africa 1
Guinea 1
Total 30
ТаBle 4. human traFFicking networks By nationality
Multinational 1
Africa 14
Nigeria 11
Guinea 2
Cameroon 1
Eastern Europe 8
Romania 4
Bulgaria 2
Hungary 1
Albania 1
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In France, the organisation of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation has recently tended towards horizontality in criminal activities. 
In other words, procurers are not at the head of a large hierarchy, but 
favour small structures and outsource some of their actions.
Street prostitution concerns 54% of identified victims, internet prostitution 
34%, and massage parlours 10% (FR-E3). Among the 65 dismantled 
networks in the course of 2016, more than half (38) concerned street 
prostitution. Despite new legal dispositions regarding client penalisation, 
street prostitution maintains a constantly high level, and remains the 
primary form of sexual exploitation in France (604 victims counted in 
street exploitation or 54% of the total number of identified victims). It 
should be noted that considering the very recent application of the law 
its effects are not yet noticeable within the prostitution setting.
Almost all (94%) of the women who practice it are foreign, particularly 
people of Nigerian nationality, as well as from Roma communities, either 
Romanian or Bulgarian. In this type of prostitution, the women rarely 
report to the police. They are mainly exploited by family members or close 
acquaintances. Nigerian prostitution is organised by established criminal 
structures, from the recruitment in Nigeria all the way to the exploitation 
of the victims by the “mamas” (“madams”) in Europe. The geographic 
mobility of these groups throughout France, and also throughout Europe, 
could be considered as an asset for these organisations, to meet a new 
demand and to escape from law enforcement pressure.
ТаBle 4. human traFFicking networks By nationality (continued)
Source: OCRTEH, 2017.
Asia 8
China 8
western Europe 1
France 1
South America 3
Argentina 1
Brazil 1
Peru 1
Total 35
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANISATION 
 OF TRAFFICKING NETwORKS
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The supply of internet prostitution represents about 34% of the re-
corded victims in France for the year 2016. It is the second most used 
type of prostitution. Constantly growing, this form of sexual exploitation 
tends to diversify itself. Practiced mainly in hotels or rented apartments 
from specialised websites, this type of prostitution primarily concerns 
young women of French nationality hired by young procurers, Chinese 
women and, to a lesser extent, South American victims. At the age of 
the digital explosion, “cyber-prostitution” continues to grow, particularly 
through the design, production, management and maintenance of ad-
vertising sites, taking photographs, videos, protection and site manage-
ment (FR-E4).
Prostitution in massage parlours amounts to 10% of the victims 
of 2016 with 106 exploited women identified, 57 of whom French 
nationals and 41 Chinese nationals. The massage parlours in the Paris 
metropolitan area are almost all run by people from the Dongbei region 
in China who exploit young women also from this region (FR-E10). This 
type of prostitution is very popular in Paris, but also tends to develop 
in other places as well. Out of 22 cases in 2016, 14 concerned the 
sexual exploitation of young Chinese women, and 8 of them prostitution 
of women of diverse nationalities, primarily French. Cities such as Nice 
(06), Béziers (34), Le Cannet (06) or even Aix les Milles (13) have seen 
this type of parlours prosper, illustrating a tendency to relocate to new 
geographic zones.
The lack of regulation regarding this activity gives ample leeway to the 
procurers, who, using the cover of wellness massages, hide prostitution 
activities involving young women in an irregular situation. The identified 
French victims had an average age of 27-28. Sexual intercourses are 
priced between €100 for a half-hour and €120 to €150 an hour 
(massage and sexual finish). However, investigations have shown that 
it would be inaccurate to talk about “very structured” networks. The 
monthly income of a salon can reach an average of €8,000 to €15,000. 
It seems that currently the activity is less flourishing as evidenced by the 
rapid closure of massage parlours.
A similar type of prostitution is the hostess bar prostitution, which has 
almost fully disappeared (0.19% of identified victims), though it remains 
in some big urban areas (Mulhouse, Lyon, Strasbourg). The majority of 
victims are French nationals, and the others are mostly of Brazilian and 
African origins.
The social organisation of trafficking networks also differs depending on 
the nationality of the perpetrators.
2.1. East European trafficking networks
East European prostitution almost exclusively concerns Romanian or 
Bulgarian Roma communities and to a lesser extent Hungarian and 
Albanian women. The structure of the networks is family and clan-
based, dominated by a strong patriarchal culture. Women from these 
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communities (sisters, wives, cousins) prostitute themselves for the clan 
chief (FR-E13). There is seldom any violence linked directly to this type 
of prostitution. However, women do suffer from interfamilial aggressions. 
Because of the free movement of people within the Schengen area, 
this type of prostitution is mobile and remains one of the most visible, 
both in big agglomerations (Paris, Lyon, Marseille), as well as medium-
size cities (Besançon, Avignon, Limoges, Troyes).
The majority of the women who are victims of this type of prostitution 
are in the hands of networks: out of 104 Romanian prostitutes identified 
in 2016, 75% were enrolled in a procuring network, with or without 
THB. Moreover, Hungarian prostitution is also making progress on the 
French territory. Hungarian women represented 28% (64 victims) of 
east European prostitution in 2016. The modus operandi of this type 
of network is the same as the one used for the exploitation of Roma 
women. The procurer keeps several lots on the street for the victims, 
and acts as their lover-boy. He encourages competition between these 
young women, promising them a better life at his side in order to push 
them to profit as much as possible from their activity. The amounts of 
money charged are usually superior to those generally observed in street 
prostitution.
2.2. Nigerian trafficking networks
Nigerian prostitution systematically occurs in human trafficking context – 
109 victims of THB networks were identified (12 in 2015). This sharp 
growth can be explained by an increased focus by specialised investiga-
tion services on this particular type of prostitution. From the recruitment 
in Nigeria and all the way to the European sexual exploitation, the or-
ganisation is supervised by “mamas.” In the countries of destination, this 
activity occurs merely on the street.
An important change regarding the itinerary taken by the victims 
to get to Europe was noticeable in 2016 – travelling by land was 
favoured, to the detriment of travel by air. Additionally, the route of 
Nigerian women through Eritrea and the entry via Greece is not taken 
anymore. These women now cross Nigeria, then pass through Libya 
and Italy before entering French territory. Most of the time, they do 
not arrive in Italy on makeshift rafts like the majority of migrants 
because their journey has already been paid by the mamas, for which 
they are going to work in Europe. The preference for land travel is 
explained by the much lower cost than that of air travel. On average, 
the transfer costs between €3,000 and €5,000 per victim, compared 
with €10,000 to €15,000 for air travel. Therefore, this new trend has a 
direct impact on the development of Nigerian THB networks. Victims 
can pay back their debt to their mama much more rapidly than before 
– in the span of one or two years. Those changes in the physiognomy 
of Nigerian networks are accompanied by a significant modification 
of the debt incurred to the mamas after their arrival. In three years, 
between 2013 and 2016, the debt had decreased by 30%, and was 
on average worth between €40,000 and €50,000 (FR-E14).
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The identification of prostitutes during the course of the investigations 
shows a resurgence of increasingly young victims, though it remains 
difficult to determine their exact age as Nigeria does not possess a 
personal records national database (FR-E5). One can also note the 
propensity of certain victims becoming mamas themselves, allowing them 
to pay their debt back more rapidly than in the past. Some begin as 
prostitutes, then prostitute-procurer and finally procurer. If they return 
to their country of origin, nothing is known about their economic and 
social integration (Quattoni, 2013).
The pressures applied by the juju ritual, closely tied to the voodoo 
tradition, represent one of the most important forms of control imposed 
by the mamas. The weight of juju in Nigerian culture is especially heavy 
in the south-western part of the country (Edo Region), where Benin 
City is located, home of most of the trafficking victims being exploited 
in France. Moreover, Nigerian sexual exploitation networks rely both on 
a strong cultural dimension as well as a solid presence of the Nigerian 
community throughout the world. They depend on a system of mutual 
aid based on brotherhoods created at the time of the decolonisation 
of Nigeria, which favours the group structure of international THB 
organised crime (FR-E14).
The fight against the exploitation of Nigerian prostitution is a priority 
for the French police authorities (FR-E9). The latest developments have 
shown that it accounts for one of the most violent types of human 
trafficking. Despite the number of networks dismantled every year, 
Nigerian organised crime continues to develop in every European 
country and conquers new territories that had been spared so far. 
After having settled in Spain and Italy – the two main entryways into 
western Europe coming in from the south – the networks have installed 
themselves in France, then in Germany and Austria, using Greece and 
Turkey as immigration corridors to enter into the Schengen area. 
From here on, north European countries are now being targeted by 
the same networks. Countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Finland 
see a certain number of Nigerian prostitutes setting up shop there, 
whether it is on their streets or in hotels and apartments serving as a 
cover-up for a type of prostitution organised via the internet. In the 
context of constant change, Nigerian criminal networks rely on Libya, 
a country of utmost importance in the organisation of victim transfer. 
Kept along the Libyan coasts in inhumane conditions, the victims are 
subject to the whims of organisers and boatmen who wait for the 
opportunity to get them across the Mediterranean and sell them to the 
mamas already implanted in different European countries.
At the heart of this very lucrative criminal activity, Nigerian brother-
hoods have all the control, relegating mamas to the lowest position 
of a very effective and well-oiled organisation. Born in the 1950s in 
Nigeria’s principal universities, these brotherhoods had taken as their 
mission the fight against the former European colonial powers and 
struggled to open access for the black population to studies and 
education. Their members have, however, quickly diverted themselves 
from this honourable goal and, following splits and fratricidal fights, 
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have increasingly turned themselves towards organised crime as a 
whole (Ellis, 2016).
If it is presently not possible to count precisely how many brotherhoods 
exist, some of them have taken a real importance and have extended 
themselves beyond the Nigerian borders. It is notably the case with 
the Black Axe, more specifically present in Italy, which has concluded 
an agreement with the Calabrian Ndrangheta for the local management 
of cocaine trafficking (FR-E2). In terms of sexual exploitation, Supreme 
Eiye Confraternity (SEC) is the most widespread of these organisations in 
Europe. After having settled in Spain and Italy, it pursues its expansion 
on French territory, specialising in prostitution logistics. Similarly to other 
brotherhoods, the SEC uses a symbol (an eagle with spread wings), a 
slogan (secret-autocracy-discipline-fraternity-no friend, no fiend), a dress 
code primarily characterised by a blue beret, as well as a terminology 
borrowed from the realm of birds.4
Like other brotherhoods, the unspoken goal of the SEC stands to 
spread its territorial influence well beyond the Nigerian borders and 
conquer Europe, seen both as the symbol of the “white enemy” and an 
extremely lucrative territory in terms of benefits tied to organised crime, 
including human trafficking. In order to reach this goal, the organisation 
permanently seeks to hire new members using false promises (university 
diploma, a large sum of money to be made), voodoo practices as well 
as violence and intimidation. Each new member is then submitted to 
an indoctrination destined to instil the norms, values, and practices of 
the group, before paramilitary training in order to test the members and 
their psychological and physical resistance. If they pass the final exam, 
the new members have to swear allegiance, loyalty, and confidentiality 
to the chief of the structure during an initiation ceremony called “flight.” 
SEC members who have been sworn in to the organisation cannot drop 
out without risk of retribution ranging all the way to murder.
Based on a highly hierarchized and authoritarian structure, the SEC is 
spread over the country in seven different regional divisions called “nests,” 
each of them ruled by a chief (IBAKA or IBK) and different levels of 
command, each referred to by a bird’s name (Ostrich, Nightingale, Eagle, 
Woodpecker, Canary). At the bottom of the ladder are the performers 
(Doves) and those without a rank (Rats), whose lives are expendable.
In France, the SEC members necessarily work together with an influential 
mama within their networks. They serve as “screens” so the members 
are less exposed. Their role includes hiring victims and sending back 
the money made from prostitution to Nigeria. The fear that their status 
as an SEC member creates within the Nigerian community allows them 
to solve conflicts generated by the oftentimes ferocious competition on 
French sidewalks (FR-E3).
4 Eiye in Yoruba, one of the main languages in Nigeria, means “bird.”
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2.3. “Deprived neighbourhood” trafficking networks
The year 2015 had already brought to light this emerging phenomenon 
among problem neighbourhoods throughout the country, and the trend 
has been largely confirmed by the 2016 investigations. An increase 
in the prostitution of young French women at the hands of urban 
offenders can be observed: they represent 13.8% of identified victims 
(154 women) in 2016 (142 in 2015); 56% of them are under the age of 
18 (87). This type of exploitation is particularly common in big urban 
areas (Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Lille etc.) and is spreading to other cities 
(Avignon, Cannes, Clermont-Ferrand, etc.). In addition to their young 
age (17/18 years old), the majority of these victims have a particular 
profile: psychologically fragile (dissocialised, disconnected from family 
and school, habitual runaways), they thus become easily exploitable 
prey (FR-E6).
The procurers are mainly known for common types of crime (theft, 
extortion, drug dealing). Their average age is 22 years and they regularly 
rely on violent coercive methods towards their victims (confinement, food 
privation, death threats, and rape). The victims are advertised via small 
ads published on the internet. Sexual exploitation is then carried out 
in cheap hotels or apartments. The procurer manages the logistics and 
controls the prostitutes, often alone or with two to three accomplices, 
coming from the same problem neighbourhood.
In judicial terms, this is a type of aggravated procuring (122 identified 
victims). However, a trend towards the structuring of networks has 
come to light (32 identified victims). “Poor areas” prostitution is a new 
phenomenon linked to the social profile of pimps, who come from 
cities and use violent methods. This prostitution happens in Airbnb 
apartments or residences-hotels, often rented through fraudulent bank 
card numbers retrieved from the so-called dark internet (darknet). It 
is not street prostitution, but a prostitution that is facilitated by online 
ads (FR-E18).
2.4. Chinese trafficking networks
Chinese prostitutes represent 18% of identified victims for 2016, with 
42% of them exploited by human trafficking networks. This type of 
prostitution is in full expansion on the internet: web-masters from the 
community are hired and rely on specialised or community sites to 
share ads online. Telephone operators work as intermediaries and make 
appointments for the clients. The prostitutes then meet these clients in 
apartments rented by the procurers.
This type of prostitution takes the shape of “sex tours,” and networks do 
not hesitate to relocate their activities to medium-sized cities (Limoges, 
Chartres, Saint-Brieuc, etc.). Most of the time, victims come to France 
deliberately to practice prostitution. Hiring in China is facilitated by 
the support of smugglers, who help prostitutes obtain tourist visas for 
France; some get an enrolment in French universities. “Once arrived 
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on French soil, the victims are harboured by people from the Chinese 
diaspora who put them in touch with procurers. Generally speaking, 
the latter handle the logistics but can also delegate the work to 
accomplices charged with finding accommodations for one or several 
prostitutes” (FR-E4).
Since the beginning of 2016 in Paris, a decline has taken place, largely 
related to the activity of the service combatting procuring. This includes 
several cases realised in the district of Belleville aiming at real estate 
owners who provide apartments for brothels, or “dormitories,” to 
street prostitutes. Information gathered from prostitutes indicates that 
they encountered many difficulties to find apartments because of the 
reluctance of owners and the inflation of Parisian rents (FR-E9).
The street prostitutes that the BRP has had to know are mostly from 
north-eastern China and peri-urban areas. With an average age of 
40 years, they arrive in France via traditional immigration channels for 
economic reasons. Former prostitutes also serve as a bridgehead in 
France to criminal organisations based in China and bring their young 
compatriots providing visas acquired under the guise of tourist stays. 
They have to pay back a debt corresponding to their passage – between 
€10,000 and €15,000 (FR-E10).
Like other communities, Chinese networks use webmasters who can 
sometimes recruit French-speaking switchboard operators who provide 
logistics for booking hotel rooms, renting apartments via, for example, 
Airbnb-based community platforms, receiving incoming calls, managing 
the number of guests and appointments.
Another type – more discrete – prostitution takes place in bars, restaurants 
or transformed warehouses, housing Chinese karaoke, mainly located in 
Seine-Saint-Denis. Clients may also be offered a prostitution service, 
accessible through a network of illegal taxis. The illicit gains are sent to 
China via a straw man (FR-E10).
2.5. Trafficking networks from South America
South American prostitution remains active on French soil and with 
113 identified victims in 2016, it represents 10% of the total sexual 
exploitation in France, all nationalities considered. Victims are mainly 
from Brazil (41), Peru (25) and Ecuador (18), with 41% of them 
exploited in THB networks (31) and without THB (47). Males represent 
half of identified victims, their activity solely practiced on the street. 
As for females, they are exploited in apartments rented via ads 
published online. The majority of the victims come from Spain, this 
movement being explained by the fall in prices of internet prostitution 
in Spain. The victims mostly perform sex tours for several weeks, 
before returning to Spain. It is usually a type of prostitution facilitated 
by a communitarian mutual aid, with a weak control of the victims 
by the traffickers (FR-E3).
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The law enforcement services in France do not have a strong “follow 
the money” culture. Certainly, there has been substantial progress, but 
financial investigations used to work mainly from what is discovered in 
the places where the procurers live. As a result, the perpetrators have 
adapted by trying to handle the minimum amount of cash in their 
apartment (FR-E7).
The financial dimension of human trafficking suffers from a lack of 
systematic knowledge; nevertheless, the qualitative information allows to 
draw some patterns (FR-E8).
3.1. Initial capital
As regards initial capital, the tendency is to place the burden on 
the victim. Generally, procuring networks feed on earnings acquired 
through prostitution. The more a network “works,” the more it grows 
and matters, and the more it becomes self-sufficient. Conversely, the 
Nigerian networks are characterised by a different pattern, since there 
are credits granted to their victims who are expected to repay this 
initial investment. There is no evidence for financing THB from other 
illegal activities such as drug trafficking. A French sociologist (Nguie, 
2015) who extensively studied the African tontines concluded that they 
operate both as financing instrument and socialisation vehicle. In the 
Parisian (Château-Rouge market) migratory context, African women 
feel the need to replicate this device: tontines thus become a market 
integration instrument and a vehicle for socialisation. Moreover, illegal 
female migrants excluded from the French banking and insurance system 
resort to tontines as a means of social protection and savings. Through 
financing projects in their country of origin, tontines establish a bridge 
between immigrant populations and their relatives back home. In the 
specific case of female prostitutes, tontines appear to be an instrument 
of money laundering.
For networks from eastern Europe, if they were to run out of funds, 
there are usurers, especially in the Roma community, in the villages 
mainly made up of wealthy traders, who lend at exorbitant rates. Usurers 
are usually preferred over the banks because the latter refuse to lend to 
Roma people in the absence of official and declared income (FR-E13).
3.2. The business costs: transport as the most 
significant expense
The African network requires an investment estimated at between €10,000 
and €15,000, depending on the kind of routes used for transportation 
of the victims (land routes or air routes). By using the air travel, the 
costs are much higher, which generally causes the purchase of visas in 
an African country from an employee of a European embassy. Then a 
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ticket consistent with the issued visa is purchased, and a stopover in 
Paris is made, in order to set foot in the desired territory. This gives rise 
to two conditions:
• If the visa was put in the passport of the “future” victim of prostitution, 
the girl can get off the plane and move freely in the territory.
• If the smuggler recovers the visa and the passport from the victim 
before she leaves the airport, then she would be apprehended by the 
border authorities and placed in a retention center. In this case the 
traffickers hire a lawyer to set her legal status, which usually costs 
between €1,500 and €2,000.
For its part, the land route is much cheaper since there are only smugglers 
to pay, but it is riskier because of sea crossings on unsuitable boats.
The east European network, which is mainly by road and clan network, 
requires an investment estimated at €300, because of reduced travel 
costs. For girls from the east, outside the European Union, it is necessary 
to add approximately €500 to pay the company which arranged the 
invitations on the French territory and the visas.
It is difficult to estimate the investment cost of a Chinese networks 
because of the multiplicity of European visas obtained, thereby allowing 
the victims to prostitute in more than one EU country.
From Nigeria, if the cost of transportation drops because of the use of 
land and sea routes, this entails greater risk taking. Indeed, the crossing 
of the desert and the Mediterranean Sea is particularly dangerous for the 
victims. “Tolls” have been established by local insurgent groups especially 
on the borders of Libya where the victim is forced to pay for her way 
or to agree to prostitute herself (FR-E17).
Regarding online transactions, it is also necessary to pay for the switch-
board – about €20 per appointment made, or about 10% of the service. 
Furthermore, there are costs for providing security to the prostitutes, 
i.e. to pay for the security guard that the network uses to provide the 
service.
The links between procurers and prostitutes continue to persist even if 
one of them goes to jail. Procurers sometimes accuse their victims of 
being responsible for their incarceration, and, as a result, request that 
the prostitutes keep working in order to meet their consumption needs 
in prison and, above all, to afford lawyers’ services, so that the procurers 
could be defended (FR-E15).
3.3. Settlement of payments
In some big cities, French prostitutes used to apply rates similar to 
earnings made in bars, on average €400 per hour. Then, networks 
from eastern Europe came, which offered significantly lower rates of up 
to €250 per hour. In the light of an increasing competition and of an 
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almost steady demand, the rates have stabilised at €150 per hour for a 
girl met through internet. For street prostitution, the supply is such that 
we find that a full sexual service is priced at €40, a decrease of 20% 
in comparison with the rate in force 10 years ago.
Generally, money is collected daily if the procurer acts not far from 
his victims. Funds are thus collected by himself or by a member of his 
organisation in cash. If the procurer resides in the source country, he 
recovers the money by any means available, either by a fellow countryman 
who is going back to the home country, and who is given money, or 
through money transfer agencies (Western Union and MoneyGram), or 
through other informal remittance systems (FR-E18).
For Chinese networks, the funds are collected by collectors or by 
switchboards that come to an agreement via telephone with the victim, 
so that she transfers 30% of the profits from prostitution. The prostitute 
must give them the money at the end of the week. Failing that or 
disregarding the imposed rules, the girls become target of specially 
recruited agents, not hesitating to use violence.
In the 1990s, prostitutes were little considered, perceived more as 
criminals than victims. Since 2016, with the new law, the act of touting 
is no longer criminalised, although the level of violence remains high, 
especially from the Nigerian, Albanian, Romanian, and Bulgarian procuring 
networks. New forms of funds appropriation have emerged and are the 
subject of commercial agreements with profit sharing between prostitutes 
and procurers, depending on a percentage determined in advance, taking 
into account the incurred expenses (accommodation, switchboard, food, 
health, etc.) of each party. Internet networks have facilitated the funds 
appropriation by working with a switchboard which allows tracing the 
earnings of a victim without any errors.
In African networks, victims work under the supervision of their procurer 
(madam/mama) who keeps the accounts up to date. The victims also 
have interest in paying their debt to recover their freedom and thus, 
in most cases, become procurers in turn. The debt bondage helps to 
expand the prostitution network and pull prices down (FR-E14).
In the case of short-term apartment rentals, the owner is rarely informed 
of what is happening in his property. Even when he is aware of what is 
happening in his place, there is no extra billing because the regularity 
of the rental gives him satisfaction, but also because of possible in-kind 
profits with the girls in exchange for his silence. Chinese networks rely 
on French couples who own apartments and knowingly accommodate 
on request prostitutes to enable them to exercise their activity, either 
for remuneration or for payment in-kind. In the dismantling of such a 
network, in addition to the penal sanctions to which they are exposed, 
all their movable and real estate assets are also seized.
For east European networks, payment is often made through official 
funds transfers and also through bank transfers, from account to account. 
For Chinese networks, payment is made by exporting luxury goods 
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previously purchased in branded stores, in countries where prostitution 
is exploited, which is difficult to control. In addition, everything is 
paid in cash, including the rental of apartments like Airbnb. Network 
members cannot take the risk of leaving traces of their identity. Some 
procurers have foreign forgery documentation to fulfil leases or send 
money through remittances companies. However, these fake documents 
cannot be used to open bank accounts because of their low quality, so 
it is common that frontmen are used as recipients of money orders in 
the country (FR-E7).
3.4. Profits and profit sharing
The case of east European prostitution
According to FR-E3, “in a typical network, a procurer manages an 
average of two of three prostitutes. The remuneration varies between 
€100 and €300 per day and per victim.” In general, victims receive 
next to nothing for their work (about €20), the rest of the money given 
directly to the procurer who spends it in diverse ways (casinos, luxury 
cars, real-estate goods in their home country).
Some victims, who do not belong to the Roma community, charge a 
bit more and can make between €300 and €900 per day, depending 
on the location they occupy on the street (busy places). The procurer 
makes between €100 and €400 a day from renting the work location. 
For this specific type of prostitution, the rates of sexual services are 
between €30 and €50 for a sexual intercourse and can go up to €80 
for Hungarian women. On average, the distribution of earnings follows a 
division at 80% for the procurer, 20% for the prostitute.
The case of Nigerian prostitution
Nigerians networks make considerable benefits and the money is usually 
dispatched via an informal value transfer system, which avoids the 
riskier physical transfer of large sums of money in cash. Frequently 
called “euro to naira” (Nigerian currency), this system works through a 
peculiar mechanism: a French agent receives the transfer orders and in 
exchange gives a code to the sender, that will serve as an identification 
code for the payment in Nigeria. The agent then contacts the payer 
in Nigeria (usually a shop owner) and gives him the order of payment 
in the following order: sender, recipient, sum of money and code. The 
agent in Nigeria keeps an accounts book in which his outstandings 
are recorded. The transfer is immediate and will be compensated by 
the regular sending of important cash sums by a trusted individual, 
responsible for collecting funds from several agents and sending them to 
the payer in Nigeria. A commission is deducted in France for the agent 
and the sender. This system does not leave traces and allows avoiding 
official exchange rates.
Nigerian women usually charge the lowest prices on the market: 
between €20 and €40 for sexual intercourse. Considering the debt 
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incurred by coming to Europe and the daily expenses of the victims 
(food, accommodation), a Nigerian prostitute gives back to her mama 
around €3,000 per month. A mama usually manages between one 
and three girls, but recent trends have shown that five to ten girls 
can work for the same mama. The organisations have adapted to law 
enforcement repression and keep the cash in their possession for a 
very short time, after which it is quickly transmitted to an operator 
for transferring abroad. In some cases, the modus operandi to launder 
the earnings comes down to buying second hand vehicles in France, 
shipping them by containers to west African countries and then selling 
them locally (FR-E10).
The case of prostitution linked to “deprived neighbourhoods”
A procurer manages between two and ten prostitutes. The rate for sexual 
services is €100 for a half-hour and €150 for an hour. The revenue is 
usually shared 50% for the prostitute and 50% for the procurer. The 
head of the anti-procuring enforcement administration in Paris (FR-E9) 
said that these young adults (usually with criminal backgrounds) do not 
consider themselves as procurers. They squander their earnings for luxury 
goods, high-end cars, travels, and holidays.
The case of Chinese prostitution
A procurer exploits on average five prostitutes, who can earn between 
€4,000 and €7,000 a month by sex tours. The pricing ranges around 
€100 for a half hour and €150 for an hour. Generally, 60% to 70% of 
the benefits are paid back to the procurer, according to the involvement 
of the network within the logistics (payment of the plane ticket from 
China, advance for the rent). Financially, this type of network relies on a 
well-functioning informal value transfer system: either the benefits made 
from prostitution are invested in the purchase of luxury goods (designer 
bags, jewellery)5 that are exported to China or the money is given to an 
intermediary in France who, in exchange for a commission, unfreezes an 
equivalent sum in China that is given to a beneficiary pointed out by 
the sender. In this case, the Hawala system is also completely integrated 
in the scheme of money laundering.
The case of South American prostitution
Pricing for sexual relations ranges from €100 for a half hour to €150 
an hour. Victims give back on average of 40% of their earnings to the 
person who facilitated the logistics (apartment rent, appointment making) 
for their sex tour and can make from €3,000 to €5,000 a month.
Different intermediaries intervene in every stage of exploiting women 
(see Figure 2): recruiters, multiple facilitators, website developers, ad-
vertising managers, travel agencies, hotels, restaurants, “canvassers” who 
manage the locations on the sidewalk, bouncers in charge of protect-
ing the girls, and sometimes, “solicitors” (bar owners, hotel concierges, 
5 The case of Louis Vuitton© goods is particularly illustrative.
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	France	 221
taxi drivers, etc.). Faced with such a complex structure, it is generally 
difficult to find those who are responsible. Thanks to cell phones and 
the internet, procurers can manage their business away from the field 
of operations, without the risk of being caught.
Figure 2. the actors oF human traFFicking and earnings
Source: INHESJ, from various case studies, 2018.
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3.5. Earnings and their use
Regarding the earnings distribution, it has already been said that this is a 
kind of contract between two parties and that the terms of this contract 
are unequal and differ depending on the origin of the victims. A case 
under investigations in 2018 by the OCRTEH shows that the professionals 
responsible for the safety of the young victims receive a wage of €1,000 
monthly (approximately 3 times the average wage in the home country) 
with a sum of €300 for food. The earnings of a prostitute in this kind 
of network are €500 to €800 per day (FR-E3).
Primarily, earnings are used to buy or improve housing in the home 
country and then to acquire property for rent in order to profit when 
the activity is over. The large networks from eastern Europe also invest 
their money in hotels, bars, or even in night clubs that will be used to 
hire further victims. As a result, only large networks are investigated for 
their assets because no answer is given by the African countries, and 
because of the lack of cooperation with China. In Roma networks, the 
money is spent buying vehicles, gambling and paying for parties (FR-E4). 
Earnings obtained by the banlieues networks are as a rule immediately 
spent in a conspicuous consumption manner.
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In 2015, 78% of people residing in France used the internet in 
the preceding three months, compared with only 56% in 2007 
(Institut national des statistiques et des études économiques, 2017). 
The accelerated development of mobile internet accompanies these 
evolutions. Almost all prostitution markets presented above have an 
online component. The internet inevitably affects the contours and 
practices of human trafficking. Supply and demand of sexual services 
are prone to use internet to develop their activities. Most of the 
websites are hosted abroad which makes it difficult for the law 
enforcement to initiate investigations. Networks use websites based 
in third countries, or common advertising sites such as Vivastreet, 
Wannonce or Coco. The encounters take place in accommodations 
rented through Airbnb.
From the point of view of law enforcement, the internet has both 
advantages and disadvantages – it is easy to use for illegal purposes (e.g. 
organise the transactions, settle payments and transfer the money abroad 
for the purpose of laundering), but at the same time, it leaves traces that 
can help the investigation.
Prostitution exclusively organised via escorting websites is essentially 
dominated by procuring networks from ex-USSR countries (Russia, 
Ukraine). The ads are put out on specialised websites and the sexual 
activity takes place either in luxury hotels or in apartments rented 
for short periods of time. It is usually a sex tour type of prostitution 
offer, with victims staying for a couple days in a city before leaving 
for somewhere else in France or to another country. Escorting 
agencies manage the appointment making after the publication of the 
advertisements, telephone operators being systematically accommodated 
outside the EU (FR-E9). Prostitutes move around the entire territory, 
mostly in big urban centres (Paris, Marseille) but also in resorts (Cannes, 
Courchevel).
Procurers settled in eastern Europe (Russia and Ukraine, mostly) take 
50% of the total benefit of each sexual encounter. An escort girl earns 
between €600 (places other than Paris) and €1,000 (Paris) a day. Rates 
for sexual relations range from €100 for 30 minutes to €1,500 for the 
whole night. The web is very useful in an underground milieu, with the 
ability to pay the services using internet banking (there have been no 
recorded instances of bitcoin use).
4. THE ROlE AND IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON HUMAN 
 TRAFFICKING ACTIvITIES AND FINANCES
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The main drive of sexual exploitation criminal groups is the search 
for maximum profit. Increasing profits are generated by this criminal 
activity throughout the European territory and are reinvested in the 
countries from which these networks originate. To combat this, within 
the framework of the Europol strategic orientation plan EMPACT, a sub-
project is dedicated to financial investigations and the seizure of criminal 
assets in the human trafficking field in order to identify money circuits 
proceeding from sexual exploitation and to strengthen the cooperation 
on cross-border assets confiscation. The financial analysis of Europol 
estimates that the annual profits linked to human trafficking amount to 
€1.8 billion, and evaluates the revenue of a sexually exploited victim to 
amount to around €9,500 per month (FR-E1).
At the national level, seizure of criminal assets has become a full-
blown inquiry line in investigations. To fight as efficiently as possible 
the criminal financial flux tied to sexual exploitation, the investigators 
attempt to identify the net profit made by networks and the methods 
of reinvestment of this money abroad. The assessment figures depend 
on the number of exploited victims, which can change from one 
network type to another, and the prices of the sexual services charged, 
which directly depend on the format of the prostitution offer (street 
prostitution has the lowest prices of the market, compared to those 
charged by internet prostitution). The durability of the network is 
another determining factor in the global consideration of generated 
revenue.
Once the criminal income is estimated, it becomes easier to grasp the 
network in terms of its assets, thus allowing to direct investigations 
towards money laundering schemes abroad. At this stage in the 
inquiries, international bilateral cooperation is a determining factor 
for the investigation, the aim being to identify the goods acquired by 
the procurers in their home countries in order to proceed to their 
definitive seizure.
In sexual exploitation networks there is a clear propensity towards 
reinvestment of criminal revenue in real estate in the country of origin, 
as well as in the purchase of luxury consumer goods (designer purses 
and jewellery). The mobilisation of specialised investigating services has 
allowed for better knowledge of the profits generated and the financial 
circuits used by trafficking criminal organisations. The OCRTEH has 
recorded an increase of more than 300% of criminal assets seizures in 
2016 compared to 2015, which amounts to €1,275,000 (FR-E3).
The designation “financial approach to human trafficking investigation” 
is not entirely new (cf. Cacho, 2012, p. 200). This approach can 
fundamentally be understood as an approach that apprehends 
and governs the human trafficking phenomenon from a strictly 
financial point of view. The financial approach is thus firstly based 
5. FINANCIAl INvESTIGATIONS OF THB CRIMES: 
 CHAllENGES AND GOOD PRACTICES
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on the assumption that the human trafficking phenomenon pertains 
to a dynamic that is eminently profit driven. This proposition is 
indeed confirmed with respect to trafficking victims, as studies have 
shown that it is essentially socio-economic precariousness that pushes 
individuals to submit themselves to various exploitation systems 
(economic or sexual). The proposition is even more valid when it 
comes to the traffickers: indeed, it is strictly the benefit linked to 
the trafficking activity that justifies its exercise – the expression “high 
profit and low risk” used concerning the phenomenon is extremely 
revealing in this regard.6 Thus, the financial approach is one which 
offers a way to act against this phenomenon through measures of 
a financial nature.7
We will first examine the perception of the financial approach to 
investigating human trafficking, taking into account that its effectiveness 
eminently depends on objective knowledge. Then, we will question the 
experience of the financial approach concerning trafficking, taking note 
that the financial measures in the fight against human trafficking meet 
with evident difficulties of application, which raise questions on how to 
improve public policies in this field.
5.1. A relative lack of knowledge 
of the financial approach
The financial approach initially suffered from a sort of rejection, 
mostly because of lack of knowledge about its nature among law 
enforcement officials. (FR-E11). Doubtless, this lack of knowledge stems 
from the way its transposition into national law was carried out, which 
complicated the comprehension of concerned measures. To start 
with, we can emphasise that the measures constituting the financial 
approach (tracing, identification, freezing, seizures, confiscations, money 
laundering sanctions for capital accumulated by human trafficking) 
are found in texts of various levels – international,8 European,9 and 
national – which form in many ways a wide kaleidoscope. Even 
though it is not rare for an infraction to be governed by texts of 
various origins, the fact remains that this does not help with the 
intelligibility of the law or the unification of the measures in question: 
not only do the texts overlap only to some extent, but one also 
6 It is in fact this financial parameter which allows to distinguish between human trafficking 
and migrant trafficking, as soon as human trafficking generates – by the exploitation of its 
victims – a permanent revenue to the trafficker, whereas when it comes to migrant traffic, the 
profit made is one-off, considering that the link between the migrant and trafficker ceases as 
soon as the border is crossed. On the question of profits, see Belser, 2005.
7 This option is justified by the fact that traffickers are sensitive to those patrimonial sanctions, 
more than to incarceration: as soon as it is possible for them to financially benefit from the 
traffic (during and especially after the incarceration period), the prison is thus perceived as a 
calculated and accepted risk.
8 The 2003 additional Protocol to the UN Convention against transnational organized crime, 
and the UN Convention itself of which its dispositions are applied mutatis mutandis to the 
Protocol.
9 See the 2005 Council of Europe Warsaw Convention, the Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing 
of Terrorism, and the EU Council’s Framework Decision 2002/629/JAI, Directive 2011/36/EU of 
the European Parliament and Council of April 5th, 2011.
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needs to take into account the ratifications and transpositions of 
various chronology by the states,10 besides the possibility they have of 
expressing reservations, which in the end leads to the impression of a 
rather complex regulatory framework. The frequent use of references 
to other legal acts in terms of financial measures makes it even more 
complex, as one can notice by reading the 2003 additional protocol 
to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime,11 or even the 2005 Warsaw Convention.12 If the concept of 
referring one legal act to another is obviously not questionable or 
problematic in law, nevertheless the effect achieved by this type of 
legal construction in “two steps” can be doubly negative. On one 
hand, this cross-reference between documents de facto leads to an 
even bigger splitting up of texts relative to the financial approach 
to human trafficking, which makes it harder for its actors to master 
intellectually and therefore weakens its application. Furthermore, a 
sort of unconscious disregarding of the referred text and the measures 
contained in it from the actors is to be feared, as though the financial 
measures figuring in the referred texts were only secondary and thus, 
less effective (see Dandurand, 2012, p. 220).
The relative lack of knowledge of the financial approach by the actors 
of the fight against trafficking can also be explained by deficiencies in 
the received training. The phenomenon is not new: we know that the 
necessity of raising actors’ awareness (police, judiciary) on the general 
question of human trafficking was ignored for a long time, until the 
reality of this phenomenon and the proportion it had taken forced 
its taking into account and justified the implementation of mandatory 
training seminars, both in police-gendarmerie schools as well as those 
training future magistrates. Today, however, if one wishes that financial 
measures be deployed by the very same actors, it is necessary to perfect 
their human trafficking expertise, but also develop in them a strong 
“financial culture.” Yet, in practice, one finds regrettable the default of 
those teams who enjoy this double trafficking-and-finances specialty.13 
It has indeed been observed that, according to the signatory states, 
specialised anti-trafficking teams exist to fight against the phenomenon – 
but they lack financial expertise and often exclusively focus themselves 
only on the trafficking infraction and neglect the financial infractions 
(money laundering) and measures (freezing, seizures, and confiscations) 
that are tied to it.
10 See European Commission Memo/13/1005 of November 20th, 2013.
11 If the 2003 Protocol added to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
indicates in its introduction that an effective action aiming to prevent and fight against human 
trafficking necessitates a “global” and international approach, it does not however contain any 
disposition relative to the financial approach, it is only because of the general dispositions that 
the Protocol proceeds to a referral, indicating that it “completes the UN Convention,” whose 
dispositions are “applied mutatis mutandis to the Protocol, unless stated otherwise” and do 
concern financial measures.
12 See article 23-3 Paragraph 3 of the Warsaw Convention, though it does not directly mention 
the infraction question of money laundering: it is the 141 Convention of 1990 that applies by 
its article 6 which provides for the obligation of all parties to incriminate laundering.
13 The statement is general: there are few teams that have a double specialisation. The French 
Border Guard has created in 2011 a specialised unit for tracing, seizure, and confiscation of 
criminal assets. The amount of the seized assets in 2011 went up to €1.66 million, or 8 times 
more than in 2010, which seems to show the effectiveness of the new measures.
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These observations highlight the necessity of promoting a more com-
prehensive training to the actors of the fight against human trafficking 
in general but also more particularly in terms of financial means. The 
necessary multidisciplinary approach implied by the financial approach 
of human trafficking does not only work through the training of various 
actors but also through their cooperation.14 This implies the creation of 
new mixed specialised teams of investigators and magistrates – financial 
and trafficking section – at the level of the financial investigation, and 
the recruitment of more financial specialists in the judiciary, at both the 
public prosecutor’s department and examining magistrate levels, in order 
to implement the whole of the preventive and repressive measures of 
financial nature (FR-E12).
5.2. Recent advances
The most recent institutional developments with regard to tackling the 
proceeds of crime in France include the establishment of several important 
institutions. In chronological order of appearance these include:
• The establishment in 2004 by Europol of the CARIN network (Camden 
Asset Recovery Interagency Network)15 as an informal network of 
practitioners and experts with the specific objective of improving 
mutual knowledge of methods and techniques – including in the 
domain of transnational cooperation – in terms of identification, 
freezing, seizures, and confiscation of the proceeds of crime.
• In 2005, the Criminal Assets Identification Platform (PIAC) was estab-
lished in France – a police unit16 responsible for the identification of 
criminal assets, including those deriving from human trafficking, which 
serves as a tool at the disposal of investigators and magistrates and 
which has the power to lead financial and patrimonial investigations 
under the supervision of a legal authority.
• In 2010, the French Agency for Managing and Recovering of Seized 
and Confiscated Assets (AGRASC) was established, with the aim to 
manage all seized and confiscated goods, as well as ensuring the 
priority compensation of civil parties’ from the confiscated assets.
AGRASC has become the Bureau of Assets Recovery and has been 
increasingly active17 – proof of the financial approach’s dynamism in 
terms of human trafficking and more generally activities stemming from 
organised crime. In France today, the institutional network is thus very 
tightly knit with these three institutions18 that allow, among other things, 
14 The ineffectiveness of the cooperation between the different actors in the fight against THB 
needs to be underlined. In some cases, a money laundering investigation can be opened in 
parallel with a trafficking one, but the outcome is uncertain because of the lack of cooperation 
between the competent institutions.
15 The aim of CARIN is to increase the effectiveness of members’ efforts, on a multi-agency basis, 
in depriving criminals of their illicit profits. It also serves as an expertise center that promotes 
good practices and provides recommendations to various institutions such as the European 
Commission and the European Council.
16 It is multidisciplinary: police, gendarmerie, civil servants from various departments (taxes, tariffs).
17 See AGRASC’s 2012 annual report.
18 See also the STAR initiative, the Egmont group, etc.
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to facilitate and make progress in the implementation of the financial 
approach in terms of human trafficking from start to finish: from the 
financial investigation which allows criminal assets to be located and 
monitored (via CARIN and the PIAC), up until their final management-
sharing-distribution, or their restitution (via AGRASC) (FR-E17).
5.3. Actual practice of the financial approach when 
dealing with human trafficking
If the perception of the financial approach with regard to the fight 
against human trafficking seems to have evolved in a positive way, 
its practice remains nevertheless fairly problematic. Yet, this means a 
discrepancy between theoretical issues and practical immaturity. If the 
practice of financial measures is relatively defective, a significant part 
of these difficulties seem to be inherent in the phenomenon of human 
trafficking itself, that is to say to its conspiracy, which is employed by 
the traffickers in order to disrupt those financial measures and/or to 
make them less effective. This statement can be verified through two 
elements that constitute singular features of human trafficking compared 
to other criminal infractions and thus hinder the practice of financial 
combat measures: the attitude and route of trafficking victims, on the 
one hand, and the important share of cash payments resulting from the 
trafficking, on the other hand.
When it comes to the victims, the necessity of their participation in 
the fight against trafficking, including financial investigations, should 
be emphasised, in particular as regards the denunciation of the crime 
through the filing of complaints or giving information to authorities on 
the network or the use and destination of the funds generated by the 
activity of exploitation (FR-E15). These measures are essential to start 
an investigation and for its advancement, and they are based on the 
collaboration of victims. Yet, especially when it comes to trafficking, 
most of the victims are passive or even accomplices, thus decreasing the 
effectiveness from the potential implementation of financial measures. 
To understand this passivity or complicity, one needs to be reminded 
that the victims of trafficking are often constrained by a “passage 
debt”19 (linked to the crossings of international borders, especially in the 
case of Asian and sub-Saharan countries), contracted at the beginning of 
the travel and that will be at the start of their retention in a situation 
of exploitation (sexual or economic). This debt – which should in theory 
be paid back gradually over time, by imputation of sums resulting from 
the forced work imposed on victims – is very often a bottomless pit 
since the victim in question would be systematically extorted by the 
network, to the point where the debt would be maintained – or even 
increased (Poulin, 2003) – leaving the victim without any solution. From 
then, the day-to-day condition is one of silent suffering and the only 
way out of this lifelong imprisonment resides in the victim’s capacity to 
climb the ladder of the criminal organisation, until she starts exploiting 
19 The passage debt ranges from €5,000 to €50,000. Prostitution is a way to repay this debt 
rapidly, since the passage cost is relative to the difficulty of crossing the borders. The higher 
the debt, the longer the prostitution work has to be to pay it back.
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other victims. This form of progression is well known in the prostitution 
sphere, where prostitutes sometimes become procurers, or pimps, and 
buy back their freedom by recruiting other prostitutes (FR-E18). Thus 
former victims become in turn the new victims’ creditors (Simoni, 2010). 
These characteristics of the victims explain why financial measures 
are difficult to put in place: as long as the victims are either inert 
(by weakness) or become accomplice to the trafficking (by necessity), 
it becomes useless to wait for their filing of a complaint against their 
traffickers and participate in exposing the reality of the trafficking or 
tracking the amount of money generated by this activity, in view of 
their freezing, confiscation and the blocking of a money laundering 
operation.
5.4. The recurring issue of international cooperation
Human trafficking also occurs on a transnational dimension, which 
increases the difficulties for the implementation of tools to identify money 
laundering schemes, since the cooperation between states becomes an 
indispensable element in the process of fighting this type of crime.20 
One of the main issues is the relation between the state where THB 
occurs, called the “claimant” state, which initiates judicial proceedings 
with the aim of freezing, seizure and confiscation, and another, called 
the “requisitioned” state, in charge of executing the rogatory measures 
of seizure and confiscation initiated by the claimant state, since in 
practice criminal assets are identified abroad. This common approach 
of traffickers seeks to complicate states’ repressive actions and preserve 
their proceeds from confiscation. The difficulties in cooperation still 
remain a main source of inefficiency: it is a source of paralysis of penal 
and financial measures against THB (FR-E11).
This can be explained by the complex dimension of cooperation, in-
dependent of the context in which it happens: the divergences between 
Roman judicial traditions and the common law jurisdictions, the dualist 
or monist conception in terms of incorporation of international law 
within national law, as well as the linguistic barriers are all recurring 
obstacles to cooperation. But when this cooperation is carried out with 
a view to seize or confiscate criminal assets, specific difficulties add 
on to those already mentioned.21 Indeed, beyond the lack of strategic 
framework for cooperative actions in this matter,22 the main obstacle is 
obviously based on the eclecticism of seizure/confiscation regimes in 
different states – some of them applying a system based on “goods” 
which allows to seize/confiscate goods deemed to be the product or 
instrument of the crime, others working with a system based on “value” 
that allows to determine the value of the product or instrument of the 
crime and to seize/confiscate the equivalent value from the trafficker. 
20 See on this theme, Lavaud-Legendre, B., “La coopération répressive en matière de traite des 
êtres humains-du droit à sa mise en œuvre”, Cahiers de la sécurité et de la justice, n° 29, Octobre 
2014.
21 On the difficulties see chapters VI and VIII of UNODC, 2013.
22 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report “Strategic Evaluation of cooperative actions in the fight 
against human trafficking” October 2013.
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Still others apply cumulatively the two aforementioned systems, which 
sometimes leads to a telescoping of the claimant state’s demands with 
the working regulations of the requisitioned state, thus risking to render 
the cooperation entirely ineffective. In the same perspective, one also 
needs to underline the lack of exact correspondence in the regulations 
of states called upon to cooperation when it comes to offences leading 
to confiscations, or their specific definition as regards the necessity 
of the delinquent’s preliminary indictment, pertaining to the rule of 
required proof, or even when it comes to the conditions in which 
third parties’ goods can be confiscated. Besides, in implementing legal 
cooperation procedures for seizure and confiscation it cannot be ignored 
that it remains under the condition of an extremely formal procedure,23 
imposed time frames, as well as required information, which does not 
facilitate its implementation and partly explains the rather disappointing 
results of the financial investigations as a tool for fighting THB (FR-E3).
Despite these weaknesses, the increasingly active participation of EU 
agencies opens new perspectives of cooperation. At the European level, 
the creation of joint investigation teams24 is a progress not only for the 
financial investigation but also for the transnational police and legal 
cooperation. This also underlines the reality of the association between 
Europol and Eurojust to transnational affairs of human trafficking, and the 
increasing success that results from it.25 The other interesting initiative is 
seen at the level of the implementation of measures of freezing, seizure 
and confiscation – it involves the implementation of a mechanism aiming 
to facilitate demands of legal mutual aid in that matter. With China and 
Nigeria, the international cooperation faces some obstacles, but there is 
progress due to direct interpersonal contacts (FR-E4).
European institutions are crucial to strengthen the fight against THB 
networks – Eurojust for the establishment of JITs, and Europol for the 
exchange of operational intelligence. In the meantime, bilateral cooperation 
with some countries remains an ordinary tool (FR-E11). Romania is 
a key partner in bilateral police cooperation because of the return 
issues in terms of internal security. Operational exchanges are widely 
implemented, as currently illustrated by the detachment of 14 Romanian 
police officers in the French police and gendarmerie services (which is 
reinforced during the Christmas holidays), as well as the detachment of 
three French liaison officers of the Central Directorate of Border Police 
on border crossing points (air, land, sea) in the context of Romania’s 
accession to the Schengen area (FR-E17).
In criminal matters, France and China are bound by the Franco-Chinese 
agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, signed in Paris 
on April 18, 2005 and in force since September 20, 2007. The predictable 
23 LOI n° 2010-768 du 9 juillet 2010 “ visant à faciliter la saisie et la confiscation en matière 
pénale ”, JORF n°0158 du 10 juillet 2010. Chapitre III : dispositions de coordination, relatives 
à la coopération internationale et à l’outre-mer.
24 Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA (13/06/2002), as well as Crétin, 2000, Coz, 2008, and 
Samuel Vuelta Simon, “L’entraide judiciaire internationale,” Revue de science criminelle et de droit 
pénal comparé, n°2, avril/juin 2007.
25 See the conclusions of the Eurojust 2012 Report, p. 27, and – as regards France – GRETA, 
2012.
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development of population flows and the concomitant phenomenon of 
organised crime (procuring) are all indications of an expected improvement 
of the relations between the two countries, thereby developing of judicial 
proceedings in a clearer framework and in accordance with French 
requirements.
Through 23 measures adopted between 2014 and 2016, Nigeria commit-
ted to implementing a policy of repression by making the fight against 
human trafficking a top priority. The measures include increasing funds 
for prevention of prostitution, which is provided for by the law aimed 
at strengthening the fight against the prostitution system. Although the 
implementation of the 23 measures of the plan is still partial, it seems 
that Nigeria tends to open up to an international policy against human 
trafficking with the obvious aim of curbing this crime.
The link between the financial approach and compensation can also 
be made more explicit. Victim compensation26 is part of the objectives 
pursued by many international organisations (FR-E15), such as the 
European Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, 
and UN Women.27 The promotion of compensation for victims could 
motivate them to cooperate. The opportunity to develop special funds in 
that sense could be productive in terms of (public) response. The funds 
could be supplied by the repayment of fines imposed on traffickers, 
as well as by the confiscation of criminal assets. The multiplying 
of criminal assets seizure and confiscation could thus contribute to 
facilitating financial compensation for the victims of human trafficking.
26 On this issue, see chapter 8 of UNODC, 2009, in particular, item 8.12.
27 Thus, section 6-6 of the UN Convention provides that “each State Party shall ensure that 
its legal system measures provides the victims of HT an opportunity to obtain compensation 
for the harm suffered”, that s. 15-3 of the Council of Europe Convention provides that “each 
Party shall provide in its domestic law the right of victims to be compensated by offenders”; 
Directive 2011/36/EU enshrines its art. 17 on compensation to victims, providing that “Member 
States shall ensure that victims of trafficking in human beings have access to the existing 
schemes for compensation to victims of violent intentional crime”.
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AGRASC Managing and Recovering of Seized and Confiscated
 Assets Agency
BPM Minors Protection Brigade, Paris Police Prefecture
BRP Brigade Fighting Procuring, Paris Police Prefecture
DCPJ Central Directorate of Judicial Police 
GIR Regional Response Group
GRETA Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking
 in Human Beings, Council of Europe
INHESJ Institut National des Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité
	 et de la Justice, France
JIRS Specialised interregional courts fighting organised crime,
 Ministry of Justice
MoI Ministry of Interior
MoJ Ministry of Justice
NGO non-governmental organisation
OCRTEH Central Office for Combatting Human Trafficking
PIAC Criminal Assets Identification Platform
SEC Supreme Eiye Confraternity, Nigeria
SIRASCO The Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence Information
 Service on Organised Crime, Central Directorate
 of Judicial Police
THB trafficking in human beings
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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Collecting the data necessary to the analysis
of the organized crime groups’ activities
from the French administrations
FR-E2 Head (commissioner) Central Office against Organised Crime, DCPJ, 
Specialised Office
FR-E3 Head (commissioner) OCRTEH, DCPJ, Specialised Office
FR-E4 Police officer, Deputy Head OCRTEH, DCPJ, Specialised Office
FR-E5 Head (commissioner) Minors Protection Brigade, Paris Police Prefecture
FR-E6 Police officer Chief of the operational section
Minors Protection Brigade, Paris Police Prefecture
FR-E7 Head (commissioner) Regional Response Group, Paris Police Prefecture
FR-E8 Deputy head Regional Response Group, Paris Police Prefecture
FR-E9 Head (commissioner) Brigade Fighting Procuring, Paris Police Prefecture
FR-E10 Deputy Head (police officer) Brigade Fighting Procuring, Paris Police Prefecture
FR-E11 Magistrate Head of the Investigation Division,
Court of Appeal of Paris
FR-E12 Magistrate Specialised Interregional Jurisdiction,
Criminal court of Marseille
FR-E13 Sociologist Consultant
FR-E14 Research fellow (Law) Centre for Comparative Labour and Social
Security Law, a joint research unit operated
by the University of Bordeaux and the National 
Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS – is a public 
organisation under the responsibility of the French 
Ministry of Education and Research)
FR-E15 Coordinator Association “Together against trafficking in human 
beings,” Caritas France (Secours Catholique)
FR-E16 Research Fellow,
Demographer
National Observatory on Crime
and Criminal Justice
FR-E17 Deputy head (commissioner) Sub-directorate fighting organised crime
and financial crime, DCPJ
FR-E18 Head Documentation Centre, OCRTEH, DCPJ, 
Specialised Office.
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In Germany, first forms of “girls trade” emerged around 1840, mainly 
trafficking children in order to introduce them into prostitution. This crime 
was mainly practiced by single persons and quickly forbidden by the 
authorities (Hofmann, 2002). In Bremen, the so called “Bremer Reglement” 
of 1852 set the rule that prostitution was not to be treated as a “real 
business.” Following this differentiation, it became possible to legally define 
prostitution as an immoral business delimited from legal business (Schmitter, 
2013). In 1876, the first broader regulation of prostitution became effective 
and brothels were only allowed in special districts, while the women 
were barracked in brothels, stripped of their rights and easily exploited by 
the licensed establishments. This rather liberal approach changed towards 
a more repressive handling during the Second World War when pimps 
and prostitutes were preventively arrested and placed in concentration 
camps in order to maintain public order. At the same time, state-owned 
brothels were opened in order to keep morale high in the army and the 
broader working population (Hofmann, 2002). From 1940 to 1942, around 
35,000 persons were forced into prostitution (Hofmann, 2002). In the 
1950s, the state-owned brothels for forced prostitution were closed and 
it took until 1960s to legally open off-limits areas where prostitution was 
tolerated. While poverty, lack of perspective and bad housing conditions 
facilitated prostitution, human trafficking played no significant role any 
more, as the special post-war situation had created a disproportionate 
relation between men and women, German women were rather sold 
abroad, than foreign women trafficked into Germany.
When talking about forced prostitution, we see that human traffickers 
exploit legal as well as illegal migration flows in order to recruit women 
under false pretence (e.g. related to the high demand of job opportunities) 
and then force them into prostitution. The incentives for the perpetrators 
are high profit margins coming along with a comparatively low risk of 
detection and conviction. Still, forced prostitution is not a legal term, as 
in public discussion there are also arguments for prostitution being per 
se a consequence of male power structures exerting force upon women 
(Gerheim, 2012).
Organised human trafficking – although it was present before that time – 
expanded in Europe after the collapse of the communist bloc and 
strengthened during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and the following 
the Schengen Agreement and the establishment of the European Single 
Market in 1993 (Aghatise, 2004; Galiana, 2000). Since then, mostly young 
women from eastern Europe are being lured by organized gangs to 
western Europe promising them profitable work as waitresses or au pairs. 
After their arrival their papers are taken away, so they cannot move 
freely in the foreign country.
FINANCING OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 
IN GERMANy
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The legalisation of prostitution in Germany since 2002, without rigid 
controls in the location where potential victims of human trafficking 
prostitute themselves, made Germany an “Eldorado for pimps and 
brothel managers” (Cho, et al., 2013), a situation, however, that might 
change in near future with the implementation of the 2017 Protection of 
Prostitution Act (Prostituiertenschutzgesetz, ProstSchG)1 and its inherent 
regulations.
During the last few years, the number of investigations in the field of 
human trafficking remained constant. While the proceedings on labour 
exploitation declined a bit, the police had to cope with a high number 
of unreported cases in both sexual and labour exploitation.
Generally, prostitution and human trafficking are not easy to define, 
as they undergo constant changes as social phenomena. All experts 
interviewed for this report implicitly or, often enough, explicitly referred 
to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime of 2000 
and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children. Although this protocol does not have 
a status of binding international law, it still has an important impact as 
a transnational cooperation agreement, where for the first time human 
trafficking is defined in detail. In it, the crime is defined as recruitment, 
transport, accommodation and reception of persons including the threat 
or exertion of violence or other forms of coercion, kidnapping, fraud, 
deceit, abuse of power or taking advantage of helpless people or 
receiving of payments or other benefits in order to obtain an agreement 
with a person coercing power over another person. Additionally, the 
perpetrator has to have the intention to exploit the victim sexually.
In German criminal law human trafficking (§180b StGB) is defined 
as undue enrichment by exerting an influence over a person in dire 
(financial) straits, to prostitute herself to the benefit of the perpetrator 
(Abs. 1 Satz 1). This is being sanctioned by a fine or imprisonment up to 
five years. Profiting from or facilitating the sexual exposure or prostitution 
of a helpless person in a foreign country for financial gain (Abs. 1 
Satz 1 and 2) can result in imprisonment of up to ten years. Added is 
facilitation of sexual action with minors (under 16) sanctioned by a fine 
or imprisonment up to five years.
Procurement is treated as a concomitant crime of human trafficking and 
forced prostitution and is regulated in article 181 of the Criminal Code, 
where persons exploiting sex workers or gaining pecuniary advantages by 
controlling and directing sex workers or procuring contacts with clients 
are to be sanctioned by imprisonment of up to three years. The interest 
protected by this law is the sexual self-determination of sex workers and 
their personal freedom to decide upon their sexual contacts; while the 
punishable crime is the forced dependency of the sex worker and the 
impairment of their personal autonomy.
1 The Protection of Prostitution Act (ProstSchG) was adopted in October 2016 and put in force 
in July 2017. Core elements are a licence necessary for any kind of sex work, in order to fight 
criminality and protect the sex workers. Since its implementation, the law has been discussed 
controversially.
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The data summarised and analysed here reflect on the numbers and 
assessments as published in the annual reports of the German Federal 
Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA). The overview 
of the situation with human trafficking as published by the BKA is based 
on numbers of completed investigations (Bundeskriminalamt, 2017). In 
addition to literature research (academic literature and press reporting of 
relevant cases), nine expert interviews were conducted. Four interviews 
were conducted in the Bundesland Bremen with police officers working 
in the departments countering human trafficking and forced prostitution 
(GE-E1/4).2 The officers are responsible for the cities of Bremen and 
Bremerhaven. Another two interviews took place with prosecutors having 
worked on cases in the trafficking in human beings (THB) for sexual 
exploitation field (GE-E5/6). They were especially relevant to contextualise 
the difficulties of THB trials and the role of victim support organisations 
as main witnesses in these kinds of trials. Two interviews were then 
conducted with members of NGOs engaged in victim protection in the 
context of THB for sexual exploitation (GE-E7/8) and one with a politician 
who organised several conferences in this field and was engaged in an 
awareness raising campaign (GE-E9). The interview sample was chosen to 
best represent the case of Bremen as a Bundesland. A deeper qualitative 
insight into one case was preferred to a broader national focus that 
would necessarily have been more superficial.
“Human trafficking and forced prostitution are so called ‘control crimes,’ 
i.e. if you do not control, there is no reported criminality in this field. 
Therefore, the number of unrecorded crimes correlates with the energy 
we put into investigations. Unfortunately, in Bremen the number of 
investigators is not sufficient to fully uncover the underlying structures in 
this field” (GE-E4).
Usually, it is women who become victims of human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation, while men more probably become victims of human 
trafficking for labour exploitation. The majority of traffickers as well as their 
victims come from Germany or from southeast European countries.
In 2016, for the first time statistical data on the exploitation of minors 
were collected. Specific exploitation practices and dependency relations 
of the victims and their exploiters, who often come from the victims’ 
close social or familial environment, make investigations particularly 
difficult. Therefore, trafficking of minors has been extended to commercial 
sexual exploitation of minors. “This includes sexual abuse by adults and 
payment of the child or of a third person in monetary or other form. 
The child is not only treated as a sex object but also as a commodity” 
2 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of 
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert. The description of the background of 
the individual sources referenced can be found in the list of interviewees in the references 
section.
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(Bundeskriminalamt, 2017). In 2016, 145 investigations with 214 minor 
victims were conducted.
In 2016, 363 investigations were completed in the field of human traf-
ficking for sexual exploitation. Compared to the previous year (364 in-
vestigations) the number remained constant. The share of investigations 
with only German victims was 20% (2015: 24%), i.e. most investigations 
were related to proceedings related to foreign victims.
Compared to 2015, the distribution of the proceedings at the regional 
level remained stable. About 60% of the investigations took place in 
the federal states of North Rhine-Westfalia, Berlin and Lower Saxony. 
The different quantity of reported cases is to be attributed to different 
prioritisations by local police as well as to the existence of specialised 
departments. The number of labour exploitation investigations decreased 
in 2016. Twelve investigations were closed in 2016, seven fewer than in 
2015 (19). Twenty-seven suspects were involved in the trials (2015: 24), 
as well as 48 victims (2015: 54).
ТаBle 1. comparison oF investigation statistics For sexual and laBour 
exploitation, 2016
Source: Bundeskriminalamt.
Sexual exploitation labour exploitation
363 investigations 12 investigations
524 suspects 27 suspects
488 victims 48 victims
95% female 71% male
85% victims from Europe 75% victims from Europe
Concerning THB for sexual exploitation, the annual national BKA reports 
show a decline in investigated suspects. In 2016, there were altogether 
524 suspects registered in the concluded investigations. Compared 
to 2015 this is a decline of 9%. German suspects were the biggest 
group (145: 28%), followed by Bulgarian (81: 16%) and Romanian 
(78: 15%) suspects (Poland: 12, Turkey: 27, Hungary: 39, other: 37, 
Africa: 16, Asia: 13, America: 3, unknown: 73). Eighty percent (419) of 
the perpetrators were Europeans and 73% of the suspected traffickers 
were male (381).3
Nigerian criminal networks form an exception insofar as women play 
a central role in the exploitation process (Europol, 2016). The typical 
structure of criminal groups engaged in THB consists of loose networks 
linked by kinship or ethnic ties (Europol, 2016). According to findings of 
3 For 19 suspects no further information could be obtained.
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Europol, people from Nigeria are mainly engaged in THB from Africa for 
sexual exploitation. After recruitment in their home country the victims are 
smuggled, given identity documents and then transferred to prostitution 
businesses. Often the traffickers use voodoo rituals, especially the so called 
juju to exert pressure. As a result, the willingness of the victims to testify 
against their traffickers in court is particularly low. In the countries of 
destination, the distribution of the victims is usually organised by women 
(“madams”). The latter often bring them into different European countries 
on a rotating principle. Nigerian THB groups are highly organised, their 
division of labour and specialisation are very pronounced, and groups of 
perpetrators react with high flexibility to law enforcement countermeasures. 
Once discovered by police, smuggling routes or transfer hubs can be 
changed on short notice. The Europe-wide networks, which can be based 
either on family or on business ties within the ethnic communities in the 
destination countries, enable a quick flow of information.
On average, less than two suspects were identified per investigation. 
However, according to police findings there are underlying complex 
structures of criminal organisations, e.g. networks connected via common 
cultural background or kinship, which are most flexible and adaptable. 
This manifests in their transnational activity, distributing their victims 
among various countries and regularly replacing them. They evade control 
and quickly move towards new more profitable opportunities, such as 
permanently changing the location of exploitation in order to maximize 
their profit with a parallel reduction of the risk to be caught. In 2016, 
assets worth €2.5 million were temporarily seized, a sum significantly 
higher than the €512,000 of 2015.
A history of relations between the trafficker and the victim facilitates 
the state of dependence of the latter. Many of the investigated suspects 
knew beforehand the victims they then sexually exploited (217 suspects, 
41%); 22 of the suspects even had kinship relations (4%), only 34% of 
the suspects had no former relation to their victims.
Often trafficker and victim share ethnic, cultural or national background, 
thus facilitating the establishment of the dependency of the victim. The 
same is true for the common language, especially when victims only 
speak the language of their traffickers and not the language of their 
destination country. This makes it easy for traffickers to keep the victims 
dependent and instil in them fear from the local authorities.
The primary cause of what at a later stage might become forced 
prostitution is the existence of an illegitimate opportunity structure and 
a socialisation method teaching women that sexuality can be exchanged 
for money. Often, it is at a later stage that coercion replaces the 
initial motivation of an easy high income (Stallberg, 1999: 603f.). Drug 
consumption (alcohol and other) is quite common as a coping strategy of 
the sex workers when they feel disgust towards their clients (Girtler, 2004: 
61ff.; 70ff.; 91ff.). Together with a typical and ostentatious handling of 
luxury status symbols it discourages women from leaving the exploitative 
business and makes the differentiation between forced and voluntary 
prostitution difficult (Boatca, 2003).
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The victims
From the 48 identified victims 34 were male and 13 female, in one 
case the sex was unknown. NGOs in this field state that women 
are increasingly exploited as domestic helpers, carers or seamstresses 
in workshops. More than half of the victims were from Ukraine 
(25 persons, 52%), followed by Polish citizens (8 persons, 17%). While 
in 2015 34 Bulgarian victims were identified, in 2016 there were only 
3 (6%). Labour exploitation takes place mainly in the construction 
sector, where most victims were identified (12 persons), although in the 
previous year it was the agricultural sector that was prevalent.
The majority of the victims (54%) were under 21 years old. In 
68 lawsuits closed by the police 77 victims were under 18 years of 
age, which means that about every fifth victim of human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation was a minor. Of the under-18 victims, 39% confirm 
that they had been involved in prostitution. This might lead to the 
conclusion that it is especially minors who are attracted into human 
trafficking by the lover-boy method (Bundeskriminalamt, 2016: 10). The 
underage victims are usually to be encountered in bars and brothels. 
This mirrors the picture we have from adult victims, of whom 39% 
also were active in prostitution in bars and brothels. Thirty-four percent 
were prostituting themselves in flats, 19% offer hotel and home visits 
and 14% were working in the street (Bundeskriminalamt, 2016). In 
2016, 488 victims were investigated that had been trafficked for sexual 
exploitation. Compared to the previous year’s number (416) this was an 
increase of about 17%, while in a five-year perspective it was under 
the average (523). As in the preceding year, around 95% of the victims 
were women (466).
German victims had the biggest share – 127 (26%; 2015: 97, 23%). 
Usually, they know their rights, trust executive authorities and are often 
socially better integrated. They are less reluctant to turn to the police 
and to report the exploitative nature of their occupation. Still, despite 
their higher consciousness of victimhood, emotional dependency based 
on a supposed love relationship often enough inhibits them to free 
themselves from this kind of exploitative relationship.
The second most common nationality of victims was Bulgarian (92, 19%; 
2015: 71, 17%), followed by Romanian victims (76 victims, 16%; 2015: 98 
victims, 24%). The share of victims from America and Asia remained at 
about the same level as in 2015. Most non-European victims come from 
Africa. Their numbers rose from 20 in 2015 to 36 in 2016. The number 
of victims from Nigeria more than doubled in 2016 (25) compared to 
2015 (10).
Another 145 cases were investigated where commercial exploitation of 
minors was the primary crime.4 In these cases, an overall of 214 vic-
4 § 176 (5) StGB – Sexual abuse of children; § 176a (3) StGB – heavy sexual abuse of children; 
§ 180 (1) and (2) StGB – facilitation of sexual action of minors; § 182 (2) StGB – sexual abuse 
of adolescents; § 235 (4) Nr. 2 StGB – abduction of minors; § 236 (1-5) StGB – trade of 
children.
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tims who were minors were identified, of whom 180 were between 14 
and 17 years old, and over two thirds were female (145 victims, 68%). 
German victims represented the majority with round 72% (155 per-
sons); far fewer numbers were from other nationalities, e.g. Hungarian 
(7 victims), Bosnia and Herzegovina or Romania (6 victims each).
Altogether 186 suspects engaged in the sexual exploitation of minors 
were identified. Most of them (111 persons, 60%) were of German 
citizenship with an average age of 35 years.5 More than a third of 
the suspects (65) were younger than 30 years, 14 of them even being 
minors themselves. Almost half (83 persons, 45%) of the suspects had 
no former relation to the victim; a third knew the victims (62 persons), 
and another 11 suspects were related to the victims. In many cases the 
initial contact took place via the internet or via social media (67 victims 
each). In 10 cases the lover-boy method came into play, all involving girls 
between 14 and 17 years.6
In the cases of THB for sexual exploitation half of the victims declared 
that they had agreed to prostitute (48 of the 96 minor victims). Related 
to the overall case number most of the victims were sexually abused 
and exploited (102 of 214). Seventy-four victims were found prostituting 
themselves in hotels or flats, while 17 victims were abused for child 
pornography. Most of the cases in preliminary investigations (around 
60%) were conducted in North Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin and Lower 
Saxony. THB for sexual exploitation almost exclusively is related to 
prostitution. The varying number of cases is due to different factors 
such as the dimension of the red light districts, the priorities of law 
enforcement agencies and the existence of special administrative offices 
for the respective milieu.
Besides THB and exploitation there are also other offences usually 
treated as accessory crimes. In 2016, in about every second case 
additional offences were investigated (188 cases, 52%; 2015: 60%). The 
total number of accessory offences declined with 270 compared to 2015 
(307), in most of the cases it was a matter of bodily harm and offences 
against sexual self-determination. A main facilitator for investigations 
has been the initiation of contact between police and victims. Case 
investigations are usually initiated by police following evidence or after 
a complaint (153: 42%). In 66 cases (18%) police initiated investigations. 
In the remaining 144 proceedings the victims alone or accompanied 
by counsellors or other third persons (e.g. other sex workers or clients) 
contacted the police.
5 In 28 of the 186 cases the age of the suspect remained unknown.
6 In 30 cases no information on the relation between suspects and victims could be identified.
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“In Bremen around 90% of the suspects are from a non-German 
background. Forced prostitution is seen as a consequent phenomenon 
to social inequality between countries, for example between countries 
such as Bulgaria or Romania and Germany“ (GE-E1). “The most common 
ethnic background of the victims in Bremen was Bulgarian and Hungarian, 
while in other federal states problems often revolve around THB from 
Nigeria” (GE-E5).
The initial situation of the victims usually is migration and lack of 
prospects, and the individual decision to migrate is most usually not 
taken in a spontaneous manner. The contrast between the financial 
circumstances and the general living conditions in the countries of origin 
related to high unemployment, low wages, lack of social security and 
political uprooting, and the relatively high level of prosperity in other EU 
countries, significantly raises the willingness and preparedness to migrate 
(Koelges, 2003).
In THB cases three phases can be distinguished. In the first phase 
women from economically less developed countries with relatively low 
educational level willing to migrate are being recruited (GE-E2). These 
potential victims are promised a lucrative job abroad. Depending on the 
background of the women the promised job can be prostitution (when 
the women have a social background in this milieu), but it can also be 
a promised position in geriatric care, gastronomy, or being a nursemaid 
for well-off German families. Another typical recruitment tactic is the 
above mentioned lover-boy method, allowing emotional control of the 
victims (GE-E2).
The second phase begins when the potential victim accepts the offer. 
Then middlemen or facilitators provide the necessary documents and 
organise the transfer. During the trip usually the identity papers of the 
women are taken away under false pretence. Most of the women tell 
that they expected to have them back after arrival, but normally this is 
not the case. However, “once the women work in forced prostitution 
it creates less suspicion when they can show their papers in police 
controls” (GE-E2).
Most women recognise their dependent situation already during the 
trip to the target country. If they try to defend themselves they would 
usually experience violence for the first time. Once arrived in the target 
country, the women are usually brought directly into brothels or the 
model flats where they are being introduced by the traffickers or other 
forced prostitutes into their future work conditions (GE-E2).
An illustrative case is being recounted by an employee of a victim 
support organisation. The victim from Bulgaria was approached at a 
supermarket parking lot and did not hesitate to join the foreigners who 
promised her a lucrative job in Germany. She had not realised the risk 
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she was taking until they reached the border. When she tried to leave, 
she was forcefully prevented from doing so (GE-E8). Apparently her 
desperation and lack of prospects as well as her hope to improve her 
living conditions were immensely high.
Most of the time, THB takes place in small businesses, in rented flats 
where one or two women work around the clock and promote their 
sex services online. One man might control several flats while the 
owner of the flats is being paid cash a sum that is much higher than 
the typical rate and of course only pays taxes on the officially declared 
amount. The trafficker normally collects the earnings on a daily basis, 
often enough controlling the number of clients either by being present 
or by installing cameras. In some cases, couriers are used, who might 
also transfer the money to the trafficker’s home country. But usually 
it is the trafficker himself who sends money back home via financial 
service providers such as Western Union. In order to maintain their 
profitability, women are often moved either between flats or between 
cities. “In one case we had a flat owner who rented out several flats 
in the same city where women could move, as a new woman always 
earns more money; once clients get to know her, her and the pimp’s 
income decreases” (GE-E6).
As prostitution is not forbidden, the delict is the exploitation of the sex 
worker. “Exploitation can mean that a sex worker might earn €500 per 
day, but she has to give €450 to the trafficker” (GE-E4). A prosecutor 
noted that it would be a far less criminalised business, if the traffickers 
would be less greedy and allow the sex workers to keep more of their 
earnings (GE-E6). The way earnings are kept very low for the women is 
exemplified by the case of a woman who had to come from her current 
working place in Frankfurt to Bremen for an investigation. She worked 
in a club (with hygienic and security infrastructure) paying a daily room 
rent of €150 per day and getting €20 per client. That means in order to 
earn €10, she had to service eight clients. Of course, this cannot directly 
be labelled forced prostitution, but it has a lot to do with exploitation 
(GE-E1).
“In the case of victims with Bulgarian background in Bremen we did not 
see organised crime involvement. Car trading usually is the first excuse 
of traffickers of women. And often they also trade cars between the 
countries, as this is not necessarily illegal” (GE-E5).
Traffickers are quite mobile, as their business model is based on a regu-
larly changing supply of women (GE-E4). Often enough the perpetrators 
are single actors or pairs, pimps who know each other and sometimes ex-
change women. Typical for forced prostitution is a rotation of the victims 
that is orientated at the client’s preferences (GE-E8). For that traffickers 
have put up a network that can be used for the exchange of women. 
These either remain owned by their pimp or they are sold for a lump 
sum (GE-E2). Still, traffickers do not seem to cooperate intensively (GE-E5). 
Contrary to other actors – such as for example illegal motorbike gangs 
(e.g. Hell’s Angels) who often run brothels on their wives’ names – the 
Bulgarian traffickers did not use legal businesses as bogus firms (GE-E5).
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The control methods are physical as well as psychological: “The victims 
are usually not allowed to leave the flats unaccompanied. They are told 
that they have to be protected from foreign pimps or that they risk 
being arrested by the police. Of course, the real reason behind that 
precaution is to prevent any contact that could enable the victims to 
leave” (GE-E1).
Deception is the most widespread means of recruitment. More than 
a quarter of the investigated victims (28%) state that they had by and 
large agreed to prostitute, but they were being deceived about the actual 
circumstances concerning the sort and extent of prostitution as well the 
earnings. Twenty-two percent were deceived into prostituting themselves, 
usually by the traffickers pretending a love relationship that pushes the 
victims into emotional dependency from where they were guided into 
prostitution and exploitation. This lover-boy method has been used 
with German, Romanian, and Ukrainian victims. Most of them were 
between 19 and 26 years old. When recruiting by this method, young 
and attractive men contact girls or young women with low self-esteem 
or weak social bonds in order to introduce them into prostitution. 
Then, they fake financial distress, in order to have the women prostitute 
themselves voluntarily because of the created emotional dependency. 
Later, this preliminary voluntariness becomes enforcement.
Around 10% of the victims became professional via model or artist 
management agencies used as a front, or via advertisements in newspapers. 
Another 10% of the victims were forced into prostitution via physical, 
and 8% via psychological violence. The family context played a major 
role for 9% of the investigated victims. Especially for victims from 
Romania and Bulgaria it often was a family member who led the women 
into prostitution.
Most victims were found in private contexts and in hotels. Although most 
of the forced sex work in Germany still takes place in bars and brothels 
(41% of the victims). Between a quarter and a third of the victims (29%) 
prostitute themselves in flats or hotels, while street prostitution was less 
popular (12%). There has been a shift from the typical prostitution in 
brothels towards the less controllable prostitution in private settings and 
hotels. This also requires an increased use of the internet for enabling 
contact between clients and sex workers.
In Bremen, most victims of forced prostitution work in private flats 
where health care is not available and violence, including regular and 
sometimes collective rape, is a common means of control. Often the 
traffickers share housing with their victims (GE-E4). Many victims tacitly 
accept their destiny out of fear and desperation, as open resistance 
only creates more violence, including threats of violence against family 
members (Hofmann, 2002; Koelges, 2003; GE-E1).
In their helpless situation victims are easily blackmailed, for example by 
exploiting their visa status or their supposed debt for transport, rent, 
etc. (Koelges, 2003). Beyond those punishments victims are also often 
threatened with police, as in the countries they come from sometimes 
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they have had very negative experiences, including forced sex with 
police officers (GE-E2).
The third phase describes the (attempt of) manipulation of the victims 
during a THB investigation or trial. Usually traffickers exert strong influence 
over the victims, since they have large networks at their disposal and 
also threaten their families in their countries of origin, and so prevent 
the revealing of detailed evidence. From a police perspective this poses 
great challenges, as often even in cases where police cooperation takes 
place security cannot be guaranteed (GE-E2).
Threats and systematic intimidation can have multiple forms. For women 
from Africa often voodoo spells are used, putting the victims under such 
enormous pressure that they often withdraw their evidence, while being 
they are too ashamed and afraid to tell the authorities about the real 
reasons (GE-E8).
This kind of Transnational ties were uncovered when police noticed that 
some German cities were closely connected with Bulgarian cities, such 
as Bremen with Pleven for example. Prior to the Bulgarian connections, 
the networks active in Bremen originated mainly in Ukraine or Belarus 
(GE-E4). Often the initial method of bringing women was through fa-
milial relations; later, these women then bring in their friends.
A police investigator reported that after having conducted many 
interrogations he understood that victims often live and work in very 
difficult conditions without perceiving themselves as victims. “From our 
perspective this is not understandable, but their starting points are often 
living conditions that are far worse” (GE-E4). Still, sometimes even for 
them the situation becomes unbearable.
Most women work every day and have to serve a number of clients. 
They also work without condoms or engage in any sexual practices when 
clients wish so (Koelges, 2003). They often do not get any health care or 
social welfare. Even minor diseases (such as bladder infections or mycosis), 
if not taken care of can become chronic; unwanted pregnancies occur 
and, of course, sex workers are more often infected with contagious 
sexual diseases than the average population. Public health authorities 
being aware of these problems also try to establish trust relations with 
the women by no-questions-asked distribution of medicine (GE-E8).
In Bremen, the type of red-light milieu facilitates private prostitution in 
model flats. Around 34% of the victims of THB prostitute themselves in 
private flats (Bundeskriminalamt, 2016). Here, they often work unnoticed 
by the public and are not allowed to leave the locations unaccompanied. 
As they often do not speak the language of the country they live in they 
usually lack personal contacts, an important factor intensifying helpless-
ness and dependency.7 There are around 85 houses and 250 flats in 
7 The prevalent type of prostitution determines the accessibility of potential victims to the police. 
Street prostitution and brothels are known locations and therefore more easily controlled, but 
private flats, where rotation of different women takes place, are more anonymous and not 
always easy to be found (GE-E2).
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Bremen where women prostitute themselves. The flats are situated in dif-
ferent suburbs, but according to the website hostessen-meile.com,8 most 
of them are to be found in Bremen Neustadt, around the Osterdeich 
and in Hastedt. Most flats are in anonymous complexes, where no neigh-
bourhood communities exist, and where people do not pay attention 
to prostitution. “These flats are being rented on a daily or weekly basis, 
which raises the debt of the victims towards their traffickers” (GE-E2).
Although not all such places are related to THB for sexual exploitation, 
this is the most common manifestation of it. Most of the women as 
well as their pimps working here come from Bulgaria or Romania or 
have their roots in other east European countries. Most victims are 
quite young, but usually minors are not advertised, as that would create 
problems and they are rather promoted privately. In terms of the number 
of investigations, “Bremen is currently in the middle position after having 
been leading the statistics for some years” (GE-E2).
The non-public sex market is the critical point in Bremen compared to 
other, bigger cities. The most prominent locations are Helenenstrasse and 
Cuxhavener Strasse. On Helenenstrasse (known as a brothel street since 
1878) there are 27 houses where women prostitute themselves. These 
houses are owned by different persons, and the women earn at least 
€30 per half an hour, with an average of €50 (GE-E2). On Cuxhavener 
Strasse, where women also prostitute themselves on the street, the 
average fee is €20 (GE-E2).
Victims and traffickers often are Roma, coming from poor backgrounds, 
with no education. Neither criminality nor prostitution seem to be morally 
or socially sanctioned. Victims are being promised lots of money, but at 
the end they earn very little and are happy if they can send €50 home 
(GE-E5). Often the whole network of persons are related to each other, 
or know each other from their villages. Typically, the women knew what 
they were heading for, although they first tell the police other stories 
because they feel embarrassed. Once they build trust relationships with 
the NGO workers they confess that they knew that they were expected 
to prostitute themselves (GE-E5).
Different intensities of violence have been observed. Some traffickers are 
very brutal – their victims have to work 18 hours per day and they are 
beaten and mistreated when they fall asleep. When recruitment takes 
place via the lover-boy method, the women believe that they are in 
an emotional relationship with their trafficker and earn money for them 
both. This is quite a common method also used by motorbike gangs to 
recruit rather weak and easily manipulated personalities (GE-E5). Cases 
with women of this kind as witnesses are very difficult to be investigated, 
as “one day they testify one thing and the next day another” (GE-E5).
Investigations, however, depend on their testimonies, as there is almost 
no other objective documentary evidence. Usually, investigators search 
8 The website publishes photos, services offered, addresses of the flats and related telephone 
numbers (GE-E2).
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for a 24-hour service offered online which is an indication that the 
service is probably not voluntarily offered by the woman (GE-E5). These 
women are very difficult witnesses, since they are often traumatised and 
ashamed; often they do not tell everything in the first police interrogation 
because they are embarrassed to have been taken in by the trafficker. 
They do not know if they can trust the police, as often they may have 
had bad experiences in their home countries, where Roma often face 
discrimination. “Then it is difficult for the prosecutor, because in the 
fourth or fifth interrogation they confess how they have been mistreated 
or raped or so” (GE-E5).
The victims are very scared of the traffickers, because they often come 
from the same village and they know the families of the victims. There 
have been cases where threats against families took place or where money 
was paid to have the victims take back their testimonies (GE-E5).
When working with Bulgarian authorities, for example, it was very 
common that witnesses withdrew their testimonies. “The family against 
which we investigated at that time in [the Bulgarian city of] Pleven 
was kind of untouchable and they might have also corrupted local 
authorities, considering that the families of the victim never got any 
response to their complaints about their missing daughter” (GE-E5). 
Therefore, the investments for the protection of victims are quite high, 
since without their evidence there would be no sentences at all; and 
without sentences, there would be no profit forfeiture either (GE-E4). 
In one case, a whole family – including the women – was involved in 
trafficking women for sexual exploitation. While in other types of crime 
women are about 10% of the perpetrators, in the case of THB they 
are nearly 50%.
“Sometimes it resembles the Stockholm syndrome, when the victims 
feel empathy for the traffickers. In one case the prosecutor recounts 
that three of the victims were in love with their trafficker, although he 
had exploited, beaten and violated them. If he gave them €50 or took 
them out they felt loved by him. While some of the victims understand 
quickly and flee at a very early stage, those who do not get out quickly 
stay for longer – in one case for about eight years, in other cases three 
to four years” (GE-E4).
The cases investigated in Bremen suggest that there is no need of initial 
capital for kick-starting a THB operation. The first investment is in the 
transport of women, whether forced or persuaded into this business. 
This costs between €80 and €150 per person in minivans and is not a 
great investment (GE-E5, GE-E4). Usually this is paid by the traffickers, 
but in some cases women pay themselves (GE-E4). Locations then need 
to be found for practicing prostitution, but this is not a great investment 
either (GE-E4). As these women earn money from the very first day of 
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their arrival, the advanced amount is soon recovered and they can also 
pay for their rooms.
Bigger amounts are needed if one would like to open a brothel or a bar, 
where a thousand euro would have to be invested to raise the visibility 
of the business and make the building recognisable from the outside 
and also install the necessary hygienic and security standards, but for the 
model flats in the city there is no extra investment necessary.
The flats are provided by local owners who get far higher rents for their 
properties that they would get in the normal market. If, for example, a 
flat with three rooms in a given urban area could normally be rented for 
€400 per month, the rent for a flat being used for prostitution would 
be ten times higher, while taxes would only be paid on the officially 
declared sum of €400 (GE-E5).
The owner of the building, who usually is not the trafficker himself, 
gets around €50 per day per woman. Normally he is paid by the pimp 
who collects the money on a daily basis, while the taxes he pays are 
calculated on the low price as fixed in a written contract. The owner 
of the building usually confirms that from his perspective there is no 
forced prostitution visible, and he always has had the impression of 
happy, voluntarily working prostitutes (if, of course he acknowledges 
that he knew how they used the flat).9 In the assumed three rooms 
there would be three women working, earning around €500 each 
per day, so “there is quasi financial risk at all for entering the THB 
business” (GE-E4). Even if a trafficker is caught, as long as he is able 
to recruit new victims, he will face no great challenges to getting back 
into business. He might even have access to capital that had not been 
confiscated by the law enforcement authorities (GE-E4).
Depending on the number of clients a sex worker could make around 
€2,000 per day, of which the trafficker takes the major part. Another 
part is used to pay for the rooms, often enough to German house 
owners (GE-E4).
The victims are told that they owe the traffickers a lot of money and that 
their keeping also costs quite a lot. Sometimes they are being threatened 
that they might be resold to more brutal traffickers. Usually victims are 
not even allowed to leave the flats unaccompanied, not even to go to 
the supermarket to buy food. They are told that they have a debt to pay 
off, but its amount never decreases, be it because of running costs, be 
it because they are told that huge investments were made to buy them 
from other traffickers or other implausible stories (GE-E5).
Sex workers give the money to the trafficker either directly after each 
client, or in other cases they put it in a box and the pimp collects 
9 A THB case with Bulgarian networks involved one flat owner who declared that the women 
always laughed when he met them in his different flats. Although at the trial he was forbidden 
to rent his flats to prostitutes, he might be back in the business, as the buildings usually are 
in a rather poor condition and would never fetch good prices at the regular house-renting 
market.
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the boxes when he makes his round each day. It depends on the trust 
level or on the means of control (e.g. cameras) that exist between 
the trafficker and the victim. If money is being withheld by the 
victim usually violence comes into play. Sometimes certain victims are 
entrusted to enforce control over other victims, and then they might 
collect the money. If the trafficker is travelling they also might send it 
via Western Union, as normally neither of them have bank accounts in 
Germany. Western Union allows direct transfer between two persons, 
but the transaction costs are quite high. Nevertheless, transactions 
of amounts such as €50 with fees of €8 are observed. The daily 
collection of money ensures that the women do not keep anything 
for themselves, and even if they run away, they cannot take a lot of 
money with them.
Sometimes, if the trafficker is controlling several women, he might use 
a “helping hand” giving them €50 or so for collecting the money, but 
these are usually costs that are avoided. In cases where there is only one 
woman, the pimp could be in the next room counting the clients, thus 
knowing exactly how much money the woman earns (GE-E4).
The 2017 Protection of Prostitution Act might make THB for sexual 
exploitation less attractive for the traffickers as it will decrease their 
profits (GE-E5). At the same time, the profits of the traffickers feed into 
a ostentatious lifestyle, with expensive cars, houses and gold jewellery 
usually in their countries of origin.
The role and impact of the internet on human trafficking
activities and finances
The role of the internet rises and it is becoming an increasingly relevant 
instrument in the recruitment process as well as a promotional platform 
for prostitution. Especially when the victims are minors, this has been 
a common way for initiating a first contact with the trafficker. The 
increasing relocation of prostitution into private flats and hotels is going 
hand in hand with an extensive online communication and has already 
led to significant structural changes in the red-light milieu. This poses 
new challenges to law enforcement authorities.
The internet played a relevant role in the recruitment of 53 victims 
(11%). The lover-boy method acquires a special relevance also in social 
networks and dating platforms. Traffickers search and contact young 
women in social networks or dating platforms and then strive to 
establish a relationship based on emotional dependency in order to 
push them into prostitution. Perpetrators also recruit on job platforms 
in Germany deceiving the victims about the conditions and the actual 
nature of the job.
Furthermore, the internet provides sex workers and their clients with 
the opportunity of contact outside of the milieu, while the pimps and 
traffickers enjoy a much broader flexibility in the acquisition of clients. 
The initiation of contact through street prostitution or in a brothel is 
no longer necessary, since an online offer and the provision of an 
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alternative location for the sexual intercourse (flat, hotel room) suffice. 
When solicitation takes place online, also the presentation of identity 
papers can be avoided. This increases the risk that sexually exploited 
sex workers and underage victims are no longer discovered by the 
police.
Given the high number of online advertisements of sex workers and 
the fact that this is the only visible presence of these persons, the 
differentiation between voluntary sex workers and forced prostitution 
becomes extremely difficult. The identification of victims also becomes 
more difficult, and it is to be expected that perpetrators in the future 
will make more use of the internet to contact and recruit potential 
victims. This development changes the overall framework of the red-
light milieu and poses new challenges for police and law enforcement 
agencies (Bundeskriminalamt, 2017).
A case in point is the organisation of human traffickers who recruited 
women in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The women were 
promised decent jobs in Germany, but were instead sexually exploited 
in different hotels. These victims were advertised online and because 
of their lack of language skills the advertisement were designed and 
organised by the traffickers. This also applied to the first contacts 
between prostitutes and clients, which were enabled and handled by 
the trafficker. This modus operandi seems to be spreading in Europe at 
the moment. It includes the offering by human traffickers of victims for 
sexual exploitation using alternative locations, thus thwarting the efforts 
of police forces (Bundeskriminalamt, 2017).
In general, it is advertising rather than recruitment that the internet is 
used for, as in most cases victims and traffickers knew each other in 
their home countries already (GE-E5). And while the flats as unofficial 
brothels are not always visible in the streets and even the door bells 
only sometimes say “Massage” or something similar, the internet provides 
a different kind of visibility. It also reduces the investment costs, as 
traffickers do not need to buy ads in the local newspaper any more, 
but when it comes to tracking down profits it is of little use and has 
no impact on the financial investigations (GE-E4). Most clients still prefer 
to pay cash and keep their anonymity – prostitution remains a cash 
business (GE-E4).
Beyond the private ads, there are forums where clients describe and 
discuss the quality and details of the sex services. When the sex worker 
is being treated as any other goods it can be very derogatory and 
misogynist. Most websites have a reference to forced prostitution and 
provide information and the possibility to report if a client suspects 
something in that direction (GE-E2).
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In April 2016, the BKA initiated a Europe-wide operation against THB 
from western Africa for a third time. In cooperation with Europol locations 
of prostitution and entry of potential victims of THB at international 
airports in 17 European countries were controlled. Four hundred women 
were identified who had probably been victims of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. Meanwhile, police inspected more than 650 brothels or 
similar establishments in Germany, while at the same time border police 
intensified controls at airports. The European cooperation becomes more 
and more relevant for the fight against THB. The Europe-wide control 
actions assist the identification of victims and organisers as well as the 
initiation of court proceedings (Bundeskriminalamt, 2017).
Whenever there is evidence of exploitation of women, a special unit 
begins to search for the profits of that crime and looks at the money 
flows (GE-E4). In that milieu it is common to have cash flows than 
transfers via accounts, which means that revenues are to be found in 
cash. “If, say, 15 flats are rented and €50 per flat per day is collected, 
then there is already a certain amount to be managed. The investigation 
team then looks into the financial assets of the suspects and they check 
their accounts and expenses. Do they pay cash into their accounts? Are 
they transferring money abroad or to other persons? Do they work, own 
real estate, cars or other financial assets?” (GE-E4).
When profits are still available, law enforcement can – by using the 
provisions of paragraph §73c of the new law – calculate the overall 
amount. Through evidence from witnesses, observations, analysis, etc., 
law enforcement can calculate the number of women in flats and from 
there the earnings. This can be up to six-digit euro amounts in case, for 
example, that an offence for a period of six months for about twenty 
flats can be proven. This then defines the payment claims towards the 
perpetrators. If victims claim they had been exploited for that period of 
time and it is known that there were six other women in this house, the 
police can calculate the profits of the one who rents them the house 
(in this case it would be around €100,000). The trafficker’s profit lies 
above that sum, as he takes more than the €50 room rent per day from 
the women. The total amount is then estimated and the assets defined 
as payment claims are confiscated. This means that his cars, cash, and 
jewellery can be confiscated, but also accounts seized, and mortgage can 
be taken out on real estate. International investigations allow searches 
to be carried out abroad, and when international cooperation functions 
well, also legally purchased assets can be seized (GE-E4).
When the direct profits from THB cannot be found, the financial 
investigation team is allowed to seize all other assets. Many traffickers 
do not know this (GE-E4). It is also possible to confiscate money when 
it has been moved illegally to friends, wives, etc. This is regulated in 
the confiscation provision of §73, stating that third persons who in the 
meantime have been given the profits can also be prosecuted. The idea 
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is to identify the profit from THB and then compensate unequal asset 
distribution resulting from the criminal behaviour. This has been set in 
criminal law for some time, but only after the 1990s it has been regularly 
applied by involving financial investigation teams from the very beginning 
(GE-E5). Now it has been expanded to all assets, even those of legal 
origin (GE-E4).
Typical assets in THB crimes are those in legal accounts and real estate, 
often enough abroad. Significantly, the investments of the trafficker are 
not part of the calculation, i.e. “the confiscated amount is more than 
the net profit, it covers all the investigated income, as the investments 
had been deliberately made in illegal activities, and crime shall not pay” 
(GE-E4). This is called the “gross-net-principle” (Brutto-Netto-Prinzip).10 
After the calculation of the profits, an asset confiscation is being 
enacted and executed on all assets found among the group of suspects 
or moved to third persons. The relevant provisions in this field of 
asset forfeiture in the context of THB trials are paragraphs §73ff. and 
§111b StPO (GE-E4).
An important part, especially in transnational settings, is to trace money 
flows when traffickers have used financial services such as Western 
Union and MoneyGram. In the first years, when Western Union began 
its business, they did not even ask for ID cards. Now both sides – the 
payer as well as the receiver abroad – need to identify themselves, 
which allows to investigate each transaction of specified persons in a 
defined period of time. “Traffickers who do not officially live here do 
not open bank accounts, but transfer regularly their cash money to 
countries like Bulgaria, Belarus or Turkey” (GE-E4).
Still, there are various challenges in international cooperation and many 
bureaucratic hurdles to overcome in investigating and prosecuting THB. 
Although the flow of cash can be obscured, often law enforcement 
knows that the traffickers transfer it to their home country (GE-E6). In 
some cases, German law enforcement would send the court documents 
and the sentence and the Bulgarian authorities would proceed with the 
forfeiture. Cooperation in this field has great potential for improvement 
(GE-E6).
When, for example, a German prosecutor tries to confiscate assets of 
traffickers in Bulgaria, during a process where the German financial 
investigation team had found assets in Bulgaria, a more intensive financial 
investigation on the ground and less bureaucracy would facilitated a 
more efficient asset freezing and confiscation (GE-E6). Usually, there is 
no German financial investigation on assets abroad and it depends on 
the local structures, if confiscated money will at the end be distributed 
among the victims. If these two investigations take place separately, 
the trials become even more complicated and less victims might testify 
against their traffickers. Currently, cooperation is established with Hong 
Kong and Thailand.
10 Following the “gross-principle” of confiscation, the investments of the trafficker are not 
subtracted from the confiscated sum. This means that more than just the profit can be 
confiscated; unfortunately, usually it is only a small fraction of it.
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It causes much more difficulties when separate trials are initiated – 
one for THB and one for money laundering. Germany has specialised 
prosecutors on this issue, and it is integrated into the other trials. That 
means that once a witness declares that she has earned €250 per day 
one can immediately confiscate that money calculated for a year for 
example, in order to make it available to the victim. That also means 
that immediately after the amount has been calculated all assets from 
real estate, cars or cash can be frozen until at the end of the trial a 
decision upon its final and definitive confiscation is made.
In Bulgaria, as in other countries as well, asset forfeiture is not integrated 
into the THB trial, but is a matter of a new trial, with another responsible 
authority. A lot of synergy effects are being lost when these two issues 
are handled separately. If this part is tried after the main trial, usually 
there is no money left, as the traffickers had enough time to remove 
everything valuable.
In Germany, the reform in this field allows to distrain all different kinds 
of assets, and victims having claims can be remunerated from the 
confiscated sums. Of course, this is only possible when there is enough 
money to be distributed among the victims. Usually, this is not the case 
and the distribution of the perpetrators’ assets has to be divided along 
quotas.
The most successful use of this instrument is very early involvement in 
the main investigation, in order to understand the underlying structures 
of the respective case (GE-E4). The earlier the financial investigation is 
involved into the process, the more detailed will be the knowledge 
about the possessions of the suspects that often are not to be found in 
Germany. Therefore, the police consider it as luck when the suspects are 
arrested just after collecting the daily earnings.
Unfortunately, cash can be hidden quite easily and it can only be found 
if police gets some hints (GE-E4). It can also be handed over to a friend 
abroad, and once money is transferred directly and not via any accounts, 
its track is lost (GE-E4). For other assets it is different: in Germany, unlike 
in Bulgaria, for example, it is impossible to buy a house with cash, 
money has to be transferred via bank accounts.
The most problematic situation is when cash is transferred abroad, 
hidden in one way or another. Before traffickers began to use Western 
Union or MoneyGram the most common way was to take the cash back 
to their home countries in the same minivan that had been used for the 
transport of women, hidden or distributed in little packets among some 
passengers (GE-E4).
Still, in many cases there is no money left to confiscate because of the 
lavish lifestyle of the traffickers. Gambling, drugs, renting expensive cars, 
sometimes boats or whole restaurants are common in this milieu (GE-E4). 
Western Union and MoneyGram represent the most common financial 
services where money transfer can reliably be traced (GE-E4). Once there 
is a suspect to whom the money flows can be attributed, the transferred 
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sums need to be plausibly related to the broader criminal pattern that 
emerge from the profit estimation (GE-E4). For this estimation, usually the 
locality where prostitution takes place is under surveillance, technically 
or by police personnel, in order to have an idea about the number of 
clients and the daily profits (GE-E4). This can be done once the major 
investigation has been initiated. This estimation is the fundament for the 
final confiscation sum as determined by the judge.
Applying these techniques only makes sense when a there is high prob-
ability of a successful investigation. THB is difficult to prove, especially 
as it relies on the major witness – the victim – whose testimony is 
often too contradictory or is retracted at a later stage. In the case of 
Bulgaria, for example, there haven’t been follow-up cases, after the first 
cooperation in that format.
The suspects’ accounts can also be seized in foreign countries – 
theoretically worldwide, but in practice it depends on the cooperation 
with the respective country and official letters (GE-E5). When good 
relations already exist, actions can be quickly taken, for example 
by freezing accounts, while the formal decision is handed in later. 
With the decision there are several ratified agreements between EU 
countries based on reciprocity, but it always depends on the country. 
The cooperation with Turkey, for example, has become quite difficult 
during the last years.
The amount of confiscated assets increased significantly in the last years. 
In all of Germany in 2016, in 16 investigative cases around €2.5 million 
were confiscated provisionally. This sum was significantly higher than for 
the year before (2015: €512,000) (Bundeskriminalamt, 2017).
International cooperation means that a German prosecutor gets in touch 
with the foreign prosecutor in order to get some information, and this 
often takes place too slowly. This is often a difficult procedure at the 
police level, as different EU countries follow different legal regulations 
how to handle these kinds of requests. In very urgent cases, one can 
directly get in touch with other police entities and then hand in the 
official request up to two weeks later. First, all the documents need to 
be translated, then the German legislative text needs to be included, 
adding up to quite a lot of time and effort to invest.
Rogatory letters function the same way. With some countries the 
exchange is well established and information about bank accounts and 
their owners are easy and quick to obtain. The account owner can be 
investigated via an automatic system, but the bank balance is only to be 
inquired via a request for information sent directly to the bank.
Of course this is more difficult to be obtained abroad, the bank 
has first to be contacted and will need some time to respond. This 
procedure usually takes more than 48 hours (GE-E5). This often might 
be too slow, as the money can easily be transferred quickly further 
into other accounts. The advantage of online banking is that it makes 
it very easy to quickly transfer from one account to another (GE-E4). 
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Of course there is a protocol, but it doesn’t help to know that the 
money went from Germany to Italy and then further to Belarus; in 
these cases investigators are always too late to seize the assets (GE-E4). 
In the context of THB this has not been a very relevant issue yet. The 
traffickers often transfer directly to their own accounts, be it in Bulgaria 
or Thailand.
The fight against human trafficking will be of special relevance during 
the next EU policy cycle (2018 – 2021) for the fight against criminality. 
Europe-wide networks of traffickers, pimps and money launderers are 
operating at a highly organised level. As to some extent they can be 
attributed to organised crime, a cooperation of different authorities in 
the countries of origin as well as in transit and target countries is of vital 
importance for an efficient prosecution.
Core elements are international cooperation and an early inclusion of the 
financial investigations into the broader investigation, also transnationally. 
The legal framework is sufficient, it only has to be implemented, the 
same counts for technological means. The fact that money is transferred 
in cash in THB cases and its tracks are often blurred makes it difficult 
to identify who is profiting beyond the given names. If there are data 
available it can be tracked, but in order to follow cash transfers one 
would have to launch an inspection and of course not every cash 
transfer is being observable, as we would need an army of investigators. 
The success in uncovering THB structures usually is a variable directly 
dependent on the police efforts in this field.
The 2017 Protection of Prostitution Act includes extensive regulations, 
and the core element is the obligation to obtain a permission to 
practice the profession of a sex worker. Prostitution is becoming linked 
to some minimum requirements related to the reliability of the business 
operator. That way prostitution remains a legal activity, but sex workers 
need to register inorder to be allowed to pursue their business. The 
existing gaps in the regulations made it difficult to fight against that 
kind of criminality, but now many experts hope that the regulation of 
prostitution will contribute to a reduction of opportunities for exploitation 
in the red-light milieu.
In order to be able to conduct more successful investigations, it is also 
very important to strengthen the NGOs working with victims. Victims 
need to be given the security that someone cares for their safety and 
helps them to get into a stable psychological condition. This is important 
for the investigation as it contributes to valuable testimonies. Without 
these no trials would be possible (GE-E5).
THB is a crime that needs to remain in the focus of police investigations. 
Police has to be present and the women have to know whom to 
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approach in case of forced prostitution. The initiative of establishing 
contact should be taken by the local authorities. Often, the same 
victims who initially claim that they are working as free prostitutes, 
in later interrogations tell about the exploitative structures behind the 
scenes.
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MoI Ministry of Interior 
BKA Bundeskriminalamt
BBmeZ Beratungsstelle für Betroffene von Menschenhandel
 und Zwangsprostitution
ProstSchG Prostituiertenschutzgesetz
KriPo Kriminalpolizei
OK Organisierte Kriminalität
StA Staatsanwaltschaft
StGB Strafgesetzbuch
StPO Strafprozessordnung
lIST OF ABBREvIATIONS
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lIST OF INTERvIEwEES
Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
GE-E1 Police Officer, Countering THB 
department
Investigator
GE-E2 Police Officer, Countering THB 
department
Investigator
GE-E3 Police Officer, Countering THB 
department
Financial Investigator
GE-E4 Police Officer, Countering THB 
department
Financial Investigator
GE-E5 Regional Court Prosecutor
GE-E6 Regional Court Prosecutor
GE-E7 NGO BBMeZ – counselling for victims of trafficking
in human beings and forced prostitution
GE-E8 NGO BBMeZ Mitarbeiterin
GE-E9 Political party Expert
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Italy represents a southern criminal hub in Europe as a destination 
and transit country for migrants arriving from north and west Africa, 
eastern Europe, the Balkans and China (Shelley, 2014), with most of 
individuals arriving from Libya. After the bilateral agreement between 
Libya and Italy in 2009 as to jointly prevent irregular migration, the 
collapse of the Qaddafi regime in 2011 and the related security 
vacuum, migration flows through the central Mediterranean route have 
increased (IT-E5; IT-E7; IT-E15). Recent data from the International 
Organisation for Migration (2018), report a total of 119,310 arrivals 
by sea to Italy in 2017 and a total of 181,436 in 2016. Among 
these arrivals, some estimations on the number of migrants that are 
further trafficked in Italy are available, although the covert nature 
of this criminal market and the lack of a centralised database do 
not allow for updated and comprehensive estimations as well as its 
constant monitoring (Eurostat, 2015). Trafficking in human beings for 
sexual and labour exploitation in Italy is mainly managed by foreign 
organised crime groups (OCGs). On one side, their modi operandi has 
been largely documented (Cabras, 2015; Ministero dell’Interno, 2015; 
Save the Children, 2017; Mancuso, 2013; Campana & Varese, 2015; 
Baldoni, 2011; Carchedi, 2010; Curtol et al., 2004; Sagnet & Palmisano, 
2015; Leogrande, 2016; Palmisano, 2017; Scotto 2016; Iovino, 2016); 
on the other, little is still known on how these groups raise and 
manage capitals to finance and sustain their trafficking operations. 
Based on data gathered through in-depth interviews carried out with 
experts among police forces, prosecutors, non-profit organisations, 
and investigative journalists in various regions of Italy1 and data 
collected from relevant judicial cases and media news, the present 
study focuses on trafficking in human beings for sexual and labour 
exploitation at the national level and in particular on:
1. Structure and actors of this criminal market.
2. Financing and financial management – source of capital to initiate and 
sustain trafficking operations and settlement of payments.
3. Costs of doing business – costs required to run this criminal busi-
ness.
4. Profits, profit sharing schemes, and reinvestment.
1 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of 
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert. The description of the background of 
the individual sources referenced can be found in the list of interviewees in the references 
section.
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The prevalence of migrants arriving to Italy from Africa is due to the key 
role of the central Mediterranean route. Data from Frontex (2017) underline 
that since 2014, the number of detections of illegal migrants crossing the 
central Mediterranean Sea has exceeded 100,000 instances. There has 
been an increase related to the persistent pressure of arrivals of migrants 
to Libya, which is the main departure country to Europe, and whose 
actual social and political instability has favoured both trafficking and 
smuggling of human beings (Wittenberg, 2017). Although migration routes 
change over time as traffickers adapt to law enforcement counteraction 
and borders patrol, at present three main routes can be identified from 
Africa to Italy (major transit point) and then other European countries: 
the western route for which the main source countries are Mali, Gambia 
and Senegal. This route in most cases connects in the Sahel with the 
central route for which source countries are Nigeria, Ghana and Niger. 
The eastern route for which source countries are mainly Somalia, Eritrea, 
Darfur in Sudan, and which usually cuts north through Sudan and Egypt 
and then along the coast of Africa (MEDU, 2018; Reitano et al., 2014; see 
also Figure 1). All these routes converge on the Maghreb, and in most 
recent years on Libya. “In all the judicial cases, women and girls follow 
the sea route and cross almost the same stops. Here they are located in 
facilities, named differently ‘connection houses’ or ‘ghetto houses’, that 
are hell on earth. Warehouses for migrants where they suffer violence 
and deprivation” (IT-E24). For example, Amnesty International (2015), has 
reported that since 2013 abductions for ransom of sub-Saharan migrants 
and refugees along the different trafficking routes in Libya have increased. 
Migrants are handed over or sold by traffickers to criminal groups upon 
crossing the border or arrival at major transit points, and then held like 
prisoners in private houses as well as subjected to torture and other 
ill-treatment for the purpose of extortion. These criminal groups are 
transnational and formed of nationals from Sub-Saharan African countries 
and Libyans. Abuses such as being beaten, subjected to electric shocks, 
or not given sufficient food and water have been documented in Sabha 
and surroundings, and in transit points (e.g., Ajdabya, the main hub for 
migrants arriving from Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia).
The majority of Chinese migrants in Italy originate from Zhejiang and 
Fujian provinces in the south of China, followed by Liaoning and Shandong 
provinces (northern China). Migrations from the north of China that has 
started in more recent years have been boosted by the expansion of 
the southern area as a result of money remittances of migrants abroad 
(Beretta et al., 2016). Trafficked migrants arrive to Italy through different 
sea, air and land routes: the east European route, crossing Romania, 
Hungary, Albania, the Czech Republic and the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia; the west European route, passing through Austria, France, 
Germany and Malta before reaching Italy. Other used routes are from 
Albania, via the Strait of Otranto, to the port of Brindisi, or from northern 
China, via the Maritime (Primor’ye) Territory of Russia, as to reach the 
city of Moscow where they get/buy visas to enter Italy (eastwest.eu, 
2013; Berry et al., 2003; Curtol et al., 2004). “I have seen different routes 
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China-Italy, passing through Turkey and Afghanistan, or other long land 
routes where illegal migrants were sold to different groups of traffickers” 
(IT-E2). In more recent times, “Asian and Indian migrants have started 
to migrate to north Africa overland by passing through the Sahara. They 
mostly fly from their home countries to African capitals sometimes 
[crossing] the Gulf Arab states. From there, they travel along common 
Saharan routes via Niger and Algeria to Tunisia and Libya, where they 
set sail to Italy” (Reitano et al., 2014: 13). As for east European nationals 
(i.e., Albanians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Poles) 
and given the role of Albanian and Romanian criminal entrepreneurs in 
trafficking in human beings, victims were used to be transferred from 
Kosovo and Montenegro to Albania, and from there by sea route to Italy 
(arriving mainly to the region of Apulia). More recently, the sea route 
has been replaced by land travels along the Balkan route, entering Italy 
mainly through the passages that connect Slovenia with the region of 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Russo, 2010; Regione del Veneto, 2004; Ciconte, 
2016; Sagnet & Palmisano, 2015).
Among migrants of different nationalities who reach Italy, some estima-
tions are available about persons who are victims of trafficking and 
further exploitation within the national territory. Nevertheless, the lack 
of a centralised database at the institutional level on trafficking in 
human beings together with the absence of systematic data collections 
(on a yearly basis) still do not allow to gain a comprehensive picture in 
Figure 1. migratory routes From suB-saharan countries to europe
Source: Authors’ elaboration on MSNBC (2018).
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terms of extent, potential and identified victims, areas of exploitation, 
exploited victims referred to social services and repatriated migrants. 
As a consequence, different sources of information are present, both 
at the national/regional or local level, such as governmental institutions 
and non-profit organisations, with the latter collecting data mainly 
through the first contact activity of street workers (Caritas, 2013; 
Save the Children, 2016; Amnesty International, 2015; GRETA, 2016). 
The Department of Equal Opportunities (Dipartimento per le Pari 
Opportunità, 2018) provides national estimations on the number of 
victims that benefit from assistance and social integration projects on 
a yearly basis.2 In 2016, (latest data available) trafficked and exploited 
victims under this scheme totalled 1,172, among which 81.4% females, 
17.6% males, 1.0% transsexuals. Adult victims are the majority (90.5%) 
while 9.5% are underage victims. As for the country of origin, Nigeria 
is the main country (59.4%), followed by Romania (7.0%), Morocco 
(5.3%), Albania (3.6%), Senegal (2.0%), Ghana (1.8%), Pakistan (1.7%), 
China (1.5%) and El Salvador (1.2%). Exploitation occurs mostly 
in forced prostitution (57.5%) and less in forced labour (7.8%) in 
economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacture, and construction 
industry. Forced begging concerns much lower percentage of victims 
(1.3%). Similarly, when taking into account underage exploited victims, 
50.4% are forced into the sex market, 9.9% in illegal economies 
such as drug selling at the retail level, 5.4% are exploited in other 
labour sectors, 3.6% are forced into begging and 0.9% into forced 
marriage. Nigerian underage victims are the most represented (67.0%) 
followed by Romanians (7.0%). The Ministry of Justice (Ministero della 
Giustizia, 2015) has provided data on criminal proceedings brought 
against traffickers and resulting in a conviction, retrieved from a 
representative sample of 15 prosecutors’ offices located throughout 
the Italian territory. From these data it is possible to trace a typical 
profile of exploited victims: young females (who are prevalent with 
a percentage of 75.2%) or male, of foreign origin (51.6% Romanian 
and 19.0% Nigerian), and in some cases married (13.6%) or with 
children (22.3%). Other nationalities of victims include Albanian (8.6%), 
Bulgarian (7.7%), Chinese (3.2%), Bosnian (1.8%), Moldavian (1.8%), 
and Polish (1.8%), while underage victims are 17.5%. Prostitution is 
the main area for exploitation of women (77.7%), while for men it 
is forced labour (48.3%), thefts (36.2%) and begging (29.3%). The 
International Organisation for Migration (2017), also provides data on 
potential victims of trafficking who are interviewed by operators in 
the places of first arrival (ports and other hotspots) on the basis of a 
set of relevant indicators (e.g. age and sex, nationality, psycho-physical 
condition, level of education, family background, travelling mode, etc.). 
In 2016, a total of 8,277 potential victims were identified; this compares 
with 6,599 ascertained trafficked victims. A small number among the 
latter have been signalled and referred to the competent police and 
judicial authorities as well as to protection programmes.
2 Through annual calls addressed to non-profit organisations, the Department of Equal Oppor-
tunities grants funds for interventions of social protection under Art. 18 of Legislative Decree 
n. 286/1998 on “Consolidated text of provisions regulating migration and the rules relating the 
status of foreign nationals” and under Art. 13 of Law n. 228/09 on “Measures against trafficking 
in persons” (GRETA, 2014).
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There are recurrent reasons among migrants for leaving, such as the 
need for international protection or the necessity to escape from 
instability and violence in the countries of origin, as well as social and 
economic factors mainly linked to poverty. All these may facilitate the 
work of recruiters, who in most cases and especially in the last years 
approach potential victims in poor and rural villages in Africa (e.g., 
Nigeria), China, and west European countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, 
Albania, Ukraine, Poland), and of very young age (IOM, 2017; Politi & 
Fick, 2015; IT-E7; IT-E22). For example, in Nigeria recruitment is carried 
out in the periphery of Benin City and, mostly in rural villages with 
the most unfavourable social and economic conditions with families 
playing a crucial role in pushing female children towards “masked” 
migration (UNICRI-PARSEC, 2010; Di Nicola et al., 2017; IT-E4; IT-E9; 
IT-E8; IT-E10). “A family mandate, with recruiters who may be friends 
or country fellows of both sexes, although women are more suitable 
for this role since dressed well, and looking wealthier” (IT-E8). The 
role of the family and/or well-known recruiters is valid also for 
Chinese and Western Europeans victims. In particular, the latter can 
be also recruited by partners or presumed partners (i.e. lover boy 
method). The major trend seems for recruiters to lure potential victims 
with the promise of legitimate well-paid jobs, such as hairdressers, 
caretakers, dancers, waitresses (IT-E10), which can also occur on the 
internet through social networks such as Facebook. The scheme is 
in general as follows: “the trafficker or the person linked to [OCGs] 
attract potential victims online. Among these [individuals] a virtual 
relationship is established based on dreams, false expectations and 
promises of a better future life; they plan weddings and travels and 
send presents or money to convince the [contacted person] to leave 
for Europe or Italy” (Di Nicola et al., 2017: 50). E-recruitment is 
usually linked to the organisation of travels and specific Facebook 
pages where complete packages of service are offered (i.e., job offers, 
travel options, and documents). Some of the interviewed experts have 
contended that on the internet and in particular on Facebook, it is 
possible to find pages where only travel services to Europe and Italy 
are offered: “An evidence that results from the investigation activity is 
the presence of Facebook profiles related to persons that offer travel 
arrangements and different options” (IT-E19). Consistently “our police 
officers that control at ports have reported that some potential victims 
once arrived in Italy show them the screenshot of a Facebook profile 
of the person that has organised their travel” (IT-E15). An interviewed 
expert also pointed out that besides direct recruiting, the pages of 
Facebook where women and girls post pictures portraying them in 
nice situations (i.e. well-dressed, holding mobiles, and having fun) 
serve as an attractive factor for others to leave their country (IT-E24). 
While communications between recruiters and traffickers is mainly 
through WhatsApp, as to avoid interceptions, the latter may be used 
to receive pictures of potential victims that were previously contacted 
on Facebook, similarly to the use of mobiles or emails by recruiters 
to send pictures of potential victims to exploiters (IT-E20; IT-E24). As 
for recruitment aimed at labour exploitation, both online and offline 
channels are employed, that are pages with online job advertisements 
and employment agencies (Leogrande, 2016).
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Migrants may travel with or without documents. In general, Nigerian 
victims that arrive by sea do not have passports, and once in Italy 
exploiters suggest to lodge asylum claims. “The more recent trend, 
compared to recover victims as soon as possible, is to leave them in 
shelter centres and wait for the resident permit to be issued. Thus, it 
is safer when they are on the streets” (IT-E24).3 Travel by plane is also 
reported (even if at present less frequent) to European airports using fake 
documents, and reaching Italy by train (IT-E18; IT-E20).
Similarly, east Europeans (i.e., Albanians and Ukrainians) may be provided 
by traffickers with fake documents, while Chinese travel on tourist or 
study visas obtained thanks to intermediaries in China. “An additional 
service offered, facilitated by a corruptive mechanism: for a payment, it 
is possible to obtain the documents needed” (IT-E2). Another way, is via 
licensed tour operators which are granted of blanket visas, and which seem 
to charge a fee for those that do not return after the expiration date. The 
trend seems to travel with genuine passports to depart the country, and 
then switch to forged or fraudulently obtained documentation (UNODC, 
2013). In Italy, documents are in most cases confiscated by exploiters, 
as to isolate the victims and make them more vulnerable (IT-E14; IT-E7; 
Leogrande, 2016). In other cases, new fake documents are provided, as 
to be safe from police controls or to request resident permits. “When 
migrants arrive to Lampedusa, they are subsequently directed to a specific 
neighbour of the city of Naples where, according to our intelligence, has 
emerged a high concentration of forgers. It does not seem a coincidence” 
(IT-E10). The debt bondage, linked to travel and/or documents expenses 
as well as access to work, represents the main factor allowing traffickers 
to exploit victims within sexual and labour markets in Italy, while using 
the threat of violent retaliation against family members if victims are 
reluctant to cooperate (Regione del Veneto, 2004; Beretta et al., 2016; 
eastwest.eu, 2013; IT-E2; IT-E10; IT-E14; IT-E21).
Foreign OCGs such as Nigerians, Chinese and east Europeans (i.e. 
Albanians, Romanians, Ukrainians, and Poles) are involved in the sexual 
and labour exploitative markets in Italy (DIA, 2017; DNA, 2017). Although 
settled throughout the country, it is possible to identify specific hubs 
for these two forms of exploitation: the cities of Turin and Milan in the 
north, and Naples, Castel Volturno, and Palermo in the south for sexual 
exploitation managed by Nigerian, Albanian and Romanian criminal 
entrepreneurs, and the province of Foggia with the area of Capitanata as 
3 Most migrants from Africa and travelling by sea are recovered in shelter centres (Centri di 
primo soccorso e accoglienza), where they receive first aid and are identified by law enforce-
ment. These centres are located in the cities of Agrigento and Lampedusa (Sicily), Cagliari and 
Elmas (Sardinia), Lecce and Otranto (Apulia), and Ragusa and Pozzallo (Sicily). If the status of 
asylum seeker is granted, a migrant can obtain a residence permit to stay in Italy. In practice, 
requests are evaluated by a territorial commission that can either accept or refuse. In many 
cases, requests are refused and migrants have the right to appeal. In the meantime, and till 
the final decision of the commission, they can remain in the national territory (IT-15; IT-E24).
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a main point for labour exploitation in agriculture (especially for tomato 
harvesting) (IT-E5; IT-E23; IT-E18; Scotto, 2016).
These criminal entrepreneurs share similar organisational characteristics. 
They are small in size (from 3-4 to 10-15 members) and based on family, 
ethnic and tribal bonds, while operating within large fluid networks 
of groups and individuals made of nodes present in both countries of 
origin and exploitation. These nodes are also connected to traffickers/
smugglers (in the form of joint ventures) in transit countries as to 
facilitate the movement of victims. Although roles and duties tend to be 
distributed among members in relation to their skills, place, hierarchy 
and location, they are in most cases interchangeable within groups 
(DNA, 2017; Becucci, 2016; Carchedi, 2016; IT-E9; IT-E6; IT-E2; IT-E18). 
The “main feature of Chinese OCGs is that of guanxi, a term referred 
to a network of relationships among members on the basis of family 
bonds or commercial interests. These groups, that have mainly settled 
in northern and central Italy, may create alliances to share duties and 
criminal markets, or may fight to control their territories” (eastwest.eu, 
2013: 102).4 Albanians, similarly to Romanians, active at the national level, 
are structured into family-based organised crime groups, with members 
belonging to the same cities or towns, and connected to the bosses 
residing in the country of origin, as well as to other small groups (cells). 
The latter are in charge of recruitment, travel organisation, procuring 
forged documents, and acts of intimidation against families of victims 
when reluctant. More often these criminal entrepreneurs collaborate in 
sexual exploitation, and at present Albanian OCGs manage the street 
prostitution of Romanian victims (Ciconte, 2016; Regione del Veneto, 
2004; Carchedi & Tola, 2005). These criminal entrepreneurs as stated by 
Palmisano (2017) have overcome the other foreign OCGs rooted in the 
north of the country in regard to trafficking for sexual exploitation, and 
in the placement of labour force in public construction sites, as it occurs 
in the city of Turin. Ukrainians, active in particular in the region of 
Campania and the city of Naples, are structured into small to medium-
sized criminal groups, with strong connections with native OCGs residing 
in Ukraine. Despite their dimension, these groups have been defined 
in different criminal proceedings as “[mafia-type] associations, due to 
the systematic intimidations and retaliations for control purposes, illegal 
immigration, and forced prostitution” (Ingrascì, 2016).
Nigerian cults (named for example Black Axe, Eiye, Aye, Buccaneers, 
Vikings, Ku Klux Klan Fraternity), are small groups independent but 
integrated within Nigerian OCGs.5 The latter in Italy can be dated back 
4 As underlined by Becucci (2016), in respect to trafficking of human beings, Chinese criminal 
groups have two main types of organisation reflecting the degree of internal trust: 1) family 
based groups involving traffickers with managerial roles, active in China and connected to 
members in Italy; 2) joint ventures among members. More often, Chinese criminal entrepreneurs 
combine both structures and bonds. Thus, a central node which is based on familial ties 
coexists with recruited individuals for specific tasks.
5 From Italian judicial cases on trafficking of Nigerian women and girls, cults inspired by Evangeli-
cal-Christian and animist beliefs are active both in Nigeria and within Nigerian communities in 
Italy. These cults act like criminal organisations and recruit members through a strict selective 
procedure. Their role is to support Nigerian OCGs in protecting businesses, recovering debts, 
and set disputes violently. In few cases, their involvement in physical mutilations against com-
petitors and ritual homicides has been detected in Italy (Carchedi, 2016a; IT-E9; IT-E15).
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to the 1980s. Settled at first in the northern and central regions, more 
recently they have expanded to southern regions such as Campania, 
Calabria, and Sicily. While cults have been detected in more recent 
years in the cities of Turin, Venice-Mestre, Milan (north), Rome (centre), 
Caserta, Castel Volturno and Palermo (south). “The power that these 
groups exercise in Italy is similar to that of Italian mafias. They manage 
drug trafficking, prostitution, and other criminal activities, and behave 
like our mafiosi in acquiring the control of local territories. In some 
criminal proceedings this characteristic has been recognised” (IT-E22; 
IT-E21). The role of the cults, in particular, is to assist the maman 
(madam) in her illegal activities such as sexual exploitation and drug 
selling, while protecting the businesses from other competitive groups of 
the same nationality (Ciconte, 2016; Carchedi, 2016a; IT-E5; IT-E6; IT-E21). 
This female member is the point of connection between the bottom 
and upper parts of Nigerian OCGs in regard to sexual exploitation (i.e. 
members/individuals that produce profits and invest revenues in the 
legal economy) (Carchedi, 2016a; IT-E6; IT-E7; IT-E24). For example, in 
one judicial case the structure and organisation of a Nigerian organised 
crime group active in sexual exploitation was described as follows in 
respect to the roles of the members: “Members active in Nigeria are 
involved in all the necessary stages to bring potential victims to Europe 
such as obtaining visas, hosting girls in accommodations while waiting 
for documents, performing a voodoo rite called juju on girls to formalise 
the obligation to settle their debts, arranging travels. While the members 
active in Italy cooperate to obtain and assure illegal entries of victims to 
Italy or Europe, to find mamans that manage women and girls and their 
prostitution activity, to arrange accommodations, to gather the proceeds 
and to intimidate victims” (IT-E20).
Native organised crime groups (Cosa Nostra, the ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, 
and Sacra Corona Unita) are not directly involved in sexual and labour 
exploitation at the national level because these illegal markets produce 
low profits, compared to drug trafficking for example, and involve higher 
risk of detection – e. g. charges of exploited victims (IT-E14; IT-E15). This 
allows foreign organised crime groups to manage more or less these 
criminal activities independently (IT-E1; IT-E15; IT-E18; Leogrande, 2016). 
Nevertheless, where Italians OCGs are present agreements have to be 
reached, and these may also consist in illegal services or exchange of 
illegal goods (DIA, 2017). “If ten Polish men decide to be gangmasters 
in Cerignola [region of Apulia] they are not able to do anything without 
the support of the local bosses. And if they have set up a human 
trafficking activity, they cannot avoid to have some relations with local 
organised crime groups that control the territory” (Leogrande, 2016: 89). 
In the regions of Campania and Calabria, for example, Albanian OCGs 
sell drugs at a favourable price in exchange of using portion of local 
territories for sexual exploitation (IT-E8; Russo, 2010), or as it occurred 
on the Apulian, Calabrian, and Sicilian coasts where native OCGs have 
allowed clandestine migrants to disembark, offered support in logistics 
and control to prevent law enforcement counteraction, and in exchange 
are supplied by foreign OCGs with drugs, weapons, and contraband 
tobacco products (Spiezia, 2008). It is more likely that partnerships 
exist among foreign OCGs, and in particular east Europeans in terms of 
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trafficking and exploitation: Albanian and Romanian, but also Chinese 
and Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs (IT-E10; IT-E14).
2.1 Sexual exploitation: the central role of female 
criminal entrepreneurs
“As for the nationalities in the Italian sex market, there are Romanians, 
Albanians, followed by Nigerians and Chinese” (IT-E10). Mobile phones 
may be used during the travel of Nigerian migrants as a means of remote 
control through GPS, which is why many victims arrive in Italy with a 
telephone number to call as to gain further information on how to reach 
their final destination. This method is also used to send bus or train 
tickets to the victims, or if recharged to sell credits to other migrants 
and then pay for the journey. In other cases, migrants are picked up at 
shelter centres by members of OCGs or individuals that are recruited for 
this purposes (called “ticket men”) (IT-E4; IT-E8; IT-E21). “Compared to 
the first migration flows where victims arrived with numbers written on 
papers and hidden in their hair, nowadays it is more likely that they call 
families in Nigeria that, in turn, inform exploiters of their arrival in Italy. 
It is a countermeasure of traffickers due to police controls when victims 
disembark” (IT-E24). When victims start to be exploited, Nigerians work 
on the street and can be forced into prostitution at the very beginning 
inside or in the surroundings of open reception centres or temporary 
reception centres.6 East European and Chinese victims work mainly in 
closed places – apartments, massage centres – and use the streets or 
the internet to approach clients (IT-E2; IT-E14; IT-E19). “Exploiters buy 
telephone numbers connected in series that women and girls use to be 
contacted by clients, and that are linked to the offers of prostitution 
services posted on internet websites or social networks” (IT-E10).
Common elements may be traced in the exploitation scheme applied by 
foreign OCGs. First, the high level of internal trafficking since victims are 
moved frequently from one city/town to another, and that victims usually 
work in another place distant from where they live (IT-E20). “At nights or 
early in the morning, regional trains from the city of Rimini to the city 
of Bologna are full of Nigerian women who commute” (IT-E10).
Second, the use of violence to force victims into prostitution, especially 
reluctant ones. Nigerians benefit from the intimidation of through voodoo 
rites7 and resort to violence in extreme situations (IT-E19; IT-E20). Use 
of violence is also typical for east European OCGs (especially Albanians), 
as a means of psychological submission and to enforce the loyalty of 
victims. Nevertheless, since the 2000s, these criminal entrepreneurs have 
lowered the use of violence as a strategy to curb their business risk 
(Baldoni, 2011). “They are more contractual in leaving few hundred euros 
6 These places are Centri di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo (CARA) and Centri di accoglienza 
straordinaria (CAS).
7 The voodoo rite (also called juju) is celebrated by local holy men in the country of origin 
(e.g., Nigeria) before the departure of the victims as a guarantee of the contracted debt. The 
coercive power of this rite, resides also in the fact that if women or girls are reluctant or 
intend to denounce their exploiters, the family persuade them to continue working and repay 
the debt, fearing serious retaliations against themselves (IT-E18).
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to the victims, and allowing more freedom in dressing and eating. During 
the 1990s earnings for women and girls amounted to zero. More recently, 
a similar trend seems to involve Nigerian OCGs as well” (IT-E8). Due to 
the intimidating force of voodoo rites, Nigerian victims are not directly 
controlled when working; on the contrary, east Europeans are subjected 
to strict supervision by members or employees of OCGs (IT-E18).
Third, the central role of females in managing exploited victims, in most 
cases supported by their partners or other male/female assistants. The 
Nigerian maman, usually a previously exploited woman able to marry 
an Italian man or to obtain a residence permit, is the point for sexual 
exploitation and may also work as a prostitute (IT-E18; IT-E20). She 
controls (i.e. demanding messages via mobile after each service) and 
organises trafficked victims, coordinates their activities and collects the 
income they make (IT-E19; IT-E24). Males (also partners) provide support 
through coercive and violent means when victims are reluctant or intend 
to emancipate (Baldoni, 2011). In some cases, exploited victims live with 
the maman, in others they are located in different apartments with other 
exploited women and girls, some of which may have legal residence 
permits as to be secured from police control (IT-E7; IT-E15; IT-E20). 
The maman may be supported by male or female assistants and other 
members or recruited individuals, depending on the number of victims 
(Table 1).
ТаBle 1. numBers oF victims and corresponding units oF criminal 
entrepreneurs in a local context
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Carchedi (2016a).
victims Maman Partner Handyman Bodyguard Supervisor Cashier
Courier –
Transporter 
from/to Nigeria
1-3 X
4-6 X X X
7-10 X X X X
11-15 X X X X X
15+ X X X X X X X
A study carried out in the city of Asti (region of Piedmont) has underlined 
that 3 or 4 maman are active, each exploiting from 4 to 6 victims, and 
receiving the support of female assistants (known as petite maman) with 
different roles. One maman, in a medium-high level position, is in 
relation with a partner belonging to a cult and in charge of intimidations 
and debt recovery (Carchedi, 2016a). Similarly, Chinese prostitution is 
managed by females – they make the appointments, collect the revenue, 
distribute money, provide food and clothes for the victims – and can 
be supported by males (Beretta et al., 2016; IT-E14). Albanian women, 
after years of prostitution and similarly to Nigerian ones can control 
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small groups of 3-4 victims, supported by their partner or another male 
member of the organised crime group (IT-E3; Russo, 2010).
2.2. labour exploitation: the key role 
of the agricultural sector
The economic sectors of labour exploitation in Italy are textile, construc-
tion, the tourist and hotel industries, food services, and in particular 
agriculture (Shelley, 2014; Palmisano, 2017; IT-E10; IT-E11). Exploitation of 
Nigerians as drug sellers has been reported, together with other works 
such as parking attendants, window washers and beggars in the streets 
regarding other nationalities. As for female victims from eastern Europe 
(e.g. Bulgarians, Romanians) exploitation occurs for jobs such as caregivers 
(IT-E12; IT-E4; IT-E6; Bertolotti, 2017; Save the Children, 2017).
Chinese migrants are mainly exploited in textile and clothing factories, 
or in restaurants, where employers may be either Chinese or Italian 
nationals who have transient relationships of reciprocal interest with 
traffickers. It is more likely that the owners of factories and companies 
(especially Chinese) know the criminal entrepreneurs involved in illegal 
immigration (called shetou) and rely on them to acquire labour force at 
low cost (Becucci, 2016; IT-E2). The opposite may also occur. In one 
police investigation, the Chinese trafficker was in contact with two Italian 
representatives of a cooperative of job placement, compliant in delivering 
fictitious employment contracts and fake paycheques (IT-E14). In other 
cases, there is no link between the traffickers and the subsequent 
employers. Thus, within the Chinese community a recruitment service 
exists based on specialised bars and newspapers, as for example in the 
city of Milan (Beretta et al., 2016).
East Europeans (Romanians, Bulgarians, Poles, Slovaks, Lithuanians) and 
sub-Saharan Africans are the main nationalities exploited in the agricultural 
sector, with the highest concentration in the province of Foggia (i.e., the 
area of Capitanata) in the region of Apulia (Sagnet and Palmisano, 2015; 
Ciconte and Liberti, 2016). Migrants are subjected to constant internal 
exploitation from north to south due to the specificity of harvesting 
seasons (Leogrande, 2016; IT-E11; IT-E16). “By the end of winter they 
brought us to pick potatoes at Cassibile [in Sicily], then they told us 
we had to go to Apulia. It is four years that we make this travel. […] 
When we arrived to the city of Lecce, they brought us with a light van 
to an Algerian man, in the farmlands of the town of Nardò” (Sagnet and 
Palmisano, 2015: 19-20). This form of exploitation involves also Italians, 
especially as a result of the economic crisis, while in regard to migrants 
the distinction between trafficked and smuggled individuals is not always 
definite. “It is hard to prove that the person employed in the tomato 
cultivation in Apulia is exploited as a consequence of trafficking. It is a 
multi-faceted situation. Migrants arrive through different illegal ways, and 
even if they have resident permits, they remain in a vulnerable situation. 
More likely, the discriminatory variable is the debt bondage. Slavery 
is the tip of the iceberg, under which there is just the exploitation of 
migrants” (IT-E11). In this regard, native and foreign OCGs benefit from 
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what can be defined as a “criminal system” in which legal and illegal 
entrepreneurs operate (i.e. grey area) based on the ancient Italian labour 
method of gangmasters and suitable to respond to the actual dynamics 
of the food industry (IT-E11; IT-E17; L’Espresso, 2016; Scotto, 2016).8
On one side, some foreign OCGs may recruit individuals with the 
promise of a legal job, arrange their travel and their further employment 
in agriculture in slavery conditions, as in the case of Polish or Romanian 
OCGs (Iovino, 2016; Leogrande, 2016). In a police operation named 
Piana (from the location of farmlands, Piana del Sele), carried out in 
the province of Salerno, a transnational criminal organisation comprising 
of Romanians and Italians was dismantled after lawsuits of some of the 
Romanian victims. The offenders were accused of having trafficked mainly 
women for labour exploitation between Romania and Italy. The latter were 
cheated with false promises of good profitable legitimate employments, 
but then exploited in agriculture. Female migrants were forced to work 
in local farms, underpaid and threatened. These criminal entrepreneurs 
were in charge of illegally intermediating with employers, subtracting 
documents, collecting payments (at higher prices) for accommodation 
and transportation, extorting money for residence permits and keeping a 
part of the salaries (Iovino, 2016).
On the other, Italian OCGs, especially where deeply rooted, such as 
in the south of Italy, and the regions of Sicily, Calabria, Apulia, and 
Campania, make profits thanks to the control of some areas where labour 
exploitation takes place (IT-E16). “In certain places, villages, gangmasters 
and farmers have to keep good neighbourly relations with local OCGs. 
This may consist in protection money and extortions” (IT-E11) or exchanges 
in other criminal activities, such as drug selling. For example, in one 
investigative operation named Svevia in 2000, local OCGs active in 
the province of Foggia, were interested in the tomato supply, and in 
perpetrating extortions money to farmers of around €1,000 for each 
shipment leaving the farm (Leogrande, 2016).
Gangmasters connect demand and supply, and offer their service to 
farmers, thus overcoming legal ways of recruitment. “In most cases, these 
persons are the only point of reference for the job searching of migrants 
devoid of the possibility to contact employers, and their role is crucial 
in less populated areas. […]. More often, they have worked for a long 
time in the territory and know employment mechanisms. Their activity is 
usually subjected to an Italian gangmaster who, in turn, is recruited by 
unscrupulous farmers. Unlike in the past, these actors now manage not 
only the recruitment of workers but also all aspects of their lives (i.e. 
hours of working, salaries)” (Pisacane, 2016: 44-45). Gangmasters form 
criminal networks. On one side, they are linked to intermediaries, such 
8 Farmers need to keep very low production costs because of the dynamics of the globalised 
food market where their power to negotiate prices with industries that process their rough 
products is almost inexistent (IT-E11; IT-E16; IT-E23). As stated by one previous victim of labour 
exploitation (IT-E23) “In my opinion, the real gangmasters are food corporations that trough a 
mechanism of lowering costs force farmers to resort to gangmasters to have labour force at a 
very low price to compete on the market.” Another reason for the use of gangmasters to hire 
day labourers is related to the cycles and timing of harvesting. In many cases, farmers need 
labour force in very short times (Ciconte and Liberti, 2016).
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as recruiters and travel organisers in the countries of origin of migrants; 
on the other, they are in constant relation with other gangmasters and 
intermediaries operating in the same region or areas of Italy. In one 
judicial investigation, interceptions of two Polish gangmasters, revealed 
connections with others collaborating for the placement of workers, 
and deciding the farmlands where employers could work. Some of the 
gangmasters charged in the trial were also involved in smuggling of solar 
panels, and were trying to organise operations of trafficking in weapons. 
Another gangmaster, for example, was connected to a friend receiving 
girls who wanted to work as prostitutes and paying €2,500 for each 
(Leogrande, 2016). Thus, as stated by an interviewed expert and as it 
results from investigative evidence (IT-E10; DIA, 2017), the presence 
of native OCGs in the agricultural sector, referred to as “agromafia” 
(agricultural mafia), may favour this form of illegal employment and 
exploitation, and the profiting from this criminal system, but there is 
no direct involvement. The lucrative business of Italian organised crime 
groups is to infiltrate and/or acquire legal farms, especially those facing 
economic difficulties, in order to infiltrate or control the supply chain, 
such as for example imposing the purchase of specific commodities, 
and easily launder revenues of other criminal activities (i.e. agromafia) 
(Europol, 2015; IT-E10; IT-E11).
Exploited migrants face hardship which includes very unhealthy and 
unsafe living and working conditions, high number of working hours per 
day (from 12 to 14), threats from gangmasters if they are reluctant to 
work, having residence in overcrowded and crumbling facilities, neglected 
right to receive medical aid if needed, and having their documents 
seized by gangmasters. “Passports, residence permits, and IDs are seized 
under the pretext of making employment contracts, while the real one 
is to keep us under their control. Sometimes, our documents are sold 
to irregular migrants” (Sagnet and Palmisano, 2015: 29). In other cases, 
employment contracts are absent or fictitious, or migrants are employed 
on piecework (IT-E15; IT-E23; Pisacane, 2016; Iovino, 2016; Leogrande, 
2016; MSF, 2008; Galeazzi, 2016). As contended by one interviewed 
expert, this option is paradoxically preferred by the former since it 
allows to earn more money being paid for each filled up container (of 
tomatoes, for example) (IT-E16). In general, women compared to men 
are preferred by exploiters since they have fewer complaints and accept 
lower salaries: €37 is the daily pay for men, while women earn €22 
if Italian and €20 if foreign. A hierarchy also exists for retributions in 
which Caucasian workers receive higher payments compared to African 
workers (Sagnet and Palmisano, 2015). As stated by an interviewed victim 
of previous labour exploitation: “It is hard to fight back this system. The 
daily threats we suffered, perpetrated by gangmasters and farmers. When 
the court trial ended, the sentences documented the state complicity 
with, for example, labour inspectors informing farmers about the day of 
inspection” (IT-E23).
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As for the financial management of trafficking in human beings, the main 
data gathered was for Nigerian OCGs for two main reasons: nowadays in 
Italy they represent the most emerging criminal entrepreneurs involved in 
this criminal activity; the high numbers of Nigerian victims reaching the 
country and further exploited into prostitution, some of whom decide 
to collaborate with police forces and judicial institutions to escape 
their situation. East European OCGs have a long history in terms of 
sexual exploitation and are not the main and recent focus of criminal 
investigations. Chinese OCGs, even if investigated, are an insular ethnic 
group, thus allowing for more limited information to be gathered, mainly 
by undercover police activity.
3.1. Sources of capital for initiating/sustaining 
operations of trafficking in human beings 
and profiles of financiers
Although Nigerian OCGs are active in the drug and sex markets, it 
appears that the source of financing for the trafficking operations may 
come from the same criminal activity or other illegal activities. As a matter 
of fact, the distinction is blurred when transnational OCGs are involved, 
and this can be true also for Eastern European criminal entrepreneurs, 
such as for example Albanians that operate in drug trafficking and sexual 
exploitation (IT-E4; IT-E10; IT-E18). Nevertheless, as underlined by one 
expert, Albanian OCGs when settled in Italy have started to gain profits 
through prostitution, and then reinvested them into drugs to be sold to 
Italian OCGs at a very favourable price, which allowed them to gradually 
ascend the hierarchical structure of this criminal market (IT-E8).
Social capital more than financial capital is crucial as to recruit potential 
victims in the countries of origin (IT-E4). For example, Chinese clans 
(i.e. extended families) are actively involved in identifying nationals that 
can be moved and further exploited abroad (IT-E2), and in most cases 
some of their members are the financiers of the trafficking operations: 
“None of these Chinese migrants could leave without paying any 
money. It was a real extortion of OCGs against family clans, which 
were obliged to turn to loan sharks to pay for travel. A real form of 
getting into debts, but not with traffickers” (IT-E14). Similarly, family 
members and relatives play a key role in recruiting potential Nigerian 
victims. More generally, community relations in rural villages facilitate 
the process, where different individuals besides family members are 
in contact with the maman or other members of OCGs and act as 
intermediaries – e.g. friends, acquaintances, priests, etc. (IT-E25). As for 
the financiers, there are different situations: in some cases, it is the 
maman who pays for travel and documents (if needed) in advance. 
“[This Nigerian OCGs] with operative cells in the city of Catania, 
Genoa and Rome, was managed and promoted by maman Jennifer 
who handled all the relationships with members/associates in Nigeria 
3. FINANCING AND FINANCIAl MANAGEMENT
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and Libya, followed the travels of victims through Africa till the Libyan 
coasts, and provided the necessary sums of money as for the victims 
to arrive to Italy” (Save the Children, 2017: 68). In other cases, experts 
point out the role of sponsors, that is persons close to the families of 
the victims that offer to cover the required expenses. There are cases 
in which the money is advanced by family members or relatives, usually 
getting into debts or selling their properties, and that wait to be repaid 
with the earnings of the victims once they have started to work in Italy 
(IT-E15; IT-E18; IT-E19; IT-E20; IT-E22; Di Nicola & Musumeci, 2014). The 
amount of debt may be known by the family, which allows to negotiate 
with recruiters: “in one judicial case, all the trafficked girls had to repay 
an amount of €30,000, except for one girl for whom the family was able 
to agree an amount of €25,000” (IT-E4).
In Libya, other payments are required by Nigerian OCGs, which leave 
the victims to other local criminal/military groups, since at present they 
cannot count on previous corruptive networks. Stories of women refer 
to the trade between Nigerian criminal entrepreneurs and Arab gangs. 
Victims are kept into connection or ghetto houses until the maman in 
Italy pays this additional amount for their release (Zandonini, 2016; 
IT-E4; IT-E21). If she has no money when requested, victims can be 
bought by other mamans even in Libya. “There are ladies that go to 
these connection houses to buy women and girls, with the intention 
of profiting and making them move to another location or country” 
(IT-E4). The financiers may be family members or relatives as well, to 
whom more money is extorted (IT-E21). Similarly, Chinese victims are 
sold during their journey to Italy, sometimes more than once, either to 
other members of the same OCGs, or to other criminal groups (IT-E2; 
IT-E14). This way, it is possible to earn more money, or to share with 
other criminal entrepreneurs the profits of trafficking. “In this judicial 
cases, involving very long land routes, groups of around thirty Chinese 
migrants were sold several times to various criminal groups that managed 
different legs of the travel and that were in contact with each other” 
(IT-E2). Simulated kidnapping may occur as well, and perpetrated by 
members of the same OCGs. This way, the anticipated amount of money 
is not considered, and additional money is extorted from the families or 
relatives of the victims (IT-E14). On the contrary, when east European 
OCGs (e.g. Albanians) are involved, the recurrent scheme is the payment 
for travel, visas, and documents to be made in advance, since usually 
the agreement with the victims is that this amount will be repaid once 
starting to work in Italy (IT-E4).
3.2. Settlement and methods of payments
In general, migrants cannot leave if payments for travel and documents 
(when needed) had not been delivered to the respective persons (i.e. 
OCGs members, intermediaries, relatives, acquaintances) in charge of the 
recruitment and arrangement of the journey, residing in the countries of 
origin (IT-E15). The most used method to settle payments are pre-agreed 
instalments, that is an initial sum of money to cover initial travel and 
documents expenses, and another sum of money once the victims start 
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to work in Italy and to repay their debt. For example, in one judicial 
case on a Nigerian organised crime group, “the woman (maman) asked 
[her contact] how much money was needed for the girl to arrive to Italy. 
The contact explained the procedure and the payment: first he would 
have to deposit half of the amount to his trustee in Nigeria, and the 
other half when the girl would have reached Italy” (IT-E20). In another 
investigative operation regarding Chinese migrants, the payment was 
made in three instalments: “The agreed settlement of payment was 1/3 
of the total amount before the departure, another 1/3 once arrived to 
Italy, and a final 1/3 through working (i.e. labour exploitation)” (IT-E14).
In some cases, it also happens that all the requested amount of money 
is advanced by sponsors, family members, or relatives before potential 
victims leave their country of origin (IT-E7). The agreement is then to 
repay once victims are employed in Italy. Sponsors, who can be also 
intermediaries of OCGs, will be repaid by them or in a later moment 
when victims start to work (IT-E7; IT-E8). On the contrary, family members 
or relatives run the risk not to be repaid. The reason is that victims 
are not able, in most situations, to send money to their home country 
because of the debt and the obligation to leave almost all the earnings 
to their exploiters (IT-E2; IT-E4; IT-E15; IT-E25). In the case of Nigerians, 
for example, the profits of victims and the possibility to send money to 
their families depend on their settlement in Europe and their subsequent 
career as mamans (IT-E20).
Besides the use of cash smuggling, which is always preferred since less 
risky, when OCGs anticipate the expenses of the travel and of eventual 
documents for migrants, there are four main methods used to send the 
money to the contact person in charge of organising the journey in the 
country of departure (IT-E10; IT-E12; IT-E15; IT-E18; IT-E19; IT-E24):
1. Hawala, an informal value transfer system, which is used in particular 
by north African and Muslim populations and represents “cash-in 
and cash-out businesses that primarily send personal remittances 
of low value and that do not preclude sending high value business 
transfer” (FATF, 2013; Europol, 2015).9 Besides the separated physical 
transportation of money, payments are made through the use of 
papers with codes among trusted brokers (hawaladars) (IT-E6; IT-E20).
2. Money transfer services (e.g. MoneyGram, Western Union, WorldRemit), 
especially with reference to Nigerian criminal entrepreneurs: “in some 
investigations, it was evident that [these groups] hold ethnic or money 
transfer shops used as a cover for illicit money flows” (IT-E12). The 
owners can be members of OCGs or accomplices, who borrow their 
ID documents or use other customers’ identity cards as to overcome 
the daily limit of money transfer.
3. Postepay service, which consists in a rechargeable credit card allowing 
to transfer money.
9 This type of service has been defined by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2013: 15): 
“criminal hawala, [a system] driven by illegitimate money flows and often controlled by criminals 
or criminal groups […]. These criminal networks are characterised by high value transactions 
between legal and natural persons that do not necessarily share the same cultural/geographic 
background.”
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4. Bank accounts, where the transfer of money is usually delivered to 
bank accounts of straw men, who can be family members/relatives/
acquaintances (of the contact person as well) or individuals connected 
to members of OCGs.
When trafficking involves migrants from Africa, and particularly from 
Nigeria, the same methods of settlement of payments are used in other 
two circumstances. First, if more money is needed in Libya for victims 
to cross the Mediterranean Sea. “The person in Nigeria appoints the 
smuggler for transportation and incurs a debt. It is not clear if the former 
sends the money from Nigeria, or if he pays through a contact in Libya. 
But the methods are hawala or money transfer services” (IT-E20). Second, 
when victims are kidnapped by or sold to other criminal/military groups 
in Libya. For example, in one judicial case, while migrants were kept 
prisoners in one camp in Sabha, there were persistent requests to their 
families to credit sums of money for their liberation through MoneyGram, 
Western Union or to bank accounts headed by family members (IT-E21). 
Unless the victims or recruiters hold a direct contact with traffickers 
and/or smugglers, and payments are mostly handled in cash, in all the 
other cases the aforementioned methods are applied. Consistently, the 
latter are used when paying individuals involved at the various stages and 
with different roles within the trafficking chain, as it occurs for example 
with “trolley men” or boga – the persons accompanying the victims 
from Nigeria to Libya – and the ticket man – the person in charge of 
recovering victims in Italy (IT-E21; IT-E24).
Costs of trafficking are mainly related to travel and/or documents 
expenses when OCGs are the financiers both from the country of 
origin and through Italy to reach the final destination. These costs are 
not particularly high if compared to other criminal activities, such as 
for example drug trafficking (IT-E8; IT-E15; IT-E20). In general, costs 
depend on the distance between the countries of origin and destination 
of victims, and the method of transportation (IT-E18). As reported in 
one judicial case on a Nigerian organised crime group, there are two 
ways of trafficking, which are in turn related to different prices (IT-E20). 
The first option, which regards travelling by airplane is the safest but 
also expensive, since it includes the costs of the ticket, documents and 
corruption in the countries of origin/transit. The second, concerning the 
arrival to Italy by sea (crossing the desert of Niger and leaving from Libya 
on boats) is cheapest, although riskier. Differences in costs of travelling 
encountered by traffickers reflect in diverse amounts of the debt of 
victims (e.g. around €80,000 if they arrive to Italy by plane and around 
€30,000 if they travel by land and then sea).
For victims arriving from Nigeria to Italy through the most frequently 
used land and sea routes by traffickers (i.e. from Benin City, crossing 
the desert of Niger to reach Libya and then Italy) that are subsequently 
4. COSTS OF DOING BUSINESS
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exploited in the sex market, the cost of travel ranges between €2,500-
€3,000 and €5,000 (IT-E4; IT-E7; IT-E9; IT-E10). This amount pays for 
travel and for the persons in charge of transportation (passeurs) (IT-E12). 
It has been contended by one expert that when the amount is around 
€5,000, part of it is supposed to pay the ransom requested by other 
criminal groups operating in Libya that keep migrants hostages in 
connection or ghetto houses (IT-E4). In some cases, additional money 
is required by OCGs, a sum that can range from €200 to €500, as 
to allow victims to continue their travel to Italy (IT-E4; IT-E21). The 
total amount of costs for having the victims arrive in Italy can be 
also higher. In one judicial case, the initial price paid by the maman 
to her contact (partner) in Nigeria was €4,000, although the cost of 
the operation amounted to a total of €11,000: “He explains that the 
money is needed for the business, and that she does not have to 
complain since the total amount [€11,000] corresponds to a favourable 
price. He also says that he will add to the €4,000 another €2,000 
for extra expenses” (IT-E20). A similar price for trafficking a girl from 
Nigeria to Italy and the city of Genoa was reported in another judicial 
case, where the total amount to be paid to all the persons involved 
in her illegal entry was €12,000 (IT-E20). Other judicial evidence 
refers to lower total costs for the journey (i.e. travel, transportation, 
intermediate stage) – between €500-€800 (IT-E24). As for Nigerian 
criminal entrepreneurs, other costs are related to the voodoo rites 
before victims leave their country of origin: in one judicial case 
the price paid by the contact of the maman in Nigeria was €500, 
while from another source of information the price was €150 with 
the obligation for the victims to pay another sum of money once 
employed in Italy and start to repay their debt (IT-E25).
Once Nigerian victims reach Italy, there are other costs to be sustained 
by OCGs. First, there is the cost of travel to the final destination. For 
example, in one case the price was around €300 (IT-E8), although the 
presence of different options and routes at the national level can make 
this estimation particularly challenging. When victims are recovered at 
the points of arrival (i.e. shelter centres) by a member or employee 
of Nigerian OCGs or the maman, this person is paid around €50 per 
journey. Second, there is the cost of management of the prostitution 
activity, such as paying the person in charge of accompanying and 
controlling victims on a daily basis while working (who can be Italian as 
well), who receive between €25-€50 per day; renting of street spots for 
prostitution (referred to as “joints”) that cost around €50-€150 per day 
and are paid to the owners that are usually other criminal entrepreneurs, 
e.g. Albanians OCGs (IT-E4; IT-E24) (Table 2).
Other costs are related to the laundering of profits, and in particular 
to services that allow to transfer money to the countries of origin. For 
Nigerians, the commission charged by the owners of money transfer 
services is around 1%. There are some OCGs that while using cash 
transportation for their profits, offer the same service to other traffickers: 
“The organisation charges 6% of the transported amount that includes 
the delivery and concealment of money, transportation and air ticket, 
and final consignment. And this is also used for licit money, since it is 
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preferred to money transfer services where movements can be traced” 
(IT-E6). Usually, this service occurs within the hawala system.
For labour exploitation involving African, Chinese and east European 
migrants, the costs related to travelling, the intermediation of recruitment 
agencies or persons in charge of providing documents, and visas (both 
for the journey if needed, and to remain in Italy) are in general 
covered by the victims (Leogrande, 2016; Palmisano, 2017; Sagnet and 
Palmisano, 2015; IT-E2; IT-E14) and no costs are incurred by the criminal 
entrepreneurs. In one case, for example, Polish migrants paid to the 
recruiter or the driver of the bus a total of €200, plus another sum 
of around €50-€100 to other intermediaries. One Polish exploited 
victim, in particular, refers to having paid €200 to the recruiter and 
another €120 to the driver, after which he was able to leave for Italy. 
In another case, a Polish man directed to the city of Foggia in the 
region of Apulia reports to have paid €150 to traffickers, €50 to an 
intermediary as to pass the last border and other €50 after the first 
week of work (Leogrande, 2016). Consistently, a young Tunisian boy 
had to pay €2,000 to an intermediary to obtain the residence permit 
to stay and work in Italy (Sagnet and Palmisano, 2015). The actual 
costs are borne by future exploited victims, while profits are gained by 
gangmasters by reducing the final amount of salaries. In the agricultural 
sector, for example, the amount of wages for workers is agreed between 
the gangmasters and the farmers. While the former makes profits from 
detracting part of the daily earnings of workers, and charging other costs 
to them (e.g. transportation, food, etc.), the latter is able to make profits 
due to the very low cost sustained for production (Palmisano, 2017; 
Sagnet & Palmisano, 2015). For example, drivers that bring migrants to 
the farmlands on a daily basis are paid €600 per month by gangmasters, 
ТаBle 2. indicative costs incurred By nigerian ocg For a traFFicking 
operation (sexual exploitation)
Source: Authors’ elaboration on gathered data, Open Migration (2017).
Type of cost Range (€)
Travel from Nigeria to Italy (by land and by sea from Libya) 2,500/3,000 – 5,000
Voodoo rite 150-500
Ransom to criminal groups in Libya 200-500
Passeur 220-330
Travel in Italy (point of arrival to destination) 300
Ticket man 50
Accompanying and controlling the girls to/at joints 25-50 (per day)
Renting of joints 100 (per month)
Money transfer service 1%-2% for each money transfer
Money courier 6% of the sum transported
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but this cost, as explained below, is actually paid by exploited victims 
(Palmisano, 2017).
As pointed out by Europol (2015) exact and overall estimations of profits 
from trafficking in human beings is challenging, and when available 
are unreliable. This is valid also for estimating profits of trafficking and 
exploitation at the national level. It is, however, possible to give indicative 
amounts of profits mainly referred to specific cases. In general, the debt 
incurred by the victims represents the main source of profits for OCGs. 
For example, the total amount of the debt for Nigerian women and 
girls ranges between €30,000 and €60,000, while for Chinese victims 
exploited in the sexual and labour markets is €15,000-€20,000 (IT-E6; 
IT-E8; IT-E9; IT-E14; IT-E20; IT-E21; Di Nicola & Musumeci, 2014). The 
requested sum of money is set completely arbitrarily by exploiters, since 
it does not correspond to the costs sustained for travelling, eventual 
documents, and access to work, and can therefore be even higher. In 
one judicial case the total debt of the exploited girl was €90,000, forcing 
her to consign €500 per week to the exploiter. It can depend on the 
behaviour of the victim, that is “€50,000 if she behaves and €70,000 
if she misbehaves” (IT-E20). Nigerian OCGs also make profits by selling 
trafficked victims among mamans, as documented by one judicial case 
in which one girl, once arrived in Italy, was sold to another exploiter 
for €8,000 (IT-E20). When the debt is repaid, and in most cases this 
happens over many years, the victims are free to leave their exploiters 
and to find another job. When Nigerian women and girls are involved, it 
is more likely that they become mamans and carry out the trafficking and 
exploitation activities using contacts developed during their experience. 
Thus, the constant arrival and employment of victims is essential for 
OCGs to continue making profits.
Sexual exploitation victims are forced to deliver daily earnings to their 
exploiters until the sum of the debt is repaid. Usually, they are supposed 
to earn a certain amount per day which can be around €100-€300 
for Nigerians and east Europeans. The opportunity to earn a certain 
amount per day is related to the ethnicity, the physical appearance, 
and the location of working (i.e. joint) (IT-E6). The sex market is highly 
competitive and victims who are pushed to generate profits due to the 
debt and intimidations can even work for very low rates (IT-E8; IT-E9; 
IT-E20). Nigerian prostitutes, for example, can work for an average of 
€30 per service, and even for less (around €10-€15). On the contrary, 
east European victims (Albanian and Romanian) can charge higher rates 
(around €30-€50), since in general they are better looking, work in 
central areas, and may have apartments at their disposal where to bring 
clients (IT-E8; IT-E12). Reaching the daily requested amount, particularly 
for Nigerians, in practice means working 10-12 hours per day (IT-E2; IT-E6; 
IT-E8; IT-E20; IT-E21). The amount of the debt for OCGs is almost a net 
profit due to the fact that victims have to cover the rent of houses/
5. PROFITS AND PROFIT SHARING
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apartments, food and clothes expenses, thus earnings pay both the debt 
and living expenses (IT-E8). As reported in one judicial case (IT-E20), 
an exploited girl was supposed to pay €250 for the monthly rent plus 
€40 per week for the food. While Albanian criminal entrepreneurs have 
adopted a more contractual model and leave 30-50% of the earnings to 
the victims, Nigerians keep all the generated income (IT-E10). As a result, 
exploited women and girls are able to repay their families (if they are the 
financiers) or to support them, once free and usually when they become 
mamans and start to exploit other victims. For this reason, when possible 
victims try to conceal some of their earnings and send them to their 
families (IT-E8). Similarly, Chinese women and girls exploited in massage 
centres or apartments are forced to leave all the earnings to the owner/
boss (usually a woman) until they have repaid their debt, and receive a 
small amount of money to cover their living expenses (IT-E14).
Within Nigerian OCGs, the money collector is the maman, who keeps 
tracks of revenues and expenditures on papers or notebooks. Within 
Chinese groups it is also a woman in charge of exploiting the girls and 
keeping their profits (IT-E14). In particular, the maman is responsible 
for delivering the proceeds to her partner or husband and to pay the 
other individuals who support her in managing the prostitution activity: 
“the girl was used to deliver the money to this lady who, in turn, every 
week sent the profits to Nigeria minus the costs to pay her husband and 
for living expenses” (IT-E4). It is believed that part of the profit is also 
divided among the higher level of OCGs, that is other male members 
residing in Italy and other European countries (IT-E9; IT-E15).
The scheme that generates profits in labour exploitation is somehow 
different. Besides traffickers there are other legal or illegal actors who 
make revenues within a grey economy. The first source of profiting 
for OCGs regards travel and document expenses that are covered by 
migrants. The latter usually pay the recruitment agencies in the country 
of origin and, in some cases, in Italy. Available examples are related 
to different economic sectors: €200 each month are remitted by a 
caregiver employed in Italy; €700 a year are paid by a waitress working 
in a hotel on the Italian coast; €200 to a Polish recruiter to work in 
agriculture (Palmisano, 2017).
In the agricultural sector, while farmers earn from employing labour 
force at a low cost (and this is valid also for processing companies and 
corporations within an “adulterated” production system), illegal profits 
from labour exploitation are mainly made by gangmasters, employers 
(when recruitment agencies are involved), and the owners of the lands 
where accommodations for workers are located (Sagnet & Palmisano, 
2015; Palmisano, 2017; Ciconte & Liberti, 2016; IT-E10; IT-E15). As for 
farmers, earnings are still high and allow them to remain in the 
market, as explained above. The following example is indicative: “They 
told us that we would be paid €3 for each container of tomatoes.10 
10 These wages (i.e. €3 per crate or €3.50 per hour) are not aligned with the salary prescribed 
by law in national contract agreements for this type of work, which should be €4.40 euros 
as a minimum threshold for 6.5 working hours per day (Leogrande, 2016; Sagnet & Palmisano, 
2015; IT-E23).
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Five workers were able to gather 25 containers per day, each of 
them earning €15 and each container holding 2.8 tonnes of tomatoes. 
25 containers a day are equal to a total of 70 tonnes of tomatoes. 
Since the farmer will sell each tonne for €60, profit margins are high” 
(Leogrande, 2016: 98).
Illegal profits of gangmasters are significant. In the area of Capitanata 
(located in the province of Foggia of the region of Apulia), Leogrande 
(2016: 204) reports the following example: “if the gangmaster subtracts 
50 cents per hour from the salary of day labourers (paid in some 
cases €2.80 instead of €3) after 10 hours of work, he has gained 
€5. If there are 50 workers, the amount increases to €250. In a 
month he profits €7,500.” A Chinese criminal entrepreneur was used 
to subtract sums of money from salaries of the exploited victims in 
order to provide them with employment contracts and residence 
permits, and to have their debt repaid. “This boss usually told the 
victims: you have to pay me a total of €15,000 for your travel and 
documents, and to remain in Italy. Thus, you owe me €1,000 for 
the residence; €1,000 for the person that works in the prefecture; 
€1,000 for the policeman that helps me; €100 are needed to pay the 
representatives of the cooperative that found you the employment” 
(IT-E14). The monthly amount of salaries was settled between this 
boss and the representatives of the employment cooperative: “if the 
boss needed, for example, to legalise three Chinese migrants he made 
fictitious contracts to an amount of €1,000 per month. Out of this 
sum, €500 were for the worker and the other €500 were kept to pay 
governmental contributions as well as the debt and other costs for 
documents to remain in Italy” (IT-E14).
As for the agricultural sector, daily salaries are agreed between farmers 
and gangmasters, the former paying around €4-€5 per container, the 
latter detracting €1.50. An interviewed victim (previously exploited), 
claimed that they should have been paid €5 for each container of 
tomatoes gathered but that the actual amount was €3, with €1.50 
withheld by the gangmaster. A worker was able to fill 6-7 containers 
a day (IT-E23). Although gangmasters sustain costs related to minivans, 
drivers, rent of accommodations and salaries of their assistants, the 
main part of expenses are recovered from employees. As an example, 
Leogrande (2016) reports an indicative estimation of profits equal 
to €1.5 million in two years (2005 – 2006) considering a total of 
5,000 Polish workers in the farmlands of the region of Apulia and an 
average of one month of employment for each worker from whom €5 
a day are subtracted by gangmasters. Charges of gangmasters are related 
to clothes used for working, accommodation (€30-€50 per month to 
the owner of the land), food (€4 per day), mobile phone recharging 
(50 cents), shower (€1), medical aid (€5 to be accompanied to the 
hospital). Penalties maybe also applied, such as €20 a day if workers do 
not comply with the arbitrary time of picking tomatoes. “From my daily 
salary of €20-€25, he subtracted €5 for transportation to the farmland; 
€3.5 for a sandwich and €1.50 for water. We actually received a net 
salary of €10 per each working day of 12-14 hours” (IT-E23). An Algerian 
gangmaster was reportedly bringing employees to bars, restaurants, and 
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supermarkets he owned, or to others owned by Italian accomplices, 
where food and other products were charged at three times more than 
the market price (Palmisano, 2017).
It should also be noted that it is not uncommon for salaries not to be 
paid at all to victims, meaning that their daily/monthly earnings, paid 
by farmers, are entirely kept by gangmasters, who in turn increase 
their profits. The latter may be also involved in other criminal activities 
while exploiting foreign and Italian workers, such as drug supply within 
farmlands. For example, consumption of amphetamine by Polish migrants 
has been reported, especially to bear the very heavy working conditions. 
Gangmasters acquire the drug at a wholesale price of €7 per gram 
and resell it at €30 per gram, which is a price higher than the average 
daily salary of workers. The latter may work for free to repay the drug. 
“In one occasion, my gangmaster bought around 160 grams and due to 
the difference in prices, he profited €3,000 in a few days” (Leogrande, 
2016: 189).
5.1. Investment schemes
At present, the investigative and judicial evidence suggests that after living 
expenses and the costs for running the business revenues are reinvested 
to run the same criminal activity, and in drug trafficking especially with 
reference to Albanians and Nigerians OCGs. In general, net profits are 
sent to the countries of origin for two main reasons: either to finance 
new trafficking operations or to invest in real estates and commercial 
activities (hotels, restaurants, bars, etc.); this is valid, with very few 
exceptions, for all the foreign OCGs (IT-E1; IT-E2; IT-E4; IT-E6; IT-E12; 
IT-E14; IT-E20). For example, Polish gangmasters, involved in labour 
exploitation used profits to acquire real estates both in Poland and Italy: 
one of those “well settled in Italy and willing to stay, besides showing 
his wealth as every parvenu, has started to invest big shares in pubs, 
bars, apartments, cars, shops. In one year he bought a house for which 
he paid €160,000 in cash” (Leogrande, 2016: 206). Compared to other 
foreign criminal entrepreneurs, Chinese OCGs invest revenues in Italy, 
and this allows them to root in local territories, launder profits, and keep 
running their legal and illegal businesses. In one case, a Chinese boss 
opened bank accounts, and acquired houses and apartments thanks also 
to the complicity of bank directors and notaries. “Using copies of the 
documents of exploited migrants he opened bank accounts, made notary 
deeds, and to put the signature it was not the documented Chinese but 
another national paid €200 for this service.” Some migrants, “after having 
repaid their debt and applying for a mortgage to a bank as to buy an 
apartment, discovered to be the holders of three houses and of negative 
bank accounts” (IT-E14). Notwithstanding this, part of the profits is sent 
back to their country of origin: “The system used was the concealment 
of cash transported by plane. There was a list of individuals with this 
role and working for Chinese criminal entrepreneurs. The typical route is 
leaving from Italy to Portugal or Spain and from there to China. Once, a 
man arrived to Lisbon to recover a suitcase with €600,000, then he left 
by plane to Beijing to deliver the money and returned to Rome. He was 
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used to travel 3-4 times a year. These are trusted men, well known to 
transfer money, which is the most important criminal activity, and also 
related to the hawala system” (IT-E14).
The same method and other money transfer systems, are employed by 
Nigerian organised crime groups that, unlike Chinese OCGs, invest all 
the revenues in their country of origin (IT-E1; IT-E2; IT-E6; IT-E19; Save 
the Children, 2017) for two main reasons. First, to acquire properties and 
commercial activities for themselves or family members: “my maman used 
the money I gave her – €11,000 – to finish her house in Nigeria” (IT-E21). 
Second, to sustain the economy of some African states. It is documented, 
for example, that almost the entire economy of Benin City is supported 
by the money made through trafficking and sexual exploitation; when 
the first migrants arrived in Europe, they understood the potential of this 
criminal activity in terms of profits (IT-E25; Musumeci & Rosini, 2017; 
Carchedi, 2016a). Nigerians prefer to “transport cash, through individuals 
called also ‘trolley men,’ who arrive at the last minute at the airport 
with 8-9 large suitcases wrapped in cellophane. Confident in the very 
limited time, they risk less control from customs officers and manage 
to transport this well concealed money” (IT-E6). A small part of profits 
invested in Italy is for buying or renting ethnic shops or bazaars that in 
many cases are covert places offering services such as money transfers 
used by mamans or her assistants (IT-E4). Another scheme used to send 
profits to the country of origin is called “euro-to-euro”, an informal 
value transfer system based on services and guarantees ad personam 
(i.e. linked to the credibility of the intermediary) within a widespread 
network of intermediaries located mainly in Nigeria, and with money 
collectors in Italy (IT-E4; IT-21). In one judicial case, its functioning is 
explained as follows: “A first man calls the [maman] who refers to him 
the account details [i.e. codes] of the euro-to-euro payment. Then, the 
same man calls another person to communicate the received account 
details. The latter will communicate this information in Nigeria as soon 
as he has finished to work. The first man calls back the [maman] and 
confirms to have reported the received information, and that the person 
receiving the money in Nigeria will go on Monday” (IT-E21). Similarly, 
east European OCGs, invest profits in their home countries to acquire 
real estates, commercial properties (e.g. bars, restaurants, pubs, hotels) 
and companies, using mainly cash transportation and money transfer 
services. A smaller part of the revenues or the total amount (in case of 
small criminal groups) is spent on a lavish lifestyle. “In one investigation 
of Albanian and Romanian criminal entrepreneurs, it was evident the fast 
change of luxury cars, and profits were mainly used to show off a high 
standard of life. They do not have a particularly dynamic entrepreneurial 
spirit if compared to drug traffickers” (IT-E1).
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The majority of interviewed experts agreed that the national legal 
framework and the criminal provisions are comprehensive and allow 
the tackling of trafficking in human beings both for sexual and labour 
exploitation. After a huge protest in 2011 of day labourers in the 
farmlands of the town of Nardò (in the region of Apulia), a specific 
provision on countering undeclared work and labour exploitation in 
the agricultural sector (art. 603 bis, c.c. “Illicit intermediation and work 
exploitation” – dubbed the “gangmaster provision”) was introduced into 
the Criminal Code by Law No. 199/2016 (IT-E11; IT-E23; L’Espresso, 2016; 
La Repubblica, 2016).11
Due to its key geographical location between Europe and the countries 
of origin of most exploited victims, Italy has enacted specific domestic 
legislation prohibiting the exploitation in human beings in different 
modalities, which includes prostitution and other forms of abuse of 
persons who are in situations of vulnerability. Italy is bounded by 
international treaties and European directives, among which the United 
Nations Convention against Organised Crime and its Protocols (ratified 
by Law No. 146/2006), thus the Criminal Code has provisions which 
incriminate conduct related to trafficking and smuggling. In particular, 
before the ratification of the United Nations Protocols, Law No. 228/2003 
had already introduced/modified the provisions against trafficking in 
human beings envisaging crimes such as “Reducing or holding a person 
in a condition of slavery or servitude” (Art. 600 c.c.), “Trafficking in 
persons” (Art. 601 c.c.), “Trade in slaves” (Art. 602 c.c.). Paragraph 6 was 
also introduced to Art. 416 of the Criminal Code, which refers to the 
“Participation in a criminal organisation” that includes increased penalties 
if there is an association that commits crimes under the aforementioned 
articles on trafficking and smuggling in human beings (Spiezia, 2008; 
European Commission, 2018a).12 Art. 416 bis c.c. “Mafia-type associations, 
including foreign ones” and Art. 601 c.c. and/or Art. 602 c.c. allow the 
prosecution of organised crime groups involved in trafficking in human 
beings. These have been applied, for example, in court trials in the cities 
of Turin and Palermo where Nigerian OCGs were sentenced under these 
articles. If Art. 416 bis c.c. is charged to foreign OCGs, it is possible 
to seize and confiscate (i.e. final stage of proceedings) cash and assets 
that represent the proceeds of crime. Preventive seizure and confiscation 
(ex Art. 240 c.c.) are envisaged under paragraph 6 of the same law 
and regard all predicate crimes; the same applies to money laundering 
11 Although this represents an important step forward to the fight of labour exploitation, it 
has been contended that the law lacks preventative provisions, such as the obligation of 
transparency of the supply chain (i.e. information to consumers on the farms and processing 
companies that sell food) (IT-E23).
12 Legislative Decree No. 286/1998, Art. 18 envisages special residence permits for humanitarian 
reasons for third country nationals subjected to violence and serious exploitation. The residence 
permits can be granted in two ways: a judicial path that is dependent on the victim’s report of 
the crime and a social path that is contingent on the victim’s report but on the participation 
in a programme of social assistance and inclusion. For further details, also on criminal 
legislation, see Spiezia (2008); European Commission (2018a); European Commission (2018b); 
Goisis (2016).
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punished under Art. 648 bis (IT-E4; IT-E5; IT-E6; IT-E21). These provisions, 
in particular, represent the strength of the Italian criminal system that 
has proved to be efficient in the fight of native OCGs due to the 
possibility to heavily undermine the material resources acquired through 
crime, and consequently the capability of OCGs to keep running their 
criminal activities (IT-E6; IT-E7; IT-E10). In general, Law No. 146/2006 
is particularly important since: a) extends the comprehensive anti-mafia 
legislation to trafficking in human beings including the potential benefits to 
collaborating witnesses; b) identifies and punishes all the activities through 
which trafficking and smuggling can start and develop; c) balances the 
repressive and social approaches (i.e. protection of victims); d) attributes 
to the Anti-mafia District Directorates the competence of investigations 
and prosecutions of trafficking and smuggling which are considered to 
be organised criminal activities (Spiezia, 2008).
At the national level, investigations of trafficking in human beings for 
sexual and labour exploitation are, depending on cases (i.e. competent 
courts where the crime occurred), jointly carried out by the State Police, 
Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza (the Fiscal Police). Dedicated 
magistrates or pools for prosecution are settled in each Anti-Mafia 
District Directorate and coordinated by the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-
Terrorism Directorate that coordinates also police forces (Spiezia, 2008; 
IT-E24). Despite the high level of expertise of law enforcement agencies 
and other field operators and the well-developed and comprehensive 
criminal legislation in Italy, there are some criticalities that impact 
on the possibility to carry out investigation and prosecution, also of 
financial type.
First, the collaboration of victims is necessary as to initiate the 
investigation and prosecution activities, but it is not always easy to 
obtain. Thus, in different cases it is not possible to proceed. “Although 
sexual exploitation and prostitution are indictable, the charges of 
victims are more effective in opening an investigative scenario and 
hypotheses, so as the activity can initiate” (IT-E10). But victims are in 
most cases, reluctant to report their traffickers or exploiters because 
this means that an investigation has to be started. They are afraid of 
retaliations against family members as well (IT-E1). On the contrary, 
it can occur that victims report to the competent authorities in times 
that are not compatible with police investigation and the prosecution 
activity (i.e. interceptions, judicial printouts), and after a path of 
social assistance and reintegration. In these cases, charges need to be 
filed in a short time. Second, prosecutions for trafficking in human 
beings are few in numbers. Such investigations involve long periods of 
observations and a challenging collection of evidence (i.e. probative 
elements), such as for example the state of vulnerability of victims 
which is not easy to prove. As a consequence, it is easier to notify 
the slavery condition than the crime of trafficking (IT-E4; IT-E6). Third, 
when investigations and interceptions can be initiated, there is the 
problem of language and translation related to the different dialects of 
foreign OCGs, and especially with Nigerians and Chinese. In particular, 
it is almost impossible to find interpreters capable to translate Chinese 
dialects. This ethnic group is very closed and suspicious, and their 
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members are not so willing to work for the judicial system (IT-E9). 
“In one case, while intercepting some gangmasters we were not able 
to understand their language. We tried different interpreters and then 
we realised that it was a particular Romanian dialect” (Leogrande, 
2016:116). Similarly, translation gaps affect the questionings during 
trials; while the differences in the ethnic background makes the police 
proactive activity on the territory particularly difficult to be carried out 
if not impossible, and the same applies to undercover police activity 
(Perrucci, 2017).
Besides these criticalities, a particular challenging aspect is the possibility 
to carry out investigations in third countries such as Libya and Nigeria, 
that represent key countries for trafficking flows towards Italy. “While 
we have efficient instruments of judicial cooperation at the EU level 
and we collaborate, also on the basis of specific agreements, with 
other European countries such as for example France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Albania, Romania, the situation in Libya makes bilateral police 
cooperation almost impossible” (IT-E5; IT-E24; IT-E22).13 Cooperation, 
including the issuing of letters rogatory, is particularly difficult with 
Nigerian authorities, and when the investigation and prosecution activity 
ascertains that the revenues of trafficking were reinvested in Nigeria. 
“In one prosecution, the presence of bank accounts to which profits 
were transferred was ascertained, but it was not possible to proceed 
with the investigation for the lack of judicial cooperation. Investigations 
in Nigeria are needed to verify where the money went” (IT-E18). Despite 
the signature of a memorandum of understanding in 2016 that bounds 
Nigeria and Italy to jointly fight trafficking in human beings, in practice 
is still difficult to collaborate, and in the opinion of the majority of 
the interviewed experts because of high levels of corruption and the 
absence of institutional procedures that facilitate investigative and judicial 
cooperation.14 As a result, in most cases the criminal assets are not 
traceable and seizures as well as confiscation cannot be applied, even 
in enforcing a sentence under 416 bis in Italy of a Nigerian OCG. Some 
of the interviewed experts consider this aspect to be one of the major 
vulnerability of financial investigations (IT-E6; IT-E7; IT-E9; IT-E10; IT-E20; 
IT-E24). It is therefore only possible to seize assets that are recovered in 
Italy once it is proved that they are linked to the commission of crime. 
“With regards to Chinese criminal entrepreneurs, it can happen to seize 
as much as €70,000-€90,000 in cash, within apartments or massage 
centres that were the profits of prostitution. But it is hard to start a 
broad investigation. While judicial collaborators and interceptions are 
key elements, finding these resources is difficult. The most important 
aspect in starting an investigation and detecting the upper levels of 
OCGs is international cooperation. For example, we are notified about 
Albanians, but no reporting on Nigeria and China is sent” (IT-E9).
13 For further details on investigative and judicial instruments of cooperation at the EU level see 
GRETA (2016).
14 The memorandum of understanding was signed in February 2016 between the Head of Italian 
Police and the Ministry of Interior Alessandro Pansa and the Nigerian Head of Police Solomon 
Arase. The focus of the agreement was the fight against trafficking in human beings and the 
collaboration to repatriate Nigerian nationals who for different reasons cannot stay in Italy. For 
further details, see Polizia di Stato (2016).
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Due to the difficulties in tracing and confiscating the proceeds of 
trafficking in human beings when international cooperation is lacking, one 
possibility could be to detect and seize cash (which is the main method 
to reinvest and launder profits) when transported from Italy to other 
countries, especially third ones. But as pointed out by an interviewed 
expert this preventive approach would expose and undermine the ongoing 
police investigation (IT-E6). When cash is discovered by the Fiscal Police 
at borders, pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 195/2008 an administrative 
sanction (fine) is imposed that corresponds to 40% of the total amount 
transported if the maximum allowed amount of €10,000 per person is 
breached. Since it is preferable to preserve the investigation activity, the 
alternative option is the so called “confiscation for equivalent” (ex Art. 
322 ter c.c.). “At the final stage of the proceedings, if profits gained when 
committing predicate crimes are no longer available for confiscation, it 
is then possible to confiscate other assets of equivalent value” (IT-E6).15 
In the end, other criticalities are related to the level of development 
of both technological archives or registers (e.g. civil registry), that can 
facilitate the identification of individuals or telephone subscribers and 
to discrepancies among criminal legislations at the international level 
(IT-E22). “An agreement of cooperation might have been signed, but a 
specific criminal legislation exists in Italy on organised crime and related 
offences. In other states, it is likely that certain crimes are not included 
within the criminal codes” (IT-E15).
Due to its geographical position Italy represents a key area for 
migration flows especially from north and west Africa through the 
central Mediterranean Sea, followed by eastern Europe and China 
as source countries. The available estimations about these arrivals, 
although not comprehensive, suggest that some migrants are trafficked 
from their countries of origin to be further exploited for sexual or 
labour purposes on the national territory of Italy, due also to the 
presence of more or less organised crime groups that are active in 
these criminal markets. In particular, trafficking for sexual exploitation 
is managed by Nigerian, Chinese, Albanian, and Romanian criminal 
entrepreneurs; while trafficking for labour exploitation is the domain 
of mainly east Europeans – Albanian, Romanian, Polish, Ukrainian, and 
Chinese criminal entrepreneurs. These actors share similar organisational 
characteristics: they are small in size (from 3-4 to 10-15 members) and 
based on family, ethnic and tribal bonds, while operating within large 
fluid networks of groups of individuals made of nodes present in the 
countries of origin and exploitation. Hubs for sexual exploitation are 
located in different Italian cities such as Turin, Milan (north), Naples, 
Castel Volturno and Palermo (south). Labour exploitation occurs mainly 
in the agricultural sector and in the province of Foggia – i.e. the 
15 When crimes are committed against minors under articles 600, 601 and 602 c.c. the confiscation 
of assets is envisaged and directly applied. If assets are not at disposal, at the final stage of 
the proceeding it is possible to apply the confiscation for equivalent.
7. CONClUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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area of Capitanata located in the region of Apulia. Collaborations 
among foreign OCGs exist, such as for example between Albanians and 
Romanians in sexual exploitation, and exchange of favours or services 
are requested if these actors operate in areas or territories under the 
control of Italian OCGs. The latter, in an almost monopolistic position, 
are involved in other criminal activities (e.g. drug trafficking, tobacco 
smuggling) considered to be more profitable and less risky.
Thus, foreign OCGs have not encountered particular barriers to enter 
these criminal markets in Italy, as it occurs in managing trafficking 
operations. Recruitment is facilitated by social capital in terms of 
networks of family members, friends or acquaintances, or by fake 
advertisements of job opportunities on the web and social media. The 
expenses for travel and documents (when needed) in most cases are 
sustained by the victims or their families, especially if labour exploitation 
is concerned. Even if OCGs advance this sum of money, including 
through sponsors that are in contact with them, the costs are much less 
than the profits gained. In the case of sexual exploitation, the amount 
of the debts of the victims imposed for their liberation is set completely 
arbitrarily and largely encompasses the costs incurred. Similarly, with 
regard to labour exploitation, the earnings of the gangmasters that 
illegally keep part of workers’ daily salaries are significant. Profits are 
mainly used to run other trafficking operations, although in some cases 
can finance other criminal activities, as it happens with drug trafficking 
by Nigerian and Albanian criminal entrepreneurs. The revenues of 
trafficking in human beings are mainly reinvested in the countries of 
origin to acquire real estates, bars, restaurants, companies, and a small 
part is spent in Italy for living expenses or to sustain a lavish lifestyle. 
The methods employed to transfer the profits are similar to those used 
for the settlement of payments – paying the individuals involved in the 
trafficking operations and in the exploitation activities. In particular, 
cash transportation represents the most frequent way of payment, 
together with the use of money transfer services and informal banking 
systems such as the hawala.
All these methods still pose great challenges in terms of the capacity 
to interrupt the financing mechanisms of trafficking in human beings, 
and the results of the study suggest important steps forward to enhance 
the preventative and counteraction activity of law enforcement and 
prosecutors. First, there is the need to foster police and judicial 
cooperation, mainly with third countries, given the difficulty of applying 
the Italian legislative framework, which is considered comprehensive 
and capable to curb the power of these criminal organisations with 
respect to assets confiscation. Second, a related aspect is the necessity 
to harmonise the legislation on organised crime at the international 
level. Although cooperation agreements are in action, in practice gaps 
in legislations weaken their effectiveness. Third, more stringent controls 
or tailored judicial instruments are needed over money transfer services 
and cash transportation, which still represent the main vulnerabilities. 
Finally, while police officers and prosecutors have high level of qualified 
expertise, developed mainly on the field, to handle the various 
aspects of trafficking in human beings (e.g. the identification of victims 
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and indicators of trafficking, the protection of victims through the 
connection and cooperation with non-profit organisations delivering 
special programs), the prosecution of offenders is still challenging due 
to their different ethnical backgrounds. In this regard, the fight against 
this criminal market could benefit from the establishment of dedicated 
multicultural police units or magistrate pools at least at the regional 
level, and from enhancing, through a similar approach, the cooperation 
at the EU level.
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lIST OF INTERvIEwEES
Expert Role and Institution Area
IT-E1 Head of Flying Squad – State Police Region of Trentino-Alto Adige
IT-E2 Prosecutor at Anti-Mafia District Directorate Region of Trentino-Alto Adige
IT-E3 Head Foreign Organised Crime
and Prostitution Unit – State Police
Region of Trentino-Alto Adige
IT-E4 Prosecutor at Anti-Mafia District Directorate Region of Piedmont
IT-E5 Head of Flying Squad – State Police Region of Piedmont
IT-E6 Head of Foreign Organised Crime
and Prostitution Unit – State Police
Region of Piedmont
IT-E7 Head of Flying Squad – State Police Region of Liguria
IT-E8 Professional, non-profit association Mimosa Region of Veneto
IT-E9 Prosecutor at Anti-Mafia District Directorate Region Emilia-Romagna
IT-E10 Head of Anti-Crime Unit – State Police Region Emilia-Romagna
IT-E11 Professional No profit Association On The Road Region Abruzzo
IT-E12 Head Flying Squad – State Police Region Umbria
IT-E13 Agency of Monopolies Region Latium
IT-E14 Officer at the Guardia di Finanza, Excise
and Revenue Police – Group on Investigation
of Organised Crime
Region Latium
IT-E15 Head of Central Operative Service (SCO) –
State Police
Region Latium
IT-E16 Professional, non-profit association Terra!Onlus Region Latium
IT-E17 Professional, Social Cooperative PARSEC Region Latium
IT-E18 Prosecutor at Anti-Mafia District Directorate Region Campania
IT-E19 Head Flying Squad – State Police Region Calabria
IT-E20 Prosecutor (previously Anti-Mafia District 
Directorate)
Region Sicily
IT-E21 Prosecutor at Anti-Mafia District Directorate Region Sicily
IT-E22 Officer Flying Squad – State Police Region Sicily
IT-E23 Professional (ex-victim of labour exploitation),
non-profit association NoCap
Region Sicily
IT-E24 Prosecutor (previously Anti-Mafia District 
Directorate)
Region Sicily
IT-E25 Freelance journalist Region Lombardy
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1In the Netherlands human trafficking became a matter of public and 
political importance in the 1990s, following international concern about 
the issue. When speaking of trafficking for sexual exploitation, however, 
civil concern and activism against trafficking in women already existed 
long before that, notably in the forms of a moral panic about “white 
slavery” at the turn of the 19th century (e.g. Doezema, 1999) and concern 
about Asian women coming to work in the Dutch sex industry in the 
1970s and 1980s. The Foundation Action Group against Trafficking in 
Women (Stichting Actiegroep tegen Vrouwenhandel, abbreviated: STV) 
originated in 1987 and fought trafficking in women in the slipstream of 
the general movement for women’s emancipation.2 In the 1990s, after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Netherlands saw an increase in East 
European women working in the Dutch sex industry – a trend other west 
European countries witnessed as well. The Netherlands became the first 
country to legally differentiate between women who voluntarily worked 
in prostitution, and those being forced to do so. Several organisations 
pleaded in the 1990s for a national rapporteur on human trafficking, 
who eventually was appointed in 2000 following The Hague Declaration 
of the European Union in 1997.3 In 2017, on its 30th anniversary, 
STV changed its name into CoMensha (Foundation Coordination Centre 
Human Trafficking) to express the broadened area of concern from 
trafficking in women for sexual exploitation to different kinds of trafficking 
in persons, affecting both men, women and children. At present, labour 
trafficking as well as trafficking for other purposes (e.g. organ harvesting) 
fall within the scope of the Coordination Centre, at least formally. We 
can, however, safely claim that trafficking for sexual exploitation, by far, 
draws most of the civil and law enforcement’s attention when compared 
to other forms of trafficking, such as labour exploitation.
Labour exploitation, as a manifestation of trafficking in human beings, 
only recently has received attention in the Netherlands. As late as 2005, 
labour exploitation was criminalised in the Dutch Criminal Code as a 
result of international legal obligations (Law of 9 December 2004, STB. 
2004, 645). However, at that time it was not clear at all whether and, if 
so, to what extent labour exploitation posed an actual problem in the 
Dutch labour market (Parliamentary Paper II, 2003/04, 29291, 3; see also 
the research of Van der Leun & Vervoorn, 2004). Until then, the shadow 
side of the Dutch labour market mostly fell within the sphere of illegal 
work and workers, and connected fields of labour law and immigration 
1 We thank all our respondents for their time and energy, without which this research would 
not have succeeded. We, furthermore, thank research assistants Marianne Sijtsma and Tineke 
Hendrikse for their contributions to this project.
2 See: http://www.comensha.nl/pagina/30jaar, retrieved 08/02/2018.
3 See: https://www.nationaalrapporteur.nl/Over/geschiedenis/, retrieved 08/02/2018.
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law (Van der Leun, 2010). However, over the past decade, and especially 
in the past couple of years, the attention towards labour exploitation in 
the Netherlands increased considerably. This is illustrated, for example, 
by the fact that since 2014 it is one of the priorities of the Task Force 
on trafficking in human beings (THB) (see also section 1). Moreover, 
one of the priorities when the Netherlands held the Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union in 2016 was increasing EU efforts against 
THB for labour exploitation. In the same spirit, the Dutch Inspectorate 
for Social Affairs and Employment (ISZW) developed a new program to 
tackle labour exploitation in 2017 (see section 4 in this report). Also, 
efforts of NGO’s such as FairWork in tackling THB in the Netherlands 
can be mentioned in this regard.4
In Dutch criminal law, multiple offences criminalise conduct that may 
fall under the definition of “trafficking in human beings” as adhered 
to in this report. One can think of specific provisions of labour law, 
immigration law, sexual offences, offences against the person or fraud 
offences. Yet the offence that is considered to be the core offence of 
THB and that is used to implement the most important international 
legal obligations on THB for the Netherlands, is laid down in article 273f 
of the Dutch Criminal Code (DCC).
Article 273f DCC is a very long and complex provision. Under influence 
of both various international legal obligations and national (policy) 
developments, mostly in the field of prostitution, the provision has 
come to encompass many paragraphs and subparagraphs that criminalise 
various forms and stages of human trafficking (Alink & Wiarda, 2010).5 In 
short, article 273f DCC criminalises the actual trafficking in human beings 
and trafficking in minors with a view to exploitation – here the definition 
closely resembles the definition of THB in the Palermo Protocol – conduct 
close to the actual exploitation and the actual exploitation, profiting from 
the exploitation, and forcing or inducing profits from exploitation. Minors 
are especially protected in the provision at various points.
Exploitation – which is central to the various forms of THB laid down 
in article 273f DCC – includes, but is not limited to, the exploitation of 
another person in prostitution, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
or compulsory labour or services including mendicancy, slavery, slavery-
like practices, servitude and exploitation of criminal activities. For the 
interpretation of these concepts, the international instruments that have 
influenced the development of article 273f DCC and case law, both at 
4 See: https://www.fairwork.nu/wie_zijn_wij/, retrieved 09/02/2018.
5 These international legal obligations that have been of influence on the development and 
wording of article 273f DCC stem from, amongst others: International Convention for the 
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic Paris, 4 May 1910; International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children Geneva, 30 September 1921; International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age Geneva, 11 October 
1933, The Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery 1926; the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Protocol); 
the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings; the Council 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings; 
Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.
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the national and at the international level, are important.6 Yet, article 
273f DCC is broader and covers more forms of exploitation.7 In order to 
determine whether there is a situation of exploitation, case law shows 
that various factors that may point to exploitation should be weighed.8 
An analysis of both national and international case law shows that these 
factors include: the type of the work, the duration, the working conditions 
and, if applicable, also the housing conditions, the restrictions that follow 
from the work, the received income, the economic profit for the offender, 
the age of the victim, and the level of involuntariness and unavoidability. 
Dutch standards function as the benchmark in weighing all these factors. 
For example, one could take the Dutch legal minimum wage into account 
(for the analysis, see Schaap, 2017). The upshot of this is that, for 
example, in case a woman used to work voluntarily in prostitution while 
retaining some freedom of movement, the situation can still be regarded 
as exploitative if other circumstances (e.g. the use of force in combination 
with giving up her income) tip the scales to exploitation.
At this point, it is important to note that article 273f DCC carries the 
label “trafficking in human beings,” but is based on a broad conception of 
trafficking of human beings that includes but is broader than the definition 
of THB provided by the Palermo Protocol. Moreover, the legislative work 
on human trafficking allows for a broader criminal protection than the 
Netherlands is legally obliged to implement following all international 
instruments on THB the Netherlands is bound by (Alink & Wiarda, 
2010: 214), as is illustrated by the definition of exploitation as set out 
above. Yet, this is also the consequence of the conduct that is criminalised 
under article 273f DCC such as the profiting from the exploitation laid 
down in subsection 6 which brings people normally operating in the 
background of the exploitation within the reach of the criminal law. 
This subsection has a purely national origin (See Parliamentary Papers 
II 1996/97, 25437, 3, 9). Since article 273f DCC is at the core of the 
criminal prosecutions in the Netherlands, the conduct criminalised in the 
provision as such is reflected in our collected data.9 Yet, in this regard it 
must be noted that in case law, even though the Dutch Supreme Court 
has provided more guidance over the past couple of years, article 273f 
DCC is not always interpreted in a consistent manner nor is the guidance 
of the Supreme Court applied in a consistent manner in lower case law 
(Van der Leun 2013; Nationaal Rapporteur 2017. In the context of labour 
exploitation see also Schaap, 2017, chapter 5).
6 A more detailed discussion of all these forms of exploitation goes beyond the scope of this 
contribution. For now, it suffices to know that their meaning can be obtained by considering 
for example the case law and guidance of the ECtHR on art. 4 of the ECHR, which lays down 
the prohibition of slavery and forced labour.
7 As is apparent from the text article 273f (2) DCC. See A-G Knigge in his conclusion of Supreme 
Court 27 October 2009, ELCLI:NL:HR:2009:BI7099.
8 Supreme Court 27 October 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI7099; See also Supreme Court 24 No-
vember 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3309 with regard to weighing these factors in case a minor is 
involved.
9 This research focused, as made clear later in this section (under the heading Data Collection), on 
human trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation. We framed these two offences conform 
the National Rapporteur, who differentiates exploitation within the sex industry and exploita-
tion outside of the sex industry – the latter consisting of the modalities labour exploitation, 
forced services and exploitation of criminal activities. Our research, besides sexual exploitation 
mainly focused on labour exploitation, although the dividing line between the two may often 
be vague.
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Neither prostitution nor the profiting from prostitution are illegal in the 
Netherlands. Since the lifting of the ban on brothels in 2000 one can 
legally run a prostitution business, provided that one has a licence and 
complies with the rules implied in it. Nevertheless, the “criminogenic” 
character of the sex industry has been emphasised in media and political 
discourse since the end of the last decennium. More repressive local 
measures towards (visible) prostitution have been observed ever since. 
Self-help organisations for sex workers, health-related NGO’s, and critical 
academic scholars claim that the increasingly repressive measures and the 
equation of sex work with human trafficking are the result of a Dutch 
moral panic on, firstly, the phenomenon of the so called “lover-boys” 
(e.g. Bovenkerk et al., 2006; Outshoorn, 2012), and secondly on human 
trafficking.10 The latter started with two large, international trafficking 
“signal crimes” (Innes, 2014) called the ”Sneep” and the “Koolvis” cases 
(respectively in 2008 and 2009).11 Since 2009, the Dutch government has 
been debating a new law on prostitution (”Law regulating prostitution 
and suppressing abuse in the sex industry”), which should address 
this supposed criminogenic character. It imposes stricter regulation of 
prostitution, for instance through an obligation for sex workers to register 
with local authorities and the lifting of the legal age to work in the sex 
industry from 18 to 21. It also investigates the possibility to make the 
client of prostitution punishable by law, if he would have reasonable 
grounds to be aware that the sex worker is a victim of trafficking.12
This particular framing of the sex industry as directly intertwined with 
human trafficking and exploitation has caused a sharp turn away from a 
tolerant approach towards, and progressive legalisation of prostitution, to 
“adopting a strict regulation of all prostitution” (Outshoorn, 2012: 233) in 
the Netherlands. This is most to the discontent of sex worker organisations, 
which claim that stricter policies will encourage sex workers to go 
underground, thereby making incidences of exploitation ever less visible 
(Oude Breuil & Siegel, 2012; Gibly, 2012).
Data collection
For this report three research methods were combined: desk research on 
relevant academic studies and policy papers; semi-structured interviews with 
law enforcement, governmental and non-governmental organisations and 
other stakeholders related to THB; and file analysis of police and court cases.
In total, 11 interviews with a total number of 17 experts were conducted.13 
Most interviews were face-to-face and semi-structured. Three interviews 
10 See Siegel, 2015 or Oude Breuil & Siegel, 2012 for the Netherlands or Weitzer, 2007 for an 
international perspective on the moral panic on human trafficking for sexual exploitation.
11 See on the Sneep case: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-case-law-case-law/
sneep-case_en, and on the Koolvis case: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-
case-law-case-law/koolvis-case_en, retrieved 08/02/2018.
12 We see an anticipation of the eventual adoption of this law already reflected in the so-called 
Valkenburg vice case (Valkenburgse zedenzaak) tried in 2016, which manifested a strong 
emphasis on the prosecution of over 30 clients of a 16-year-old trafficking victim. See: https://
www.om.nl/onderwerpen/valkenburgse/, retrieved 08/02/2018.
13 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of the 
code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert. The description of the background of the 
individual sources referenced can be found in the list of interviewees in the references section.
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were held by telephone, due to time constraints on both the respondents’ 
and the researchers’ side, and were, where necessary, followed up by 
email-correspondence. The interviews where transcribed and analysed by 
the Dutch country research team. This shared analysis ensured researcher 
triangulation, which enhances the validity of the project findings.
Besides the desk-research and interviews 14 (confidential) cases of THB 
for sexual exploitation were examined, next to 11 publicly available court 
reports on THB for labour exploitation.14 The 14 cases of sexual exploitation 
cannot be generalised, as they have a regional bias, due to the fact that 
we could only access these particular files. However, we chose as diverse 
set of cases as possible in terms of the following variables: size of the 
trafficking network; domestic/foreign case; number of perpetrators/victims; 
modus operandi et cetera, in order to prevent a selection bias in those 
respects. Initially a large sample of 33 court files of sexual exploitation that 
happened within the Region Middle Netherlands in the last 5 years were 
screened and 11 cases were selected for content analysis. The last two 
cases (NL-CC13 and 14) were related, in the sense that the same victims 
appeared in them, although the traffickers did not seem to be related. 
The 11 cases consisted of 19 files, meaning that in some cases, multiple 
suspects, who were separately tried before court, were implied. Thus, by 
“case” we refer to an incidence of exploitation in a certain exploitative 
setting. The number of files per case does not say anything about the 
number of victims (one suspect could have one or more victims, just 
like two or more suspects can have, in theory, one or more victims). 
It does say something, however, about the complexity of the trafficking 
network: cases with more files are generally concerning larger networks 
of greater complexity. Next to the 11 court cases of the Region Middle 
Netherlands (NL-CC4 to CC14), we added another 3 confidential cases 
of our police respondents (NL-PC1 to PC3). For reasons of anonymity we 
cannot elaborate on the concerned region.
The files on sexual exploitation (cases 1 to 14: PC1 to CC14 on sexual 
exploitation) were different in content and richness from the information 
in the court reports (CRP1 to CRP11 on labour exploitation), which is not 
surprising as the court and police files were confidential data for which 
we needed clearance, whereas the court reports were published and, 
therefore, publicly available.15 The depth of the available information in 
both kinds of files, however, was not a problem in this research, as the 
files were not to be compared. THB for labour and sexual exploitation 
are two such different modalities that they needed to be analysed 
separately, anyway. The files were coded and analysed separately and 
will be separately treated in the report under each heading. See section 2 
for an elaboration on the cases.
Using three different methods – desk-research, semi-structured interviewing 
and file analysis – ensured methodological and data triangulation, which 
enhances the validity in qualitative research.
14 The cases have been coded and are referred to in the text with their code; they are listed in 
the “List of studies cases” table in the references section.
15 Available at www.rechtspraak.nl
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The Netherlands serves both as a destination and source country for 
human trafficking and is among the five countries of western Europe 
recording the highest number of trafficking victims (Shelley, 2014). 
Human trafficking is classified along two main axes by authorities 
like the National Rapporteur on human trafficking (Nationaal Rapporteur 
Mensenhandel en Seksueel Geweld tegen Kinderen): sexual versus non-sexual 
exploitation on the one hand, and domestic versus cross-border forms 
of human trafficking on the other hand. This results in a distinction of 
four types of human trafficking. Domestic sexual exploitation oftentimes 
concerns exploitation via the so-called lover-boy method, in which 
young males feign a love relationship to make (often minor, Dutch) girls 
dependent on them and drag them into sexual exploitation. Secondly, 
in cross-border sexual exploitation foreigners, foremost women from 
east European countries like Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, or west 
African women are victimised by criminal groups that have a certain 
level of organisation. They are legally or illegally transferred to the 
Netherlands and put to work in the sex industry. Sexual exploitation in 
the twenty-first century is oftentimes facilitated by the Internet; likewise, 
political and law enforcement awareness about digital forms of sexual 
exploitation is increasing and must be further addressed (Nationaal 
Rapporteur 2017a). The third and fourth type of THB distinguished 
are domestic and cross-border exploitation outside the sex industry. 
Labour exploitation spans both categories.
Foreign victims of labour exploitation are typically from east European 
countries and Asia. Based on the statistics of the National Rapporteur, 
the sectors in which labour exploitation occurs the most seem to be 
constantly changing. This, however, is probably caused by the impact 
of the detection and prosecution of large cases on the statistics. 
Typical risk sectors include agriculture, forestry, the catering industry 
and housework including au pairs. Considering the predominance of 
law enforcing institutions’ attention to exploitation within the sex-
industry (Bos et al., 2016; Heemskeerk & Rijken, 2011, Smit, 2011), 
we can safely assume that the number of labour exploitation cases 
hides a considerable dark figure. In view of the migration and refugee 
inflows and deregulation of the labour markets, labour exploitation is, 
according to a study conducted by the ISZW, expected to increase 
in the upcoming years (Inspectie SZW 2017). Between 2011 and 
2015, 41 investigations on labour exploitation were conducted by the 
Inspectorate SZW. Seventeen investigations were completed in 2016 
(Inspectie SZW 2017).
Victims of human trafficking are registered at the Coordination Centre 
for Human Trafficking (Coördinatiecentrum Mensenhandel, hereafter: 
CoMensha); their numbers concern notifications of possible victims of 
human trafficking. CoMensha is responsible for the national reporting, 
registration and coordination of human trafficking victims known to 
different authorities or persons. The number of registered victims is 
declining in the last years, from 1.287 in 2012 to 952 registered victims in 
1. MARKET OvERvIEw
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2016.16 In the period between 2012 and 2016, about 60% of registered 
victims belong to the first two categories of human trafficking, pertaining 
to sexual exploitation. Sex trafficking is therefore, according to registries at 
CoMensha, more prevalent in the Netherlands than exploitation outside 
the sex industry. The group of sexually exploited victims comprises 
43.9% Dutch nationals in 2016; compared to 56.1% foreigners.
In total, 61.3% of all registered victims of human trafficking at CoMensha 
in 2016 are foreigners. Cross-border exploitation outside the sex industry 
is superior in numbers to domestic exploitation outside the sex industry 
(90.1% of victims outside the sex industry were foreigners in period 
between 2012 and 2016). Of the 244 registered victims outside the 
sex industry, labour exploitation counts for 82.5%. The rest percentage 
concerns other forms of exploitation (such as organ trafficking or the 
exploitation of criminal activities of minors). The group of victims outside 
the sex industry, in contrast to victims of sexual exploitation, is comprising 
equally of men and women.
The national report on human trafficking points out that the assessed 
number of victims of human trafficking is very high. The National 
Rapporteur recently published, for the first time, an estimation of the 
total amount of victims besides their usual numbers on registered victims 
of human trafficking. It is estimated that annually between 5,000 and 
7,500 persons become victims of human trafficking in the Netherlands 
(Nationaal Rapporteur, 2017a). On average, one can therefore speak of 
6,250 human trafficking victims each year. The number of registered 
victims at CoMensha is thus, supposedly, about six times smaller than 
the estimated total number, which implies a high dark number of 
victims. Estimations are based on the method of MSE (multiple systems 
estimation), which allows for estimations of the number of victims that 
do not appear in official databases based on how registered victims 
are distributed across various registries (e.g. police, Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment, care institutions and regional coordinators for 
human trafficking). The MSE-estimation combines numbers of registered 
victims of human trafficking in a 6-year period. Considering the fact 
that generally more public and law enforcement attention is paid to 
sexual exploitation than to labour exploitation (or other forms of human 
trafficking, such as organ trade), we can safely assume that not all forms 
of human trafficking have the same dark number. Thus, the estimates 
should be read with caution, or even scepticism.
According to the National Rapporteur (2017b) an increasing proportion of 
human trafficking remains out of sight due to shifts in enforcement priori-
ties and a growing lack in expertise and capacity of responsible authori-
ties. The number of registered cases at the Public Prosecution Service 
(Openbaar Ministerie, hereafter: PPS) serves as another indicator of this 
negative trend. Whereas in 2014, 282 cases were registered, this number 
decreased by 22% to 220 cases in 2016 of which in 103 cases a sentence 
was passed. Additionally, 30% of cases were dropped due to insufficient 
16 Both numbers do not consider victims exclusively reported by KMar who, since the judgment 
of the Supreme Court of 17 May 2016, belong to the group of sub-3 cases without exploitation 
(e.g. cross-border prostitution) and can no longer be regarded as THB.
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evidence in 2015 (Nationaal Rapporteur, 2017a). The developments say 
little or nothing about the extent of or trends in the phenomenon itself 
as they might correlate with, for instance, investigative capacity and priori-
tisation. The dwindling of case numbers, the drop of the conviction rate 
and the average duration of imposed unconditional custodial sentences 
might also indicate that the criminal justice system conveys a too broad 
or vague concept of human trafficking (van Kempen, 2017: 2).
An increase in the available budget in 2017 and 2018 should, according 
to the National Rapporteur (Nationaal Rapporteur, 2017a: 16) strengthen 
and intensify the tackling of human trafficking17 and the (upcoming) new 
law on prostitution (“Law regulating prostitution and suppressing abuse 
in the sex industry”) should further help combat human trafficking and 
organised crime within the Dutch sex industry, it is claimed, as it would 
allow for stricter regulation of prostitution (see Introduction). The firm 
belief, however, that these measures will lead to an increased control 
over abusive conditions in the Dutch sex industry is refuted by self-help 
organisations and critical scholars, who consider further stigmatisation 
and criminalisation of the sex industry as a deterioration of labour 
conditions and transparency in the industry.
Since the lifting of the ban on brothels in 2000, legal prostitution in 
the Netherlands has comprised of licensed companies, like window 
prostitution, sex clubs or escort companies on the one hand, and non-
licensed companies or independent prostitutes in municipalities with 
no licence obligation, on the other hand (Daalder, 2007; Nationaal 
Rapporteur, 2017b; Outshoorn, 2012). Paradoxically, prostitution at private, 
indoor locations, as one of the most invisible forms of prostitution, has 
been and remains the most common form of sexual exploitation in 
the latest human trafficking report (41% of 1.383 registered victims of 
sexual exploitation between 2012 – 2016 in which the specific sector 
of prostitution is known; Nationaal Rapporteur, 2017a). This argument 
further bolsters the plea for a new prostitution law, which also aims 
to put escort services under stricter regulation. However, the increase 
might very well have to do precisely with the more repressive stance 
on prostitution, as the current diminishing of legal and visible places to 
do sex work (e.g. legal window prostitution areas have been closed in 
parts of The Hague, Amsterdam, Utrecht and several smaller cities in the 
Netherlands, see: Siegel, 2015) could have urged sex workers to switch 
to less visible and less regulated settings. The result is a market of a 
few legal (licenced and non-licenced, if a licence is not necessary) and 
monitored sex industries, and a supposedly numerically bigger share of 
illegal or criminal sex enterprises. Another remarkable trend, according 
to the public prosecuting office and an NGO that assists individuals 
confronted with domestic, sexual and honour-based violence, is the 
growing involvement of very young girls in prostitution, sometimes as 
young as 11 years old. The NGO employee, quoted from a national news 
website, attributes this growth to the importance of internet and social 
media, which make it easier to recruit girls for prostitution (NOS 2018).
17 Bos, Loyens, Nagy and Oude Breuil (2016) similarly claim that in the case of trafficking 
in minors for exploitation of criminal activities, the expertise and capacities are lacking to 
properly identify and treat such cases.
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The Netherlands has an “integrated approach” of combatting human 
trafficking, referring to a focus on prevention, protection, repression and 
cooperation of different government and non-government organisations 
in human trafficking policy (Harbers 28/11/2017), including administrative 
enforcement, but with criminal prosecution as a keystone (Alink & 
Wiarda, 2010). In the context of this integrated approach, there seems 
to be an informal division of tasks, according to which the Dutch police 
sees criminal prosecution of traffickers as their main goal, leaving the 
protection of victims mainly to civil organisations and NGOs (Oude Breuil 
et al., 2011: 37). With the Task Force Human Trafficking (Task Force Aanpak 
Mensenhandel), a collaboration of different parties involved in combating 
human trafficking was introduced in 2008 (Heemskeerk & Rijken, 2011; 
Nationaal Rapporteur, 2017a). In the Task Force, each party has its 
own responsibilities when it comes to tackling human trafficking and/or 
supporting victims. This division of tasks carries the risk of confusing 
victims and other involved parties as to which partner organisation 
they should turn to. Moreover, it implies a risk of undiscovered cases if 
cooperation between involved parties is ineffective and indications for 
human trafficking are not recognised (Nationaal Rapporteur, 2017a). The 
“barrier model” is (still) the leading policy approach in combatting human 
trafficking in the Netherlands. In this approach, based on situational 
prevention theory, different institutions (such as the tax authority, 
municipalities, police, chamber of commerce, housing corporations, et 
cetera) work together to “mount barriers” with the purpose of disrupting 
the human trafficking business process.
With regard to labour exploitation, the present research (interviews 
and file research) revealed two prevalent forms in the Netherlands. 
Firstly, organised labour exploitation in companies in which temporary 
employment agencies are often (but not necessarily) a facilitating player. 
Characteristic of this type of labour exploitation is the involvement of 
multiple victims, mainly from eastern Europe or Turkey. Secondly, there is 
one-on-one labour exploitation in cases of au pairs or smaller businesses 
like restaurants. According to our respondents (NL-E8, NL-E13), organised 
labour exploitation is more prevalent in the Netherlands. However, cases 
of exploiting au pairs are increasing or becoming more visible in recent 
years (NL-E14).
Both types of labour exploitation can often be regarded as family 
businesses, as suspects of labour exploitation usually operate with 
their spouse, siblings or within their extended family (NL-E8, NL-E13, 
NL-E14). Another remarkable characteristic is the exploitation of fellow 
countrymen. Labour exploitation can thus be characterised as an intra-
ethnic phenomenon. In the case of the exploitation of au pairs, this 
would mean that for instance a Brazilian woman living in the Netherlands 
organises young women to migrate from Brazil to the Netherlands for 
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANISATION 
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housekeeping jobs (NL- CRP6). According to FairWork and the Inspectorate 
SZW (NL-E8, NL-E13), exploiters are either own family members or 
acquaintances in cases of one-on-one labour exploitation or “dubious 
temporary employment agencies” (NL-E9, NL-E14) in the case of organised 
labour exploitation. Additionally, labour migrants are oftentimes put to 
work behind the scene or closed doors (cleaning, cooking, au pair) or 
out of public view (seasonal workers).
The recruitment modus operandi can often be described as an “all-
inclusive” package with which recruits are approached. In these all-
inclusive packages transport from the country of origin, work place and 
accommodation in the Netherlands as well as transport from housing to 
the work place are arranged by the exploiting parties or accomplices. 
They create a situation of total isolation, dependency, and control. In the 
case of a Chinese restaurant, the victim was accommodated in a room 
above the restaurant, which was secured and controlled by an alarm 
system that was activated at night, to which the victim did not know the 
code. Consequently, the victim was effectively restricted in his freedom 
of movement (NL-CRP7).
Travel to the Netherlands is arranged in some cases. In other cases, 
workers arrange and pay for the travel themselves. The funds required 
for the travel are oftentimes either borrowed from relatives or future 
employers (NL-E13). The travel sum may then be used as raison 
d’être for a form of bonded labour. Accordingly, the migrant workers 
are in a stringent debt relationship with their exploiters. Debts are 
paid off gradually through later job earnings. Although such a system 
might give the impression that migrant workers are not necessarily 
forced to enter “fortress Europe” to work under hazardous conditions 
(Andrees, 2008), some form of coercion, or profiting from someone’s 
(financially instable and therefore) vulnerable position, is employed at 
this stage, and is further induced by false promises. Moreover, the 
line between poor working conditions and labour exploitation is 
often blurry (Hiah & Staring, 2013; Van Ellemeet, 2007), which can 
partly explain our finding that victims and suspects do not always 
identify themselves as such (NL-E13). That is, they legitimise the act 
of exploitation through culturally shared expectations on working 
conditions (Hiah & Staring, 2013).
Temporary employment agencies either operate in workers’ countries of 
origin or, recently becoming more prevalent, the Netherlands (NL-E8). In 
the first case, they advertise for better work in the Netherlands and profit 
from more deprived working conditions and lower salaries in the country 
of origin. Labour migrants are easy targets due to their limited proficiency 
in the Dutch language, their lack of knowledge of Dutch laws and rights, 
their limited access to the legal labour market and therefore – when 
illegally working – a lack of alternatives and a general fear of authorities 
(Van Ellemeet, 2007). The focus of employment agencies is usually on 
seasonal work, the Inspectorate for Social Affairs and Employment (NL-
E13) points out. If work is provided through temporary employment 
agencies, usually two parties are involved: the agency itself and a 
hiring company. In that case, exploitation can take place on both ends, 
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	the	netherlands	 305
meaning that the temporary employment agency as well as the hiring 
company profit by extracting money from the migrants. The interviews 
(NL-E14) have shown that the lines between the two companies can 
be blurred to the extent that one party is involved rather than two, as 
both the agency and hiring company might be owned by one and the 
same person. Family businesses which cooperate are another possibility. 
In these constructions, different family members own different businesses 
involved in the commission of labour exploitation (e.g. NL-CRP5).
With regard to human trafficking for sexual exploitation, based on the 
studied cases (NL-PC1 to NL-CC14) we can conclude that it is elucidating 
to categorise the encountered “business models” in four main categories 
or typologies.
The first category concerns domestic human trafficking cases, in which 
there is generally no international component, nor an extended, organised 
trafficking network. The pimps are Dutch young men – according to 
some respondents (e.g. NL-E14; NL-E1, 2, 3, 5 & 6; see also: Verwijs et al 
2011) often with a migrant background – who have only one or a limited 
number of girls working for them. Although the pimp might have friends 
who are also into pimping, they are generally not part of an organised 
trafficking ring or network, in the sense that no sophisticated distribution 
of tasks exists. The modus operandi is known in the Netherlands as the 
lover-boy method. This refers to the strategy of grooming and socially 
isolating the victim, so that she falls in love and becomes emotionally 
dependent on the pimp (Verwijs et al 2011). Victims are generally 
Dutch girls who are of minor age when the grooming begins. They are 
often easy targets, namely girls who have limited intellectual abilities or 
mild psychological disorders (e.g. NL-CC8, and this also came forward 
in several of the expert interviews), grew up with dysfunctional family 
relations, were interned at youth institutions (see also: Verwijs et al 
2011) or have low self-esteem. The pimp will specifically target such 
girls, making them believe that “love” is mutual. Through a narrative 
of him being indebted to a friend, which can be settled if she has 
sex with the friend, she will be drawn into sexual exploitation in the 
confined space of an apartment. Having sex with the pimp’s friends 
will become a more regular activity she is convinced or coerced into. 
This evolves into her having multiple clients outside of the pimp’s social 
network (still in a private apartment, or in a hotel room) and eventually 
ends up in a window prostitution area upon becoming 18 years old. 
Cases NL-CC5, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 could be typified as domestic cases 
with such lover-boy modus, and without an extensive criminal network, 
although these cases differ in their number of victims per case – from 
one victim (NL-CC8) to two (NL-CC9 and 10) and three (NL-CC5). 
Moreover, in one of these cases (NL-CC13&14) two pimps seemingly 
worked together as their respective victims overlapped and claimed to 
be working for three pimps of the same ethnic background. Although 
this might point towards a more organised form of domestic trafficking, 
we still classify it in the first category; there was no international 
component, the degree of organisation seemed to be still relatively 
low and the modus operandi clearly matched the other cases in this 
category.
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The second type are run by Dutch perpetrators as well, but they 
exhibit a larger degree of organisation and, moreover, often have an 
international component in the sense that (some of) the traffickers’ 
victims are coming from abroad. The trafficker or pimp, who has 
Dutch nationality or has a stable residence permit in the Netherlands, 
employs third parties to facilitate part of the work. He might, thus, 
outsource tasks such as: a) recruiting girls18 in (generally) eastern Europe; 
b) transporting girls to the Netherlands; c) assisting the girl – once in 
the Netherlands – to acquire a tax number, inscribe at the Chamber 
of Commerce or a housing corporation, or rent a window; d) offering 
one’s home address as postal address; e) driving the girl to the (window) 
prostitution area; f) other small services, such as buying condoms and 
lubricants, et cetera. The victims in these cases are Dutch girls, girls 
from eastern Europe, Greece or another EU country that is linked, for 
example, to the migratory roots of the perpetrator. Case NL-CC4 (and see 
also NL-CC6 and 11) is an example of this type: two men who appear 
to be friends and know each other’s victims, and who have overlapping 
acquaintances who are in the pimping business as well, exploit two 
(possibly three) women in one and the same prostitution area in a 
Dutch town. From their court files it becomes clear that they probably 
both run their own businesses, but do spend time together, giving each 
other advice and going to brothels together. Both of them employ third 
parties to facilitate their businesses and some of these third parties even 
overlap. By way of illustration, one exploiter demands a female sex 
worker to assist his newly recruited girl in renting a window and other 
administrative tasks in return for a small fee. Likewise, the exploiter 
maintains professional relationships both with a recruiter in another 
European country and with a Dutch taxi driver who brings the girl to 
the prostitution area. The other exploiter, in his turn, pays someone to 
offer his postal address to the girl, et cetera. The lover-boy tactic might 
initially play a role here as well – in the sense of making the girl fall 
in love, as well as isolating her by taking her identity papers, smashing 
laptops, mobile phones, et cetera – but the women are generally older 
and more experienced than in the above type case, and consequently 
show more resilience and initiative. Interesting in this regard is that 
we found examples of online recruitment (e.g. NL-CC4). The means of 
coercion may include severe violence, or the threat of violence (e.g. 
“Wherever you go, I will find you and I will kill you,” NL-CC4) but can 
also involve subtler modes of persuasion, for instance through pointing 
out the opportunity to earn a lot of money and applying some form of 
debt bondage (i.e. she is told that she owes him money for the travel, 
rent, et cetera). There are also examples of victims with a religious or 
conservative background being forced by the threat of exposure (e.g. 
by pictures taken, NL-E5, 6). The means of coercion show an important 
difference with the next type of trafficking for sexual purposes: threats 
of violence are in the above type generally limited to the victim herself 
(as that is the only person within easy reach of the Dutch pimp), 
whereas in the following category, they may extend to family members 
in east European home countries.
18 In the cases studied, only girls figured as victims. Also in the larger sample of 33 cases we 
have not come across a case in which the victim was a man/boy.
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In the third category we find cases in which both victims and pimps or 
perpetrators come from abroad, mainly eastern Europe – particularly 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria (e.g. NL-E1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and NL-E14). The 
prostitution business they run is generally a family business (as we 
already claimed in section 1 of this report) and some respondents 
(e.g. NL-E14) mentioned the Roma origin of some of these families. 
Case NL-CC12 is a clear example of this, as both the pimp and his 
victim are of Romanian origin. Information from the police surveillance 
(namely telephone taps) clearly shows that the pimp’s family members 
in Romania are involved in the business, as the mother regularly calls 
to discuss how business goes, and the father sends new girls to the 
pimp, who stays in the Netherlands. The interviewed lawyer, NL-E14, 
also comments on this type of trafficking:
“It is often a family. Father and son, uncle and who-knows-whom. 
Or they come from the same village, are neighbours and the brother 
of the one is married to the sister of the other, that kind of cross-
connections. Brothers-in-law… yes, family relations. (…) [Sometimes 
the victim has been] the girlfriend of one of them and there is also a 
child. And the child then stays with the mother of one of her pimps. 
Awful constructions which make it very difficult to press charges. 
(…) A couple of women in this situation do not see their children 
anymore.”
The trafficking network is generally quite flexible; when one of its 
members gets arrested, another family member (son, brother, nephew, 
son-in-law, NL-E14) will take over. There is some kind of hierarchy in 
the sense that the head of a family runs the business from the source 
country, but apart from that, the network is flexible and can easily adapt. 
Victims are oftentimes also part of the family as the wives or girlfriends 
of the pimps. Coercion strategies generally coincide with authority and 
gender structures in these families, or, if the victims are unrelated, with 
local perceptions of such families as powerful and dangerous.
The fourth and last category was mentioned to us in our interviews 
with the police and FIU-the Netherlands (NL-E1, 2 & 3, and NL-E11 & 
12, see also: OM 2016; Van Reisen et al., 2012: 30-32), and consists 
of trafficking cases related to migration routes from the African 
continent and the Middle East.19 (This might have to do with the fact 
that our files were from the Region Middle Netherlands. Cases related 
to refugee and migration routes might rather be found at regions next 
to the Dutch border or those which have an airport.) The above-
mentioned migration and refugee flows coming from these regions 
(and our FIU-the Netherlands respondents, NL-E11 & 12 particularly 
mentioned Libya as an area where both smuggling and trafficking take 
place) produce a vulnerable population which consists of easy targets 
for traffickers and smugglers.
We have summarised the above-mentioned types or categories in Table 1. 
It should be taken into account that our case-study sample is not 
19 We did not encounter such cases in the court files.
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representative for the illegal market as a whole; after all, only a limited 
number of files could be studies, and they were all from one region in 
the Netherlands. Moreover, some cases might exhibit such organisational 
sophistication that they are less easily identified and investigated – such 
cases existing in the Netherlands are illustrated by the Sneep and 
Koolvis cases, for example (see footnote 11). Therefore, Table 1 should 
not be read as an extensive overview of all possible forms of trafficking 
organisations in the Netherlands, but, rather, as a categorisation of the 
cases studied in this research.
ТаBle 1. typology oF cases oF human traFFicking For sexual exploitation 
studied in this research
Source: File research & interviews, Oude Breuil, Schaap & Merz, 2018.
Case type name
Trafficker 
Foreign/
Domestic
Trafficked 
Foreign/
Domestic
Family 
business?
level of 
organisation
Outsourcing
Domestic
lover-boy cases
D D No Low; individual 
business
No, barely
Dutch/foreign 
organised cases
D D&F No Employ one or 
more facilitators
Yes, one or
more tasks
Foreign family 
businesses
F F Yes Family network 
structure; everyone 
his/her own task; 
patriarch on top
Yes, several tasks 
within family
Foreign, 
migration-related 
cases
F F ? Network structure Yes, flexible 
network with 
diverse partners
3.1. Source of capital for initiating/sustaining criminal 
operations. Access to capital in critical moments
Sources of capital for initiating operations of labour exploitation are 
limited as workers are often put to work in the exploiters’ own company, 
which can be seen as a vehicle for recruitment. Payments to arrange 
travel, first residence and work, which go as “brokerage fees,” are used 
as starting capital. This implies that no further investments are needed. In 
the case of several exploited Hungarian workers (NL-CRP5), victims had 
to pay a €270 brokerage fee in advance, followed by €60 weekly for 
accommodation in housing provided by the exploiters. Job trainings are 
commonly used to finance labour exploitation activities among temporary 
3. FINANCING AND FINANCIAl MANAGEMENT
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employment agencies (NL-E8). During periods of job trainings, workers 
are put to work for a certain period of time either without receiving any 
payment, being forced to pay for the trainings in advance or having to 
pay back ostensible costs at a later point in time.
As far as human trafficking for sexual exploitation is concerned, the 
afore-mentioned difference between domestic sexual exploitation through 
the lover-boy method, on the one hand, and domestic and international 
sexual exploitation through more complex, international trafficking 
structures, on the other hand (see section 2) is reflected in the financial 
management of such forms of exploitation.
In domestic lover boy cases with a low level of organisation no significant 
starting capital was needed. Pimps did not have a particularly large 
financial base, and did not need any, as their girl(s) would, once 
recruited, be quickly put to work. As such, her first earnings would 
serve as (starting) capital for paying initial expenses such as lingerie. We 
could argue, though, that the pimps rely on their social capital or, more 
particularly, their social skills in order to start their businesses. According 
to Baron and Markman (2000: 106) “the nature of the entrepreneurs’ 
face-to-face interactions can strongly influence their success,” and they 
particularly highlight the importance of “the ability to read other persons 
accurately, to make a good first impression on them, and to persuade 
or influence them (ibid: 107, emphasis added by us).” In these trafficking 
cases, we have seen how the pimps targeted particular girls who would 
be susceptible to their recruitment style. In other words, the offenders 
were particularly good at reading their victims (NL-E14). They would then 
invest personal attention, time, and some money (presents) in making 
the girls, who would eventually engage in sex work for them socially, 
mentally and sometimes physically (e.g. drug addiction) dependent on 
them. Her falling in love with him can be seen as a result of good 
persuasion or influencing skills, and so can his ability to convince her to 
give him all, or the lion’s share of her earnings under the pretence that 
he would save that money for a shared apartment (NL-CC9), a nail studio 
for her (NL-CC9), a holiday, a car (NL-CC8) et cetera. A last resource 
that is possibly used as starting capital is benefit fraud. Some of our 
interviewees (NL-E1, 2, 3) revealed that young pimps abuse the so-called 
WAJONG benefit scheme. This is a benefit meant for young people with 
a chronic illness or handicap.
Access to capital – in general or in critical moments – for pimps of this 
organisation type is mainly acquired through the girl(s) working for him. 
The money earned by the girl might be used to secure a new place 
for prostitution or access to another venue (window, brothel, massage 
parlour, et cetera), but, considering the low organisation degree of the 
business, is more generally used for the costs of living of the pimp 
and the girl(s). In other words: capital earned is most often spent. If 
the pimp needs more money, he encourages the girl – at times very 
coercively and violently (see also section 3.2) – to work longer, take 
more clients, engage in sexual activities she dislikes (e.g. NL-CC5) or 
get a breast enlargement surgery and liposuction (NL-CC9). One of 
our expert respondents (NL-E13) came across some cases of sexual 
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exploitation, in which the pimp’s lawyer in the lawsuit in which one of 
his girls testified, was paid with the money another girl working for him 
earned (in prostitution).
The picture is somewhat different for the more complex Dutch/foreign 
and international cases. In one of the cases in which the main part 
of the organisational network is located in the Netherlands (NL-CC4), 
we have come across an interesting way to acquire starting capital: 
acquiring a loan from a(n) (insurance) bank (e.g. a mortgage on an 
acquired house or apartment). In this case, the person convicted of 
human trafficking acquired a mortgage twice – one time on a false 
employment declaration – for a house that the trafficked person was 
later lodged in. Because of the limited size of our sample of court files, 
we cannot presume this practice to be a common strategy. However, 
the example does show that the world of sexual exploitation effectively 
uses the legal financial market for acquiring financial means. Apart from 
that, we can conclude from both the cases and interviews that traffickers 
might use starting capital proceeding from other illegal businesses, 
such as a hemp plantation (NL-CC4), selling ecstasy (NL-CC5), weapons 
trade (NL-E14) or scams (NL-E6). For sustaining the business, we have 
come across two more techniques (which also apply to the domestic, 
low-level organisation type mentioned above): one is what we would call 
scamming the (naïve) client, and the other the artificially top-ranking 
the internet profiles of exploited girls. As far as the first technique 
is concerned, respondents NL-E5 and NL-E6 mentioned cases in which 
clients would pay in advance for making several appointments with the 
girl in a row. After the first appointment, there is no next one and the 
client has lost his money. Another source of revenue encountered by 
these respondents is the client who pities the girl and wants to buy 
her free. He might then pay “several thousand” but the girl will (have 
to) continue working anyway. Secondly, when girls are advertised on 
“sex service websites” such as www.kinky.nl, it can be profitable for the 
business to have her profile appear first on the front-page of the website. 
This can be artificially achieved through calling her number a multitude 
of times, which pimps do in order to raise her status as a sex worker 
and her visibility on the internet (NL-E 5, 6; NL-CC5).
As far as the foreign family business category is concerned, we further 
observed that social capital is an important form of starting capital here, 
too. The East European pimp in case NL-CC12 could rely on his family 
members, who were aware of his work in the Netherlands and even 
seemed to play a “coaching” or steering role in it. When ‘his girl’ did not 
earn enough money, he was reassured by his mother on the telephone 
that his father would soon bring him another girl. Through family bonds, 
more girls could be recruited, who would bring in more money. More 
in general, the financial investigators we interviewed (e.g. NL-E1, 2, 3) 
commented that it was extremely difficult to get insights into the 
capital that such family business traffickers actually own, as – partly due 
to the extended family structures, within which many are involved in 
the business – it is hard to determine who owns what, and how that 
is related to the business. In that way, a trafficker can appear to have 
no income when his bank accounts in the source country are checked, 
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because his earnings or properties are hidden through inscribing them 
on the name of another family member.
3.2. Settlement of payments
In labour exploitation cases the traffickers have several means to acquire 
profit through employing legal or illegal migrant workers. We can categorise 
these in three revenue models, which are intricately related: i) saving on 
salary costs, thereby lowering the costs of production; ii) paying few or 
no taxes; iii) other revenues directly extracted from labour migrants. 
To start with the first, employers can reduce the costs of production to 
such an extent that their net profits augment by finding ways to realise 
more production against lower salary costs. Salaries are kept low in many 
different ways, for instance through a rewarding system based on piece 
rates instead of hour rates, by paying lower wages per hour to migrant 
workers compared to Dutch workers, by demanding long working days, 
by allowing little or no free days/hours, by ordering labourers to work 
weekends or overtime without paying extra and by pushing the legal 
possibilities of temporary or seasonal working conditions through unpaid 
periods of job training, spending minimal money on working conditions 
and fraudulently minimising the worked hours of employees. An example 
of the latter is the manipulation of time clocks in the Champignon case 
(NL-CRP10). Time clocks were used to track attendance of workers by 
recording their arrival and leave from work and manipulated in such 
ways that the time worked would appear as less than the actual working 
hours. Secondly, and related to paying low salaries, employers paid few 
or no taxes (NL-E13) as their social charges (werkgeverslasten in Dutch) 
remained low. Social charges, after all, are related to paid salary: if salary 
costs are lower, charges decrease with it.
Besides these two ways to reduce costs (i and ii) employers, in the third 
place, extract money in a more direct way from their employees (iii). One 
way is rack-renting (huisjesmelkerij in Dutch), meaning that employees are 
forced to rent housing facilities provided by the employers, for which 
the employees pay much more than the actual value of the facilities. 
Facilities are small, overcrowded and dirty. Water or electricity are not 
sufficiently provided and broken furniture is not repaired (NL-CRP4, 
NL-CRP5). A paradoxical means of exploitation related to this – which 
has been recognised by McGauran et al. (2016) as a form of labour 
exploitation – is providing not enough work to labour migrants. Back in 
their home countries, the workers signed a contract – the aforementioned 
all-inclusive package deal which covered travel, housing facilities, working 
contract – that included a certain number of working hours, which is 
necessary to be able to pay for all the expenses and have some residual 
earnings. If, consequently, the working hours are less than promised, 
but the expenses (e.g. housing and subsistence) remain the same, labour 
migrants find themselves in an unfortunate situation, and the employer 
ends up earning without spending any money. Subsequently, housing 
facilities become a revenue model for exploiters. According to McGauran 
et al. (2016), this should be interpreted as exploitation as well. We have, 
moreover, found examples in both file research and interviews (e.g. 
312 Financing	oF	organised	crime:	human	traFFicking	in	Focus
NL-CRP3, NL-E8) of exploited labour migrants being forced to pay fines 
for “infractions of the rules” (e.g. being late for work, making a phone 
call during working hours, accidentally damaging property, et cetera), or 
being forced to spend part of their earnings on meals provided by the 
employer (NL-CRP10), or in supermarkets owned by the employer. Debt 
bondage also recurs in our cases as a mechanism to profit from labour 
migrants. In this context, debts incurred by travel costs, fines, lack of 
work or outstanding rent of housing facilities are involved.
Another direct way to extract money from labour migrants is by having 
their salary directly sent to the exploiter’s or a family member’s 
(of the exploiter) bank account. Alternatively, they are in possession of 
the workers’ money cards and pin codes and therefore are directly in 
command of their earnings (e.g. NL-CRP5, NL-CRP7, NL-E8, NL-E9). In one 
case (NL-CRP5), a total of € 23,092 – in wages for Hungarian employees 
was paid in 2009 and 2010 by various temporary employment agencies 
on a bank account number of the exploiter. Furthermore, €19,030 of the 
amount was withdrawn by the exploiters via ATMs in the Netherlands 
and Hungary; an act which itself can be interpreted as “converting” 
the money. Profits emerging from accommodation are usually collected 
weekly. Labour migrants need to pay off their brokerage fees with their 
work. It is oftentimes completely unclear to the victims whether, and if 
so, to what extent their salary was set off against the debts that they 
had with the exploiters (NL-CRP5) as labour migrants have no insight 
in the administration. Blackmailing and threatening are commonly used 
strategies, either with or without use of physical violence, to ensure they 
get their money. In the case of illegal labour migrants, their illegality 
and fear of authorities is oftentimes used to keep workers quiet (Van 
Ellemeet 2007). Exploiters threaten to inform the police or, in the case 
of relatives being the victims, send them back to their country of 
origin.
As far as sexual exploitation is concerned, most pimps – irrespective 
of the category or type of sex trafficking (see section 2) – have non-
transparent, dynamic “agreements” with the women working for them. 
For example, in case NL-CC4, the girl who came from a Central European 
country to the Netherlands for work – the pimp had paid her travel 
expenses – had been told that she could earn up to €1,000 or €2,000 
a day as a sex worker in the red-light district of a Dutch town. She 
supposedly owed the pimp €3,000 for domiciling her on an address 
in the town and for the rent of the window. Until that sum of money 
would be paid off, she would first hand over all her earnings, then 70% 
of it, and once paid off, she would pay him 50% of her earnings, plus 
the rent of the apartment where she stayed when she was not working. 
Another girl in the same case (belonging to pimp number two in this 
case) agreed to paying half of the rent of their apartment, but she was 
informed that the rent was €1,400, whereas it was only €900. Generally, 
we can conclude that in most cases we came across victims did not 
precisely know how much they earned, spent, and handed over, or how 
large their debt to the trafficker was. This might very well be a conscious 
tactic of the trafficker: the less she knew about her earnings in relation 
to what he received, the better.
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	the	netherlands	 313
Another common strategy to make sure the girl would hand over the 
money was constant close supervision and control. To illustrate, the 
pimp would call or WhatsApp the girl constantly (in most of the cases 
studied), would ask her to take pictures of herself in the street where 
she was supposed to see a client (NL-CC5), or would watch her from 
the other side of the street (NL-CC12), in order to keep track of how 
much she was probably earning and whether that matched the money 
handed over. Some pimps set a target for the girl to earn every night, 
and she was not supposed to come home before the target was reached 
(NL-CC4, NL-CC5). Besides that, several forms of threats and violence 
were imposed upon the victims in order to make them comply with the 
rules and discipline them into handing over their money. To name but 
a few methods that appeared throughout the studied cases: threatening 
to hurt or kill the victim or her family, severe physical and sexual abuse, 
mental abuse (making the girl feel bad about herself if she does not 
earn a certain amount of money), damaging her property, in particular 
mobile phones, laptops, et cetera, in order to isolate her, taking away 
identity papers, having the girl place a tattoo with his name or initials 
on it, inventing fictive debts, et cetera.
3.3. Costs for doing business
As stated in section 3.2, labour exploitation cases are characterised by 
saving on salary costs, taxes and other revenues directly extracted from 
workers. Seeing that the operating expenses are nominal, the benefits 
usually outweigh the costs of doing business. Costs for advertisements 
and recruiting are minimal due to the widespread use of website, 
newspaper advertisements and social media in the Netherlands and abroad. 
Besides, labour migrants are often family members or acquaintances of 
the recruiter. Methods of recruitment are therefore largely based on 
intermediary contacts and word of mouth. As mentioned earlier, housing 
is oftentimes arranged via family members or other accomplices and 
labour migrants are accommodated under poor conditions. Although 
housing is a cost post for traffickers, at the same time, it functions as a 
basic revenue model.
Although companies run the risk of making costs due to investigations 
run by authorities – they may need to pay fines for providing insufficient 
labour conditions, or spend time and money on inventing and applying 
fraudulent administrative constructions – we also found a case of labour 
exploitation (NL- CRP3) in which the employers gave instructions to 
workers about what to say in case of visits by the Labour Inspectorate. 
In this particular case, the costs they would eventually face due to labour 
inspectorate controls were limited by training workers for such incidents, 
and limit the damage.
In the sexual exploitation cases studied, we have encountered the 
following possible costs. Of course, these depend on the degree of 
organisation of the trafficking network (or lack of it). First of all, there 
are costs related to the recruitment of the girls. In one-man trafficking 
activities, these might include buying the girl presents, costs for personal 
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image management (golden necklaces, rented cars, et cetera) and 
parties. Advertising the girl on the internet also can involve payments 
to webhosts and costs for photographs. In international trafficking 
businesses, recruitment might involve paying for advertisements on the 
internet and in local newspapers to attract girls to the job, or paying 
a third, local party to arrange for that.20 Costs will also be involved 
for transporting the girl(s) to the Netherlands and housing her once 
arrived. When a girl comes from abroad, there are administrative costs, 
such as registering her in the municipality and on a fixed address. The 
pimp then has to rent a window (in window prostitution) or pay for 
hotel rooms or other locations to work along with paying subsistence 
costs and costs related to the job (such as for condoms, lubricants, 
lingerie et cetera). Next, telephone costs will be made in order to 
groom, control and supervise the girl(s). Depending on the size and 
“professionalism” of the business, traffickers might further need to pay 
their facilitators. For example, in NL-CC4 one of the traffickers paid 
a (sex worker) associate €300 for helping “his” girl acquire a window 
and informing her on the ins and outs of the job. The other trafficker, 
in the same case, paid €250 to a man who would go with the girl 
to the municipality to have her registered at his home address. From 
our sample of cases, but also from large national signal cases such 
as the Sneep case (see footnote 11), we know that costs might also 
be incurred through abortions, tattoos, breast implants et cetera. Last 
but not least, traffickers of foreign, family-business type of trafficking 
bear the expense of transporting the money back home (see next 
section).
Moreover, there are costs when getting caught. Table 2 mentions the 
amounts to be paid in the cases where a fine, or compensation to the 
victim(s) was imposed (as far as these came to the fore in the files 
studied).
20 We have not come across the exact prices paid to these facilitators.
ТаBle 2. compensations to victims imposed on traFFickers
Case Total Sum
Material 
damage
Immaterial 
Damage
Amount per victim
Nl-CC4 €17,100 12,100 5,000 (to 1 victim)*
Nl-CC5 €15,453.32 Not indicated Not indicated Victim 1: €6,329
Victim 2: €7,564.40
Victim 3: €1,559.92
Nl-CC6 €13,300 Not indicated Not indicated (to 1 victim)
Nl-CC7 €2,609.42 €1,109.42 €1,500 (to 1 victim)
Nl-CC8 €25,489.15 Not indicated Not indicated (to 1 victim)
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3.4. Profits and profit sharing
Profits in labour exploitation cases, and especially in those cases in 
which migrants are employed in the exploiter’s legal business, are typically 
re-invested and laundered in the exploiter’s business. In the case of the 
involvement of temporary employment agencies, profits can emerge on 
two ends: the temporary employment agency and the hiring company. In 
organised cases of labour exploitation involving cross-border exploitation, 
profits are (partly) transferred abroad (NL-E14).
In sexual exploitation cases, again, profit making, spending, and 
sharing depends on the type of trafficking organisation. The first type 
of domestic, low-organised, lover-boy technique trafficker is said by our 
respondents to mainly spend the profits on partying, expensive cars, 
watches, trademark clothing, gambling, drugs, et cetera, as exemplified 
in the responses of NL-E1 and NL-E3:
NL-E1: “The lover-boys? They spend it all. They do not have registered 
capital, no money on the bank, no property, no income. Sometimes 
they do have an alimony (…). They are really boasting about their 
money. So they spend a lot, and if they have some money, it is cash, 
hidden somewhere. (…) These lover-boys, they drive luxurious rented 
cars, they spend enormous amounts of money on that. (…) Yes, they 
spend on parties… it is really about bragging, the classic show-off. 
That’s how they also impress the girls… with the money and that big 
car, golden necklace, nice watch.”
NL-E3: “Yes, and they also like to shop in the PC Hooftstreet: clothes, 
coats and Louis Vuitton toiletry bags, I encountered.”
NL-E1: “Yes, coats and jeans of €800.”
NL-E3: “[Calvin] Klein pants…”
From the above quotation we could also conclude that profits are, 
rather, invested in image and reputation.
ТаBle 2. compensations to victims imposed on traFFickers (continued)
        * As explained in section 4, in the Netherlands the convicted does not pay the compensation directly to the victim, but to the Dutch state, 
which will pay the compensation to the victim.
Source: File research, Oude Breuil, Schaap & Merz 2018.
Case Total Sum
Material 
damage
Immaterial 
Damage
Amount per victim
Nl-CC9 €704,000 Not indicated Not indicated Victim 1: €515,000
Victim 2: €189,437
Nl-CC10 €20,000 €10,000 €10,000 (to 1 victim)
Nl-CC12 €3,090 Not indicated Not indicated (to 1 victim)
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Dutch/foreign trafficking networks with a higher degree of organisation 
rather invest their profits in property: houses (e.g. NL-CC4: one of the 
offenders owned two houses), a boat (e.g. NL-CC11) and cars (NL-E6, 
NL-E14). That is to say, it can be proven that they own this property 
and considering their earnings in prostitution it can be safely assumed 
that they either got the property with the exploitation money or sustain 
it with this money.
As far as the foreign, family businesses are concerned, profits are 
invested in the country of origin. Revenues are usually laundered via 
real estate (shops and shopping centres, holiday parks, hotels – NL-E13) 
or luxury goods like expensive cars (NL-E5). According to NL-E2 and 
NL-E3 some Bulgarian traffickers showed similar patterns of spending as 
Dutch domestic lover-boy traffickers: gambling, boasting at parties, nice 
cars, anabolic-steroids and impressing new victims with these lifestyles. 
Besides, the money might be saved, not so much on a bank account 
but through underground banking systems that are ethnically organised 
(NL-E13).
In the international cases, money earned would be sent abroad to 
family members “back home” via money transfer offices, such as GWK 
or Western Union. The amounts transferred would be low enough 
so as not to attract the attention of financial intelligence units.21 Our 
respondents, however, commented that money transfers via Western 
Union are declining due to the traceability of transactions and an 
increase in investigations. Cash couriers or “money mules,” people who 
carry the money with them, have become the most prevalent form of 
transferring money. Mention is made of special minibuses that transport 
traffickers, victims, and money for a fee (NL-E5, NL-E10, NL-E14). Women 
might also carry the money with them on the plane or on the bus. We 
came across a peculiar case (NL-E1, 2, 3) of a man who made deposits 
up to €30,000 to send to an African country, only to pick it up himself 
in that country.
3.5. The role and impact of the internet 
on human trafficking activities and finances
In comparison with sexual exploitation, the internet seems to play a 
less central role in human trafficking activities for labour exploitation in 
the Netherlands as clues of online involvement are scarce. In one case 
of organised labour exploitation and trafficking (NL-CRP5), Hungarian 
workers were recruited online via advertisements on a Hungarian job 
placement website. The job offers in the Netherlands included various 
21 Since 1994, financial institutions in the Netherlands dealing with cash payments have had an 
objective notification obligation; every cash payment above a certain amount of money had to 
be notified to the Notification Point Unusual Transactions (Meldpunt Ongebruikelijke Transacties). 
Since 2005, there has been a general indicator that obliges financial institutions to subjectively 
notify other suspicious financial behaviour as well, such as: consistently staying (just) under the 
threshold for notification. In the Netherlands, we now have an objective indicator (which is, for 
banks, financial institutions, et cetera, €2,000), above which transactions should be notified to 
FIU-the Netherlands, and a subjective indicator, saying that if such institutions have a suspicion 
on a transaction, they are obliged to notify that (see Ministerie van Financiën January 2014).
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promises and commitments for job-seekers like net hourly wages varying 
from €7,30 up to €9 or contracts for at least half a year with the 
possibility of a five-year contract.
In sexual exploitation cases, however, the internet and social media 
play an important role in three phases of the trafficking process. First, 
the internet plays a role in the recruitment of women, particularly in 
the case of international trafficking. Advertisements on the internet and 
in local newspapers were found to be used by domestic traffickers with 
international businesses in order to attract women to the job (NL-CC4). 
Secondly, internet and social media are crucial in attracting clients and 
making the girl (and her services) visible for a large public. Especially in 
the domestic, lover-boy-related cases, the pimp would make an internet 
profile of the girl, including explicit photos, on a client website such 
as www.kinky.nl. In order to make sure the girl’s profile is on the top 
of the list of advertisements, pimps call in on her profile/number so 
many times that the advertisement ends up on top (NL-CC5). Moreover, 
social media are used for communication and are an important means 
to control strategies – WhatsApp is commonly used by the pimp 
or trafficker and his girl(s), both in its facility to send text messages, 
and in its facility to send pictures. In NL-CC5, the victim was forced 
to send pictures very regularly to prove that she was actually where 
she had told her pimp that she would be, or to show whether she 
really had the money she had promised. Social media was used in 
case NL-CC10 as a threat. The pimp threatened to release sex videos 
and nude pictures to family and friends of the victim, if she would 
refuse working for him. In the fourth place, social media and internet 
could function as an exploitation modality in itself, for example in 
cases where child pornography was produced (NL-CC6). The National 
Rapporteur exemplified this as well, in mentioning the Amersfoort case, 
which is unique in the Netherlands so far. In this case, a young woman 
stated that for thirteen months she had been forced by her trafficker 
to perform sexual acts for the webcam against payment. The entire 
exploitation took place digitally and the victim had no physical contact 
with customers (Nationaal Rapporteur, 2017a).
As a result of the Dutch integrated approach towards human trafficking, 
financial investigations on THB are not only conducted in the context of 
criminal investigations by investigative authorities such as the police, but 
some form of financial investigation may for example also be done by a 
public body at the administrative level (e.g. by municipalities), by financial 
intelligence services (such as FIU-the Netherlands), or by private bodies 
such as financial institutions (e.g. by banks), either at their own initiative 
or to fulfil legal obligations. Clearly, the financial investigations differ in 
approach and pursued results, depending on – amongst others – the aim 
of the investigation, the investigative authority concerned and the legal 
4. FINANCIAl INvESTIGATIONS OF THB CRIMES: 
 CHAllENGES AND GOOD PRACTICES
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and institutional framework the authority operates in. In this section, the 
main focus is on criminal financial investigations, yet two examples of 
other financial investigations on THB are also briefly discussed below.
Criminal financial investigations
In essence, three authorities are in charge of criminal investigations of 
THB in the Netherlands. These are the Dutch police force, the Royal 
Netherlands Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, hereafter: 
KMar), and the ISZW. All three investigative authorities operate 
under the authority of the PPS when investigating THB. Yet, under 
this authority, all three can in principle conduct their own criminal 
investigations on THB in the form of sexual exploitation and/or labour 
exploitation, or cooperate with and support one another in a criminal 
investigation (Aanwijzing Mensenhandel 2013). However, each of these 
authorities has a focus area and specific legal powers and duties related 
to their overall responsibilities and objectives. The upshot of this is 
that sexual exploitation is investigated primarily by special units of 
the Dutch police force, the so-called Aliens Police, Identification and 
Trafficking in Human Beings Department (AVIM). Labour exploitation is 
investigated primarily by the ISZW. The KMar plays an important role 
in investigating signals of THB (in both forms) at airports, ports, and 
the Dutch borders (NL-E3, E13, E14).22 In this report we discuss the 
financial investigations into THB for sexual exploitation on the basis of 
the information provided by the police (AVIM departments in three 
regions of the Netherlands), and the investigations into THB for labour 
exploitation on the basis of the ISZW data.
Every criminal investigation of THB must go hand in hand with a 
criminal financial investigation that is directed – if possible – not only 
at the defendant but also at the entire criminal network.23 The aim of 
the criminal financial investigation is threefold: i) to support the case in 
terms of evidence; ii) to enable the confiscation of unlawfully obtained 
profits; iii) to substantiate a possible claim of damages of the victim 
(Aanwijzing Mensenhandel, 2013).
The first objective is considered to be especially important when the 
THB investigation is conducted ex officio – i.e. an investigation that 
starts at the investigative authority’s own initiative and not on the basis 
of a report by a victim (NL-E1).24 For various reasons only very few 
victims tend to press charges in trafficking cases, while testimonies 
of victims are considered to be of great importance in proving THB 
(Holvast & Van der Meij, 2011; Vianen et al., 2006). In the absence 
22 For the exact legal powers and the allocation of tasks between the police and the KMar, see 
article 4 of the Police Act 2012 (Politiewet, 2012), and the letter of the Minister of Security and 
Justice of 29 November 2016 (Brief van de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie van 29 november 2016 
over de Wettelijk taak Koninklijke Marechaussee bij mensenhandel, Kenmerk 2016928).
23 This starting point is laid down in the direction on THB of the Public Prosecutor’s Service, the 
so-called Aanwijzing Mensenhandel 2013, which provides authoritative guidance.
24 An ex officio investigation can start, for example, on the basis of signs picked up by prostitution 
controls or by the basic team of the police, by an anonymous notification at Meld Misdaad 
Anoniem (Notify Crime Anonymously – a telephone number for citizens to notify observations 
of crime anonymously), but also on the basis of information of intelligence services, such as 
information of the Financial Intelligence Unit.
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of a report by a victim, a THB investigation can still be initiated and 
then, the criminal financial investigation can contribute significantly 
to the evidence in trafficking cases (NL-E1, E6). That said, even if 
there is a report by a victim or reports of multiple victims, financial 
investigations are considered to be of great importance in establishing 
and/or supporting proof of THB. After all, a characteristic of human 
trafficking cases is that statements by victims may be difficult to assess 
and inconsistencies in statements are often present (NL-E2, NL-E7; 
see also Holvast & Van der Meij, 2011; Goderie & Boutellier, 2009). 
Financial data and calculations can help to support, verify or negate 
these statements (NL-E1, NL-E3, NL-E7).
The second objective of the financial investigations – to enable the 
confiscation of unlawfully obtained profits – should be read in light of 
the Dutch instruments on combatting organised and lucrative crime. In 
these instruments, the deprivation of proceeds of crime plays a central 
role. An important instrument to deprive the proceeds of crime is 
the Dutch measure on the deprivation of unlawfully obtained profits 
(maatregel ter ontneming van wederrechtelijk verkregen voordeel, hereafter: 
confiscation measure), laid down in article 36e DCC. The confiscation 
measure does not have a punitive aim but is of a restorative nature. It 
aims to restore the financial situation as it was before the commission 
of the crime by making a person who is convicted of a crime pay a 
sum of money to the state in order to deprive that person of unlawfully 
obtained profits (Kamerstukken II 1989/90, 21504, 3; see also Borgers 
2001: 75-118). Since investigating the possibility to deprive traffickers 
of their criminal proceeds gained is the starting point in every human 
trafficking case (Aanwijzing Mensenhandel 2013), criminal financial 
investigations are to be directed at the application of article 36e DCC 
as well. The upshot of this is that the investigators gather data, make 
calculations and – if possible – draw up a confiscation report in order 
to establish the amount of unlawfully obtained profit, which can be 
the material profit made, subsequent profit made and/or costs saved by 
the commission of THB (NL-E1, NL-E2, NL-E3; Emmelkamp et al., 2016; 
see for more information Borgers, 2001: 185-261). Important to note 
in this regard is that if there is a conviction, the confiscation measure 
can be imposed in a separate court decision for profits made by that 
very offence, but – under certain conditions – also for criminal acts for 
which the offender is not convicted.25
Apart from establishing the unlawfully obtained profits, another important 
task for the financial investigators with regard to the confiscation proceedings 
is to search for assets to effectuate prejudgment attachments with the 
aim of securing assets for the execution of the confiscation measure if 
imposed (NL-E3, NL-E1, NL-E6, NL-PC1; see in this regard article 94a (2) 
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering, hereafter: 
25 The latter can be the case if there are “sufficient indications” that the offender committed the 
offences and they yielded profit for the offender, as follows from article 36e subsection 2 DCC. 
However, the latter can under certain circumstances, also be the case if it concerns profit 
from offences that are not committed by the convicted person but did result in profit for the 
convicted person, as follows from article 36e subsection 3 DCC. As will become clear in the 
subsequent sections this has consequences for the methods used to calculate the profit.
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DCCP).26 Notably, under Dutch criminal law, in order to prevent the 
frustration of recovery by sham arrangements, assets belonging to other 
people can under certain conditions also be seized with that same aim 
(art. 94a (4) and (5) DCCP).
The third objective of the financial investigations (substantiating a possible 
claim of damages of the victim) should be read against the background of 
the central position of victim care in trafficking cases, of which enabling 
compensation of damages for victims constitutes an important part 
(Aanwijzing Mensenhandel 2013).27 The Dutch legal system knows several 
ways by which a victim of THB can claim damages.28 Apart from filing a 
civil suit, a victim can claim damages via the criminal procedure in the 
Netherlands, by filing a claim by an injured party (vordering benadeelde 
partij), as laid down in article 51f DCCP.29 The data gathered and 
calculations made by financial investigators can help to substantiate the 
claim of the victim (NL-E14), can inform the public prosecutor in forming 
an opinion on the claim, can be of use for the defence in rebutting the 
claim, and inform the judge(s) when deciding on the claim.30
In this regard, another but often interrelated route of receiving damages 
for the victim must be mentioned that presents a unique feature of the 
Dutch legal system (Giesen et al., 2015). A criminal court can, on its own 
discretionary power or on demand of the public prosecutor, impose a 
compensation order to pay compensation to the state for the benefit 
of the victim of the crime (article 36f DCC).31 If a compensation order 
is imposed, this grants an executorial title to be executed by the PPS 
(in practice by the Collective Debt Collection Agency, the CJIB) on behalf 
of the victim allowing police and judicial powers to be used to enable 
enforcement.32 The main advantage of the compensation order, thus, is 
that it strengthens the recovery position of the victim and relieves the 
victim of the burden of enforcement. There is an advance payment 
26 It should be noted that prejudgment attachments can also be imposed for the purpose of 
preserving the right of recovery for a possible imposition of a fine (see article 94a (1) DCCP) 
and for the purpose of the compensation order (article 94a (3)(4) DCCP). For the procedure 
of recovery, see article 574, 575 DCCP and 577 DCCP.
27 The third objective is related to the second objective: compensating a victim can be another 
way to deprive an offender of the proceeds of crime and to enable restoration of the financial 
situation as it was before the commission of the crime.
28 In this report, only those avenues are mentioned for which the financial investigation is directly 
relevant. Yet, more avenues of receiving/claiming damages exist.
29 This provision should be read together with article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code on unlawful 
acts in Dutch tort law.
30 To rule on the question of damages, the criminal court applies the rules of Dutch tort law. 
However, ruling on a claim of damage by an injured party is only allowed for the criminal 
court on condition that the ruling does not cause a disproportionate burden and hinders 
the criminal trial, that an order or penalty is imposed (or there is a conviction without the 
imposition of any penalty or other order), and that the damages claimed stem directly from 
the crime (article 361 DCCP). If these requirements are not met, the claim is inadmissible or 
partially inadmissible, leaving it to the victim to file a civil suit in order to claim compensation 
(Giesen et al., 2015).
31 Prerequisite for imposing the order is that liability to pay damages under tort law must be 
established. As seen above, this will be the case if “a claim by an injured party” is sustained. 
Therefore, in practice, the compensation order is almost always imposed together with a 
sustained claim by the injured party (Giesen et al., 2015; Candido et al. 2017).
32 If the offender does not meet the obligation to pay the compensation, the accompanying order 
of substitute custody in default will be imposed, but this accompanying order does not dissolve 
the civil law obligation to satisfy the compensation.
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scheme connected to the compensation order (article 36f subsection 7 
DCC). This scheme determines that the State advances the amount of 
damages that is not paid by the offender within eight months after the 
decision imposing the order on the offender has become final.33
Financial investigations by the police (focus on sexual exploitation)
When the police conduct a criminal investigation on THB, in theory every 
police officer of the specific unit in charge of such investigations (AVIM) 
is expected to conduct some form of financial investigation him/herself.34 
However, when the case contains a more complex or extensive financial 
component, financial investigators specialised in THB can be called upon 
(NL-E3; NL-E7). This is for example the case when it is suspected that large 
profits have been made and a confiscation report needs to be drawn up 
or a prejudgment attachment must be imposed (NL-E3). These financial 
investigators can advise the police officers in the principal investigation, 
or they can conduct their own financial investigation within or in parallel 
to the principal investigation.35 In these financial investigations, the first 
step usually taken is to financially investigate the actors already known to 
be involved in the case, starting with the suspect(s) and victim(s), and – 
depending on the case – also taking into account family members or 
friends of the suspect(s).36 The financial investigators try to establish the 
role of the actors and their relationships, reveal (more) of the network 
involved, and establish the financial position – in the broad sense of 
the word – of the actors involved, which can eventually be important in 
providing evidence of profits made by suspects, of damage suffered by 
victims, of possibilities for confiscation, and for proof of the offence of 
THB more in general.37
Data to base the case on include direct financial data, indirect financial 
data and other information. Direct financial data refers to financial 
data that regard the financial position and/or transactions of the actors 
involved, such as bank records, data from the tax authorities, data from 
currency exchange offices, data from FIU-the Netherlands where various 
entities are legally obliged to report unusual transactions38 and data 
from the Credit Registration Office where credit providers are legally 
obliged to register all granted loans.39 Indirect financial data refers to 
data that provide information on the financial position of the actors, but 
33 Although the compensation measure with advance payment generally is considered a best 
practice, a critical note is that receiving a large amount of money at once without professional 
support might put vulnerable victims of THB at risk. They might not know what to do with the 
money and risk to fall prey to other (or the same) traffickers or other criminals (NL-E1, NL-E2, 
NL-E3).
34 In this regard, see also the last subsection (Obstacles) in this section.
35 A financial investigation that is concerned with the unlawfully obtained profit can be conducted 
next to the principal investigation. This is a so-called Strafrechtelijk financieel onderzoek (criminal 
financial investigation), abbreviated SFO.
36 For the legal requirements that must be met in requesting the data, see below.
37 Yet, it is important to note that the financial investigations conducted more or less simultaneously 
with the principal case are initially aimed at discovering tactical clues for the investigation of 
the THB. Only later the focus shifts to substantiating demands for a confiscation order and/or 
for damages (NL-E1, NL-E2).
38 For more information on FIU-the Netherlands, see below.
39 On the basis of the Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het financieel toezicht).
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that are not financial data. One can think of data from the municipal 
personal records database that show where and how (in what kind of 
property) the actors live or information from the land registry office 
where property is registered. Indirect financial data can also concern 
information on registered vehicles and driving licenses. Besides, it is 
verified whether the relevant actors are registered as entrepreneurs at 
the Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel) and/or are involved 
in or with corporate entities. Clearly, other information can shed light 
on flows of money as well, such as information posted on Facebook, 
other social media accounts and WhatsApp or text messages that can 
provide insights in the lifestyle and the pattern of spending of the actors 
involved. Also relevant are payment information of advertisements on sex 
websites, the bookkeeping of offices that rent windows for prostitution, 
booking information of hotels, et cetera. More general police information, 
gathered in the principal proceeding – or if not yet gathered that can 
also be requested – such as the results of searches of places and 
objects seized, telephone data or tap results can also be of importance. 
Of great importance are the results of interviews with the suspect(s), 
victim(s) and other actors involved. It is considered to be highly 
beneficial if financial investigators are involved in the preparation of the 
interview and/or conduct interviews themselves, since specific questions 
on financial aspects can be asked and financial data gathered can be 
clarified and verified (NL-E3, NL-E1, NL-E6, NL-E7).
In order to request many of these data, a formal demand of the public 
prosecutor is necessary, in several instances an investigating judge must 
grant a written authorisation, and in some instances – also depending 
on the kinds of data and the kind of investigation in which the data are 
being requested – additional requirements must be met and/or other 
procedures should be followed (for more information, see Corstens & 
Borgers 2014: 281-355, 411-595).
In order to gather the data in the Netherlands, the financial investigators 
can – if all procedural requirements are met – contact the respective 
bodies and/or consult the systems themselves. That said, every police 
district has its own information hub (Districtelijk Informatie Knoopppunt) that 
can provide up-to-date information from various police systems and on 
various police issues 24/7. The information hub can also request data 
from external bodies and/or systems (NL-E7). In this hub, various types 
of expertise are combined; its main advantage is that it can provide the 
information faster and in a more structured way (NL-E7).40
The above concerned data are available in the Netherlands. However, 
in many cases of THB an international component is involved and 
40 In this regard, reference must also be made to an intelligence cooperation that used to exist 
between the National Police, the Tax Authority, Customs, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investiga-
tion Service (FIOD), the CJIB, various special investigation services, and the PPS, the so-called 
Infobox Criminal and Unexplainable Property (Infobox Crimineel en Onverklaarbaar vermogen, her-
after: iCOV), that was considered to be very valuable in the investigation (NL-E1, NL-E2, NL-E3, 
NL-E5, NL-E6, NL-E7). iCOV delivered data-intelligence products to the co-operating authorities 
and developed risk-indicators and patterns that could help to expose money laundering and 
fraud constructions. (Opportuun nr. 4, 2016; NL-E7). However, due to a problem with the 
Convenant at this time of writing, iCOV is no longer operational (NL-E7).
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data must be gathered abroad. In order to gather data abroad, usually, 
requests of assistance must be sent abroad. In Europe, various European 
legal instruments govern these requests. Yet, the national procedural law 
of the requesting and requested state remains important to a certain 
extent (for more information, see Klip 2016). The requests can concern 
data but also the confiscation of property or assets. Yet, as will become 
clear below, the international component often turns out to be an 
obstacle to the criminal financial investigations. Another option to gather 
data abroad is co-operating in a Joint Investigation Team (JIT). Various 
respondents have already participated in these JITs and were overall very 
positive about their experiences.
Once the data are gathered, the next step in the financial investigation 
is to interpret the data. Once interpreted, as seen above, the data can 
provide a lot of information or evidence for the principal case. Clearly, 
the data can also provide information on the existence and amount 
of unlawfully obtained profit and can help to uncover property of the 
offender for the purpose of preserving the right of recovery for the 
compensation order or the confiscation measure as discussed above. In 
establishing the unlawfully obtained profit (and also in establishing the 
amount of damages for the victim) calculations play an important role. 
These calculations can in turn also help to establish the plausibility of 
the unlawfulness of the profit (Borgers, 2001: 302).
In order to calculate the unlawfully obtained gains, different methods 
can be used. The method that is most commonly used and that usu-
ally results in the most accurate amount is the so-called transaction 
calculation (NL-E3, NL-E6). In a transaction calculation, profits made by 
of the offence are determined and the expenses made are subtracted, 
resulting in the overall unlawfully obtained profit (NL-E3, NL-E2; Em-
melkamp, Felix & Verschaeren, 2016). The profits made by the offence 
can be determined by multiplying various – so-called – building blocks. 
In a case of sexual exploitation, these building blocks are for example: 
the number of victims, the number of days the victim has worked, 
the number of clients the victim has had, and the price per client. It 
should be noted that since the price per client and the number of cli-
ents per day may differ, often average numbers are established over a 
certain period of time (NL-E1). Also, the building blocks can be extrap-
olated to other periods of time which can partially relieve the burden 
of proof on the Public Prosecutor.41 The expenses that are subtracted 
clearly depend on the case concerned, but one can think of money 
for food, housing, booking costs for the workroom or hotel, telephone 
costs, lingerie, condoms, lubricant, et cetera (NL-PC1, NL-CRP11 – see 
also section 3.3). Yet only those costs directly related to the THB can 
be subtracted (art. 36e (8) DCC; NL-E1; NL-CRP11). Evidence for the 
building blocks and costs can come from the data described above. For 
example, the bookkeeping of the prostitution offices, telephone data, 
and wiretapped conversations, for instance, on the number of custom-
ers (NL-PC1). Declarations of victims, witnesses and customers are also 
very important (NL-E2, NL-PC1, NL-CRP11). Often several sources of 
41 See the judgement of the Dutch Supreme Court of 25 March 1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:AK1364.
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data must be combined in order to paint 
an accurate picture. For some costs (such 
as the costs of food or condoms), standard 
fees can be used in the calculation. How-
ever, for the building blocks no standard 
fee is available; the building blocks depend 
on too many variables, e.g. the street the 
woman works in, the competition, the age 
of the woman, the looks of the woman, 
the sexual acts the woman is willing to per-
form, et cetera (NL-E3, NL-E2, NL-E14). Yet, 
in case it is impossible to find or provide 
any information on the amount of money 
earned, but it is clear that window prostitu-
tion took place during a certain period, a 
minimum fee of €100 per day (NL-E14) is 
used. Yet, this should be regarded as an 
absolute minimum. In Box 1 an example 
from a recently published case report is 
provided as an illustration of a transaction 
calculation concerning one victim. Evidence 
for the building blocks in this case was pro-
vided by declarations of the victim and the 
bookkeeping of the workroom the victim 
worked in.42
Because of the design of the law (as set out above) under certain 
circumstances,43 abstract methods of calculation can be used and no 
direct causal connection needs to be established between the advantages 
and the offences from which they are the result (De Zanger, 2015). 
Therefore, the point of departure of these calculations is not the profit 
per crime, but the amount of money/property/assets (hereafter: property) 
the offender had at his or her disposal over a certain period of time 
that cannot legally be accounted for. These methods are the so-called 
property analysis method and the cash position method.
With the cash position method, a comparison is made between the 
opening balance and ending balance of the person involved, and the 
intervening flows of money are investigated. Central to this method is 
the presumption that expenditures that cannot be legally accounted 
for are the result of criminal activity. It is up to the defendant to ar-
gue plausibly that the expenditures had a legal source.44 In the simple 
version of the cash position method, only cash flows are investigated. 
Deposits on the bank are booked as expenditures. Cash withdrawals are 
42 See the judgement of the Court of the North of the Netherlands of 5 December 2017, ECLI:
NL:RBNNE:2017:4662.
43 For article 36(2) DCC if the profit can be related to specific criminal offences and for article 
36(3) DCC if it concerns a conviction for an offence with a high category of fine (so-called 5th 
category, which is THB in article 273f DCC). See also Supreme Court of 14 March 2017, ECLI:
NL:HR:2017:414.
44 According to the Dutch Supreme Court this is not in violation of article 6 EHRM as long 
as several requirements are met. See Dutch Supreme Court 17 September 2002, ECLI:NL:
HR:2002:AE3569.
Box 1.
Income in the period of 2006 – 2012
2006: 96 working days x €500 per day = €48,000
2007: 294 working days x €500 = €147,000
2008: 294 working days x €500 = €147,000
2009: 294 working days x €350 = €102,900
2010: 126 working days x €350 = €44,100
2011: 13 working days x €400 = €5,200
2012: 31 working days x €400 = €12,400
Total = € 506,600
Costs over the period from 2006 – 2012:
Rent €84,040
Condoms, lubricant and other attributes €17,220
Working clothes €5,000
Make-up and tanning 2 times €2,410.00 €4,820
Transport €57,400
Total = €168,480 -/-
Total = €506,600-€168,480 = €338,120
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considered to be legal income.45 In the 
complex cash position method, account 
movements are also taken into account. Im-
portant with this calculation is to filter cash 
withdrawals and deposits in order to prevent 
double counting (NL-E1, NL-E2, NL-E3; NL-
PC3; Borgers, 2001, p. 301-302, 351; Em-
melkamp et al., 2016). However, since not 
all profit can be made visible, one can also 
take into account non-monetary profit, out-
standing debts and subsequent profit (Butter-
Sintenie & Van Diggelen, 2014). In box 2, a 
schematic example of a simple cash position 
derived from a police file is set out.46 In box 
3, a schematic example of a complex cash 
position derived from Emmelkamp, Felix & 
Verschaeren (2016) is set out.
In the property analysis method, the unlaw-
fully obtained profit is calculated by making 
use of the property of the offender with the 
presumption that an increase in property 
that cannot be explained by visible and 
legal sources of income has an illegal origin 
(NL-E1; Borgers, 2001).47 It is up to the of-
fender to argue plausibly that there were 
indeed legal sources of income. This meth-
od is affected by establishing the property 
(money and possessions) at two moments in 
time (a starting date and an end date). The 
property at the start date is compared to 
the property at the end date, yet a correc-
tion is made by adding the actual expendi-
tures (also investments) and by subtracting 
the legal income (Borgers, 2001). The result 
of this calculation is the sum that cannot be 
related to legal flows of money. An example 
also derived from Emmelkamp, Felix & Ver-
schaeren (2016) is set out in box 4.
It is possible to use different calculations to substantiate the plausibility 
of the calculations. However, a disadvantage of the abstract methods 
is that in practice, it turns out to be very difficult to map all the 
expenditures and property, especially if part of the property is located 
or cash flows take place outside the Netherlands. This often makes 
the result of the abstract calculation less accurate and lower than the 
45 Important is to make sure that alleged cash expenditures are not also specified on the bank 
statements (lest these are counted twice).
46 If Butter-Sintenie and Van Diggelen are followed, the profit from saving costs, non-monetary 
profit and subsequent profit should also be subtracted.
47 According to the Dutch Supreme Court this is not in violation of article 6 EHRM as long as 
several requirements are met; Dutch Supreme Court of 28 may 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE1182.
Box 2. Simple cash position method
Opening balance in cash
 +/+ legal cash receipts
 -/- End balance cash
 = available for expenditure
 -/- Factual cash expenditures
 = difference
 = unlawfully obtained profit
Box 3. Complex cash position method
Opening balance in cash and bank account
 +/+ legal receipts
 -/- End balance cash and bank account
 = available for expenditure
 -/- Factual expenditures
 = difference
 -/- profit from saving costs
 -/- non-monetary profit
 -/- subsequent profit
 = unlawfully obtained profit
Box 4. Property analysis method
Property at the end date
 -/- Property at the starting date
 = increase in property
 +/+ Actual expenditures
 = total expenditure
 -/- legal income
 = unlawfully obtained profit
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results of a transaction calculation (NL-E3, NL-PC1; see also Borgers, 
2001).
Financial investigations by the ISZW (labour exploitation)
Cases of THB for labour exploitation are less dealt with by the police 
(NL-E13; Tiende Mensenhandelrapportage 2017), but are rather part of 
the inspection work of the ISZW – the supervising and investigative 
authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. In its task 
of identifying cases of labour exploitation, ISZW collaborates with 
several NGOs (the most important one being FairWork). An important 
component of ISZW’s investigation of labour exploitation is a financial 
investigation, comparable to the financial investigation elaborated upon 
above. This means that various direct financial data, indirect financial 
data, and other data are requested and investigated, both in the 
Netherlands and abroad – since significant profits in some labour 
exploitation cases are transferred abroad. Naturally, due to the nature 
of labour exploitation the data requested, and especially the third 
category of other data, will differ to a certain extent from the kinds 
of data requested in cases of sexual exploitation. Important in labour 
exploitation cases are for example hour registrations, pay slips and data 
from internal systems of the ISZW, e.g. reports on corporations made 
by the inspectorate. Some of the data are also gathered online, for 
example by looking at reviews on businesses posed online which can 
provide important information. Contrary to cases of THB for sexual 
exploitation, for labour exploitation cases it is often possible to 
follow a paper trail (NL-E13). An explanation can already be found in 
the fact that Dutch legislation on wages determines that the statutory 
minimum wage must be transferred on the bank account of the 
recipient and may not be paid in cash (article 7a Wet minimumloon en 
minimumvakantiebijslag; NL-E13).48
To request the data, the same legal (procedural) requirements must be 
met as set out in the sections above. When the data are gathered, 
the next step is interpreting the data and – if possible – making 
calculations. Also for calculations of the unlawfully obtained profit by 
labour exploitation, declarations of victims are very important and 
function as a starting point. Interesting in cases of labour exploitation 
is, however, that the emphasis in the calculations will often be on 
costs saved by the exploiter (NL-E13). Yet, also calculations are made 
that establish the amount of money a victim should have received but 
did not receive. In order to establish the unlawfully obtained profit, 
also the amount of money that should have been paid to the tax 
authorities is calculated (NL-E13). Another important task of ISZW is to 
uncover/reveal how the money was invested, also for the purpose of 
prejudgment attachments. For this, in practice, it is often necessary to 
make requests to search abroad.
48 However, we did come across constructions by which exploiters try to circumvent these 
obligations.
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Other financial investigations
Financial investigations on THB are also conducted outside of the 
scope of criminal law. Two relevant examples are provided by financial 
investigations conducted by FIU-the Netherlands and financial investigations 
by banks.
FIU is the organisation in the Netherlands where institutions are obliged 
(by law) to report unusual financial transactions on terrorism and money 
laundering.49 This means that the data FIU-the Netherlands works with 
are transactions that are labelled “unusual,” following so-called report-
indicators implementing the legal report obligation laid down in the Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act, (Wet ter voorkoming 
van witwassen en financiering van terrorisme, hereafter: Wwft).50 The main 
task of FIU-the Netherlands is to investigate the unusual transactions 
reported, to enrich them with additional information, and to see whether 
these transactions can be declared suspicious and thus be shared with 
investigative and intelligence services (article 13 Wwft; NL-E12). Other 
tasks of FIU-the Netherlands are to share developments they monitor 
with other parties such as the ministry and investigative authorities, to 
conduct their own investigations and to share their expertise with other 
(foreign) parties (NL-E12).
With respect to THB, investigative authorities can ask FIU-the Netherlands 
to provide transactions and information on transactions of a certain actor.51 
As already became clear above, data gathered on unusual transactions by 
FIU-the Netherlands can be of great importance in criminal investigations 
on THB. Vice versa, the requests of the investigative authorities with 
the accompanying information on the investigation can help FIU-the 
Netherlands to label their transactions. Yet, FIU-the Netherlands can also 
conduct its own intelligence investigations regarding THB on their data.52 
On the basis of acquired knowledge on THB (e.g. based on information 
coming from police, the ISZW, academic research or results of their own 
research), queries are developed. These queries are run on the data on 
a weekly basis. Results of the queries are investigated by researchers of 
FIU-the Netherlands and if declared suspicious, the data and information 
can be passed on to investigative authorities. In their investigations, 
49 This is laid down in the Wwft, which implements the Directive 2005/60/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing and subsequent 
directives. However, it should be noted that the reporting obligation was already laid down in 
predecessors to the Wwft that, in turn, implemented the predecessor of Directive 2005/60/EC, 
namely Directive 2001/97/EC. FIU-the Netherlands is part of the Dutch Police in organizational 
terms but is an independent body of the Netherlands (NL-E12).
50 These report-indicators can be found on the website of FIU-the Netherlands: https://www.
fiu-nederland.nl/
51 This should be done via a so-called lOvJ2 request. This is a request made by an investigative 
authority via the National Public Prosecutor for Money Laundering to FIU-the Netherlands. 
The request can concern the suspect, but also people related (in one way or another) to the 
suspect and/or alleged or potential victims.
52 These investigations can be initiated on their own initiative or can be based on a request of 
for example the Expertise Centre on THB (Het Expertisecentrum Mensenhandel en Mensensmokkel, 
see: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/contact/contactgids/expertisecentrum-mensenhandel-en-
mensensmokkel-emm) or an information hub from a police district if there is capacity and 
will to start a new investigation.
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FIU-the Netherlands can collect various sorts of other data as well 
(direct financial data and indirect financial data). The data collected are 
interpreted and the results are laid down in so-called intelligence reports. 
These intelligence reports can be of great value to the investigative 
authorities in order to start an investigation (NL-E11, NL-E12).
For FIU-the Netherlands, it is also very easy to request data from 
other FIUs abroad since no formal requests need to be sent. This 
information can also be passed on to investigative authorities (to direct 
the investigation) if the other country has given its consent. This tends 
to provide very useful information in THB investigations and can speed 
up and further the investigation. After all, the time-consuming obstacle 
of a formal requests is not present. However, if the information is used 
in an official report, a formal request must be sent anyway, but then the 
information is already known.
A financial investigation can, furthermore, be conducted by a financial 
institution such as a bank. After all, their core business centres on financial 
transactions. Considering the money management of THB described 
above, this can be especially interesting in cases of labour exploitation. 
Yet, there is no legally binding obligation for banks to conduct financial 
investigations on THB that can be compared to the obligations in respect 
of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing. This means that 
picking up signals of THB is often considered to be an added bonus 
rather than an obligation (NL-E10).53
However, just like anti-money laundering and terrorist financing, financial 
crime units of banks can (and sometimes they do) take up the issue 
(NL-E9). A bank can analyse its transactions and identify red flags. A 
bank can scan its transactions by running queries on certain scenarios 
of THB (just as FIU-the Netherlands does). However, a major difference 
is that FIU-the Netherlands has the benefit of the fact that a selection 
has already been made – the data FIU-the Netherlands works with are 
unusual transactions that are reported as such – while a bank has to 
work with all transactions. In practice, if such queries are run, this results 
in a very high number of hits. Running these queries has therefore not 
been proven to be very successful so far (NL-E9, NL-E10). Also, privacy 
regulations certainly do not allow banks to undertake every action that 
could potentially be undertaken in identifying red flags (NL-E10). It 
should, however, be reminded that investigative authorities such as the 
police or the ISZW can of course request data (e.g. transactions) from 
a bank on certain subjects in a THB investigation and banks also have 
the obligation to report unusual transactions to FIU-the Netherlands that 
can also concern THB cases. When it comes to the role of financial 
53 Also, if banks do conduct financial investigations of some sort on THB, the investigations are 
often part of so-called human rights due diligence. Human rights due diligence on THB is not 
the result of a binding legal obligation but follows from non-binding instruments such as the 
United Nation Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and can be described by 
some banks in their statement published under the UK’s Modern Slavery Act (Van Dijk et al., 
2016). Yet, if due diligence is conducted, it is mostly directed at high risk sectors, high risk 
countries and multinational or large corporations, while THB clearly is also present closer to 
home and in other segments of the market, and can concern all kinds of corporations and 
individuals (Van Dijk et al., 2016).
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institutions in combatting THB, it is interesting to note that they can 
be and according to our respondents also are present at the “front 
door.” After all, when people or corporations apply for loans, open 
bank accounts or are involved with a bank in another way, account 
managers and customer relationship managers that are trained in picking 
up signals of THB and know what do when these signals are present, can 
(and do) play an important role in combatting THB. Moreover, several 
banks register suspicious behaviour they encounter in their day-to-day 
activities in internal systems. This can, for example, already be the case 
when a woman opens up a bank account but a man who accompanies 
her does all the talking and demonstrates “suspicious behaviour” (NL-E9). 
In theory, investigative authorities can also request this information when 
investigating a certain subject in a THB case. However, in practice this 
is not always done (according to our respondents, an explanation could 
be that there is a lack of awareness).
Obstacles54
Based on the interviews with our respondents and the case studies 
done, several obstacles can be identified. Some of the most important 
obstacles are connected to the nature and the modus operandi of the 
trafficking. An example is the fact that in many cases of human trafficking 
for sexual exploitation, there is no (or only a limited) paper trail. It 
is a cash business and – as it appears – large amounts of cash money 
are transported abroad and/or rapidly spent. This makes it difficult to 
trace and confiscate the money and is further complicated by reluctance 
to press charges by victims, as well as their oftentimes-inconsistent 
declarations (see above), and by the complicated distinction (in labour 
exploitation) between bad work management and actual exploitation (see 
sections above). In terms of legislation, privacy legislation is sometimes 
experienced as an obstacle since some data (e.g. video footage) can 
only be saved for a certain amount of time and certain (investigative) 
actions are not allowed due to privacy considerations. Also applying for 
formal demands of the public prosecutor or written authorisation of the 
investigative judge (and formalising data) are by some considered to be 
time consuming. However, other respondents do not experience this as 
a problem. On a practical level, borders are often experienced as an 
obstacle: when requests for data or for the confiscation of property must 
be sent abroad, in transnational THB cases, it can be very difficult to 
get a request executed. Most notably in countries that are not parties 
to a treaty with the Netherlands on this matter. This tends to constitute 
a problem particularly in cases of labour exploitation.
Even if there is an existing legal framework, time is considered to be 
an important obstacle. Executing the requests in practice takes a lot of 
time. The investigative authorities often depend on the authorities in 
other countries, and it is sometimes difficult to know where the request 
must be made. This can not only delay the investigation (and therewith 
a subsequent procedure in court) with associated negative consequences, 
54 In this section, references to the experts are omitted in order to protect their position and 
anonymity.
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but can also frustrate the investigation and possible confiscation of the 
proceeds of THB. To provide an example, there have been cases where 
people abroad were notified (by offenders in the Netherlands) about 
the investigation and requests for searches, which resulted in possessions 
being hidden and property put on other names. Another time-consuming 
aspect related to requests for data is the fact that once data is received, 
often translations must be made.
Another aspect that makes national borders an obstacle is the fact that 
procedural rules and/or practices on gathering data and on confiscation 
differ in various countries. A unique feature of the Netherlands is, for 
example, that prejudgement attachments on assets of the offender (or 
under conditions on assets belonging to another person) are also possible 
for the purpose of preserving the right of recovery for the compensation 
order. However, in other countries this option does not seem to exist. 
Since investigations in the Netherlands are more and more focused on 
enabling damages for the victim, this constitutes an obstacle in those 
investigations. Also, not in every country can prejudgment attachments 
be imposed on assets belonging to another person. Yet, also if there are 
common rules on gathering data or confiscation (e.g. due to European 
legislation on the matter), these rules are not always enforced as such 
in practice and confiscations are not always imposed. Even if property 
is confiscated, the right of recovery (for the confiscation measure) may 
still not be secured, since in a number of cases the property is not 
alienated in due time, which can cause a decline in value and frustrate 
the procedure.
Moreover, in a JIT, although highly valued, respondents experienced some 
obstacles. Some of these were caused by (differences in) procedural 
rules as well. For example, if in a certain country only one person 
participating in the JIT can draft a formal document and eight other 
people must sign it before it is formalised, the investigation can take a 
long time. Another example provided by our respondents is that in a 
certain country wiretaps were allowed for only a very limited number 
of days, yet, in the JIT there was a clear hint that something was going 
to be discussed in another country. However, wiretapping was no longer 
allowed. Some of the obstacles experienced in a JIT also related to 
practicalities in other countries, e.g. data that needed to be collected 
physically at banks.
A lot of respondents face obstacles in terms of capacity. On the one 
hand, there does not seem to be enough time, manpower and means 
available to investigate all that could be investigated. For example, it may 
be of great importance to clarify how a certain suspect lives in a case 
of sexual exploitation, regarding the above discussed difficulty to trace 
cash money flows. Investigating, for example, the amount of money at 
one’s disposal and the pattern of expenditure can provide evidence on 
the amount of unlawfully obtained profit and may be useful for making 
abstract calculations. Investigating the facilitators was also brought forward 
as a useful addition to what is currently investigated, as facilitators in 
one case can be also involved in another case. However, investigative 
authorities are lacking capacity to do this. Neither is there enough 
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time and/or manpower to be present at all interviews of suspects or 
witnesses, or to support the preparation of all interviews, while this is 
considered to be of great value.
On the other hand, there does not seem to be enough capacity to 
investigate all that should be investigated according to the guidelines of 
the PPS either. Not in every THB case a financial investigation can be 
conducted. In some instances, it is not even possible to investigate every 
THB case in due time. In this regard, it should be noted that the available 
means and time seem to differ depending on the kind of case concerned. 
If it concerns a case that starts on the basis of e.g. intelligence information 
(a so-called proactive case), often with more suspects involved, usually 
more means and time are available than in a case that starts e.g. on the 
basis of a report of a victim (a so-called reactive case).
In terms of intelligence and ICT-technology, according to our respondents, 
only limited action is undertaken on this part by the investigative 
authorities themselves on THB when case preparation is concerned, 
whereas this could be very fruitful in discovering (more) cases and 
for securing evidence. Yet, FIU-the Netherlands sometimes plays an 
important role in this regard. Also, THB cases include suspects with a 
lot of knowledge on the use of technological means and social media, 
who use it for example to recruit victims, to recruit clients or to control/
pressure their victims, as mentioned in section 3.5. However, the same 
knowledge is not always present at the investigational level. A related 
obstacle seems to be the fact that digital tools to process financial 
data such as bank accounts are still missing. Some are being developed 
and purchased, but not all investigative departments have these systems 
at their disposal.
Maybe the most important conclusion of this research is implied in 
the concern reflected (in different wordings) by financial investigators 
in this research: Where does the money go? Notwithstanding huge 
developments in the Netherlands over the last decennia in financial 
investigation, in confiscation possibilities, and in the compensation for 
victims in THB – both in a legal sense and in the professionalization of 
the practice of financial investigations – a lot of money flows in THB 
remain invisible.
On the one hand, that is intrinsic to the crime: only a small part of 
the actual THB and traffickers are visible and investigated. According 
to some respondents, this often concerns the “stupid” and unorganised 
traffickers; the smart, well-organised traffickers often escape investigation. 
Moreover, as far as sexual exploitation is concerned, this form of 
THB oftentimes does not leave a paper trail, contrary to labour 
exploitation. Whereas in casu labour exploitation it was perceived as 
difficult to determine when “bad working conditions” would become 
5. CONClUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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labour exploitation, that situation is vastly different from the reality of 
human trafficking for sexual exploitation – and even more so since The 
Netherlands made a sharp turn towards a more repressive approach 
on prostitution. The latter trend further distances sex work from other 
branches in the labour market that are vulnerable to exploitative working 
conditions (like working in fruit production in Dutch greenhouses), as 
well as from a successful claim to rights.
But the lack of a paper trail in THB for sexual exploitation can also 
be linked to the characteristics of the different types of trafficking 
organisations and their financial “habits” in the Dutch context. This 
research revealed that it is elucidating to typify these different forms 
of organisation into four models or categories. Firstly, we differentiated 
domestic sex trafficking cases with a low degree of organisation – not 
seldom one (Dutch, often migrant background) pimp with one or two 
(Dutch) victims – and a typical lover-boy method of recruitment and 
exploitation. A paper trail of profits earned is often lacking here, with 
money made being immediately spent on a boasting pimps’ lifestyle of 
golden necklaces, (hired) cars, expensive brands clothing and luxurious 
parties. This lifestyle is also a recruitment asset. For this type of trafficking 
starting capital mainly exists of social skills – such as reading a person, 
influencing, and persuading her. The case is different for the second 
type: cases in which pimps are Dutch, and (some) victims are from 
abroad, and in which we see a higher degree of organisation and (often) 
an international component. These Dutch traffickers recruit – often 
indirectly via a recruiter in the source country – not only Dutch girls 
but also girls from Eastern Europe. They use facilitators to outsource 
part of their (criminal) activities. They invest their profits in property: 
real estate, boats, cars, in which case there might be a paper trail. 
However, since the allocation key of earnings in prostitution is often non-
transparent and dynamic (it may change over time, at the pimps’ will), 
that paper trail is often complex, internally inconsistent and incomplete. 
In the third type of trafficking organisation – the foreign, family business 
structured organisation – the paper trail is often missing as well. Starting 
capital is limited, but social capital seems to compensate for the lack 
of financial capital and provides the trafficker with some stability and 
security. The revenues are invested in the source country – in real 
estate, cars, et cetera. Financial investigators often have a hard time 
getting sufficient insight in such foreign investments, being hindered by 
time constraints and (transnational) administrative complexities. Moreover, 
money is increasingly transported in cash, instead of being sent to 
the source country via money transfers – contributing only to the lack 
of a paper trail. We have not looked deeply into the fourth type in 
this research, namely THB as a result of migratory (refugees) flows, as 
we did not encounter such cases, notwithstanding the fact that our 
respondents did. Moreover, we did not come across highly sophisticated, 
large, international trafficking organisations, although prior cases in the 
Netherlands – such as Sneep and Koolvis – suggest that these do exist.
All of the discussed types of THB for sexual exploitation use the internet 
and social media quite extensively. They use it: i) for recruitment of new 
girls; ii) for advertising the girl to clients; iii) as a means to control her; 
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and iv) as an exploitation modality in itself. In labour exploitation, the 
internet is similarly, though far less, used for recruitment.
Although in both forms of human trafficking – for labour and for 
sexual exploitation – the lion’s share of profits emanates from the very 
basic technique of having someone work for you without paying that 
person (enough), there are other practices to augment the profits. In 
labour exploitation we found three revenue models, which are intricately 
related: i) saving on salary costs through letting the victims work more 
hours than they are paid for; ii) paying few or no taxes; iii) other 
revenues directly extracted from labour migrants – like money for a 
meal, relatively expensive housing, fines, et cetera. Profits made are 
generally invested back in the company.
As far as the detection and confiscation of profits of THB are concerned, 
we can say that the Dutch legal system and policies concerning THB are 
unique in some aspects. First of all, because of an integrated approach 
to THB, not only the police but other parties – FIU-the Netherlands, 
banks, municipalities, ISZW – are involved in financial investigation. 
The fact that they all look at the phenomenon and the money to be 
traced from a different professional perspective seems to be a strength 
for financial investigations (as long as these perspectives are sufficiently 
communicated and exchanged). They can all add different information 
to the puzzle and work with different methods, thereby helping each 
other finding the information needed. However, there are limits to such 
cooperation, as our respondents pointed out. While some of them 
were pretty content about the amount of information they could share 
with other organisations, others believed that the law on privacy and/or 
differences in “culture” often played havoc with exchanging private and 
public information freely and thereby being able to combat THB more 
effectively. They would, thus, like to see more exchange of information. 
In general, it is considered to be important that various parties (both 
public and private) share information on, for example, modalities, modus 
operandi, and financial management in THB cases on a structural level.
The Dutch legal system further provides for a compensation order, 
which implies that the convicted should pay compensation to the victim, 
but will not do so directly, but via the Dutch state, which will apply an 
advance payment scheme. This construction relieves the victim of the 
burden of enforcement – the possible scenario that the trafficker does 
not pay (in time) is not the victim’s problem any longer.
A useful aspect of the Dutch approach to recovering money earned 
in THB, concerns the confiscation of assets. Not only can the Dutch 
state impose prejudgement attachments on money and assets from 
the trafficker, but also under certain conditions from others than the 
trafficker. This is also possible in order to preserve the right of recovery 
for the compensation order. This is, in principle, a valuable response to 
traffickers putting their revenues on other people’s names to hide their 
“black” money.
Notwithstanding these highlights in the Dutch legal system, our respond-
ents also brought forward some challenges for the future. They concern, 
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in the first place, complexities in international cooperation. Notwith-
standing the fact that JITs were without exception positively valued, 
these international teams could not solve every problem related to the 
transnational character of (combating) THB. Also, JITs are not and cannot 
be established in every THB case. Therefore, the obstacle remains that 
requests for data or for the confiscation of property sent abroad, can 
take a long time to be executed. Moreover, procedural rules and prac-
tices on gathering data and on confiscation are not the same in other 
countries. This slows down or even frustrates the (transnational) detection 
and confiscation of finances and assets acquired through THB.
Secondly, respondents mentioned the lack of capacity within the Dutch 
legal system as an important limitation of financial investigations into 
THB. They feel they could do a better job combating THB if they would 
have more capacity to pro-actively analyse the vast amount of available 
(financial) data. True as this may be from their point of view, there 
are some considerations to take into account here: firstly, the fact that 
in the contemporary information era the amount of available data will 
always (far) extend investigative capacities. Secondly and related to that, it 
depends on the available technology, expertise and skills of investigative 
authorities whether the vast amount of data can be efficiently tapped 
into; in that respect it is important to mention that some respondents 
in this research expressed their concern over the insufficient knowledge 
of ICT technology and social media in Dutch law enforcement. Thirdly, 
the quest for data – and more particularly the linking of different data 
systems – may be at odds with European citizens’ privacy and the safety 
of their personal data. Fourth and lastly, the wish to tap into the vast 
amount of data (assemblages) in order to fight human trafficking needs 
to be balanced with rather protective goals: making sure European 
citizens can have their human rights respected and work without being 
exploited.
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AvIM Aliens Police Department, Identification and People 
 Trafficking
CJIB Collective Debt Collection Agency
DCC Dutch Criminal Code
DCCP Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit
ISZw Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment
JIT  Joint Investigation Team
KMar The Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary
PPS Public Prosecutors Service
STv The Foundation Action group against Trafficking 
 in Women
THB Trafficking in Human Beings
wwft Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
 Prevention Act
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lIST OF INTERvIEwEES
Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
Nl-E1 Financial investigator Aliens Police Department, Identification and 
Trafficking in Human Beings (AVIM) Amsterdam
Nl-E2 Financial investigator Aliens Police Department, Identification and 
Trafficking in Human Beings (AVIM) Amsterdam
Nl-E3 Financial investigator Aliens Police Department, Identification and 
Trafficking in Human Beings (AVIM) Amsterdam
Nl-E4 THB Expert Aliens Police Department, Identification and 
Trafficking in Human Beings (AVIM) Amsterdam
Nl-E5 Financial investigator Aliens Police Department, Identification
and Trafficking in Human Beings (AVIM)
Central Netherlands
Nl-E6 Financial investigator Aliens Police Department, Identification
and Trafficking in Human Beings (AVIM)
Central Netherlands
Nl-E7 Financial investigator Aliens Police Department, Identification
and Trafficking in Human Beings (AVIM)
East Netherlands
Nl-E8 Director NGO FairWork
Nl-E9 Head Intelligence & Analysis Bank
Nl-E10 Head Environmental,
Social & Ethical Risk Policy
Bank
Nl-E11 FIU-the Netherlands Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
Nl-E12 FIU-the Netherlands Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
Nl-E13 Financial Specialist Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment (ISZW)
Nl-E14 Lawyer victims of THB Law firm
Nl-E15 Policy maker Administrative 
Approach Organized Crime
Municipality Amsterdam
Nl-E16 Employee Foundation BARKA NL
(support for Polish migrants)
Nl-E17 Financial Investigator Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment (ISZW)
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55,56,57
55 We screened a total sample of 33 court files of sexual exploitation that took place in the Region 
Middle Netherlands. Of the 33 files, we selected a sample of 11 cases for content analysis 
(of which the latter two were related to one another). The cases consisted of 19 files (see 
footnote 58 on the difference between a “case” and a “file”). We chose the cases as diverse as 
possible regarding size of the trafficking network; domestic/foreign case; number of perpetrators/
victims; modus operandi et cetera in order to prevent a selection bias. For further backgrounds 
of the sample method and data analysis, see Data collection above.
56 A case refers to an incidence of exploitation in a certain exploitative setting. In some of our 
case-studies, the case existed of two or more files, meaning that there were two or more 
suspects connected to the case, who were separately tried before court. The number of files 
per case does not say anything about the number of victims (one suspect can have one or 
more victim(s), just like two or more suspects can have, in theory, one or more victim(s)). It 
does say something, however, about the complexity of the trafficking network. Cases with more 
files generally concern larger networks of greater complexity. See section 2 for an elaboration 
on the cases.
57 Whereas the court and police files (cases 1 to 14: PC1 to CC14 on sexual exploitation) involved 
confidential data for which we needed clearance, the court reports (CRP1 to CRP11 on labour 
exploitation) are publicly available on [www.rechtspraak.nl].
Case Institution Particularities
Nl-PC1 Police Police files, case 1 (sexual exploitation)
Nl-PC2 Police Police files, case 2 (sexual exploitation)
Nl-PC3 Police Police files, case 3 (sexual exploitation)
Nl-CC4 Court Court files,55 case 4 (sexual exploitation, 2 files)56
Nl-CC5 Court Court files, case 5 (sexual exploitation, 1 file)
Nl-CC6 Court Court files, case 6 (sexual exploitation, 6 files)
Nl-CC7 Court Court files, case 7 (sexual exploitation, 2 files)
Nl-CC8 Court Court files, case 8 (sexual exploitation, 1 file)
Nl-CC9 Court Court files, case 9 (sexual exploitation, 1 file)
Nl-CC10 Court Court files, case 10 (sexual exploitation, 1 file)
Nl-CC11 Court Court files, case 11 (sexual exploitation, 2 files)
Nl-CC12 Court Court files, case 12 (sexual exploitation, 1 file)
Nl-CC13&14 Court Court files, case 13&14 (sexual exploitation, 2 files)
Nl-CRP1 Court Court report 157 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:8461
Nl-CRP2 Court Court report 2 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:16185
Nl-CRP3 Court Court report 3 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2013:2951
Nl-CRP4 Court Court report 4 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2014:6563
Nl-CRP5 Court Court report 5 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:3785
Nl-CRP6 Court Court report 6 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:5035
Nl-CRP7 Court Court report 7 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:6594
Nl-CRP8 Court Court report 8 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:6595
Nl-CRP9 Court Court report 9 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2016:9602
Nl-CRP10 Court Court report 10 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2016:9615
Nl-CRP11 Court Court report 11 (labour exploitation) ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2017:4662
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Policies against trafficking in human beings began in Romania shortly after 
the 1989 revolution when the main organised crime groups emerged. 
The legislation developed at a slow pace and mostly after the year 2000 
(Centro de Estudos Sociais, 2014, p. 453). In December 2000, Romania 
signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime as well as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, especially Women and Children.1 Shortly after, in 2001, the 
parliament adopted Law No. 678/2001 on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings. Heavily amended over time and supplemented 
by other legislation, this law is still in force in 2018. Human trafficking 
was defined as a crime in the Criminal Code that entered into force 
in February 2014.2 In 2006, Romania signed and ratified the Council of 
Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings3 and 
established the National Agency against Trafficking in Persons (ANITP) 
under the supervision and coordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.4 
ANITP has the mandate to coordinate, evaluate and monitor at national 
level the implementation of policies against trafficking in human beings, 
victim protection and assistance. Also, ANITP is the national rapporteur 
under the EU Directive on Trafficking in Human Beings 2011/36. The 
Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) 
has the legal mandate to investigate human trafficking crimes.5 It is 
an autonomous and specialised anti-organised crime prosecutor office 
under the General Prosecutor Office. The Romanian Police, organised 
under the Ministry of Interior, cooperates with DIICOT as judicial police 
and also established a Trafficking in Persons Unit within Directorate for 
Countering Organised Criminality.
Historically, Romania had been a country of origin and transit, but 
recently it became also a destination country for trafficked persons.6 
Trafficking within Romania (internal trafficking) is also on the rise as 
1 The Convention and the Protocol were ratified by the Romanian Parliament in 2002 by Law 
no. 565/2002.
2 Chapter VII – Trafficking and exploitation of vulnerable persons, Articles 209-217.
3 Law no. 300/2006 ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings, adopted on May 3, 2005, opened for signature and signed by Romania in 
Warsaw on 16 May 2005.
4  The agency’s applicable legal framework is Government Decision No. 460/2011.
5 Article 11, paragraph 1, no. 2 of the EO no. 78/2016: DIICOT has a mandate to investigate 
the crimes defined in Art. 210, art. 211, and art. 217 of the Criminal Code.
6 Media reports indicate that Chinese workers or babysitters from the Philippines are exploited in 
Romania. The 2017 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report states that: “Romania is 
a destination country for a limited number of foreign trafficking victims, including sex trafficking 
victims from Italy and Armenia” (United States Department of State, 2017, p. 363). The 2016 
GRETA report mentions that “in the period 2011 – 2015, 15 foreign nationals were identified 
as victims of trafficking (seven from the Republic of Moldova, five from Bangladesh, one from 
Serbia, one from Greece and one from Poland)” (p.7). A media report highlighted exploited 
workers from Honduras (Popescu, 2012).
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35% of identified victims were trafficked internally in 2011 – 2014, 
most of them children.7 The most striking case of internal trafficking 
happened in Berevoiești, Argeș County, where 40 persons, including 
minors, were enslaved into forced labour over long periods of time.8 
Nevertheless, a distinction needs to be made between traditional labour 
exploitation in rural areas (children sold to shepherds, for instance) 
and new forms of exploitation of Romanians in other European Union 
countries. Vulnerable people from poor areas, with poor education and 
few opportunities in search for a better life end up in the EU as victims 
of traffickers who promise jobs too good to be true and an easy way 
out of misery. New social narratives are constructed by the perpetrators 
to legitimise trafficking and slavery as consensual agreement between 
partners. Trafficking is justified as a family matter and legitimate practice 
between lovers or spouses. DIICOT notes that “traffickers do not just 
sentimentally overwhelm a victim, they marry her or have children with 
her, which is why receiving money from the victim’s prostitution activity 
(legal in the destination countries) becomes justified as money for family 
daily expenses”. (DIICOT 2017, p.16) The distinction between trafficking 
and sex work is intentionally blurred to avoid prosecution as prostitution 
is regarded as a legitimate way to make ends meet. Already vulnerable 
because of poor education and abusive families, the victims believe this 
narrative.9
The report is based on a desk research of available official statistics, 
reports and independent studies, of 18 interviews with convicted 
perpetrators conducted in four Romanian prisons (Jilava, Rahova, Giurgiu 
and Constanța/Poarta Albă) and six interviews with experts, NGOs 
activists and law enforcement professionals. Access to prisons was 
allowed based on a formal approval of the National Administration of 
Penitentiaries and subsequent cooperation agreements between Syene 
Centre for Education and each penitentiary involved.10 The selection of 
the convicted perpetrators was done by prison staff based on a profile 
submitted by the researcher (conviction for THB as part of an organised 
crime group, all types of exploitation, and willingness to participate in 
research). The study was formally approved by the Ethics Committee of 
Syene Centre for Education and all the interviewed perpetrators signed 
an informed consent form. At the end of each interview, without being 
previously informed, the interviewed perpetrators received an incentive.11 
The interviews were not recorded by electronic means, the researcher 
only taking written notes. The written notes were further transcribed 
into MS Word and organised according to the theme of concern (e.g. 
source of capital, settlement of payments). Thus, patterns were identified. 
7 78% of the child victims have been trafficked internally (GRETA 2016, p. 7).
8 DIICOT, Comunicat de presa, 13.07.2016 and DIICOT, Comunicat de presa 2, 13.07.2016. In 
2017, the perpetrators received final sentences of between three years and five years and four 
months of imprisonment. One of the slaves has received damages of 15,000 lei (approximately 
€3,400) (Grigorescu, 2017).
9 DIICOT notes “increased exposure of counties in the Moldovan area, due to low living 
standards and increased unemployment, victims, especially minor, coming from disorganized 
families with precarious education” (DIICOT 2014, p. 14).
10 The author was supported in conducting this research by the Syene Centre for Education 
Romania, a Bucharest-based NGO.
11 A notepad and one volume of Great Encyclopaedia of World States.
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The patterns were further checked in the interviews with experts and 
available reports or studies.
The human trafficking market in Romania is very dynamic as the 
authorities struggle to control this crime. DIICOT reported 1,319 human 
trafficking files (involving 3,800 perpetrators) finalised with indictments in 
the period 2010 – 2017. In the same period, DIICOT investigated and 
dismissed other 4,329 would-be human trafficking files. Regarding the 
number of victims involved in the DIICOT files finalised with indictment, 
6,470 victims were registered in 2010 – 2017 period, 35% of the victims 
being minors (2,262 minors).12 The courts reported 2,230 offenders 
convicted for human trafficking in the 2010 – 2016 period.13 In cases 
ongoing at the beginning at 2018, human trafficking represents 8% of 
all cases dealt with by DIICOT, coming third after drug trafficking (56% 
of total ongoing files in 2018) and cybercrimes (24% of total ongoing 
files at the beginning of 2018) (DIICOT 2018, p. 14). Human trafficking 
indictments (including plea bargain) constituted 15% of total organised 
crime group indictments in 2017, in fourth place after cybercrimes, 
economic crimes and drug trafficking (DIICOT 2018, p. 15). In the total 
number of cleared up organised crime group cases in 2017 human 
trafficking made up 16%, followed by smuggling, tax evasion and 
drug trafficking. Thus, human trafficking represents a tangible share in 
the overall crime market in Romania, being conducted by specialised 
OCGs. The domestic prostitution market involves between 23,000 and 
47,000 sex workers, generating over half a billion euros. According to 
recent estimates, if prostitution is legalised tax revenues would reach 
€100 million per year (CRIDES, 2012).
ANITP annually reports about the victims of human trafficking registered 
in their database,14 although full data on victims is available in open 
format only for the year 2015,15 raw data being only selectively 
available for other years. Comparing with the DIICOT victim statistics, 
ANITP identified more victims through their identification mechanism 
(6,532 victims in 2010 – 2016 vs 5,861 DIICOT identified victims, in the 
same period). The number of victims is even greater if one considers 
the 2015 Eurostat report which highlights that “Bulgarian and Romanian 
citizens were also most likely to be registered in another EU country 
as victims of trafficking” (Eurostat, 2015, p. 34). Only for 2010 – 2012, 
Eurostat (2015, p. 35) reports 6,101 Romanian victims registered across 
the EU (Romania is on the first place as per number of victims). Large 
12 Data compiled from DIICOT annual activity reports. In its 2014 annual report DIICOT provided 
regional victims statistics on human trafficking and smuggling in migrants’ altogether, although 
more than 90% of the victims come from human trafficking files.
13 Data compiled from the US State Department annual trafficking in persons report.
14 National Integrated System to Monitor and Assess Trafficking in Persons (SIMEV).
15 Open data available here: http://data.gov.ro/dataset/victime-trafic-de-persoane-2015 (full data 
on victims).
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numbers of Romanian victims (over 400 in 2010 – 2012) were reported 
in UK, Italy, Spain, France, and Germany.
Victims are from all over Romania, rural and urban, men and women, 
trafficked inside or outside Romania. In the period 2011 – 2016 most of 
the victims were women (68%), half of them girls/minors. In respect to 
men (32%), only 10% were boys/minors. The main type of exploitation was 
sexual exploitation (56% of the victims), followed by labour exploitation 
(31%), begging (7%) and other forms of exploitation (forced theft, failed 
exploitation, etc.). Most of the victims came from rural areas (57%).16 
Considering the level of education, most of the victims (46%) had 
completed lower secondary education (5 to 8 grades), followed by upper 
secondary (26%) and primary (14%).17 Regarding age, 33% of the victims 
were in the 18-25 year-old cluster, while 32% were 14-17 years old. The 
next relevant age cluster (18%) were those 26-40 years old. Considering 
the type of family background, 53% of the victims were raised by both 
parents and 28% by single parent, with 14% raised in foster homes and 
abandoned.18 Half of the victims were recruited by acquaintances or 
friends and 33% by individuals not previously known to them, 10% were 
recruited by family (including parents) or spouse/partner. Other recruiters 
included neighbours and pimps. The most common recruiting promise 
was foreign job offering (41% of victims), followed by prostitution and 
pornography (24%), and domestic job offering (14%). Most of the victims 
16 43% from urban areas. ANITP provided in their reports specific data on rural/urban scale 
only for the years 2011 – 2015. Nevertheless, from the interviews it seems the trend did not 
reverse.
17 Data compiled from ANITP report for the years 2012 – 2016, the only years from which raw 
data on victim’s education were available.
18 The data are for 2016, the only year for which ANITP provided raw data.
Figure 1. main statistical indicators regarding human traFFicking 
prosecutions 2010 – 2017
Source: DIICOT annual reports.
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were recruited in person (88%), 3% by newspaper advertisement and 
2% online. Romania is the preferred country of exploitation (internal 
exploitation), with almost half (48%) of the ANITP registered victims 
in the period 2011 – 2016 exploited in Romania. The other half was 
exploited abroad, top five destinations including Italy (14% of total 
registered victims), Spain (11% of total registered victims), Germany (9%), 
Greece (4%) and UK (3%).19
Sexual exploitation is the main mode of exploitation as there is a high 
demand in Europe for sexual services, with large consumer countries (cities 
where sex city breaks are being organised with dedicated low-cost flights). 
In some countries, sex work/prostitution is legalised, while in Romania 
it has an unclear legal status (it is no longer incriminate, but subject to 
an administrative fine) (RO-E4 and Sandu, et al., 2017). Regarding labour 
exploitation, trafficked workers are exploited in agriculture (72%), begging 
(11%) and construction (8%).20 Labour exploitation is less represented in 
statistics for cultural and law enforcement reasons (RO-E2). Men typically 
do not consider themselves victims of human trafficking. They interpret 
exploitation as deception and are reluctant to submit complaints, thinking 
worse things happened in life. Labour complaints are submitted by 
Romanian workers in the country of exploitation and they are prosecuted 
by other countries’ agencies or law enforcement agencies in Romania 
consider the crime as deception. This happens as labour exploitation is 
seen mainly as a labour matter, a civil dispute. The other reason is that 
deception is more easily prosecuted, the evidence for trafficking being 
hard to obtain.
19 The data cover the period 2011 – 2016, raw data being available.
20 ANITP 2012 and 2013 raw data.
Figure 2. proFile oF the victims
Source: ANITP annual reports.
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Almost 30% of the victims in 2013 – 2016 period originate from five 
Romanian counties.21 Dolj (177 registered victims), Constanta (173 victims), 
Brasov (172 victims), Mures (172 victims) and Timis (122 victims).
Although there are not many studies of the sex market in Romania, 
those available suggest that there are 23,000 to 47,000 sex workers 
in Romania (Sandu et al., 2017). ANITP and DIICOT statistics reveal 
that half of the trafficking is cross-border and half is domestic.22 
Commercial sex is still regulated by legislation on public morality.23 
There is no public record of the number and level of fines applied to sex 
workers, qualitative data indicating that on average a sex-worker receives 
3-4 fines daily (Sandu et al., 2017, p. 4). The qualitative data indicate 
that “sexual workers tend to adopt a pattern of temporary or circular 
migration in Western European countries for a few months to a year to 
supplement their income” (Sandu et al., 2017, p. 3). Massage parlours 
and video-chat business are legal, but loosely regulated. According to 
media reports, cybersex workers may earn up to €4,000 monthly as 
21 Romania has 41 counties.
22 ANITP reports.
23 Art. 2 of Law no. 61/1991 – inviting persons in public places, under any form, to engage 
in sexual intercourse in order to obtain material benefits, as well as urging or compelling a 
person, for the same purpose, in committing such deeds shall be punished by a fine of 500 
to 1,500 lei (€111 to €333).
Figure 3. human traFFicking main recruiting counties
Source: ANITP annual report.
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international webchat companies open subsidiaries in Romania (Pressly, 
2017). Nevertheless, average income is lower, below €1,000/month, 
as suggested by video chat companies (Glamour Studio, March 30, 
2016). Sex-workers are considered deviant, thus treated with hostility 
by family and with enmity by public authorities. Social stigma and 
self-stigma prolong marginalization, lack of access to public goods such 
as social assistance, healthcare, and protection as sex workers are 
reluctant and even afraid to report to the authorities abuses against 
themselves (Sandu et al., 2017). In a recent case, a minor victim of 
human trafficking recognised a police officer with whom she had 
sexual intercourse and declared he threatened to fine her for having 
sex with him (Tolo.ro, January 30, 2018). Marginalization thus makes 
sex workers easy victims to human traffickers. ANITP statistics on 
victims reveal that 24% of the victims are approached by the recruiter 
proposing a prostitution job. Thus, we may infer that sex-workers may 
be vulnerable to such offers.
OCGs in Romania tend to have either a sophisticated structure with 
units having specific tasks and expertise, or to be loose networks with 
simple structures (DIICOT, 2018, p. 18). Human trafficking OCGs tend 
to fall in the second category, being networks linked by family, kinship 
or ethnic ties. Several of the OCGs identified in the research were 
ethnic/clan based (Roma) groups, other were mainly profit oriented 
groups without an ethnic base – association of former neighbourhood 
acquaintances and friends, or common criminal background. Almost 
all the groups, during their life-span, operated in Romania as well 
as cross-border. Most of the perpetrators interviewed reported that 
their network was composed of relatives and friends. In the RO-C8 
file, 80 perpetrators were involved from the same family (parents, 
children, uncles, aunts, cousins). In the RO-C2, RO-C4, RO-C12 files, 
the perpetrators also had family ties (cousins, extended family). The 
majority of traffickers are male but perpetrators reported that some of 
the victims were given a higher status to recruit and supervise other 
lower level victims. RO-C9 (perpetrator) used his first victim to recruit 
other three women, all of them living with him and prostituting in the 
same apartment. Although part of a larger group, each member had 
his own group of victims. Such women groups are extremely unstable 
as victims come and go, they fight and regroup. RO-C15 allegedly 
started a relationship with a “girlfriend” who prostituted for him and 
brought in another two “friends” to prostitute together. RO-C15 said 
he had up to eight women in exploitation in the same time, in 
different European countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and the 
UK): “in the beginning they fall in love, they want to give everything 
to their lover.” Romanian perpetrators operate with small and mobile 
groups of victims, supervised by few members. The sexual exploitation 
trafficking business model changed in last years to make it safer for the 
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANISATION 
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perpetrators. The traffickers marry their victims, even having children 
with them, arguing when prosecuted that they have a consensual 
agreement to prostitute in order to have an income for the family. 
Lover-boy continues to be the most used recruiting method for sexual 
exploitation (DIICOT, 2017, p. 16).
The prostitution market in Romania is structured by the location in 
which sex is being conducted: street prostitution, indoor prostitution 
(apartments/villas, massage parlours, clubs/hotels), escort and video-chat, 
with many sex workers abused and trafficked (TAMPEP, 2002 – 2004, 
pp. 305-307). According to the interviewed perpetrators, the distinction 
is only relevant for the level of comfort and hygienic conditions, OCGs 
penetration and prostitution practices/sex work being similar.
At the same time, these groups are extremely violent. RO-C4 said his 
clan is the most violent in the city, committing also murders. They 
intimidate, coerce and beat victims who do not obey. RO-C8, RO-C9, 
RO-C10 admitted using violence against the victims from time to time. 
They also put psychological pressure on victims, make them dependent 
of different substances (drugs, alcohol). They use violence also against law 
enforcement or competing clans. RO-E1 gave example of a prosecutor 
investigating a crime group: “after a day into the office protecting a 
victim and arresting several perpetrators, minutes after parking her car in 
front of the house, the car was damaged and decorated with a funeral 
floral crown.” RO-C16 reported stories of the fights among clans for 
controlling territory.
The labour exploitation OCGs tend to be more sophisticated at least in 
the recruitment phase. They use commercial entities to place workers 
abroad and promise attractive salaries ($1,500 monthly, for instance),24 
good working conditions, free accommodation and transport. Once in 
location, identity documents are seized under the excuse of drafting 
labour contracts. After they start working the victims are not paid, 
entering into a debt trap. The victims are told that the agency/the 
trafficker incurred several expenses bringing them to the work place 
(transport, accommodation, commissions, paperwork) and demand 
reimbursement. Thus, the victims’ first salaries are not paid in order 
to cover the trafficker initial expenses that are in fact overrated. The 
workers are left without money and the trafficker continue to cover 
their accommodation, transport and food, putting new overrated debts 
on their shoulders. Thus, the victim enters into a never ending cycle of 
dependence.
24 A 2015 DIICOT file.
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3.1. Source of capital for initiating/sustaining criminal 
operations. Access to capital in critical moments
The perpetrators interviewed had connections with the criminal sector 
before engaging into human trafficking operations. Several perpetrators 
had been previously convicted for other offenses,25 while the rest of 
the perpetrators were familiar with criminal practices.26 The perpetrators 
reported that the initial capital is very low, most important being the 
abilities and knowledge of the territory/criminal environment. Some of 
the perpetrators entered the business with the help of a friend or a 
relative,27 while the rest did it on their own. In order to begin a human 
trafficking for sexual exploitation undertaking, a place and victim is 
usually needed. RO-C12 started human trafficking as a way to diversify 
his real estate business which was in a downturn after the 2009 – 2010 
economic crisis in Romania. The perpetrator established a hospice care 
in a particular location, but as debts continued to accumulate, in search 
of new opportunities, he was informed by a friend that prostitution 
was legal and it was very profitable business in Austria. Also, the friend 
recommended that he contacted another person in Austria. After a visit 
to Austria and a thorough training on the business specifics, RO-C12 
started to recruit women, especially from his hospice care and from rural 
areas nearby, promising them a better life. His initial costs for establishing 
the activities in a foreign country were:
• recruiting costs (mainly transport to victims' locations and petty cash 
payments – €100);
• beauty salon costs and clothing (€1,000);
• transport to Austria by car (gasoline costs – €100 one-way);
• apartment rent (€1,200) and the initial deposit (€1,000) – in one 
apartment two or three victims were usually accommodated (the 
victims did not prostitute in the apartment, only in the clubs);
• medical tests and paperwork for independent worker license (€100) – 
according to the perpetrator the medical tests were run weekly and each 
victim had a medical insurance – (€50/week/person); the initial paper-
work tour was subcontracted to an intermediary for €1,500/woman.
Thus, the perpetrator estimated that the initial costs were approximately 
€5,000 covered by his own savings, not borrowed. The perpetrator did 
not report costs for placing the victims in clubs.
RO-C2 reported that a victim transporter was paid €500 per transport, 
excluding gasoline (approximately €300 per round trip by car from 
25 RO-C3 and RO-C8 – theft; RO-C12 and RO-C4 – violence; RO-C10 and RO-C18 robbery; 
RO-16 car theft.
26 RO-C1 and RO-C11 run a business in an area known to be infiltrated by organised crime, 
RO-C2, RO-C6, RO-C7, RO-C9, RO-C13, RO-C14, RO-C15, RO-C17 were raised in a criminal 
environment – family/foster home, neighbourhood, RO-C5 worked in a law enforcement 
agency.
27 RO-C1, RO-C2, RO-C3, RO-C6 RO-C9, RO-C10, RO-C12, RO-C13, RO-14, RO-C15, RO-C17.
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Romania to Germany). In RO-C9 and RO-C13 cases, the family (father, 
uncle and/or cousins) was involved in human trafficking so the initial 
costs were covered by the family. RO-C10 reported that in order 
to begin trafficking in Romania one needs €700 for the apartment 
rental and €150 for advertisement and clothing. In RO-C14 case, the 
perpetrator’s initial cost consisted in renting an apartment in Romania 
(€300/month + half of a month rent as initial deposit = €450). 
The customers, mainly tourists, were identified by taxi drivers and 
accompanied at the location (for these services the taxi drivers were 
given 50 lei [€10] per client). In RO-C15 case, the initial costs were 
also related to renting an apartment in which sexual exploitation took 
place (the apartment was also located in Romania, so the initial cost 
was €500). In RO-C16 case, the perpetrator used the victims for street 
prostitution. The perpetrator reported that he did not pay for the 
place on the street because of his connections into the underworld 
clans (“on the street you need to have protection”). His initial cost was 
apartment renting, one apartment accommodating two-three victims. 
The perpetrator reported that the victims took care of their looks on 
their own (no beauty salon expenses were reported).
The perpetrators reported that newcomers did not buy victims but 
did the recruitment themselves mainly through the lover-boy method. 
RO-C16 said: “it’s a stupid thing to sell/buy women, if you do not 
convince the girl you do nothing.” Victims are recruited from poor 
neighbourhoods, from rural areas by promises and deceit. Through the 
lover-boy method, the perpetrator gives excessive attention to the target 
(a vulnerable person), buy herself presents, take her out, and exhibit his 
prosperity in order the victim to fall in love with him/care for him. The 
second step is to take the victim to live with him and to manipulate 
her to prostitute for him in order for them to live a comfortable couple 
life: “I get a babe, I suggest that she does prostitution to maintain our 
relationship, but also for helping her family with money” (RO-C10). The 
lover-boy method is based on the creation of a dependency (emotional 
but also different substances are used)28 and psychological manipulation. 
The victim recruited by this method is called “wife.” RO-C13 reported 
he had an official wife (not practising prostitution), a minor whom he 
married traditionally and from whom he was unable to divorce without 
being expelled by the community and clan, and a second “wife” used 
for prostitution. He reported he had to split every week between 
the two wives: he told to the second that he is forced by tradition, 
community, clan and family to stay with the first and he told to the 
first that he has to stay with the prostitute in order to raise money for 
the family. In RO-C17 case, the perpetrator was a drug addict youngster 
who recruited a drug addict victim that used to prostitute for drugs. 
The perpetrator was helped by a friend to start the business. The friend 
lent him money to rent an apartment and cover the initial investment: 
a professional photographer who took pictures of victims, costs of the 
ads in newspapers and a website. Thus, the initial investment was 
around €1,000.
28 Alcohol, drugs, but also substances to enhance sexual pleasure so the victims to experience 
pleasure only with the perpetrator (RO-C4 and RO-E4).
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The lover-boy method is used both by individual traffickers and by 
traffickers that are part of an organised crime group (RO-E2). RO-C18 
(perpetrator) was part of a criminal group, his role being to recruit 
victims by the lover-boy method, maintain contact with them during 
exploitation and collect the money. After recruitment, the victims were 
sent by the other group members to Spain, Greece, and Italy. Each 
victim thought she was into a relationship with him (the three victims 
did not know each other) as they talked weekly by phone and he 
paid them regular visits (approximately four visits per year): “I had to 
be very careful so that they did not find they are a group of girls 
because otherwise jealousy would spoil things. You must be all for 
them. I have grey hair of too much talking on the phone with each 
girl until 2-3 o’clock in the night. Everyone would tell me her day to 
day problems.” In the case of RO-C11, the perpetrator recruited the 
victim but having problems in renting an apartment and convince her 
to prostitute, he sold her for 300 lei (€65) to a trafficking group.
The RO-C8, RO-C4, RO-C3 cases involved perpetrators with a criminal 
record, part of well-established organised crime groups with different 
types of criminal activities.
After being involved in human trafficking no perpetrator reported the 
need for extra money to sustain the activities. The perpetrators reported 
huge profits from sexual exploitation starting from day one. Several 
perpetrators used the money from sexual exploitation to lend other 
perpetrators (usury practices among criminals). RO-C3 (perpetrator) 
reported that he was still owed some money and he planned to get it 
back after being released from jail. Law enforcement officials (RO-E4) 
report that the perpetrators are helped with money while in prison by 
the members of the group that managed to avoid prosecution. In one 
case the perpetrator that avoided jail time had to support 10 members 
of the group in prison (by regular money transfers).
In case of labour exploitation, the initial costs are comparable with those 
of sexual exploitation. In the RO-C7 case, the perpetrator recruited 
seven persons from his neighbourhood in Romania and promised them 
work in Spain. The initial investment per person was €220: €120 for 
the flight ticket and €100 for incidental expenses. The money was 
lent by the perpetrator and the victims had to repay him from their 
first salaries. Once in Spain, the victims were taken by an intermediary 
and they had to reimburse the money for daily accommodation and 
transport from their salaries. Accommodation and transport were 
provided by the intermediary in Spain (a member of the trafficking 
group), the victims being unable to travel without “assistance” or look 
for jobs themselves. Each day, those in need of workers would come 
to the accommodation location and select the desired workers (like 
a slaves’ fair). The salaries were paid by those in need of workers to 
the Spanish intermediary, but the Spanish intermediary did not pay the 
workers because of their “debts.”
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3.2. Settlement of payments
In case of sexual exploitation, the perpetrators report a 50/50 share 
with the victim, but this is hardly the case in practice. There are two 
main types of control over the victims: daily monitoring (when the 
victim is controlled daily by the perpetrators or his agents in domestic 
or cross-border environments) and emotional control (when the victim 
has a certain degree of freedom of movement and of reporting the 
revenues).
In daily monitoring case, victims are left only with the clients’ tips. The 
perpetrator takes all the money from the victim on a daily basis and 
provides weekly allowances for cigarettes and food instead. Perpetrators 
also buy clothing and makeup for victims (also drugs, alcohol, etc.). 
From time to time the perpetrator gives the victim several hundred 
euros to send to her family in Romania (approximately €150-200/
month) (RO-E3). Thus, the family in Romania (sometimes a child) has 
just enough to survive from one month to another and the victim is 
kept in dependence. They are also emotionally blackmailed: according 
to phone tapping, traffickers speak nice to the victims, tell them they 
love them, they cannot live without them: “without you I am nothing,” 
“you are my life”, for instance. They also remind them of their children, 
giving free days and money to visit relatives in Romania (RO-E4). In 
emotional control cases (lover-boy method), the victim believes she 
is in a relationship with the perpetrator and she willingly reports and 
surrenders the revenues to the perpetrator.
RO-C2 reported that the victims would hand over to him in the morning 
all the money raised overnight. RO-C10 reported that his share was 75% 
and the victim’s share was 25%. RO-C12 reported he kept all the money 
but he gave money to the victims when needed. RO-C13 reported 
having eight victims exploited in the same time, under the same roof 
(a villa rented for this purpose) and all the money was administered by 
himself (he registered on a notebook the money earned by each victim; 
the money earned during the day was collected each evening). RO-C15 
said all the money was kept inside the house, in a safe place known 
also by the victims (three women): “everybody took from there as much 
as they needed.” RO-C16 reported that the victims brought daily all 
the money to him. RO-C18 (a lover-boy) said that all the money was 
wire-transferred to him (Western Union, Money Gram, bank account) 
or handed over in cash during his visits. The wire-transfers were rapidly 
exchanged into cash.
Victims are also kept addicted to different substances, such as drugs 
(cocaine, marijuana), cigarettes, and alcohol. RO-C4, RO-C6, RO-C9, 
RO-C13, RO-C15, RO-C17 (perpetrators) admitted using drugs for 
themselves and the victims. RO-E3 encountered a victim who used to 
drink two litters of vodka with Red Bull energizer daily.
The level of income from sexual exploitation depends on the country 
in which exploitation takes place (Romania, Spain, UK, UAE, etc.), the 
season (winter/summer), the place of exploitation (club, street, hotel, 
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etc.), the day of the week (weekends tend to be more expensive), the 
type of sex and the physical appearance of the victim (beauty and 
age, minors generally being more expensive). In the interviews with the 
perpetrators several estimates on the average level of income per victim 
were provided. The perpetrators in the sample trafficked victims for 
sexual exploitation in Romania, Austria, Spain, UK, Italy, and Greece.
In Romania the average prices for sexual intercourse are 50 lei (€11) for 
oral sex and up to 200 lei (€44) per hour for normal/vaginal sex. The 
prices are lower on the streets and higher in apartments or massage 
parlours. There are exceptions and the so called “luxury” services may 
reach up to €200/hour (RO-C4, RO-C9, RO-C13, RO-C15, RO-C16, 
RO-C17). The number of clients per day in Romania is five to ten in 
an apartment/parlour and up to 20 on the streets, depending on the 
season (in summer, street prostitution is more active than in winter). 
The perpetrators reported that in Romania a victim earns between 
700 lei – 1,000 lei (€155-€220) and 2,500 lei (€550) per day (2,000 lei 
[€440] being the average reported by several perpetrators). For an entire 
month, the perpetrators report 20-25 working days (free time, period, 
etc.). Thus, a victim exploited in Romania earns on average 30,000 lei 
(€6,660) per month (around €70,000 per year).
Abroad, in the European Union, prices are higher. In Austria the price in 
between €50 to €100 per sexual intercourse in clubs, a usual Romanian 
victim having between three and ten clients per evening. The perpetrators 
calculated an average to €500 per night per victim (although they 
also reported earnings of €1,000/night). The victim also earns a share 
from the client’s orders of drinks at the bar (usually 10%). With an 
average 20 working days, each victim makes around €10,000 per month 
(€120,000/year). In Greece, the prices for sexual intercourse are lower 
but there are more clients. According to RO-C18 (perpetrator), in Greece 
there are brothels having a seven-euro entry fee for less than ten minutes 
of sexual intercourse. The perpetrator reported that the Romanian victims 
earned €300-500 per day, around €8,000 per month and €90,000 per 
year. In Spain the prices are between €60 to €100 in clubs/apartments 
(depending on usage of condoms or not) and €20 to €60 in the street. 
In clubs/apartment up to five clients per day are serviced, while in the 
street the number of clients goes up to 20 on average. So, an exploited 
victim generates €400 per day, €8,000/month and €90,000 per year. In 
the UK, the prices are in pounds sterling and they reach from ₤60 to ₤100 
per sexual intercourse (depending on usage of condom). A victim may 
earn ₤500 to ₤700 per day at a hotel, having five to seven clients. RO-C3 
reported that with four victims in the UK he earned on average ₤2,500/
day. So, a victim generates on average in UK an income of ₤12,500/
month, and ₤135,000/year (€150,000). RO-C10 (perpetrator) reported that 
over a period of three months in Italy he had an income of €50,000 
with one victim. RO-C6 (perpetrator) reported the prices in Italy to be 
€30-€100 per sexual intercourse, with an average for 10 to 15 clients per 
day (€15,000/month, or €150,000/year). RO-C15 (perpetrator) reported 
cashing €200,000 from a victim in two years abroad. The sums above 
are estimates from the perpetrators point of view and memories and they 
should be taken with precautions as the perpetrators do not stay one 
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year into the same place and the victims are not exploited continuously 
(some leave or escape, get sick, etc.). The perpetrators in our sample 
exploited between 3 and 24 victims at the same time.
The income from selling victims for sexual exploitation also depends 
on the country of selling (selling abroad costs more than in Romania), 
the availability of passport (victims with passport are more expensive), 
age (minors are preferred), the person selling the victim (parent or 
trafficker) and physical appearance of the victim and the emotional 
status (e.g. offended, nervous). Victims are sold by recruiters (lover-
boys) to organised crime groups and between organised crime groups. 
Nevertheless, there are instances when victims are sold by their own 
parents or caregivers to organised crime groups. In our sample, six 
perpetrators acknowledged selling victims to other traffickers/groups, 
except RO-C11 who said the acts he was indicted for were not real 
(namely selling a victim for €65). The price for a victim ranges between 
€400 and €8,000. RO-C17 reported recruiting and selling runaway 
teens to other traffickers for only €400. RO-C2 reported buying a 
teenage girl from her father for €3,000 (the girl had been transported 
by her father to Austria). RO-C3 reported kidnapping and selling 
teenagers to Albanian OCGs for up to €8,000/person. On average 
a victim for sexual exploitation costs €1,000-€2,000. As mentioned 
before, the numbers reflect the perceptions of the perpetrators. RO-E3 
said that victims can be sold for as low as 100 lei (€20) and as high 
as €5,000.
In case of labour exploitation, the work of a farmer or of a construction 
worker is paid by €45-60/ working day (RO-E4). This money is not fully 
paid to the worker as the perpetrators keep most of the money to cover 
previous so called debts of the worker, and costs of accommodation and 
transport. Sometimes, the workers are guarded not to escape, are beaten 
to comply and their identity documents are seized by the perpetrators. 
They live in very poor conditions, with no medical assistance and work 
up to 15-17 hours per day. Several cases of Romanian workers enslaved 
in Italy were reported in 2017 (Antena3.ro, October 5, 2017; Dancu, 
2017; Stoica, 2017). The workers are paid one euro per hour while the 
perpetrators keep the rest of the €50. Perpetrators can make a profit 
of €1,400 per month (around €15,000 per year) from only one worker. 
The monthly income from an enslaved worker is far less than from a 
sexually exploited person. Nevertheless, labour exploitation involves a 
higher number of victims at the same time29 and is less risky than the 
sexual one as the authorities register such cases as tax fraud or labour 
disputes.
3.3. Costs of doing business
In case of sexual exploitation, the perpetrators’ costs are related to 
accommodation and transport of the victims, commissions for wire-
transfer (Western Union, MoneyGram), activities to keep the victim 
29 Thirty-five victims in an Italian case uncovered in October 2017.
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dependent (club hang-outs, substance addiction, money to be send 
to their families, cigarettes, food, clothing and makeup costs), guards’ 
salaries to monitor the victims, licenses/authorisation and regular medical 
examinations, if any.
• When abroad, the victims are usually accommodated in a different 
place than the one in which they are exploited. The accommodation 
costs range between €700 and €1,800 per month and include 
rent and utilities (for three or four persons). These costs are paid 
by the perpetrators. In Romania, the victims are accommodated in 
the exploitation venue, the costs being up to €400/month including 
utilities (from 4 up to 12 persons accommodated in one apartment). 
Transport is done either by car or by low-cost air travel.
• The monthly costs for food and cigarettes were estimated to €200/
per victim abroad; in Romania these costs are around €50.
• The cost of money send by one victim to her family is €200/month 
(RO-E2 and RO-E3); moreover, the victims exploited in Romania are 
not allowed to send money home.
• RO-C12 perpetrator reported spending up to €1,500 weekly for clubs 
hang-outs, clothing and substance addiction for three victims.
• The costs for guard are up to €700 per month. RO-C2 was recruited 
as a guard and promised €700 per month to keep an eye on the 
victims. He stayed in a two-room apartment in Vienna with three of 
the victims, one being a minor.
• Medical costs were mostly skipped as the victims did not have access 
to healthcare. In few cases where perpetrators reported medical costs, 
they were up to €100/month. In some cases, in order to resemble 
fashion models, perpetrators invest in plastic surgery for the victims: 
increasing breast size, Botox injections (RO-E4).
• Promotion costs: internet (€10/month), ads (€10/ad), professional 
photos (€30/individual short session-15-20 photos), video-chat equip-
ment (€75-€100/professional webcam), etc.
Regarding bribes, the perpetrators with activities aboard reported that 
bribes were not paid (e.g. as RO-C2 claims: “Austrian police do not 
accept bribes”). In Romania, regular bribes are paid to law enforcement 
and local politicians. RO-C15 established a massage parlour as a cover-up 
for human trafficking and he reported that he had to contribute monthly 
to the police €1,000 (in summer) and €500 (in winter): “the police came 
every month in order to collect the money during controls. They say the 
money is shared with those from the organised crime unit. You cannot 
do such business without police protection.” The relationship between 
government officials and human trafficking perpetrators is currently a 
high topic on the public agenda in Romania as a recent journalistic 
investigation uncovered a human trafficking file involving police officers, 
intelligence officers, public servants, and prosecutors (Tolo.ro, January 29, 
2018; Tolo.ro, February 1, 2018; Tolo.ro, February 3, 2018). RO-C8 
(perpetrator) said he was a police informant and developed his criminal 
network under the protection and supervision of police chiefs (his 
marriage godfather being an influential police chief). He allegedly paid 
€5,000 to a prosecutor to drop charges against his son. RO-C3 admitted 
his trafficking operation benefitted from the protection of a member of 
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parliament who was offered money and prostitutes for free. He also 
declared paying regular bribes to local authorities (municipality and 
police). The relationship between civil servants/politicians and human 
trafficking networks is entrenched as reported by experts and media 
scandals.30 RO-E2 and RO-E3 reported that local authorities are involved 
in trafficking networks, especially the police, oversight agencies and child 
protection services under the county councils (DGASPC). DGASPCs are 
called the “entrance of hell” as minors under their care are recruited 
by traffickers with the knowledge and sometimes help of the staff and 
managers.31 Even when the staff does not receive financial incentives 
from the perpetrators, they turn a blind eye for fear of losing their job.32 
Other cases of public officials involved in THB have also been detailed 
in the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings (GRETA, 2016, paragraph 188).
Taking into account the above mentioned costs, the average monthly 
business costs for a victim are €1,00033 abroad and €200 in Romania 
(for accommodation, transport, meals and bribes). In case of large, very 
specialized criminal undertakings the costs for video-chat hardware and 
software equipment’s may go up to €30,000 or more, not to mention 
the plastic surgery works.
In case of labour exploitation, the initial travel costs and monitoring 
costs are the most relevant ones. Once in the exploitation venue, the 
workers are forced to work in order to pay back their real or overrated 
debts. The costs for accommodation and meals are also exaggerated 
by traffickers so that the victim would be unable to cover his/her debt 
irrespective of work effort. Monitoring workers involves physical abuses, 
threats, and movement restriction. RO-C7 reported that the victims 
were charged ten euros per day for accommodation and transport 
expenses. Nevertheless, the victims were paid for their working days 
even 45-60 days after they completed work, making them borrow 
money and entering into a never ending cycle of dependence.
3.4. Profits and profit sharing
In case of sexual exploitation, the profits are mainly used for luxurious 
lifestyle and investments in real estate and cars. Almost all profits are 
deposited or invested in Romania.34 Profits are also used to establish 
legal businesses, but these businesses are mainly established to recruit 
victims (e.g. clubs, recruitment agencies) or cover up human trafficking 
30 Cases reported by media (Ciuperca, 2017).
31 DGASPC Dambovita file (DIICOT 2016, p. 105).
32 For instance, the staff do not report to the police when minors come back to their room late 
at night, wearing new clothes and having in their pockets expensive mobile phones. The cases 
are not reported even when the victims complained they were raped and beaten. According to 
a Government Note 66 children in the custody of child protection units have been trafficked 
in 2015: http://www.sgg.ro/legislativ/docs/2016/06/bz6nd_p9v3mhqw80ys7f.pdf
33 This amount includes: €300 (accommodation and utilities) + €200 (food and cigarettes) + 
€200 (money for families) + €200 (guards and security) + €100 other costs (e.g. medical 
tests).
34 Ninety percent, according to RO-C4‘s estimate.
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operations and launder crime money (e.g. real estate). Crime money are 
also lent with interests to other persons for a certain period of time, but 
this practice is not entrenched as the perpetrators are extremely mobile 
and it is hard to pursue debtors from abroad (RO-E4).
Lifestyle is a critical issue reported by all the perpetrators and experts 
interviewed. RO-E4 called the perpetrators “termites/white ants” as the 
profits are immediately spend on bets, restaurant meals, and private 
concerts: “In general, the Romanian trafficker lives for the day, the 
money is used to flatter their vanity.” RO-C2, RO-C10 and RO-C12 
(perpetrators) reported losing money regularly to sport bets (up to 
€1,000 per month), RO-C6, RO-C13 and RO-C15 to casino gambling 
(especially roulette, up to €4,000 lost one night). RO-C2 described the 
perpetrator for whom he worked for as a spendthrift: “he was paying for 
the drinks for everyone in the bar.” RO-C12 spent money in restaurants 
hosting concerts of Romanian singers famous to the underground world 
(he declared giving €3,000 to such a person to sing several songs at his 
table). RO-C15 declared paying €8,000 for an hour for singing at this 
restaurant table. RO-C6 also admitted spending large sums of money in 
restaurants, paying fiddlers to play at his table. RO-C4 alleged to know 
traffickers who gave €20,000 to such fiddlers. Luxury clothing, watches, 
mobile phones and perfumes are also among usual goods bought by the 
perpetrators.35
Real estate and cars are predominant investments (RO-E4). RO-C3 
declared he invested the profits in apartments (for a single room 
apartment he allegedly paid €28,000, for another one €60,000), holidays 
homes, luxury cars and land in Romania. RO-C6 invested in real-estate. 
RO-C8 claimed to have invested in two apartments, one villa and several 
cars (but the assets are not registered on his name). RO-C12 declared 
he used crime money to buy two new cars: a BMW and a Peugeot. 
RO-C15 said he bought a brand new Range Rover for €55,000, a house 
and gave loans with interest to acquaintances. Cars may be included 
also into the lifestyle budget as they are bought with the intention to 
signal wealth and status.36 RO-C16 bought a Range Rover Phantom 
though he did not hold a driving license. He also bought two houses. 
These investment choices need to be understood in the context of the 
regulation of cash payments which had not been capped before 2015 
(more on this in section 5 below).
Infiltration into the legal economy is another development line for 
criminals. To launder money and cover up trafficking operations, RO-C3 
has set up legal businesses – a club/discotheque, in which he allegedly 
invested €87,000, and a construction company, in which he allegedly 
invested €80,000. The perpetrator claimed that business was conducted 
legally, all taxes were paid, and he was regarded in the community 
as an honourable entrepreneur. In fact, his trafficking operations were 
located 100 km away from the business offices, in a hotel in a different 
county. As he reported, the club did not make any profits, but no big 
35 As reported by RO-C4, RO-C5, RO-C15, RO-E4.
36 As reported by RO-C4, RO-C5, RO-C6, RO-C8, RO-C12, RO-C15, RO-E2, RO-E4.
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losses either, being used mainly as a victim recruiting facility. Vulnerable 
women/girls were identified by the DJ and invited to the perpetrator’s 
office, who promised them a better life. The construction company was 
used to launder the proceeds of crime. RO-C5 – a perpetrator and 
former law enforcement officer – also owned a club and a construction 
company. He trafficked aboard his former employees (four women) and 
intended to use the profits to construct a building. The victims transferred 
€86,000 to his name (using Western Union and MoneyGram). On this 
money, the perpetrator bought land and construction materials before 
being prosecuted. RO-C8 established real-estate agencies, construction 
companies (building houses and office buildings) and fast-food restaurants, 
using crime money. RO-C15 established a massage parlour as a cover-
up for human trafficking. Different traffickers used the place to exploit 
their victims, including under 18 year-old girls. RO-C4 confirmed that 
almost all massage parlours are managed by organised crime groups 
and are a cover-up for sexual exploitation. In 2013, a massage parlour 
received a fine of 25,000 lei (about €5,600) and was ordered by the 
court decision to close (GRETA, 2016, paragraph 172). Other typical 
businesses are beauty salons, car wash facilities and video-chat (RO-E2, 
RO-E4). RO-C16 opened a hair salon in which he invested €5,000.
Famous and expensive lawyers are commissioned to defend the 
perpetrators in court. RO-C3 claimed to have paid €22,000 to defence 
lawyers. RO-C2 nominated two famous lawyers in Romania allegedly 
hired to defend him. RO-C17 also complained about the costs of 
lawyers. Some media have reported an increase of the market for 
defence lawyers (Enache, 2014).
Other sums are given as gifts by the perpetrators to ensure future loyalty 
by their close relatives, clan or group (RO-E4).
The perpetrators prefer to hold the money in cash and smuggle it into 
Romania by themselves or through Romanian bus drivers. RO-C15 preferred 
to hide the money in his house (e.g. €50,000 were hidden in a flower 
pot, in a bag and €65,000 were hidden in a chair). RO-C3 brought into 
Romania €70,000 cash, hidden in his car. RO-C4 worked also with cash. 
RO-C12 also reported bringing cash into Romania by car. Perpetrators did 
not invest money using the financial markets. RO-E4 claimed that she did 
not know of cases of trafficking money being invested in stocks, offshore 
companies or bitcoins.37
RO-E4 had cases with perpetrators hiding the crime money abroad, 
buying clubs, restaurants or coffee shops having two-three floors with 
several rooms for prostitution and sexual exploitation: “traffickers learn 
from criminal files and try avoiding making the same mistake twice.” 
Nevertheless, traffickers, at least those who had been convicted, are not 
sophisticated persons – they search for the simplest way of action and 
they do not want to complicate their lives with responsibilities, such 
as paying taxes, evaluate financial risks or assuming intellectual duties. 
Traffickers do not change trafficking models if they still work (RO-E4).
37 According to DIICOT (2018, p. 20) darknet and bitcoin are used by drug traffickers.
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In case of labour exploitation, the perpetrators also tend to invest in real 
estate. RO-C7 invested money in two houses in Romania.
3.5. The role and impact of the internet 
on human trafficking activities and finances
Internet is used by the sexual exploitation perpetrators mainly for 
promotion. Several perpetrators (RO-C3, RO-C6, RO-C10, RO-C13, 
RO-C15, RO-C17) reported that the victims took care of their own 
advertising by using social networks and adult websites (regular posting 
of their photos, administrating their accounts, programming clients), 
some of the victims having their own website. However, this online 
activity does not mean the victim is not physically monitored. Internet is 
also used by perpetrators (or victims) to recruit other victims (by posting 
ads about labour or prostitution opportunities). The group represented 
by the RO-C17 perpetrator had logistics and administrative staff at 
their disposal. For instance, they hired specialised administrative staff 
(receptionists) to take over the phone call from customers, to make 
appointments of customers to specific victims, disseminate online ads on 
recruiting and available prostitution services, and respond to questions 
and replies from potential victims. RO-E2 confirmed that organised 
crime groups have entire departments specialised in online promotion 
and website development or subcontract such services. RO-E3 reported 
that the lover-boy method is used also through social media networks 
along with sextortion practices. The perpetrators build fake social media 
profiles and ask personal details and pictures. Europol reported that 
the internet is a crucial tool for human traffickers facilitating targeting 
of potential victims, access to personal data, logistics and transport, 
advertisement and surveillance (Europol, 2016, p. 12). The Romanian 
Centre for European Policies reported that a pattern in recruiting victims 
is posting job offers that do not correctly reflect pay, type of work 
and benefits (Toma et al., 2017, p. 13). There are Romanian websites 
promising video chat jobs which claim to pay up to €1,000/month 
(plus 70% commission and free monthly city breaks in Europe) and 
it is hard to make the difference between legitimate business and 
human trafficking operations.38 Romania has legislation regulating places 
(including online) where striptease or erotic programs are allowed to 
be presented to the public.39 Based on this regulation video chat and 
massage parlours may be lawfully established in Romania.
According to RO-C4 (perpetrator), there is a competition between typical 
exploitation and video chat exploitation. Video chats are used also 
by individual sex workers or international companies and this affects 
the profits of the domestic criminal groups. RO-C4 reported extortion 
racketeering practices against a video chat owner, including violence 
threats and car damage. The video chat business was established in a 
villa and it ran with 20 sex workers. Most of the perpetrators in the 
38 Romania has allergy 5,000 video chat studios and 100,000 persons working into this business 
(Angheluta, 2018).
39 Law no. 196 of 13 May 2003 on the prevention and combating of pornography.
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sample used money transfer services (especially Western Union and 
MoneyGram) (RO-C3 and RO-C18). RO-C1 reported using apps to 
communicate with group members (e.g. Skype, WhatsApp, Facebook). 
Such apps are used also as a form of control and intimidation. The 
interviewed perpetrators used also online booking to ease travel around 
Europe. Internet and the new communication technologies improved the 
traffickers’ business processes, giving them access to new markets and 
clients.
Internet is also used for recruiting workers for labour exploitation. 
Work placement agencies are used to deceive potential workers about 
the work and working conditions (RO-E3). According to a study, 
30,000 applicants registered in 2014 on Romanian online recruitment 
platforms (European Commission, 2016, p. 72). The E-liberare Association, 
a Romanian NGO advocating against human trafficking, promoted a 
fake job website40 in order to evaluate the profile of interested users. 
As it turned out, most of those clicking the “apply” button had been 
13 to 16 years old girls.
Apart from being used by perpetrators, internet operations may be 
monitored by law enforcement, but new investigation techniques and 
skills need to be developed. According to the Romanian Criminal 
Procedure Code, law enforcement may use the following special 
techniques in human trafficking files: intercepting communications or 
any kind of remote communication, access to a computer system, 
photo, audio or video surveillance, location or tracking by technical 
means, obtaining data on a person’s financial transactions, detention, 
surrender or search of postal items, use of undercover investigators and 
collaborators, authorised participation in certain activities (committing a 
crime), supervised delivery, obtaining traffic and location data processed 
by the providers of public electronic communications networks or 
providers of publicly available electronic communications services.41 As 
the use of these special techniques is incipient, law enforcement needs 
to invest in human resources and training (Suian, 2016). At the end of 
2017, DIICOT started two projects on specialised techniques financed 
by European Union: CY-OPS (law enforcement training in the area of 
undercover online operations – 120 online investigators will be trained) 
and SIPOCA54 (on developing methodologies and training for electronic 
search) (DIICOT, 2018, p. 10). As of 2018, such investigation techniques 
are rarely used.
40 The website appealed to young, outgoing persons with basic English skills seeking employment 
abroad.
41 Articles 138-154 of Criminal Procedure Code.
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In 2011, Romania introduced regulations on extended confiscation,42 
but there are still challenges in enforcing the provision besides several 
fiscal crimes. In 2017, ANABI, the Romanian agency for the management 
of forfeited assets, established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Justice, become operational43 and started to register seized assets, 
arrange for their interlocutory sale, managed a unique bank account 
for seized money and temporarily stored and managed mobile assets 
having an estimated value exceeding €15,000. ANABI is developing an 
integrated electronic system of seized criminal assets (ANABI, 2016), 
provides advice to prosecutors during seizing procedure, and is the 
Romanian Asset Recovery Office.
In 2015, Romania introduced legislation to limit cash transactions.44 
According to the law, legal persons cannot receive in cash more than 
5,000 lei daily per person (€1,100) and it is forbidden to fragment 
cash receipts from the beneficiaries for invoices whose values exceeds 
5,000 lei (the difference has to be paid only through cashless payment 
instruments). This ceiling does not apply to payment in instalments. The 
sanction consists of a fine of 10% of the cash amount overpaid or 
exceeding the ceiling. It needs to be further researched, therefore, how 
this law will affect the investment patterns of organised crime groups.
Romania’s financial intelligence agency, the National Office for the 
Prevention and Control of Money Laundering, oversees operations 
above €15,000 and reports suspicious transactions to law enforcement. 
Romanian money laundering legislation compel legal persons to develop 
anti-money laundering procedures, to have specialized personnel and to 
report suspicious transactions.45
A Financial Investigation Unit has been set up in the Directorate for 
Organised Crime Combat of the Romanian police to track accounts and 
conduct financial profiling of OCGs, including identifying money laundering 
operations. Such a unit is also deemed necessary within DIICOT in order 
to conduct financial investigation in parallel with criminal investigation. 
DIICOT has argued that OCGs use in their criminal activities professionals 
such as accountants, lawyers, financial councillors, and law enforcement 
should benefit from similar assistance (DIICOT, 2018, p. 19).
Given the profiles of the traffickers, until recently financial investigation 
was not a priority for prosecutors. Financial investigation may take up 
42 Art. 112 (1) of the Criminal Code.
43 It was established by Law No. 318/2015 on the establishment, organisation and functioning of 
the National Agency for the Management of Seized Assets.
44 Law no. 70 of April 2, 2015 for the strengthening of the financial discipline regarding the 
operations of cash and cash payments and for the modification and completion of the 
Government Emergency Ordinance no. 193/2002 on the introduction of modern payment 
systems.
45 Law no. 656/2002 on the prevention and sanctioning of money laundering.
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to two years so that the structure and the members to be identified 
along with their financial routes. According to the interviewed experts, 
the prosecutors try to identify first the perpetrators, their closer relatives/
straw men and their standard of living (properties on their names, 
bank accounts, MoneyGram and Western Union transfers, and income). 
Many of the perpetrators put their properties on the name of close 
relatives (parents, siblings). As part of financial investigation data/financial 
records are requested from other countries. A recent trend is for former 
convicted criminals who return to the human trafficking market to become 
extremely skilled in hiding profits and their traces: “They make most of 
the investments abroad. In order to deceive law enforcement, however, 
they also invest a minor part in real-estate in Romania knowing that 
the property will be confiscated but hope that the prosecutor would be 
satisfied with finding something instead of nothing and stop investigating 
other, more difficult and time consuming paths” (RO-E4). The methods 
used by the prosecution to calculate the profits are rather empirical: 
number of victims, average victim income per night, and number of 
working nights. The financial investigation closes with a report. In the 
analysis of OCGs, DIICOT states that criminal groups are money driven, 
not leader driven (DIICOT, 2018, p. 18). Thus, criminal groups tend to 
reorganise and resume activity soon after being disbanded. Without an 
effective policy of forfeiture, criminal measures are not dissuasive.
RO-E4 stated the challenges to enforce extended confiscation provisions: 
“the initial hearings have to be very detailed otherwise in court you 
may find defendants bringing justification and submitting loan or sale 
contracts allegedly signed ten years before with their relatives in order 
to raise doubts in the mind of the judge”.
The main challenge of DIICOT from the financial investigation point of 
view is to identify enough assets and seize them in order to ensure that 
human trafficking victims are duly compensated. For 2014 and 2015, 
DIICOT issued raw data on the registered damages and value of seized 
assets in human trafficking files. The value of damages (0.7% in 2014 
and 0.08% in 2015) and frozen assets (3.55% in 2014 and 0.1% in 2015) 
in human trafficking files is very low comparing with the total frozen 
assets and damages registered in relation with all the files and crimes 
under DIICOT’s mandate. The low level of registered damages is due 
to the inability of law enforcement to document the entire exploitation 
period and the entire number of victims involved as well as the lack of 
methodology to calculate damages in human trafficking files. The assets 
frozen are only those found in the possession of perpetrators. In 2013, 
assets and valuables confiscated in the course of investigations for human 
trafficking crimes amounted to €177,295, $11,036, and the equivalent 
of €13,315 in other currencies, as well as 8.76 kg gold, 84 real estate 
properties and 104 vehicles (GRETA, 2016, paragraph 181).
This low level of seized assets makes it more difficult for the victims to 
secure compensations, even if the compensations are awarded by the 
court. Usually courts allow for very low compensations to human traffick-
ing victims – as low as ten euros, for instance – but even these compen-
sations are not really effective without any seized assets (RO-E3). GRETA 
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urged Romania to improve the 
collection of statistical data on 
compensations granted to vic-
tims of THB without noticeable 
success: “GRETA was informed 
that 56 victims of THB were 
awarded compensation by a 
court in 2011 and 53 in 2012. 
There is no information on 
the amounts of compensation 
awarded and whether it was 
actually paid. No information 
is available on compensations 
awarded to victims of THB by 
courts in 2013 – 2015” (GRETA, 
2016, paragraph 144).
Regarding international cooper-
ation, there are countries with 
which cooperation is very in-
tense (Germany, Spain, France) 
and others with which it is 
harder to cooperate, such as Ireland and Italy. Joint Investigation Teams46 
are reported to work very well, with 13 new teams on human traffick-
ing opened in 2017 with Netherlands, UK, Spain, and France. In 2017, 
DIICOT (2018, p. 64) registered one European Investigation Order on 
human trafficking with the Netherlands. DIICOT started criminal inves-
tigations against 26 Romanian citizens who allegedly committed human 
trafficking abroad as part of OCGs.47
Law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities, such as DIICOT, and 
police need to develop more sophisticated big data analysis in order to 
evaluate risks and perpetrators. A good practice that can be used or 
replicated by DIICOT is ANAF risk analysis of the wealth of individuals. 
ANAF is the Romanian tax administration responsible for tax collection 
from legal and natural persons. Beginning in 2013, ANAF has developed 
a screening mechanism for evaluating an individual’s wealth measured 
against the level of paid taxes (Economica.net, August 6, 2016). ANAF 
identified four groups of risks: wealthy owners of poor companies, 
wealthy persons without any known economic activity, wealthy persons 
with volatile income, and wealthy persons with other types of fiscal 
risks. Wealthy persons were determined on several indicators: lending 
to other persons more than 200,000 lei (€44,000), buying real estate 
over €70,000, establishing bank deposits over 150,000 lei (€33,000) 
and buying cars worth over €25,000. Based on these criteria, almost 
300,000 individuals have been put into risk categories and further 
analysis resulting 132,000 cases in which estimated income was by 
at least €11,000 higher than the taxed income. This group has been 
46 Joint Investigation Teams conduct joint operations, exchange of evidence, journeys, and 
translations, 90% of the costs being covered by Eurojust.
47 The following number of Romanian citizens have been investigated for human trafficking by 
OCGs in these countries: Germany (2), France (1), Spain (21), Italy (2) (DIICOT, 2018, p. 65).
Figure 4. damages and seized assets in human traFFicking Files (€)
Source: DIICOT annual reports.
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further discriminated using the following indicators: estimated undeclared 
income higher than €220,000 in 2011 – 2013, real estate over €150,000 
purchased in 2011 – 2013, cars over €75,000 purchased in 2011 – 2013. 
Thus a sample of 5,884 individuals have been defined. Each person has 
been analysed through a kindship network analysis method in order to 
compensate the risks (for 1,161 persons the level of taxed income of 
relatives compensated fully the risks). In the end, 4,723 natural persons 
and 3,156 of their relatives were analysed in detail and 345 cases were 
selected for documentary fiscal inspection. In 2016, 312 documentary 
fiscal inspections were conducted and in 273 cases personal fiscal 
inspection was approved. Out of the 273 approved inspections, ANAF 
conducted 21 in 2016 and in 15 cases issued tax decisions for unpaid 
taxed of 11.3 million lei (€2.5 million), 1.7 million lei being paid 
voluntarily and assets being seized worth 4.6 million lei (ANAF, 2017, 
pp. 22-23).
Human trafficking takes place nation-wide in Romania. Each year, up to 
1,000 victims are identified by ANITP and DIICOT but many more still 
wait to escape the slavery trap. ANITP as well as DIICOT have a certain 
limited administrative capacity to deal with the crime. Reasonably, based 
on a maximum number of cases cleared up early over the past seven 
years, DIICOT cannot solve in one year more than 600-800 human 
trafficking files. The bulk of files left from 2017 to be closed in 2018 is 
impressive – 1,234. At the current capacity DIICOT will need two years 
without any new case in order to clear up this backlog.
Perpetrators can engage easily in human trafficking for sexual exploitation 
as the entry costs are reasonable (€1,000 to €5,000) and the profits 
are enormous and immediate (€70,000-€150,000 per year per victim). 
The costs to maintain the operation are up to €1,000 per victim/
month, resulting in net profits up to €8,000-€9,000 per victim/month. 
The social fabric in Romania, marked in some areas by poverty, abusive 
families, alternative narratives of social success, and the high demand 
of sexual services in the EU offer multiple opportunities to traffickers 
who use simple methods like lover-boy, websites and social media or 
direct prostitution proposals to recruit victims (who try to escape the 
poverty trap). Perpetrators do not seem interested in sophisticated 
money laundering operations, they infiltrate the legal economy but 
also keep their money in cash and do not use the so called darknet, 
offshore accounts or bitcoins. Such perpetrators are more interested 
in feeding their vanity and showing off in their social circle. OCGs 
are violent, but with weak internal organisation based on kindship or 
ethnicity, money driven, not leader driven. They use corruption to 
secure their businesses against law enforcement and to have access to 
vulnerable persons, especially minors. The number of victims exploited 
simultaneously by such OCGs tend to be limited to dozens (8 to 
24 victims in our sample of perpetrators).
5. CONClUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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At the same time, labour exploitation requires involvement of legal persons 
and partners abroad able to provide work in illegal conditions and ensure 
the monitoring of workers. The daily profit per worker could be up to €50, 
but it is less than in sexual exploitation cases. The number of victims per 
group tends to be limited to dozens. Nevertheless, the risks are balanced 
by the assumption that work exploitation is not human trafficking but 
deception or tax fraud, and the reluctance of authorities in some EU 
member states to apply criminal sanctions against these practices. The 
labour exploitation market is profitable as the demand for cheap work 
is also high in the EU and entire social categories in Romania are at the 
poverty limit, with traffickers profiting on opportunities and deceiving 
vulnerable people into too-good-to-be-true jobs, free accommodation and 
transport. Work placement agencies and websites are loosely monitored 
by state authorities and corruption is still pervasive.
Financial investigation is still an insufficiently used instrument, DIICOT 
struggling to establish such an internal unit. The assets are seldom seized 
and victims do not receive compensations. Websites and social media 
monitoring, and big data analysis are lacking.
Recommendations
• Improve regulation of work placement agencies, massage parlours and 
clubs in order to ensure closer monitoring and access to data.
• Develop methodology to calculate damages in human trafficking files 
and train law enforcement and judges.
• DIICOT, ANITP and the courts should publish regularly open data 
on victims’ characteristics, damages, seized assets, awarded and 
actually paid civil compensations, and perpetrators’ profiles. ANITP 
needs to maintain statistics on re-trafficked victims and regularly 
publish open data. This would allow independent monitoring to 
develop awareness on the shortcomings of asset recovery and victims’ 
compensation. Giving the uneven access to data, lack of a data 
integrator and an independent monitoring mechanism, in line with 
GRETA recommendations, Romania should designate a National 
Rapporteur according to the provisions of the Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings.
• Develop new big data analysis instruments to evaluate criminal risks, 
learning from previous models applied in Romania (by ANAF, for 
instance) or at the international level.
• Establish a financial investigation unit within DIICOT.
• New instruments need to be developed to increase online monitoring 
activities on social media, online job agencies and escort forums and 
sex chats that facilitate exploitation.
Such measures need to be supplemented by targeted information and 
prevention activities (focused on identified hotspots), reducing social mar-
ginalisation of vulnerable categories, and targeting corruption in public 
institutions.
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ANABI National Agency for the Management of Seized Assets
ANAF National Agency for Fiscal Administration
ANITP National Agency against Trafficking in Persons (RO)
CRIDES Center for International Research and Documentation
 of Sexual Exploitation
DIICOT Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime
 and Terrorism (RO)
EU European Union
GRETA Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking
 in Human Beings
OCG organized crime group
THB trafficking in human beings
lIST OF ABBREvIATIONS
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lIST OF INTERvIEwEES
Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
RO-C1 Criminal entrepreneur Transporter
RO-C2 Criminal entrepreneur Guardian/Supervisor
RO-C3 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C4 Criminal entrepreneur Debt collector
RO-C5 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C6 Criminal entrepreneur Recruiter
RO-C7 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C8 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C9 Criminal entrepreneur Recruiter
RO-C10 Criminal entrepreneur Recruiter
RO-C11 Criminal entrepreneur Recruiter
RO-C12 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C13 Criminal entrepreneur Guardian/Supervisor
RO-C14 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C15 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C16 Criminal entrepreneur Group leader
RO-C17 Criminal entrepreneur Recruiter
RO-C18 Criminal entrepreneur Recruiter and Guardian/Supervisor
RO-E1 Organised crime expert University/Professor
RO-E2 Victim’s assistance NGO/Leader
RO-E3 Victim’s assistance NGO/Leader
RO-E4 Prosecutor Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime
and Terrorism
RO-E5 Police Officer, THB expert National Agency Against Trafficking
in Human Beings
RO-E6 Police Officer Romanian Police
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In Spain, trafficking of human beings was incriminated in 2010 with 
the modification of the Penal Code, specifically with the inclusion of 
article 177bis.1 The crime carries a harsher sentence when the victim 
is a minor.2 Before this, forced prostitution and sexual exploitation had 
been punished, but the crimes were not established as it is set forth in 
the Palermo Protocol. This belated inclusion in the Spanish Penal Code, 
in contrast to its neighbouring European countries, has meant that the 
public administration does not have a consolidated plan of action, both 
in victim support and in the prosecution of the crime. This is particularly 
so in trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation, which has barely 
been addressed or prosecuted (Meneses-Falcón, 2017).
The scope of the phenomenon of trafficking differs depending on the 
exploitative purpose for which it is carried out. The most visible is 
trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation, since certain aspects 
that give it greater volume converge:
a) the partial decriminalisation of procuring (pimping) in the Penal Code 
of 1995, which allowed greater tolerance toward the third-party 
organisation of sexual commerce (Meneses-Falcón, 2017);
b) the extra-legal status of prostitution has facilitated the creation of 
prostitution apartments, brothels and hostess bars (prostitution in 
Spain is neither regulated nor prohibited);
c) the existence of a demand for paid sex with a very significant volume 
of business, which is among the highest in Europe (more than 20% 
of the male population has paid for sexual services) (Meneses-Falcón 
et al., 2015).
Trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation occurs in the more 
precarious labour markets, which require cheap and temporary manual 
1 Whoever, using violence, intimidation or deceit, or abusing a situation of superiority or need, 
or the vulnerability of a national or foreign victim, or through the delivery or receipt of 
payment or benefits to achieve the consent of the person who possesses control over the 
victim, were to capture, induce, transport, transfer, receive or house such a victim, including 
the exchange or transfer of control over the victim, for any of the purposes described below, 
within Spain, from Spain, in transit or with destination therein, shall be convicted of human 
trafficking and punished with the penalty of five to eight years imprisonment:
a) Imposing on the victim forced work or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery or 
servitude or begging;
b) Sexual exploitation, including pornography;
c) Exploitation in order to perform criminal activities;
d) Extraction of their bodily organs;
e) The celebration of forced marriage.
 A situation of need or vulnerability exists when the person in question has no other alternative, 
real or acceptable, to being subjected to abuse.
2 Article 177bis.2. Under 18.
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labour that is not supplied by local workers. Specifically, the most 
affected sectors are agriculture (the production of vegetables, fruits, 
olives and wine), domestic service, construction, and textiles. In recent 
years, trafficking networks that exploit victims who have been forced into 
begging, or the committing of crimes, notably thefts and drug dealing, 
have been detected. Victims of sexual trafficking are also, in some cases, 
being forced to commit crimes of theft. Lastly, trafficking for the purpose 
of organ exploitation is marginal – the organ donation system is very well 
organised, with the result that the clandestine sale of organs in Spain 
is practically non-existent. There is no data related to export of organs 
from Spain to other countries.
Various sources of information have been utilised in the development 
of this report. First, the foreign nationals’ sections of the reports of the 
State Public Prosecutor’s Office from 2014 to 2017 were used. Second, 
court judgements on the trafficking of human beings with the purpose 
of labour or sexual exploitation have been compiled (82 sentences 
from 2012 to May 2017 were obtained). Third, information has been 
obtained from a series of key informants, through semi-structured 
interviews; among the key informants interviewed, we highlight the 
following:
– Public Prosecutor for the Foreign Nationals section of the Spanish 
government (SP-E01 and SP-E03).3
– Two provincial level public prosecutors (SP-E02).
– Autonomous police forces with human trafficking competence of the 
Basque Country and Catalonia (SP-E12, SP-E13 and SP-E14).
– Three teams of the National Police Corps from three provinces (UCRIF 
of Murcia, Huelva and Seville) (SP-E07 to SP-E06).
– Two teams of the Guardia Civil – from the head office (Madrid) and 
from the province of Huelva (SP-E05 & SP-E06).
Fourth, six interviews of people convicted of trafficking human beings, 
currently serving their sentences, were carried out.4 All six had been 
convicted of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation (five 
women, three Nigerians and two Romanians, and one man, of Paraguayan 
nationality, coded SP-C01 to SP-C06). In July 2017, there were sixty-one 
people serving sentences in Spanish prisons for human trafficking. Lastly, 
we contacted the Office for Asset Recovery and Management (ORGA) 
to collect information on assets in this crime (SP-E15). However, due to 
its recent (2016) establishment and scant activity, the gathering of data 
has been very limited.5
3 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of 
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert, while “C” means criminal entrepreneur. 
The description of the background of the individual sources referenced can be found in the 
list of interviewees in the references section.
4 The Spanish Prison Service granted us the interview in a prison where seven people were 
serving sentences for trafficking. Having been asked and given the informed consent for the 
interview, six agreed to participate.
5 In the two years ORGA has been operating, five cases of human trafficking have been referred 
to them, all of them sexual trafficking, involving the investigation of thirty people and assets in 
Colombia, Panamá, France, Brazil and Finland. All of the people investigated were European.
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In order to conduct the interviews, the interview scripts for the study 
have been adapted to the Spanish context in order to make the 
interviews more efficient and focused on the situation in Spain. Most 
of the informants possessed abundant information on trafficking for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation, but not on labour exploitation. Enquiries 
were made in different provinces attempting to find cases of labour 
trafficking, but the information was scarce and proved to be difficult 
to evaluate overall. The information obtained was then processed and 
organised in order to carry out content analysis for the writing of this 
report.
The crime of human trafficking in Spain is investigated and prosecuted 
by the State Security Forces, Guardia Civil and National Police Corps, 
specifically the UCRIF (Central Unit for Illegal Immigration and Document 
Falsification Networks), as well as by the Foreign Nationals Unit of the 
State Public Prosecution Office. The two autonomous police forces 
(Ertzaintza and Mossos d´Escuadra) also have authority in the prosecution 
of this crime. There is a defined split of responsibilities between the 
different police bodies although there is some overlapping which is 
counteracted by a good degree of coordination.
With respect to the trafficking 
victims found in Spain, most of 
them are victims of sexual ex-
ploitation (more than 80%) (FGE, 
2015; FGE, 2016; FGE, 2017; 
(Eurostat, 2015). The vast major-
ity of these victims are women 
(more than 98%). In contrast, 
the victims of trafficking with 
the purpose of labour exploita-
tion are mostly men (more than 
80%). A worrying trait is the 
increase in minors being vic-
tims of trafficking that has tak-
en place in recent years (FGE, 
2017). In 2014, 4% of trafficking 
victims were girls. This percentage has increased to 8% in the following 
two years (FGE, 2015). Finally, it is worth mentioning the reduction in the 
number of victims that have been detected since the 2015 report; accord-
ing to the criteria applied by the public prosecutor’s office, the number 
of detected victims is 40% lower in 2016 than in 2014. This considerable 
decrease is due, we believe, to the inspections carried out by the Na-
tional Police and the Guardia Civil in brothels (in which it is more difficult 
to find trafficking victims since in these establishments the women usually 
appear to consent to working as a prostitute), meaning that the sexual ex-
ploitation of women and girls been moving away from these types of es-
1. MARKET OvERvIEw
ТаBle 1. victims oF traFFicking For sexual exploitation*
        * Victims at serious risk and identified victims.
Source: Reports from the State Public Prosecutor, Foreign Nationals Office.
year women Men
Female 
minors
Male 
minors
Total
2014 871 12 36 1 919
2015 455 37 44 0 537
2016 337 1 28 0 366
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tablishment, which are open to 
the public, to private residences 
and apartments, where inspec-
tions by state security forces are 
not carried out.6
With respect to the number 
of people investigated and 
detained for crimes of sexual 
trafficking, just as with the 
number of victims, the number 
of people detained has been 
decreasing over recent years 
(FGE, 2015; FGE, 2016; FGE, 
2017). Given that it is possible 
that this type of crime is con-
centrated in private residences 
and apartments, it is harder to 
be able to investigate and de-
tain the culprits (Meneses-Fal-
cón et al., 2017). In the cases 
of crimes of trafficking for sex-
ual exploitation, the numbers 
of men and women detained 
have become more even, be-
ing almost equal in 2016 (FGE, 
2017). However, in the cases of 
crimes of trafficking for labour 
exploitation in Spain, those 
investigated and detained are 
mostly men.
Lastly, if we look at the number of investigations conducted, and the 
convictions obtained, we can see that the number of convictions is very 
low (FGE, 2015; FGE, 2016; FGE, 2017). It is important to be aware of 
6 In order to inspect an apartment, the police need a court order, since it is considered a private 
residence. Judges and magistrates only permit such searches if there are clear signs of criminal 
activity.
ТаBle 2. victims oF traFFicking For laBour exploitation
        * The data for male and female victims of labour exploitation in 2014 are not known.
Source: Reports from the State Public Prosecutor, Foreign Nationals Office.
year women Men Female minors Total
2014 - - - 173*
2015 19 92 - 111
2016 13 71 2 86
ТаBle 3. numBer oF people investigated/detained For traFFicking crimes
Source: Reports from the State Public Prosecutor, Foreign Nationals Office.
Sexual labour
year women Men Total women Men Total
2014 269 429 698 7 46 53
2015 227 354 581 3 59 82
2016 137 151 288 5 19 24
ТаBle 4. numBer oF investigations, judgements, and convictions 
For traFFicking crimes
Source: Reports from the State Public Prosecutor, Foreign Nationals Office.
Sexual labour
year Investigations Judgements Convictions Investigations Judgements Convictions
2014 154 14 11 10 2 1
2015 74 24 18 15 1 1
2016 70 29 6 8 0 0
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	spain	 375
the difficulties that currently exist in order to secure a conviction for 
a crime of human trafficking. Convictions in the Spanish legal system 
depend fundamentally on the declarations of the victims, who in many 
cases do not wish to testify against the traffickers who had trafficked 
and exploited them, whether due to actual threats from the traffickers 
themselves, or fear, or even because the women are not aware that they 
have been the victims of a crime.
The main strategy of investigation and prosecution of the crime of human 
trafficking in Spain has been the declaration of the victim (SP-E01). Results 
to date have not been very productive. Only a relatively low number 
of delations have been achieved. In 2017, a new focus has been put 
forward: investigations on money laundering, the assets of those under 
investigation (traffickers), and crime against the public treasury (SP-E01). 
But this is only a recent strategy and it is hoped that it proves fruitful in 
the coming years.
Criminal trafficking networks (some of them very reduced) can be 
classified into three types, according to their organisation (SP-E05, SP-E12, 
SP-E13, SP-E07).
a) Large, highly structured organisations, with members responsible 
for different functions in the country of origin of the victims, in 
transit and in the destination country (recruiters, those responsible for 
documentation, for bribery at border crossings, those charged with 
harbouring the victims, with accompanying them during transit, and 
those who provide the basic products necessary for the exploitative 
activity – cosmetics, lingerie, etc.).
b) Smaller organisations that do not have a large deployment of people 
to undertake various tasks, which are instead carried out by a 
small group. At times, they might contract the services they need 
(obtaining documentation, border crossings, etc.) from larger trafficking 
organisations.
c) Family type organisations or of a small-time trafficker’s initiative, one-
person, lover-boy types, in which the profits are appropriated by an 
individual, in which the scale of the trafficking is limited to recruiting 
two or three women who are exploited with little investment.
Most traffickers convicted in Spain belong to the second and third 
types described above. Large networks are less represented among 
those detained and convicted. There are few convictions of those who 
have greater responsibility and who hold higher positions in the human 
trafficking organisations.
In recent years, the presence of women in recruitment in the areas of 
origin and in sexual exploitation has increased (SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E08, 
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANIZATION 
 OF TRAFFICKING NETwORKS IN SPAIN
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SP-E11). Many of these women are former victims who collaborate with 
the network once they have paid off their debts, as a way of earning 
profits – just as was done with them – or as another way of completing 
their debt payment. These women are more effective models in 
the recruitment of other women, because they parade themselves as 
successful women who came to Europe and set themselves up on their 
own account. Former victims are more effective when they are used 
as recruiters. In 2015, out of 616 people detained for trafficking, 40% 
were women7 (SP-E12, SP-E13; Surtees, 2008).
The victims come from various areas of origin: the Latin American 
route, the east European route, the sub-Saharan African route and the 
Asian route. The trafficking networks have transnational connections, 
with contacts in the local communities where they recruit their victims, 
and connections in Spain (SP-E01, SP-E02, SP-E05). Furthermore, they 
usually know Spanish and European Union legislation well, and the 
difficulties that they are likely to meet while transporting victims and 
the places where they can best gain entry (SP-E05, SP-C02). The 
traffickers give precise instructions to their female victims concerning 
the Spanish police, what they should say to them, and they depict the 
police as just as corrupt as the police from their countries of origin 
(SP-E05, SP-C05). They usually deceive them, telling them that if the 
Spanish police discover them, they will put them in an Internment 
Centre for Foreign Nationals and deport them (Meneses-Falcón et al., 
2015).
The organisations that originate in eastern Europe tend to be larger 
and have fewer documentation problems because they move within 
the Schengen Area. Romania and Bulgaria are the two countries that 
have the heaviest presence both as victims and traffickers (FGE, 2017). 
Two main types stand out: those that are more organised, that recruit 
their victims with the promise of employment in domestic service or 
hospitality and catering jobs (which is the case of women for sexual 
exploitation); and those that involve a procurer (pimp) who recruits 
a woman by duping her into falling in love with him (the lover-boy 
method), after which he proposes going to Spain for a job that a friend 
has offered him, and on arrival in Spain he induces her into prostitution 
using emotional blackmail (Marcus, 2008). In other cases, there is no 
deception – recruitment is accomplished directly by offering to pay the 
costs (transport to Spain and accommodation in the destination city) 
that are needed to get started in Spain. Once one of the women is 
established in sexual exploitation, the recruiter returns to repeat the 
process with another woman (SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14). Lastly, there 
are the traffickers who control two or three women with the help of 
another woman who has been recruited beforehand (SP-E05, SP-E12, 
SP-E13, SP-E14).
Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia tend to be the destination cities of choice 
for eastern European victims of sexual exploitation, and from there they 
are distributed to other cities. If the victims do not resist and generate 
7 Data confirmed by the Penitentiary Institutions in Spain.
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	spain	 377
ТаBle 5. actors who participate in traFFicking crimes
Actor Role
Trafficker Person who commits a crime of trafficking for sexual or labour exploitation
Recruiter Person who seeks and deceives women (victims) into trafficking
Transporter/ 
Intermediary
Person who transports the victim from the country of origin
to the final destination.
Procurer (pimp) Person who exploits the victim directly or by deception
(the lover-boy method).
Controller Person who controls the victims (in Andalusia. the controllers hired to 
oversee the work of the victims are sometimes called “Manijeros”)
Lover-boy Main controller and trafficker of women for sexual exploitation who holds
a sentimental relationship with the victim.
Figure 1. actors who participate in traFFicking
the revenue that their traffickers demand, they will be exploited for a 
long time and their sexual exploitation will never end until they cease 
being profitable (SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E07, SP-E11). In the case of 
trafficking for labour exploitation, the destinations are Andalusia and the 
Levante (the provinces of Alicante, Castellón, Murcia, and Valencia), as 
Destination
Spain
The recruiter, pimp, madam and exploiter
could be the same person (a woman in Nigerian
cases or a man in Romanian)
Recruiter from Spain by
telephone, and others ways Victim
Madam
Transporter Trafficker
Victim
Explotaition
in Spain
Country
of origin
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these are the places with the highest demand for temporary manual 
labour in agricultural estates (SP-E07, SP-E06, SP-E11).
The organisations originating in sub-Saharan Africa are composed and 
organised differently (Ellis and Akpala, 2011). There are those that are 
highly organised, with contacts in different countries and that traffic to 
Europe, and there are those that are more family-based or domestic, 
which are not well organized, as mentioned above. In any case, from 
Africa there are two entry points into Europe: Italy, from Libya; or Spain, 
from Morocco (SP-C02, SP-C03). Here, we will focus on the latter.
The country of origin of the women who come to Spain from Africa is 
mainly Nigeria, and specifically Benin City (SP-E08, SP-C01, SP-C02, SP-
C03). Women coming from other Nigerian cities tend to have Paris or 
London as their (final) destinations, although sometimes these are transit 
cities for coming to Spain. There are different overland routes, the main 
one passing through Mali, Algeria and Morocco (SP-E08, SP-C01, SP-C02, 
SP-C03). Another frequently used route passes through Guinea, then by 
plane to Ukraine and from there to Austria (SP-C02). The route by plane 
is more expensive and the debt that is subsequently demanded from the 
victim is greater, between €60,000 and €80,000 (SP-C02, SP-C03). The 
land route is cheaper, being made by bus or in trucks with other men 
and women (SP-C02). During the journey, however, there is always a 
“boss”8 who accompanies several women as far as Morocco (Alomar and 
Plasencia, 2014). The journey can last days or months since the distance 
from Benin City to Tangier, Morocco, is 3,477 km. Once in Morocco, 
they are placed in a camp or accommodation which is provided by the 
“boss” until there is a boat available to cross the Straits. These boats 
are normally intercepted by the Spanish police and the Spanish Red 
Cross. The organisation instructs the women how they should act in 
front of the NGOs and the Spanish police (SP-E05, SP-E06). Once the 
boats are intercepted, the women are looked after by the Red Cross for 
24 hours, after which they make contact by telephone with someone 
from their country’s network who resides in Spain (the contact having 
been provided by the boss who organised the crossing of the Straits) 
(SP-C02). From Andalusia, they are transferred to Madrid. On other 
occasions, France is the destination, with Bilbao being the transit city to 
French-speaking countries (SP-E12, SP-E13). This journey is made when 
they are not detained or retained in an Internment Centre for Foreign 
Nationals.
In the case of women coming from Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa 
who arrive via aeroplane, after their arrival at the airport they are taken 
to an apartment to work as a prostitute, or to a type of brothel known 
as a “club de alterne de plaza”9 (Meneses-Falcón, 2017). In this brothel 
model, the trafficked persons live in the same establishment where they 
work as prostitutes, servicing clients in the same room that they live 
8 Also called “husband,” this person is always male and sees to their safety throughout this 
journey. Sometimes this boss has non-consensual sex with the victims.
9 Prostitution work is moving from brothels and concentrating in apartments or houses (which 
customers access by appointment). These premises cannot be inspected by the police unless there 
is search warrant (court order), unlike the brothels, which undergo annual formal inspections.
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in. The establishment provides them with clothes, cosmetics and the 
necessary basic products, which are added to the debt that they have 
with the traffickers, the sum of which they discover when they arrive 
in Spain. In other cases, mainly those coming from sub-Saharan Africa, 
they are housed in an apartment with three or four other women and 
taken to work as a prostitute on the street in city centres, on industrial 
estates or on roads on city outskirts, always in places close to a brothel 
that offers the presence of customers of prostitution (SP-C03, SP-C04, 
SP-C05).
Regarding the east Asian women who are trafficking victims, there is little 
data. The Asians are a highly secretive group and not much information 
is available on their business. This is a pending issue. Nevertheless, the 
information obtained shows us that the victims are in apartments or 
massage parlours that are strictly controlled by a “madam” who never 
allows them to be alone (SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14). Two types 
of apartment exist (SP-E05): those that are exclusively for the east 
Asian population, particularly Chinese, and those that are aimed at 
Westerners. In both cases, there is a lot of movement, both of women 
and apartments, which makes police investigations difficult. In some 
cases, they bring in the women by plane, using passports from Taiwan or 
Japan, and entering the European Union through airports that have less 
traffic (SP-E05, SP-E14, SP-E02). However, it tends to be easier to do the 
transportation by road, entering through the border of Slovakia, which 
is the most permeable (SP-E12, SP-E13). They are often accompanied 
by a Chinese male, who is responsible for the transportation (SP-E05, 
SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14). This man, whom they call “snakehead,” will 
have a resident’s permit in the Schengen Area, and tends to travel with 
around five Chinese women (SP-E12, SP-E13). These organisations are 
very difficult to approach and investigate, due to their discretion, secrecy, 
scant predisposition to collaborate with the police and lack of desertions 
(SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14).
Lastly, we must add that African drug routes are being overlapped with 
human trafficking routes from Guinea and Nigeria (SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, 
SP-E14, SP-E07). There are also signs that some Asian routes of human 
trafficking (Pakistan) are being used to get terrorists into the Schengen 
Area (SP-E14). These aspects require deeper investigation.
With regard to the trafficking of human beings for the purpose of 
labour exploitation, the networks that have the highest presence are 
Romanian and Bulgarian (SP-E06, SP-E11). Their victims are men of the 
same nationality, who are often recruited from the same localities as the 
traffickers themselves. The process consists in offering work to harvest 
or pick agricultural products for the season, agreeing on the wage plus 
room and board, without any intention of actually paying them. The 
financial process is described in detail below. Only some of these men, 
after working for the first month and not getting paid, make this fact 
known to the police (SP-E06). If the police officer who deals with the 
complaint is not specialised in human trafficking, they will not identify it 
as such. Instead, it is recorded as a simple offence against the rights of 
the worker, or mere labour exploitation (SP-E06, SP-E11).
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As a result of the research conducted, the analysis of the interviews 
carried out, and the study of court judgements, the following six sub-
sections address the financial aspects of human trafficking.
3.1. Source of capital for initiating/sustaining criminal 
operations. Access to capital in critical moments
From the information gathered in all the sources consulted in this work, 
both from the police and judicial authorities as well as from the traffickers 
interviewed and serving sentences for their crimes, it can be deduced 
that in Spain human trafficking (both for sexual and labour exploitation) 
is carried out mainly by individuals or small organisations. The minimum 
barriers to entry in economic terms contribute to this fact.
In the case of sexual exploitation, as will be discussed below in this 
report, the costs of recruitment, transfer and maintenance per victim 
do not exceed €1,000 in the case of European and African sources 
and from €2,000 to €3,000 when the origin is Latin American or Asian 
(when it is carried out by air travel). As a result, the market is saturated 
with small traffickers who invest their savings or small family and friend’s 
loans to start the activity. It has been found that in many cases they are 
old victims or relatives, who once they have reached the knowledge of 
the activity are established on their own.
In the case of prostitution, there are entrepreneurs with brothel businesses 
and a significant financial flow and investment volume. However, because 
of the legal situation of prostitution in Spain (without regulation) these en-
trepreneurs are disconnected from the very crime of trafficking (regulated 
and heavily punished) to focus exclusively on that of prostitution.
3.2. Settlement of payments
Payments are made in two different scenarios.
a. Those that are made within the receiving country (in this case Spain): 
In the case of sexual exploitation, the number of transacted payments 
is significant, but the average size of a transaction is small. They are 
made either in cash (majority) or with the exchange of goods or 
services (marginal). They are very difficult to track because of their 
characteristics.
 In the case of labour exploitation the are almost no payments to 
the victims. The traffickers receive their payments in cash to avoid 
detection by the authorities.
b. Those that occur between countries (origin, intermediate and destination): 
The banking controls established for the international monetary move-
ments by the Spanish authorities to prevent money laundering are 
very strict (any single or multiple transactions by the same individuals 
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above €3,000 is subject to a declaration) so that this method is used 
marginally.
 Greater volume of movements is carried out by individuals who travel 
and who hide money in their luggage. Since 2007, the legal maximum 
in the European Union according to regulations to prevent money laun-
dering is €10,000. Customs controls at borders, ports and airports are 
significantly reducing the amount that is moved through this channel. In 
2016, 77 sentences were issued in Spain, of which 49 were convictions 
(General Council of the Judiciary). However, the vast majority of them 
are linked to crimes of tax evasion or crimes unrelated to human traf-
ficking, such as drug and tobacco smuggling or arms trafficking.
 Finally, the most frequent method of economic movements is those 
carried out by exchanges without movements of money. This procedure 
is very difficult to monitor, although its existence has been detected 
in transactions with different continents (Hawala). This mechanism is 
described in more detail in the next section.
3.3. Costs of doing business
The costs of doing business depends on the origin of the victims and 
the trafficking network structure. Thus, doing business with victims from 
sub-Saharan Africa is more expensive even though the costs are cheaper 
than victims from eastern Europe or Latin America. In general terms, 
costs stem from transportation and maintenance as most of the victims 
are deceived in their country of origin.
Coming from sub-Saharan Africa
Most of the women who come to Spain through trafficking networks 
come from Benin City, Nigeria, and, to a lesser extent, from other 
countries such as Guinea or Cameroon. A person close to the victim 
or to their family suggests coming to Spain to work as a waitress, 
cleaner or in personal care (SP-C01, SP-C02, SP-C03). The person who 
arranges the deal to come to Spain does so in exchange for money. 
This agreement or contract is usually made with a commitment that 
is enforced using Voodoo rituals (Dols, 2012). The expenses include 
recruitment and transportation. The costs differ, depending on the route 
and the intermediaries. In the case of the route by air, there is the 
added cost of false documentation (€1,000 to €3,000). In general, this is 
done using a real passport but changing the biographical page and using 
a fake identity (SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-E07, SP-E08). On other 
occasions, they use a passport belonging to a fellow countrywoman who 
already has Spanish residence and who looks like the victim (SP-E14, 
SP-E07, SP-E08). In these cases, the victims usually enter via another 
country (the United Kingdom or France) before moving on to Spain, and 
so avoid answering questions about their stay in Spain (SP-E14, SP-E07, 
SP-E08, SP-C03). They may also come with an Italian or Portuguese 
passport (Cape Verde).
– Route by aeroplane. The victim is generally transferred to Lagos 
or Guinea accompanied by a network member whom they call 
382 Financing	oF	organised	crime:	human	traFFicking	in	Focus
“boss.” They may also travel this leg of the journey alone, although 
this is unusual. Once arrived in these cities, they are housed with 
someone belonging to the organisation until the flight departure. 
They fly to Paris or London, and from there to Madrid (SP-E14, 
SP-C03). In Madrid, they are collected by other people, generally 
a woman or a couple who are compatriots and who provide 
accommodation (SP-C02, SP-C03). Sometimes these women know 
that they are coming to work as a prostitute, but not the conditions 
in which they will have to do so (SP-C03, SP-C03). If they refuse, 
they are threatened until they acquiesce. Then they are instructed 
as to how they must work in prostitution and that all of their 
earnings will go toward paying off their debt. The traffickers are 
often Nigerians resident in Spain, who request women in order 
to exploit them, and the organisation in turn contacts a recruiter 
based in Nigeria (SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-E08). In this case there 
can be two intermediaries before the victim reaches the exploiter.
– Overland route. The recruiter in the victim’s locality is responsible 
for taking her, along with other women (the journey is generally 
undertaken with three or four women), to as far as Morocco, travelling 
various routes by bus or in trucks along with other people, even going 
some of the way on foot. Bribes have to be paid at border crossings 
(SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-C02). On arrival in Morocco, they may 
be housed with a compatriot (SP-C02). From this moment they may 
begin to be exploited sexually or used to work as a beggar while 
waiting to be able to cross the Straits (€1,500). When the boat 
crossing is due to take place, the victim is given a mobile phone in 
order to contact the person in Spain, a compatriot, who will be in 
charge of their exploitation and who will charge her room and board 
(SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-E07). In Spain, there may be one 
or two exploiters, moving the victim from one place to another (SP-E12, 
SP-E13, SP-C02, SP-C03).
The cost per victim until the time of placing them in Spain is approximately 
€10,000, (SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-C02, SP-C03). According to 
information provided by the police, sometimes the intermediaries get 
paid with sex with the victim, particularly at the border (SP-E12, SP-E13, 
SP-E08). In some cases, the cost of transporting the victims to Spain 
increases because they can be kidnapped by other criminals who demand 
a ransom from the traffickers10 (SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-13, SP-E14, SP-E08).
Coming from eastern Europe
The initial investment in the victim is small (SP-E05, SP-C04). Transportation 
from the place of origin to Madrid is overland and costs around €100 
per person recruited. Arranging documentation is not a complicated 
process. On occasion the journey is made using low-cost flights. In both 
cases, the cost depends on whether the trafficker acts alone, or if more 
people are involved in the journey, or whether it is an organised network 
(SP-E02, SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-E11).
10 We have not been able to establish the amount of money demanded for these kidnappings, 
or the frequency with which they occur.
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Lover-boy traffickers. He will recruit his victim in the country of origin 
(Marcus, 2008). He will choose his victims based on their characteristics 
of vulnerability. He deceives them into falling in love and proposes going 
together to Spain (a one-way bus journey from Bucharest to Madrid 
costs €100). Generally, he is already resident in Spain, where he has 
colleagues, men or women, his actual partner sometimes being among 
the latter. When they reach Spain, he tells the victim that she has to 
work as a prostitute, exploiting her by controlling all the aspects of the 
work, such as place, prices, clients and services. The lover-boy and his 
victim may also travel by plane (Bucharest to Madrid, €150) (SP-C04).
Small organisations. These are made up of a recruiter (male or female) 
in the country of origin, who may or may not accompany the victim, 
travelling to Spain by bus or aeroplane. She is collected by other 
people (two or three controllers who will handle her exploitation). 
Documentation, if the country is part of the EU, is a mere formality with 
low costs. If the east European country does not belong to the EU (e.g. 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova), there is a cost for arranging the necessary 
documentation and visas (Judgment nº 15, see Appendix 1).
Highly organised groups. The number of people involved is bigger 
although we cannot speak about big organisations in these cases. They 
have a person who recruits in the place of origin, another responsible for 
arranging documentation, another to carry out the transportation when 
it is necessary (accompanying the victim, the flight), and a group that 
is responsible for the exploitation (vigilance, control and collection of 
money, moving the victim to other places – brothels). This was the case 
for one of the convictions we have examined, of a Russian organisation 
of traffickers and exploiters (Judgment nº 15, see Appendix 1).
Coming from latin America
The trafficking organisations coming from Latin America originate in 
the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, 
which are the countries with the greatest flow of migration toward 
Europe (SP-E02, SP-E05, SP-E10). The principal destination for these 
countries is Spain, due to the similarity in language and culture. Only 
when alerted to strict controls in Madrid Barajas Airport do they try 
to enter Europe through the airports of Orly in Paris, Fiumicino in 
Rome, Schiphol in Amsterdam or Heathrow in London, all being transit 
countries (SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-C02, SP-C03). Because these EU transit 
countries are not the destination countries of the victims, the controls 
are not overly rigorous; in fact, some victims have arrived in Spain 
with a false passport (SP-E01). In order to enter Spain, a passport, a 
visa obtained in the Spanish consulate in the country of origin or a 
letter of invitation, a contact in Spain and a minimum sum of money, 
are all required. If necessary, the documentation would be falsified by 
the network, as a public prosecutor of trafficking from Santo Domingo 
in the Dominican Republic showed us.11 It requires an investment of 
11 A member of our team interviewed one of the Public Prosecutors for trafficking in Santo 
Domingo in April 2017.
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€3,000 for each person recruited (documentation, visa, money for the 
journey that will be taken away on arrival in Spain, and an aeroplane 
ticket) (SP-C05). Recruitment in local communities is usually carried 
out by people from the same country, occasionally with the presence 
of Spanish nationals. The offer of work tends to be domestic service, 
waitressing, dancing, childcare or elderly care (SP-E10). On occasion, 
employment as an escort or prostitute is proposed but without giving 
the details of the conditions that would be found on arrival. The 
recruitment is usually undertaken from Spain, whether through an 
advertisement in a local newspaper, by internet, or through a contact 
who resides in the country or origin (Meneses-Falcón, 2017). Both 
traffickers and victims arrive by aeroplane, which means there is the 
expense of the flight. In addition, there is the €900-plus that they 
must carry in order to substantiate that they are travelling as tourists, 
although this money is recovered by the traffickers once they have 
entered the country. Lastly comes the cost of the documentation: 
passport and visa or letter of invitation (SP-E08). In the case of a 
trafficker from Paraguay who was interviewed, the initial outlay of 
money was from his savings: he used it as a way of investing in 
order to obtain profits (SP-C05). He had permanent residence and 
employment in Spain.
Coming from China
Different routes are possible from China (SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, 
SP-E07):
a) direct flight to Madrid or a flight to Poland and then to Madrid.
b) flight to Dubai, from there to Guinea, then to Paris, and finally to 
Madrid;
c) overland, entering through countries with permeable borders (e.g. 
Greece).
In almost all cases, the vic-
tims reach their destination ac-
companied by a Chinese male 
(SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13). This 
person only ensures the trans-
portation of the victims, after 
which he returns to his coun-
try of origin. On occasion, the 
recruiter and the transporter 
are the same person, but on 
others they are different peo-
ple. Sometimes, there may be 
one or two people working as 
transporters to bring the wom-
en to a country in the Schengen Area, and then another distributes 
them around Europe. They charge €800 for each woman. The total 
cost of bringing a victim from China varies between €1,000 and €2,000 
depending on the documentation obtained (SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-E07, 
SP-E06, SP-E11).
ТаBle 6. costs For the traFFickers oF transporting a victim to spain
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Sub-Saharan
Africa
latin
America
Eastern 
Europe
China
Costs per victim 
until arrival
in Spain
€10,000 €3,000 €150 €2,000
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Therefore, the cost that the traffickers may have to invest in the victims 
ranges from €150, for those coming from eastern Europe up to €10,000 
for sub-Saharan victims. In other words, the expense for those belonging 
to the Schengen Area is, logically, lower, since there are fewer transit 
risks. The greatest expense corresponds to sub-Saharan Africa, although 
this cost can be lower, depending on the route and the network 
members involved in the transport up to the Straits and subsequently 
to Spain.
labour trafficking
Labour trafficking victims mostly come from Romania and Bulgaria, al-
though there have been cases of victims coming from Latin America 
(SP-E06, SP-E11). The victims are offered a monthly salary of €400-€800, 
including room and board, for work either in the harvest/picking of ag-
ricultural products in Almeria, Murcia, Huelva, Jaen, Rioja, etc., or in 
construction. Generally, they are made to pay for work materials, or 
made to hire them, and when the victims do not receive their salary 
after one or two months they make a formal complaint (SP-E07, SP-E06, 
SP-E11). These formal complaints are often treated by the police as la-
bour exploitation instead of trafficking which diminishes the trafficking 
statistics. For construction work, traffickers recruit men. Women are 
used more for domestic service. According to police data, at times of 
most intensity in the harvesting/picking of agricultural products, there 
can arise immigrant settlements of around 5,000 people per harvest 
season, many of them trafficking victims (SP-E05, SP-E07, SP-E10, SP-E06, 
SP-E11).
Based on a recent case from Latin America, small-time traffickers ap-
pear, particularly in Central America (Nicaragua),12 generally of women, 
aimed at domestic service (SP-E10). The traffickers provide the victims 
with around €3,500 in order to enter as tourists (covering passport, 
aeroplane ticket and the money required as a tourist). They demand 
that the property of the family is pledged as collateral for the debt, 
but in reality, they take both the property and the money the victims 
earn in domestic service. They enter the country through Barcelona 
airport, with stopovers in Panama, Mexico, and Paris. Debt repayment 
is monthly with 10% interest. However, as it is a compound interest it 
proves impossible to end the debt. Furthermore, the costs of accom-
modation and upkeep are added to the debt (SP-E10). These costs are 
variable depending on the area and the season – between €5 and 
€10 are typical amounts. It is very significant considering the victims’ 
monthly salary.
In the case of Chinese textile workshops that have been dismantled in 
Barcelona, trafficking occurred through the requests of companies set 
up for that purpose, which were in principle fronts but subsequently 
had some activity (SP-E14). Two or three workers are usually requested 
on behalf of these companies, fulfilling the requirements of Spanish law. 
This is what is known as “people laundering” (SP-E14). In these cases, 
12 A police investigation in Murcia.
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each worker had to pay between €16,000 and €18,000 for their job, 
and they worked in conditions of slavery, unaware that they were victims 
of a crime (SP-E14). The costs of recruitment and transportation of the 
victims do not differ greatly from those stated above for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation.
As mentioned previously the number of cases is very low and the 
information available is very scarce. As mentioned in the conclusions, 
there is a challenge ahead for the authorities to determine whether these 
crimes are marginal or not clearly identified yet.
Estimates of costs of victims for traffickers
In Spain, the number of victims of trafficking for the purpose of labour 
or sexual exploitation are not known with exactitude. Figures are often 
mentioned that are not verified, which is due to a wish to create 
sensationalist effects, rather than actual or estimated accounting. The 
available data comes from NGO records of victim assistance, or from 
police operations recorded by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. However, 
these samples are biased and do not represent the whole population, 
which tends to be hidden, wider and more diverse. In this regard, the 
samples examined in ethnographic studies can provide more accurate 
estimates. Using two academic studies that apply rigour and quality 
(Malguesini et al., 2005 and Sanchis, 2011),13 we can estimate a figure of 
around 100,000 people that work as prostitutes. From the ethnographic 
work carried out by the team for this report, we can estimate that 
between 20% and 40% of these women could be, or have been, 
victims of trafficking.14 If we use the mid-range to estimate the victims, 
we get a figure of around 40,000 women in Spain. Although we cannot 
determine the time period, it can be understood that this is a cumulative 
prevalence.15 Using the percentage distribution of nationalities recorded 
in the state-level reports of NGOs16 (Médicos del Mundo/Médicins du 
monde, 2017; APRAMP, 2017), that provide assistance to people who 
work as prostitutes and that detect trafficking victims, around 55% are 
from Latin America, 25% from eastern Europe, 15% from sub-Saharan 
Africa and 5% from Asia (China). We are aware that this is a hypothetical 
estimate as there are no real data that can validate it. The exact figure 
13 Malguesini et al., 2005. Impacto de una posible normalización profesional de la prostitución en la 
viabilidad y sostenibilidad futura del sistema de pensiones de protección social. [Impact of the possible 
professional normalization of prostitution in the future viability and sustainability of the social 
protection pensions system.] Unpublished report; Sanchís y Sierra, 2011. El mercado de la 
prostitución femenina. Una aproximación desde el caso valenciano. [The female prostitution market: 
an approximation using the example of Valencia.] Política y Sociedad, 48, 175-192.
14 In the ethnographic work conducted in brothels, the women were asked how they started to 
work in prostitution, and between 2 and 4 women out of every 10 had been recruited and 
deceived to come to Spain by trafficking networks. The NGO Médecins du Monde found 
evidence of sexual trafficking for 573 people, 7% of the people assisted (9,451) in 2016. 
This percentage, however, is very low. It might indicate an annual prevalence, whereas our 
ethnographic data gives a cumulative prevalence. The distribution of potential victims differs by 
sector: while the women working as prostitutes on the street are mostly victims of trafficking 
or smuggling, this is not the case in brothels or apartments.
15 Refers to the number of women that started prostitution as a consequence of trafficking at 
some point in the 2005 – 2017 period.
16 Data calculated using the records of attendance to those working in prostitution, of the NGOs 
Médecins du Monde and APRAMP for 2016.
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of sex workers remains hidden as in Spain there is a lack of studies to 
determine them with rigour.
According to two reports by the NGOs mentioned, more than 80% of 
the people who work as prostitutes in Spain are foreigners (Médicos del 
Mundo, 2017; APRAMP, 2017). If we rule out those of Spanish nationality, 
we find that the women of Latin American origin are the most numerous 
(Brazilians, Dominicans and Colombians), followed by those coming from 
eastern Europe (Romania and Bulgaria) and sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria), 
and lastly those from Asia (China). The highest costs for traffickers are for 
those coming from Africa, due to the longer journey and larger number 
of intermediaries, and those from Latin America due to the greater 
number of women (see Table 7).
ТаBle 7. costs estimates For traFFicking For the purpose 
oF sexual exploitation
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Sub-Saharan
Africa
latin
America
Eastern 
Europe
China
Costs per victim until arrival
in Spain
€10,000 €3,000 €150 €2,000
Estimating 40,000 victims
Cumulative prevalence
15% (6,000) 55% (22,000) 25% (10,000) 5% (2,000)
Cumulative cost €60 million €66 million €1.5 million €4 million
Estimating 7% annual prevalence 
of 7,000 victims
15% (1,050) 55% (3,850) 25% (1,750) 5% (350)
Annual cost €10.5 million €11.55 million €263,000 €700,000
Lastly, we estimate the annual prevalence volume of victims of trafficking 
for the purpose of sexual exploitation at 7% of the population (women) 
whose main activity is prostitution. This estimate is based on, as we have 
stated, the reports of the largest NGO in Spain (Médicos de Mundo, 
2017), which assists a large section of society in contexts of prostitution 
and with long experience in victim detection.
3.4. The money deriving from the victims
Once in Spain, the victims are informed that they have incurred a debt 
of between €6,000 and €8,000 for those coming from Latin America, 
between €3,000 and €4,500 for those coming from eastern Europe, 
between €35,000 and €70,000 for those that come from sub-Saharan 
Africa and between €20,000 and €30,000 for those coming from China 
(SP-E02, SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-E07, SP-E08, SP-E06, SP-E11, 
SP-C02, SP-C03, SP-C04, SP-C05). All of these are in cases of sexual 
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exploitation. If the exploitation is for labour, the debt is not so high 
and is variable, depending on the sector of the labour market in which 
victims are being exploited.
In all cases the women are charged for room and board, around €300 
to €500 a month in a shared apartment, which generally houses three 
other women in the same situation and who usually work as prostitutes 
on the street (SP-C02, SP-C03, SP-C04, SP-C05). Judging by the sentences 
(see Appendix 1), if they work on the street, they have to pay €100 a 
month for the street section they occupy, since it is controlled by pimps 
and organised groups.17 If a woman has come with a child, a network 
member looks after it and charges around €200 a month for the 
service. The victims do not handle money, hence their working clothes, 
condoms, sex toys and other products that they need are provided by 
the exploiter. If they need asylum, they are charged €300 more for 
arranging it.
If they are accommodated in a brothel, there are other expenses that 
are added to their debt: kits of towels and sheets, between €5 and 
€10 for each client, an average of 10 clients a day, so €50-€100 a day; 
cosmetics, clothes, condoms, and other products that they need, around 
€300 a month; payment for the room, full board, between €40 and 
€80 a day (€1,500 to €2,400 a month); handling of documentation or 
visa renewal (€1,300); payment for photographic features for websites or 
17 There are several industrial estates where prostitutes work, such as Alfafar in Valencia, 
Guadalhorce in Malaga or Marconi in Madrid. In the Marconi industrial estate, on the outskirts 
of the city of Madrid, the locations for prostitution are controlled by a mafia that charges the 
women or their pimps.
ТаBle 8. traFFicking For sexual exploitation
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Costs
Sub-Saharan
Africa
latin
America
Eastern 
Europe
China
Costs per victim until arrival
in Spain
€10,000 €3,000 €150 €2,000
Income: Debt demanded €30,000 to 
€70,000
€6,000 to 
€8,000
€3,000 to 
€4,500
€20,000 to 
€30,000
Estimate of cumulative victims 15% (6,000) 55% (22,000) 25% (10,000) 5% (2,000)
Estimated cumulative income
At the minimum*
€180 million €132 million €30 million €40 million
Estimated 7% annual
prevalence, 7,000 victims
15% (1,050) 55% (3,850) 25% (1,750) 5% (350)
Annual income
At the minimum*
€31.5 million €23.1 million €5.25 million €700,000
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internet advertisements (€1,000); cosmetic surgery.18 In some brothels run 
by the traffickers, they also charge the women €30 for every client they 
do business with – in other words, as though it was a commission.19
This therefore means a minimum of between €30 million and €180 mil-
lion in cumulative prevalence, and between €700,000 and €31.5 mil-
lion in annual prevalence, that the trafficking networks would obtain 
solely in terms of debt incurred. However, to this debt other costs that 
are extracted from the victims must be added. The costs of accommo-
dation, products or services that they need for themselves or to work 
as a prostitute are charged apart or added to the debt. These are sum-
marised in Table 9.20
These expenses are difficult to count and estimate. While some of them 
are one-off (arranging asylum application, advertising or photographic 
feature), others are daily, such as the sheet and towel kit. The income 
obtained from working as a prostitute vary according to the place where 
it is undertaken, the province and the physical characteristics of the 
women.
The costs shown in the table above are the minimum, obtained in 
interviews that the team behind this report has conducted in other 
research on women who are not forced to work as prostitutes (Meneses 
Falcón, et al., 2017). From this occupation they could thus earn between 
€2000 and €8,000 a month, with an average of three clients a day. The 
prices can vary a great deal, depending on the type of sexual services 
18 Judgement 1/2015 of Russian network of traffickers.
19 Case of Russian traffickers. Supposing an average of 10 clients/day, in an average brothel of 
40 women, the daily earnings for the women’s services are 30x10x40 = €12,000 in commis-
sion daily.
20 Data collected in ethnographic work in brothels by the principal investigator of this report.
ТаBle 9. other expenses extorted in addition to deBt
Source: Authors’ calculations.
when exploited on the street when exploited in a brothel
• €300 to €500 a month for room and 
board if they live in an apartment
• €100/month for a street section
• Condoms
• €4 to €8 a day for room
• €1,000 internet advertising
• €5 to €10 for sheet and towel kit 
for every client
• Lingerie and other products for work
• Photographic features for advertisements
• €300 for arranging asylum
• €1,300 visa renewal
• Cosmetic surgery (usually not compulsory)
• €300 gynaecological check-ups (usually compulsory, monthly)
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that each woman offers and the length of time they spend with the 
client. In the case of brothels, the women also earn 50% commission 
for each drink the client has with her. In general, the price of the 
drink is between €10 and €20, and they usually have two or three 
drinks before performing sexual services. It is likely that these earnings 
increase under conditions of sexual exploitation in trafficking, because 
these women cannot choose their clients, are compelled to carry out 
all types of sexual practice and the number of clients is fixed by their 
traffickers.
Regarding labour trafficking, in order to make an estimate we rely on 
the examples given by our key informants in interview (SP-E07, SP-E08, 
SP-E06, SP-E11).
ТаBle 10. estimate oF income From sexual services
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Street/Industrial estate Brothel Apartment
€5 to €40 per service €40 to €100 per service €60 to €120 per service
50% commission fee for 
consumption of alcohol
ТаBle 11. costs oF traFFicking For laBour exploitation
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Costs/Income
Domestic 
service
Agriculture
Costs per victim
until arrival in Spain
€3,500
€150
Bus from Romania or Bulgaria
Income:
Debt demanded
€3,500 + 
120% annual
maintenance 
expenses
€36/day picking strawberries (25 days, €900/month)
€47/day picking oranges (25 days, €1,175/month)
€150 documentation
€15/day tool hire and transport to the farm
(25 days, €375)
Costs of room and board are sometimes
charged separately.
The oranges season (Seville) is three months long. Calculating the salary, 
tool hire and transport costs for the picking season, the earnings for each 
worker are approximately €4,650. In the case of strawberry, raspberry 
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and blueberry picking (Huelva), the season lasts four months21 and the 
earnings €3,600 per worker (SP-E06, SP-E11). Some 15,000 people are 
needed for the strawberry harvest. According to our key informants 
(SP-E06, SP-E11), settlements of up to 5,000 men from sub-Saharan 
Africa, Romania and Bulgaria spring up for these harvests. A proportion 
of them will be victims of labour exploitation (a crime against workers’ 
rights) or of trafficking for this purpose (particularly Bulgarians and 
Romanians). In some fruit-picking provinces, up to 18 worker settlements 
have been counted, with approximately 200 people in each, around 
3,600 people in total, many of them with irregular documentation.
Victims of trafficking for labour exploitation are also charged for room 
and board (even though the accommodation is in warehouses or barracks 
in unhealthy conditions), work materials and tools, transport to the farm, 
and so on (SP-E06, SP-E11).
The traffickers tend to be of 
the same nationality as the 
workers and usually contracted 
as overseers by the farm 
owners/agricultural businesses. 
In Andalusia, these overseers 
are called Manijeros. As they 
have paid for the bus ticket 
to bring the workers to Spain, 
they use this supposed debt as 
a reason not to pay them for 
work they do. At the end of 
the month instead of paying 
them their full wages (around €900),22 they deduct the costs of tool 
hire, transport, life insurance (which has been agreed with the bank on 
opening their current accounts and of which the workers know nothing 
about), and accommodation, which means that the final sum deposited 
in the workers’ bank accounts is only €100 (SP-E06, SP-E11).
In Catalonia, trafficking networks for labour exploitation that use the 
form of worker cooperatives have been detected. In some cases, 
the cooperative covers the whole process. In many others, Spanish 
companies hire the cooperative to carry out certain jobs. Some of 
these cooperatives were dismantled in 2017 (SP-E14). Under this form of 
labour organisation, workers are not directly contracted, but are made 
members of the cooperative. They are only paid, supposedly, if there 
are profits. Victims work when there is demand whether this means two 
or twenty hours per day. The employer, or manager, is usually Spanish, 
but the person in charge of finding the victims has Chinese nationality 
residing in Spain. The victims must pay a debt of around €20,000 so 
their income is very small and barely covers their support. Some of the 
victims, once they have paid their debt, become part of the Chinese 
21 Sometimes there are several harvests, but we only estimate the picking of one harvest.
22 Perhaps less because, although this is the amount that they are due as a standard, the overseer 
will offer them less money, around €400 to €500.
ТаBle 12. estimates oF income From laBour traFFicking 
Based on two cases
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Strawberry picking (Huelva) Orange picking (Seville)
€3,600/worker/season €4,650/worker/season
Crew of 100 workers
€360,000
Crew of 100 workers
€465,000
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human trafficking organisation and, in turn, control or exploit other 
newly arrived.
3.5. Profits and profit sharing
As already pointed out, the destination of the money earned from 
exploitation will differ, depending on the type of trafficking network and 
the sums involved. Therefore, for the small-volume trafficker, the profits 
obtained will be their source of income for living, and depending on 
whether they are exploiting one or more victims, they may be able to 
acquire assets (a car, a house or some luxury item), but in general the 
low-level trafficker obtains a minimum of between €2,000 and 3,000 
monthly through the exploitation of one victim.
When the organisation is medium-sized, in which there are at least four 
or five people involved in recruitment, transportation and exploitation, 
at least four or five victims are needed to gain a profit, depending on 
their origin.
An example of a medium-sized network would be any of the Nigerian 
networks. A specific case is court judgement 33/2015, Pontevedra (J14, 
in Appendix 1). In this judgement, three female victims are named, 
with debts of €45,000 each, making a total of €135,000. The three 
defendants have their money deriving from illicit means (bank transfers 
and deposits that cannot be accounted for) seized, amounting to: 
defendant A, €73,450 in two years; defendant B, €212,481 in two years 
and a Mercedes; defendant C, €310,000, in three years. This income 
comes to a total of €595,931, which reveals that more victims had been 
exploited than the three named in the summary. Most probably, part of 
this money is paid to members of the network with different functions, 
in Spain and in Africa.
The large, highly organised transnational networks, according to the analy-
sis of court judgements, were from eastern Europe, specifically Russia, 
and from sub-Saharan Africa, specifically Nigeria. A Russian case (Judge-
ment 1/2015, Madrid – J15, Appendix 1) provides suitable illustration.
The organisation is headed by a man, responsible for the network, 
and his wife, who is the bearer of all the former’s assets and who 
collaborates in different tasks. He controls the whole business, even 
taking on the distribution of the women around the different brothels 
(internal trafficking). Another person recruits young women in different 
Russian cities, and yet another prepares the passports, altering the entry 
and exit stamps, without leaving Spain, sending them to Russia where 
they are falsified. There is also the person who distributes the women to 
the brothels, when the head man does not do so personally, collecting 
money off them (€1,500 per woman provided, 20% of their earnings 
and €1,300 for visa renewal), and another who controls, collects their 
money and exploits the victims in the brothels. A separate individual 
physically moves the victims from one club to another. Each woman 
is expected to earn from €4,000 to €6,000. The women pretend to 
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send money to their families, but the money goes to their recruiters 
in Russia. They open current accounts in Spain and collect the money 
directly from the brothel women in cash. Some of these brothels are 
the property of network members or have owners, also Russian, that 
collaborate with the organisation. The brothels to which they transfer the 
women are managed by members of the network.
From these cases and from the analysis of the interviews, we can point 
out several different forms of moving money:
• The Nigerian networks send the money to their country of origin, 
occasionally enduring poverty and scarcity in Spain, but they and 
their families have assets in Nigeria (SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14, SP-E02).
• When they use intermediaries on the sub-Saharan routes and networks, 
sometimes the victims are told to pay the network member who has 
collaborated on the journey instead of the final trafficker, and when 
the debt with the former is paid off, they continue paying the latter. 
Thus, the money is moved around less (SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14).
• The trafficking networks from eastern Europe invest money in assets 
and luxury items in their country of origin. On occasion, these groups 
display ostentatious wealth via Facebook, which means that this kind 
of social media publicizing can be used to monitor revenue from 
exploitation (SP-E01, SP-E02, SP-E03).
• Sometimes, it is not the traffickers that send the money but the 
victims, who wire the money to their families, and these families 
then pay the traffickers in the place of origin. These cases have been 
detected both in Latin America and in sub-Saharan Africa (SP-E01, 
SP-E02, SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14).
• Another form of handling the money in the case of Nigerian networks 
consists of sending various articles that are then sold in shops in 
Nigeria (SP-C01, SP-C02, 1W15). The delivery of products can be small 
or large scale. The shipment from the port of Barcelona every fifteen 
days of 53-foot containers completely filled with a very diverse range 
of products (cars, electrical appliances, clothes, butane canisters, etc.) 
has been documented (SP-E14). The money made from their sale is 
accumulated in a current account in Nigeria, which is used to make 
payments from there (SP-C02).
• On other occasions, the money transfer system known as Hawala 
is used. It is based on codes of honour and trust (SP-E01, SP-E12, 
SP-E13, SP-E14). Thus, a network member A, located in Spain, tells 
another member in Nigeria, B, whom he/she knows, to pay a third 
person, C. The relationship between A and B is based on trust and 
word of honour in the fulfilment of the request. When B needs a 
payment made in Spain, he/she turns to A, who returns the favour, 
thus meaning that the money is not moved and is very difficult to 
track. This payment system avoids transfers that can be tracked by 
the police, leaving no trace as there has been no physical transfer of 
money and is based on word and honour.
• In some cases, but above all in the eastern European networks, 
webs of ghost companies are created to launder the money, or 
in the purchase of assets by the traffickers or members of their 
families, in case they are detained and so that their assets are not 
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seized (SP-E01, SP-E02, SP-E03, SP-E14).
• Nigerian and Chinese networks also carry the money personally to 
their countries. The amount of €10,000 is the maximum that can 
be taken in cash without having to be declared (SP-E05, SP-E14). Up 
to four journeys to Nigeria have been counted, each time carrying 
this sum of money, either some of the trafficking network members 
travelling separately or four people on the same journey (SP-E05, 
SP-E14). Sometimes, the money is shipped in cash in the containers 
that are chartered from the port of Barcelona (SP-E14).
• Front men have also been used, or third persons for whom a bank 
account is opened, or the trafficker’s asset is placed in their name, 
sometimes without them knowing this (SP-E03, SP-E05, SP-E14).
• The Chinese organisations use loss-making companies to launder 
money, particularly Chinese restaurants or similar businesses (SP-E03, 
SP-E14, SP-E07).
• There are cases of transfers to tax havens and movement of transfers 
to different countries until reaching those tax havens. Remitters are 
often used for sending money (SP-E03). In the case of Nigeria, current 
accounts can be opened without much identification or documentation 
(SP-E14).
• Lastly, money transfers have also been detected entrusted to other 
people so that they make them instead of the traffickers, thus avoiding 
the appearance of the trafficker’s name. The commission for doing so 
costs €100 per transfer. This method is used by Chinese and Nigerian 
networks (SP-E03, SP-E05, SP-E14).
3.6. The role and impact of the internet 
on human trafficking activities and finances
The information and communication technologies have provided traffickers 
with greater flexibility in their actions and in obtaining the benefits 
from human trafficking. Three activities of traffickers benefit from the 
new technologies: the recruitment, the exploitation of victims and the 
movements of money (Hughes, 2014; Europol, 2016).
Although there are hardly any studies on the use of the internet to 
recruit victims for sexual exploitation in Spain, there is ample evidence 
that this means is used for that purpose. We have located ads in the 
Dominican Republic (Meneses-Falcón, 2017) for supposed jobs in Spain, 
obtaining significant monthly income. The advertisements refer to a web 
page where interested parties’ data are requested for contact and re-
cruitment. In interviews with convicted persons (SP-E01, SP-E02, SP-E05, 
SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14) it is evident that there is a significant recruitment 
activity in the countries of origin through newspaper and Internet adver-
tisements. However, in the recruitment of victims for labour exploitation, 
newspaper ads or personal contacts are used (SP-E06, SP-E11).
When the victims for sexual exploitation are in Spain, the traffickers use 
the internet to advertise their victims as well as contacting customers 
(SP-E01, SP-E02, SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14). They do it through ads 
on existing web pages, or that they themselves create.
Financing	oF	traFFicking	in	human	beings	in	spain	 395
In a study carried out on flyers with advertisements for sexual services 
distributed on the windshields of cars on the streets of Madrid (Meneses-
Falcón, et al., 2017), it became clear that most of them included internet 
addresses. Although a quantitative study is not carried out, a very 
significant percentage of them were suspected of sexual exploitation and 
coercion.
Sometimes, victims are forced to pose for photographs of these ads that 
in turn serve as control and blackmail to maintain their exploitation. 
Usually victims are threatened with sending them to their families. On 
the other hand, the use of security cameras inside the brothel also serves 
the traffickers to control the victims so they cannot escape exploitation. 
In addition, women of sub-Saharan origin are offered a mobile phone 
by the traffickers from which they are controlled (SP-E02, SP-E05, SP-E12, 
SP-E13, SP-E14).
Finally, there is evidence that the internet is being used as a fast and 
efficient way to make money transfers. As we have seen, traffickers use 
sophisticated methods for the movement of money with the objective of 
being undetected. However, transfers through the internet are still used, 
especially when dealing with small amounts. Generally, it is not the 
traffickers themselves who will make all the transfers, but they will use 
the victims or other people to make the transfers to a current account 
in their country. By doing so, they divide the total amount and avoid 
attracting the attention of the money laundering prosecutors (SP-E03, 
SP-E05, SP-E12, SP-E13, SP-E14).
As we have stated, up until now the investigation in Spain of trafficking 
crimes has been focused on the victims and the pursuit of the traffickers. 
This approach is evidenced both in the legislation and in the investiga-
tions and convictions. The modus operandi of the traffickers is ever more 
sophisticated and greater difficulty is being encountered in the prosecu-
tion of these crimes. Those that have been thwarted and the sentences 
imposed are based fundamentally on the declarations of the victims.
Among the challenges that must be faced, the following stand out:
1. Investigation methodologies based on following the financial transac-
tions and on their tax implications have been scarcely used (SP-E01, 
SP-E02, SP-E03). The opening of these lines of investigation is recent 
(2017) and their results are still awaiting evaluation. These investiga-
tions require finance skills and a closer collaboration between the 
human trafficking and tax and money laundering law enforcement 
bodies. Currently the scarce resources available for the latter are 
concentrated on pursuing other types of crimes which involve higher 
economic volumes.
4. FINANCIAl INvESTIGATIONS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING CRIMES: 
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2. The statistics and data on the trafficking of human beings requires 
greater systematisation, organisation and unification. The informa-
tion and data are dispersed, and they are not always in agreement 
when they come from different institutions. Greater transparency, 
and better accessibility, of the data is needed, as at times it proves 
difficult to locate and obtain them. As well as direct data, specific 
studies are needed of the context and market where the exploita-
tion takes place. We are referring to the specific labour markets 
where trafficking for the purpose of labour is prevalent, and prosti-
tution when the purpose is sexual. For the latter, there is no study 
on the national level that addresses its prevalence, its characteristics 
and its dimensions.
3. Greater effort is required in the detection and identification of traf-
ficking for the purpose of labour exploitation. This is frequently not 
distinguished adequately from other offences against workers’ rights, 
and the trafficking aspect often goes unnoticed. In order to achieve 
this, the following are necessary: a) better training of the professionals 
and police forces not specifically assigned to the pursuit of this crime; 
b) widening of the controls and inspections in the more precarious, 
temporary and seasonal sectors of the labour market, which is where 
those cases detected and identified have been found; c) improvement 
in labour legislation so as not to facilitate exploitation,23 as almost 
everything results in an offence against workers’ rights.
4. Those detained, investigated and convicted are, above all, intermediaries 
belonging to small and medium-sized networks. The investigation of 
and access to the network bosses and the more organised networks 
need to be conducted with greater emphasis and resources. Most of 
those convicted in Spain for trafficking crimes do not belong to large 
organisations and never occupy the highest positions of responsibility 
in them.
5. The falsification of personal documents, visas and entry and exit 
stamps is done with ease. The utilisation of the same passport for the 
entry of different people coming from sub-Saharan Africa is particularly 
frequent, given that once one person has entered the passport is sent 
back to be used by another person. The use of electronic chips or 
displays would make it possible to eliminate paper and the possible 
falsification of stamps.
6. The investigation of trafficking crimes is still very dependent on the 
declaration of victims, who do not tend to report or declare due to 
the fear they have of their traffickers. A change of focus must be 
put into effect, with more monitoring of the money, based on the 
prosecution of tax crime, money laundering and the unexplained 
wealth of the traffickers.
7. Spanish court rulings on trafficking networks of Latin American origin 
are scarce. However, the interviews obtained from informants and 
the results of the investigations conducted show that Latin American 
women are proportionally more numerous in the sector of prostitution. 
It should be examined whether this is a shortfall in getting to these 
23 The businessman or overseer has a very long period of time in which to register the workers 
in the social security system. They can do so on the same day until midnight. The harvesting 
of agricultural products may be carried out between 6am and midnight, whether the worker 
has a residency or work permit or not.
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criminal organisations or whether, on the contrary, in this migratory 
influx, smuggling predominates over trafficking.
Good practices that can be highlighted are:
1. The creation of the Office for Asset Recovery and Management (ORGA) 
in 2016 is a clear step forward in pursuing the human trafficking crimes 
in general and the financial aspect of it in particular. The Office applies 
the results of the management and realisation of the effects, assets, 
instruments and proceeds of crime for the purposes provided in the 
Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure. Although it deals with the assets re-
covered from all types of crime activities, in the case of human traffick-
ing is already playing a pivotal role in detecting crime and incriminate 
criminals when other evidences are difficult to obtain. However, it is still 
early to evaluate how decisive is going to be in the coming future.
2. Spanish border controls are quite exhaustive and efficient, which has 
a double impact on trafficking. On the one hand it is making difficult 
the transfer of money from the destination to the origin countries. On 
the other hand, trafficking networks have to seek other destinations 
as transits in order subsequently to enter Spain.
3. The controls and inspections of brothels by the Spanish police since 
2011 have enabled the dismantling of some trafficking networks and 
the stagnation or closure of many brothels practising exploitation, 
an effect that has gone hand-in-hand with the economic crisis. A 
strategy that has been used in recent years to evade these controls is 
the transfer of the business to apartments or houses that cannot be 
searched without a court order, because they are considered private 
property and not regulated by an operating licence for prostitution. 
Regulation of these businesses is needed to enable the Spanish police 
to carry out exhaustive inspections.
4. Medium-sized human trafficking networks originating in eastern Europe 
and sub-Saharan Africa have been dismantled, as can be seen from 
the Spanish conviction rulings, which have made it possible to learn 
more about how the trafficking networks operate.
Spain has a strategic geographical position in Europe for the entry of 
victims of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation from Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa. But the efficiency of border controls 
frequently leads the networks to other nearby countries as transit. 
However, most of the victims come from eastern Europe given that there 
are fewer risks and the movement of traffickers and victims is easier in 
the Schengen Area. The conditions of the agricultural labour markets 
and the market for sexual services means that Spain is an important 
destination for the trafficking networks to bring their victims. In general 
terms, it is worth pointing out that the trafficking organisations have little 
investment in the victims they recruit and reap significant profits from 
them. We can conclude with the following points:
5. CONClUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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1. The trafficking networks that invest the least are those originating 
in Eastern Europe, whose cost per victim is the price of the bus 
to bring them to Spain (€100); and those that invest the most are 
the sub-Saharans, with a maximum cost of €10,000 (transportation, 
accommodation, straits crossing, documentation and bribes). In 
between are the investments made by networks originating in Latin 
America (€3,000) and China (€2,000).
2. In the case of trafficking for the sake of sexual exploitation, debts 
of €6,000 to €8,000 are demanded from Latin American victims, 
€3,000 to €4,500 for those from eastern Europe, €20,000 to €30,000 
for those from China, and €30,000 to €70,000 for sub-Saharan 
Africans, approximately. To these earnings must be added other 
payments that are extorted from the victims, including room and 
board, documentation, asylum requests, sheet kits, commission for 
every client attended, medical check-ups, payment for the use of 
public spaces to work as a prostitute, etc.
3. With regard to the victims of trafficking for the sake of labour 
exploitation, the traffickers deduct between €3,600 and €4,650 from 
their pay per worker and season, and they also charge them for room 
and board, tool hire, transport to the farm, documentation, etc.
4. The destination of the money that they obtain from the victims may 
either be invested in Spain or, in most cases, sent to the country of 
origin of the trafficking organisation. There are several ways of sending 
the money: carrying it in cash on the person to the country of origin, 
by one or several people, with a maximum of €10,000 per person; 
paying somebody €100 to make a transfer; using the Hawala or 
Daigou24 (Chinese) payment systems, based on codes of honour and 
favours; utilising loss-making companies to launder the money and 
later operate with it; using front men or third parties in whose name 
they put the assets or current accounts into which they have invested 
the money; using remitters; or the victim sends the money to his/her 
family and the latter then pays the traffickers in their country.
5. The new technologies are used by the trafficking networks in the 
recruitment of victims (job advertisements) and in advertising their 
victims (advertisements of sexual services). Other uses have not been 
detected in this research.
24 Daigou means “buying on behalf of.” It is a channel of commerce in which a person outside 
of China purchases commodities (mainly luxury goods) for a customer in mainland China, since 
prices for luxury goods can be 30% to 40% higher in China than abroad. It is often used for 
money laundering.
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Respondent 
code
Position/Department Institution/Role
SP-E01 Attorney General State Public Prosecution Office, Spain
SP-E02 Province Chief Attorney State Public Prosecution Office, Spain
SP-E03 Public prosecutor economic affairs State Public Prosecution Office, Spain
SP-E04 Public prosecutor trafficking,
Santo Domingo
State Public Prosecution Office,
Dominican Republic
SP-E05 Captain, Offences against person Guardia Civil (National)
SP-E06 Lieutenant Guardia Civil (Regional)
SP-E07 Inspector Seville 1 National police, UCRIF
SP-E08 Inspector Seville 2 National police, UCRIF
SP-E09 Inspector Seville 3 National police, UCRIF
SP-E10 Inspector Murcia National police, UCRIF
SP-E11 Inspector Huelva National police, UCRIF
SP-E12 First Agent, Offences against
the Person
Ertzaintza, Basque Country
SP-E13 First Agent, Offences against
the Person
Ertzaintza, Basque Country
SP-E14 Sergeant, Human Trafficking Mossos d´Escuadra, Catalonia
SP-E15 Director ORGA
SP-C01 Criminal entrepreneur Nigerian, trafficker
SP-C02 Criminal entrepreneur Nigerian, trafficker
SP-C03 Criminal entrepreneur Nigerian, trafficker
SP-C04 Criminal entrepreneur Romanian, trafficker
SP-C05 Criminal entrepreneur Paraguayan, trafficker
SP-C06 Criminal entrepreneur Romanian, trafficker
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APPENDIx 1. ANAlySIS OF SExUAl TRAFFICKING SENTENCES 
    IN SPAIN
No Sentence Origin Profit from victim
J1
677/2012
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Paraguay €4,500
J2
9/2013
Barcelona
Romania
J3
153/2013
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania €3,000
J4
Not registered/2014
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Not specified
J5
269/2014
Castellón
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Not specified
J6
327/2014
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Brazil €3,000
J7
341/2014
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Guinea Not specified
J8
186/2014
Valencia
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria €50,000
J9
261/2014
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Not specified
J10
733/2014
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria Not specified
J11
217/2014
Vigo
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Transportation costs
J12
3/2014
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Not specified
J13
333/2015
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Not specified
J14
33/2015
Pontevedra
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria €45,000
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No Sentence Origin Profit from victim
J15 1/2015 Russia
Various figures for a total amount
in excess of €200,000
J16
57/2015
Palmas de Gran Canaria
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria
Various figures for a total amount
in excess of €50,000
J17
80/2015
Valladolid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Not specified
J18
379/2015
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania Not specified
J19
947/2015
Barcelona
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J20
451/2015
Lleida
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria
J21
4/2015
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J22
34/2015
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J23
8/2015
Ávila
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J24
809/2015
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
Transportation costs
€100 per day (position on street)
€300 per week (renting)
J25
177/2015
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria €50,000
J26
420/2016
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria €35,000
J27
109/2016
Barcelona
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria
€30,000 to
€55,000
Depending on the victims
J28
433/2016
León
Sexual Trafficking
Brazil €30,000
J29
211/2016
Madrid
Trata Laboral
Paraguay €4,000
J30 157/2016 Nigería €70,000
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No Sentence Origin Profit from victim
J31
6/2016
Zaragoza
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J32
538/2016
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria €4,000 per victim
J33
786/2016
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J34
1002/2016
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J35
97/2017
Albacete
Sexual Trafficking
Romania
J36
67/2017
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria €50,000
J37
166/2017
Madrid
Sexual Trafficking
Nigeria €50,000
“Trafficking” in this chapter follows the definition introduced by 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol) supplementing 
the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime (UNTOC). According to article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol, 
trafficking in persons is “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, 
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation”. Exploitation includes, “at a minimum, the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or 
the removal of organs” (United Nations, 2000). The above definition 
of trafficking further involves two additional conditions: firstly, the 
consent of the exploited victim is irrelevant when the means specified 
in the definition have been used (art. 3(b)); secondly, the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person under the age 
of 18 (a child), constitutes trafficking in persons, even if the particular 
means specified in the definition have not been used (art. 3(c)) (United 
Nations, 2000).
While the UNTOC definition has served as the template for definitions 
of trafficking found in other pieces of national and international law, 
such as the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings, or the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 (which 
essentially aggregated “human trafficking” and “modern slavery”), it does 
not resolve with certainty certain key issues as they arise in the empirical 
manifestations of the phenomenon. Firstly, the nature of the process 
leaves a considerable margin for uncertainty as to whether trafficking 
has genuinely taken place. From a victim-centred viewpoint the process 
may result in a non-harmful outcome, even though an illegal situation 
exists (for example, illegal prostitution or employment of adult migrants). 
According to the National Crime Agency (NCA), 82% of potential 
victims exploited for labour in the UK in 2014 were European Economic 
Area (EEA) nationals legally entitled to live and work in the UK (NCA, 
2015a). Secondly, from the viewpoint of the offending behaviour, the 
grey area concerns the element of organisation as defined in the main 
body of the UNTOC (i.e.art. 2(a): “structured group of three or more 
persons”). Engaging in the trafficking process does not require crossing 
such particular organisational threshold; in other words, trafficking may 
not always involve an “organised criminal group” (see Antonopoulos and 
Papanicolaou, 2018).
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When trafficking is a “transnational” crime, it is best understood as a 
process embedded in contemporary migration flows facilitated by push, 
pull and facilitating factors and involving the availability of at-risk population 
in the countries of origin (see van Liemt, 2004; Europol, 2011). The UK 
is primarily a destination country for trafficking victims from: central and 
southeastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); 
Africa; Asia; Latin America; and the Caribbean.1 Although in UK policy, 
law enforcement and non-governmental organisartion (NGO) rationale 
great emphasis is placed on human trafficking that is of transnational 
nature, it is important for one to remember that human trafficking is 
not always and necessarily a transnational crime. Indeed, in local, multi-
agency settings in the country, domestic/internal trafficking has been 
also recognised as an issue affecting UK and British nationals and at an 
increasing rate (UK-E4; UK-E5; UK-E6; UK-E7; UK-E13; UK-E14, etc.).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of the financial 
management of the human trafficking business in the UK, an area that is 
largely under-researched (see Zhang, 2009). The study is based, firstly, on 
interviews with a number of knowledgeable actors.2 Secondly, intelligence 
reports by the Metropolitan Police were used. These intelligence reports 
are essentially problem profiles on either human trafficking in particular 
or organised crime in general with the purpose to inform tactical tasking 
and coordinating groups within the police. Finally, open sources on the 
topic have been used in order to gain a better understanding of the 
business models in the human trafficking business in general. These open 
sources include reports by academics, research institutes, the government 
(Home Office), national and international law enforcement agencies 
(British Police, NCA, Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency 
[SCDEA],3 Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority [GLAA],4 Europol, 
etc.), reports by international organisations (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Financial Action Task Force [FATF]), and 
NGOs. Open sources include media sources and press releases from law 
enforcement agencies. Following this introduction, the chapter is based 
on four substantive sections:
1 There have also been cases in which the UK was a transit and source country for trafficking 
victims. In a rather unusual case, in 2008, the UK Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) identified 
vulnerable British nationals, who were trafficked by a British crime ‘collectivity’ to Norway. 
They were subjected to labour exploitation and were paid as little as £20 per week (Home 
Office, 2009).
2 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of 
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert, “C” stands for criminal (entrepreneur)/
trafficker/exploiter and “V” for victim. The description of the background of the individual 
sources can be found in the list of respondents in the references section.
3 SCDEA dissolved in 2013.
4 GLAA (formerly GLA) is essentially a labour inspection body, which was established in 2005 
following the death of 23 Chinese cockle-pickers in Morecambe Bay in 2004. The GLAA 
licensing scheme regulates businesses to make sure they meet the employment standards 
required by law. An employment agency or labour provider, who provides workers to the 
agriculture, shellfish gathering or any activity associated with processing and packaging, needs 
a GLAA license. Licensing standards cover health and safety, accommodation, pay, transport 
and training, whether a labour provider is fit to hold a licence and whether tax, National 
Insurance and VAT regulations are met. A labour provider must have a GLAA licence to work 
in the regulated sectors; it is a criminal offence to supply workers without a licence or use an 
unlicensed labour provider (see www.gla.gov.uk). In this report the acronyms GLA and GLAA 
are used interchangeably because some of the reports that are used were published by the 
authority under its old name.
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• Section 1 provides a general overview of the human trafficking business 
and discusses existing relations between the legitimate sectors and 
human trafficking in the UK;
• Section 2 offers an account of the social organisation of human 
trafficking in the UK and the key actors involved;
• Section 3 describes the financial aspects of human trafficking in terms 
of source of financing, settlement of payments, costs of business, as 
well as the profits made and how the profits are spent and further 
invested. Finally, it examines the role of the internet in the human 
trafficking business and its finances;
• Section 4 deals with the good practices and challenges in relation to 
the financial investigation of human trafficking in the UK.
The British Government, through a “multiple systems estimation” ap-
proach, which analyses the overlaps between human trafficking cases 
that come to the attention of the authorities through various sources, 
estimates that there are between 10,000 – 13,000 potential victims of 
human trafficking (in all its forms) in the country (see Silverman, 2014). 
Of course, it is extremely difficult to determine accurately the scale 
of trafficking in the UK (and any other context), and have a clear 
picture as to the numbers of people who have been trafficked, due 
to the clandestine nature of human trafficking, underreporting, (often) 
culturally-induced reluctance to report victimisation to the authorities, 
“…significant intelligence gaps on human trafficking…” (UK-E9), lack 
of awareness and understanding of the signs of human trafficking 
(Hornsby et al., 2017), as well as discrepancies in statistical reports 
(see also Kelly and Regan, 2000; Goodey, 2008; Project Acumen, 2010; 
Weitzer, 2012). The official estimate admittedly is based on “very 
poor data around the number of people trafficked, and hence [there 
are] large margins for errors”…; “the analysis is based on estimates 
concerning the proportion of women involved in prostitution who are 
likely to have been trafficked ([and] it [is] not directly informed by 
evidence concerning the number of women observed to have been 
trafficked)” (Dubourg & Prichard, 2008: iii & 15). After 2009, the 
number of potential victims of human trafficking is a product of the 
National Referral Mechanism (NRM).5 Between its inception in 2009 
and December 2016 14,538 people were referred to the National 
Referral Mechanism (Table 1).
5 “The National Referral Mechanism is a framework for identifying victims of human trafficking 
or modern slavery and ensuring they receive the appropriate support. The NRM is also the 
mechanism through which the Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit (MSHTU) collects data 
about victims. This information contributes to building a clearer picture about the scope of 
human trafficking and modern slavery in the UK. The NRM was introduced in 2009 to meet 
the UK’s obligations under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings. At the core of the NRM is the process of locating and identifying “potential 
victims of trafficking” (NCA, 2017b). To be referred into the NRM, potential victims must be 
referred by an authorised agency, known as the “first responder” (police, border force, GLA, 
local authorities, specific NGOs) to a “competent authority” (the UKHTC or Home Office 
Immigration and Visas – where trafficking may be an issue as part of an asylum claim).
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In 2016, there were 3,805 potential victims submitted to the NRM, 
a 17% increase on 2015 figures, which were in turn a 40% increase 
on 2014 figures. Of these 3,805 potential victims, 1,936 were female 
(51%), 1,864 (48%) were male and a further 5 (<1%) were recorded 
as “transgender.” Reporting showed potential victims of trafficking from 
108 countries, with Albanian, UK and Vietnamese nationals being the 
most commonly reported nationalities (NCA, 2017a). In 487 cases 
the type of exploitation was recorded as “unknown.” The number 
of underage victims was 1,278, the majority of whom were from the 
UK (255 children), an increase of 100.8% from 2015 (NCA, 2017a). 
One needs to be reminded that these are people referred into the 
NRM and are not necessarily confirmed as trafficking victims.6 In fact, 
the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner in his first annual report 
noted that just over a quarter of the cases identified in England and 
Wales in 2015 under the NRM resulted in crimes recorded by the 
police (The Guardian, 2016). Moreover, according to a recent report 
by the National Audit Office, 46% of all referrals made in 2016 had 
not received a conclusive grounds decision as at March 2017 (National 
Audit Office, 2017).
According to Organised Crime Group (OCG) Mapping, in 2015 there 
were over 6,000 active OCGs consisting of nearly 50,000 individuals 
(NCA, 2016). However, there is no estimate of the OCGs that are 
involved in human trafficking in particular, and even if this was the 
case, the estimate would inevitably ignore the large number of individual 
traffickers. Network analyses of the trafficking cases known to the Greater 
Manchester Police in 2015, for instance, suggested that most suspects 
were individuals involved in just one crime of exploitation against one 
victim (Gadd et al., 2017; see also following section).
The number of prosecutions for “human trafficking”/”modern slavery” 
offences7 is increasing (especially following from the Modern Slavery Act 
2015) against a relatively low base compared to the referrals (see also 
Haughey, 2016). In 2015, for example, 117 offenders were prosecuted for 
modern slavery offences in the UK, 19% higher than the 98 prosecuted 
in 2014. From 2004 to 2015, 511 individuals were convicted for human 
trafficking/modern slavery offences (see Table 2).
6 In addition, there is no link between these referrals, and arrests and convictions.
7 “Modern slavery” was introduced as a separate crime recording category in April 2015.
ТаBle 1. numBer oF potential victims reFerred to the national reFerral 
mechanism, 2009 – 2016
         * 2009 figures cover April-December only.
Sources: Home Office (2014); NCA (2015a); NCA (2017a).
year 2009* 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Referrals 535 714 946 1,186 1,746 2,340 3,266 3,805
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At least three phases can be distinguished in the human trafficking 
process: a) recruitment; b) transportation from the place of origin to 
the place of destination and potentially the illegal entry of the trafficked 
person; and c) the exploitation phase (see Salt and Stein, 1997). The 
first phase, recruitment, excluding the event of abduction of the victim, is 
known to be facilitated by a diverse set of actors as friends and family 
of the victim, co-workers, people of spiritual authority, employment 
agencies, or even artistic management companies (UK-E1; UK-E2; UK-E3; 
UK-E4; UK-E5; UK-E5, UK-V1 etc.). In some cases, the context of the 
recruitment phase is informal networks in small localities in the country 
of origin. For instance, a significant number of trafficking victims from 
Romania in a locality in the north of England are recruited in Pentecostal 
churches in specific villages or small towns in the country in which there 
is an over-representation of Roma people; villages such as Calaras, Bacau, 
Vrancea, Focsani etc. (UK-E11). In many cases in the recruitment phase, 
traffickers take advantage of local financial and cultural peculiarities in 
the country of origin:
“So there, the understanding is, Vietnam, poor family, organised criminals 
in Vietnam say ‘right, we’ll give you whatever [payment], this is your 
money, send so and so [the trafficked victim(s)] to the UK, they’re now 
going to pay off the debt’. What that means for us is that we’ve now got 
a safeguarding issue because they’re a child, a child who won’t comply, 
because generally, a child from Vietnam, they’re much more streetwise 
than our kids, you’ve got a child who feels it is an honour to pay back 
the family debt, you’ve got a child who feels that their family will be 
seriously harmed or murdered if they don’t pay off the debt, and you 
have a child who probably still think that their life is still better here 
than it was in Vietnam” (UK-E5).
Traffickers may use legitimate agencies but even when an illegitimate 
front is used, they may present to the victim contracts and legal 
documentation as a means of alleviating any concerns about trafficking 
and masking the intended exploitation (UK-E1; UK-E2; UK-E3). Many of 
the exploited individuals are knowingly and voluntarily recruited for both 
the sex industry and the labour market in the UK. Although they know 
or suspect the labour sector they would be introduced in, they may be 
unaware of the level of exploitation. Forging documents or obtaining 
the necessary documents, by means of corruption and bribery of law 
enforcement or other officials is a possibility at this stage. The recruitment 
phase also involves false promises including “employment packages” 
ТаBle 2. numBer oF convictions For human traFFicking/modern slavery 
oFFences in the uk, 2004 – 2015
Sources: Haughey (2016: 13); www.parliament.uk.
year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Convictions 0 12 21 23 24 25 16 8 13 148 108 113
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where they are also offered (tied) accommodation as part of their job, 
as well as various provisions and help with everyday life practicalities. For 
example, most Romanian people who come in the north of England for 
work are promised – apart from work on a contractual basis – help with 
the process of claiming benefits and health care (such as the services of 
a dentist). In the case of internal trafficking in the UK, recruitment very 
often involves homeless people, poor people hanging out in food banks 
and “soup kitchens,” individuals with mental health problems (Oram et 
al., 2015) and dependencies, and grooming (vulnerable) children and 
young people at care facilities (UK-E7). Interestingly, one of the research 
participants mentioned that an individual, who had been identified by 
the local police as a trafficking “risk,” attempted at joining Barnardo’s 
SECOS (Sexual Exploitation Children’s Outreach Service) Project on a 
voluntary basis in order to have access to potential victims (UK-E4). 
Finally, recruitment is also facilitated by information and communication 
technologies (see also sub-section 3.5).
Transportation, including the stage of harbouring the victims in transit, is 
also a phase in which different actors perform different functions (see 
following section) – the financial significance being that the involvement 
of a variety of actors entails transactions, which cannot be indiscriminately 
considered as part of an “organised crime activity”. The transportation to 
the UK, especially from other EU member states, is frequently executed 
legally. In the case of non-EU nationals, transportation involves mostly 
ports in the south and east coasts of the country (UK-E5).
There are two main forms of exploitation – a) sexual exploitation and 
b) labour exploitation – being relatively more visible and thus detectable 
than other forms of human trafficking, such as, for instance, organ 
harvesting and trafficking. Sex trafficking victims can be highly visible 
and engage in street-level prostitution but in many cases sex trafficking 
takes place in “underground” venues, such as private homes or brothels. 
Public and legitimate locations such as massage parlours, spas, health 
clubs, and strip clubs also act as fronts for illegal prostitution and 
trafficking.8 Similarly, forced labour has been detected in labour intensive 
manufacture, construction and agriculture (e.g. fruit farms in Kent, cockle 
farms in Cumbria etc.) (see also UNODC, 2009), service establishments 
such as nails salons, car washes, garages, cleaning services, tanning 
salons, the hospitality industry, restaurants, the care industry, skip hire 
companies and waste disposals as well as domestic servitude.9 What 
facilitates labour trafficking and exploitation in the UK is the extended 
labour supply chains, which allow for a high degree of separation 
between the agent (intermediary) who supplies labour, on one hand, 
8 The number of sex workers in the UK is estimated to be around 72,800 with about 32,000 
working in London. The EU enlargement of 2004 and 2007 had a remarkable impact on the 
nationalities of migrants working in prostitution in the UK (TAMPEP Network, 2009). According 
to the Sex Work Research Hub, street-based sex workers comprise just over 25% of sex 
workers in the UK, with the remainder working in diverse indoor settings (cited in House of 
Commons – Home Affairs Committee, 2016a: 10).
9 In many cases, the two forms of exploitation coincide. For example, sexual intercourse with 
a (trafficked) woman many times, and specifically in public and legitimate locations such as 
massage parlours, spas and strip clubs involves the provision of non-sexual services, e.g. a 
massage, a dance, serving clients, etc.
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and the end-user of labour, on the other. In such a diverse and devolved 
system, legal businesses are not always aware of where the workers were 
sourced and how they were recruited (Harris et al., 2014; Skrivankova, 
2014). Finally, trafficking victims particularly from Vietnam are exploited 
in cannabis farms. According to the National Crime Agency, in 2016 
the most common type of human trafficking recorded for both adult 
and child (minor) victims in the UK was trafficking for the purposes 
of labour exploitation (NCA, 2017a).10 Some of the interviewees from 
law enforcement agencies and NGOs also attested to labour trafficking 
and exploitation commonly occurring in these sectors of work and 
establishments (although one needs to remember that there is often 
intersectionality within forms of exploitation, UK-E17; UK-E20):
“At the age of 16, the victim, who was an orphan, was sent by his 
foster parents to Russia from his home in Vietnam. He stayed in 
Russia for 6 years, working in a restaurant. He was then told he was 
coming in the UK, which he was happy about. He travelled to the UK 
in a truck with a number of others, in a journey that lasted several 
days, arriving in London in August 2013. He was taken to a restaurant 
and worked as a waiter and pot washer, and went on to work at a 
clothes factory. He was given accommodation and was allowed to 
eat at the restaurant for free but was never paid any money. In May 
2014, he was taken from London to a house in Eaglescliffe [a town 
in the northeast of England]. He was given some food and was told 
to look after some cannabis plants. He did not leave as he had been 
threatened and was told he still owed money to the males who took 
him there” (UK-E9).
Human trafficking is dispersed throughout the country and it is rather 
difficult to identify hotspots other than perhaps the larger cities of the 
UK (for sexual exploitation): London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, 
Newcastle, etc. However, there seems to be a significant number of 
(known) labour trafficking cases in the south and east of the country 
and a significant number of (known) sex trafficking cases in the west, 
the north, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland (NCA, 2016). It is also 
interesting to note that the exploitation of (the same) migrants may 
involve more than just the UK. Intelligence reports reveal that Albanian 
men and women with forged Italian passports travel to the Republic 
of Ireland, where they are exploited in the construction industry and 
in agriculture, and then move up to Northern Ireland for the same 
activities. In fact, they move from one country to the other on the 
basis of available work and for short time projects. These workers live in 
rented caravans or even in sheds.
Exploited individuals are controlled in a variety of ways. Workers are 
sometimes sold from one employer to another. Often violence and 
mostly threat of violence is employed. However, it is worth noting that 
10 At this point it should be mentioned that an individual may be recorded as a “victim of labour 
exploitation” although no information is provided about the sector or type of exploitation. As 
such, someone may be recorded as a victim of labour exploitation whether s/he is exploited in 
a farm, a construction site and a factory or through begging and forcing them into participating 
in criminal activities (e.g. cannabis farms) (see NCA, 2015a).
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when it comes to the sex industry in particular, competition compels 
entrepreneurs/traffickers to not be indiscriminately violent towards 
women and girls. This is not to suggest that violence is not present. 
The more clandestine the market, the more likely it is that there is 
abuse and violence (UK-E1; UK-E3; UK-4). It is also important to note 
that violence in the human trafficking business is often associated with 
specific cultural characteristics of some traffickers. For example, according 
to police intelligence reports, the willingness of some Chinese traffickers 
to use violence is seen as a method of ‘saving face’ and earning status 
within the trafficking collectivity rather than a rational need to control 
victims. In the human trafficking business there is less need for violence 
than in other illegal markets (e.g. drugs market, extortion/protection), 
and the reason, according to Kopp (2012), is the absence of a need to 
control a territory in the exploitation phase. This is reflected – among 
other – in the relatively harmonic coexistence among various small 
trafficking schemes in various small localities in the UK.
As regards labour trafficking – and apart from the very often clandestine 
nature of the phenomenon and the desperate need to earn money – 
there are conditions and circumstances that lead to exploitation, such 
as ignorance of employment and other rights in the UK, inadequate 
linguistic skills, and cultural issues such “acceptance of a hierarchy 
of family control with a fear of wider social consequences if working 
arrangements are challenged” (Beels, 2017: 4). Recent evidence in the 
UK suggests that in some instances exploited individuals (especially 
uneducated Romanian Roma with no adequate knowledge in English) 
are forced into specific conditions by being threatened that if they do 
not comply they will be “kicked out of the country” on the basis of 
Brexit (e.g. UK-E9; UK-E11). In rather exceptional cases, traffickers force 
exploited workers to commit offences as a way of preventing them from 
going to the police and asking for help.
Reliable information on the structures and operations of trafficking 
networks in the UK has been less readily available as it typically 
depends on specific case studies (see, for example, Spencer, 2014), as 
well as on offender profiles drawn from prosecution and conviction data. 
Complaints about the quality and depth of information are common, 
and, while this situation is typically attributed to the clandestine nature 
of the activity (see Surtees, 2008), the involvement of a multiplicity 
of actors holding diverse positions towards the issue means that the 
process of generating relevant knowledge is not immune from important 
conceptual and thus, inevitably, factual biases (see Weitzer, 2015; 
Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2018). Generally, the human trafficking 
business in the UK is fragmented and decentralised. Different actors 
may play a significant role in different stages of the trafficking process. 
These actors may:
2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAl ORGANISATION 
 OF TRAFFICKING NETwORKS
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• operate as “lone wolves” engaging/grooming vulnerable women and 
girls and then forcing them into prostitution. The presence of the lone 
trafficker is in stark contrast to the Home Office assertion that the 
proportion of human trafficking that is “organised” is 100% (see Mills 
et al., 2013);
• belong to more robust organisational forms featuring hierarchical 
structures. These robust organisational forms, which are rather un-
common, can be mostly found among ethnic groups with a strong 
familial basis such as the Albanians and typically reflect the family 
hierarchy;
• operate within stronger or looser networks whether as individuals, as 
couples or as part of smaller groups carrying out different functional 
activities in one or in different phases of the process. Some of these 
structures may operate locally and on a very small level or operate in 
a much wider geographic area. For example, a Polish group dismantled 
by the authorities operated across the UK and in cities like Edinburgh, 
Belfast, Glasgow, Leeds, and Newcastle. The network employed a 
London-based receptionist, who was effectively the person picking up 
the phone when a punter called and she coordinated the girls in the 
aforementioned localities (UK-E16).
Many trafficking collectivities operate within discrete ethnic or immigrant 
communities. However, cross-ethnic arrangements do exist and casual 
employees and/or victims are sometimes recruited from outside the core 
ethnic group (Webb and Burrows, 2009). Chinese human traffickers, 
exactly because of the saturation of the Chinese restaurant/take away 
business in London due to the large number of Chinese, occasionally 
form alliances with traffickers of other nationalities in order to provide 
(exploitative) work for their (trafficked) compatriots. As mentioned before, 
and excluding the victims, there is a number of actors in human 
trafficking. These actors are:
• The organiser. The organiser is concerned with the planning of the 
operation, the establishment of contacts with individuals, with the 
recruitment of actors into a collectivity, etc. In small schemes, an 
organiser deals with all aspects of the schemes from recruitment 
and transportation to exploitation (see also Brå, 2008). Very often an 
organiser is identified with the owner of an establishment in which 
the exploitation takes place. This can be, for instance, the owner of 
a restaurant or a car wash.
• The recruiters, who are concerned with the recruitment of people 
for sex and labour exploitation. The recruiter is someone, who lives 
permanently in the country of origin of the exploited individuals, and 
has a very good knowledge of the language, the peculiarities of each 
country and/or specific locale, or even knows the victims personally 
(UK-V1). In some instances, and in the case of sexual exploitation, ex-
sex workers are used to persuade women and girls to come and work 
to the UK. In the case of labour exploitation, groups of workers are 
recruited and managed by someone of the same ethnic background. 
This individual acts as an intermediary between the workers and 
the employer and is often himself a former employee of the same 
employer.
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• The transporters/escorts, who are concerned with transporting or at least 
assisting women in coming into the UK. There may be more than one 
transporter/escort throughout the whole journey, although in many 
cases victims (particularly from eastern Europe) for both sexual and 
labour exploitation travel to the UK on their own.
• The enforcers. In a trafficking scheme, these are individuals with the 
duty of supervising victims in the venues of exploitation. Many times 
they have the duty of collecting debts.
• The corrupt public officials. The corrupt public officials are those who 
either provide assistance during the trafficking process (e.g. employees 
in embassies and consulates and/or employees in local authorities) or 
other, who are being bribed to turn a blind eye to the exploitation 
(e.g. corrupt police officers).
• The legal business owners. These are individuals, who own the places in 
which the exploitation phase of the trafficking process takes place.
• Enablers: These can be lawyers assisting in stages of the trafficking 
process as well as advising and defending traffickers in a regular 
or ad hoc basis or professionals who are integral in the financial 
management of the business such as accountants (see UK-E16),
• Freelancers. These are facilitators that are peripherally linked to a 
trafficking scheme and in fact may be unaware of the scheme or the 
level of exploitation. These freelancers may vary from a legal business 
receptionist, to teenagers delivering cards for escort services to venue 
such as pubs, to taxi drivers and general “helpers.”
The presentation of these actors within the trafficking business does not 
necessarily mean that these exist in every collectivity and/or scheme. 
It would be extremely difficult to provide an accurate profile of the 
trafficking group member as there seems to be a diversity of profiles 
rather than a profile. The individuals who participate in this business 
are not necessarily experienced criminals. Some have the relevant 
infrastructure to get involved (e.g. a legal company, a farm, a bar, a 
massage parlour, an apartment in which the exploitation phase takes 
place); some enter the business with absolutely no resources. The 
vast majority are men however, in some schemes the participation 
of women is functional (e.g. in the recruitment phase). As mentioned 
earlier, traffickers are not always unknown to the victims. Many times 
the trafficker is a friend, a neighbour, or even a member of her (nuclear 
or extended) family (e.g. UK-V1). The age of onset of offending is 
usually later than conventional criminals (late twenties/early thirties) 
(see also Broad, 2013).
Although the belief among most of the interviewees in this study was 
that traffickers enter the business because it is a lucrative business 
(“…it’s entirely motivated by significant amounts of money…”, UK-E5), 
the reality is that there are a range of rationales for entering the 
market; a range of rationales that, as we will see in the next section, 
has financial implications:
• Making money: Here, there is a wide range of traffickers. Some (mostly 
migrant traffickers) exploit others for “survival” (see also Broad, 2013), 
some exploit an opportunity to make money and often within the 
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context of a legal business. In a very small number of cases minority 
ethnic traffickers (of British nationality) initiated small and ephemeral 
prostitution schemes involving underage girls in order to amass capital 
to start their own legitimate business (UK-E2);
• Making money and becoming “brokers of sexual pleasure” to friends: this is 
exclusively in the case of sex trafficking – “…to look like ‘the man’ 
to their friends” (UK-E2);
• Avoiding expenses, remaining competitive, and saving their business: this 
is especially the case with labour exploitation. According to the 
GLAA, this type of exploiters is defined as “chancer”: “an individual 
who… knowingly or unknowingly fails to pay workers properly or give 
them their basic employment rights. They may start out with good 
intentions. They may come under pressure to reduce their margins or 
lose a vital contract. The chancer protects the margin of their own 
business by passing on an unfair share of the commercial pressure to 
their workers. The chancer also needs to believe that by doing the 
right thing by his or her employees the business is not going to be at 
a competitive disadvantage” (Beels, 2017: 4).
Similarly to other illicit trades and activities, individuals may become 
involved in human trafficking via trust, familial and kinship, and neigh-
bourhood contacts. In the case of Chinese human traffickers operating 
in London, associations of people with same birthplace (tongxianghui) 
are important. Finally, an environment of great importance for the for-
mation and consolidation of relationships for human trafficking is legal 
businesses. Legal businesses also operate as the context in which rela-
tionships (employer-employee and between/among partners) are forged 
and transformed into criminal business relationships, and dependability 
of individuals is manifested (see also Antonopoulos and Hall, 2016 for a 
similar trend in the illegal tobacco trade; CSD, 2015).
There is discussion as to whether human traffickers are involved in 
other illicit trades and criminal activities. Generally, this appears to be 
dictated by the scale of the trafficking scheme. Small schemes tend to 
be specialised in sex or labour exploitation specifically, whereas large 
schemes or schemes associated with robust organisational forms often 
featuring hierarchical structures are more diversified (see NCA, 2017c). 
These organisational forms are found to be involved in other criminal 
activities often violent ones (e.g. extortion and debt collection) as well 
as drug trafficking and counterfeiting. Intelligence reports suggest that 
Chinese organised crime groups operating in Strathclyde (Scotland) with 
links in London and Northern Ireland are involved in human trafficking 
for both sexual and labour exploitation as well as money lending and 
extortion.
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3.1. Source of capital for initiating/sustaining 
criminal operations
Although, as mentioned earlier, some have the relevant infractusture to 
get involved in the exploitation phase of human trafficking, generally, 
there are either no or very low market entry costs to the trafficking 
business (UK-E14; UK-E16). In the case of internal trafficking, underage 
victims are relatively easily recruited among groups of vulnerable people 
with absolutely no financial requirement being in place. In some 
other instances, underage vulnerable victims may be lured into sexual 
exploitation by small gestures like being offered a jewel, a meal, a 
used mobile phone, or simply being given attention and an initial nice 
treatment, which are unusual occurrences in their life. As one of the 
interviewees, who works in the field of residential child care – and 
among other – with vulnerable girls who have been victims of internal 
trafficking, mentioned:
“You don’t need any money to persuade these vulnerable girls to have 
sex and do anything with anyone, really. Usually, we are talking about 
those girls who have been severely abused even by family members 
at a very young age, may have learning difficulties, who see the world 
through their ‘pink glasses’ and, if asked at a bus stop, a take-away, at a 
park, they will say ‘yes, why not?’. Or girls who have been through such 
hardship in their life that, if you show them even the slightest interest, 
they are yours. Money is not essential…” (UK-E13).
In the case of cross-border mobility, frequently, the “victims” have 
savings to migrate abroad, or have been given money by their families 
for trips. Naturally, in this case, no amount of money is required from 
traffickers. In other cases, perpetrators fund the travel of victims abroad 
and arrange all transportation logistics, and then use this as a form of 
debt-bondage when the victim has arrived to the UK. In cases in which 
there is a convergence between human smuggling and human trafficking, 
it is irregular migrants that provide the start-up capital for the business. 
For instance, Chinese “snakeheads” charge up to US$30,000 per head 
for long overland journey from east China to the UK via Russia, and 
eastern European countries (UK-E1; UK-E2; UK-E3; etc). Once in the UK, 
many who have not paid the smuggling fees or their families are not in 
the position to cover the trip expenses are found work with gangmasters 
in order to pay for the outstanding fee. The victims themselves are 
sometimes manipulated into providing the capital that is needed for a 
trafficking scheme. One of the interviewees mentioned an interesting 
case in which Chinese migrants, who were to be exploited in various 
labour sectors in the UK, were following English language classes for 
which they paid their traffickers (UK-E2). Within the enlarged European 
Union after 2004, people come into the UK from all over eastern Europe 
and in the process some may be forced to labour or sex, others may 
be coerced, and others are willingly “exploited” because this is the best 
option they have (see also Leman and Janssens, 2008). Other cases 
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involve the traffickers confiscating the identity documents from their 
(Eastern European) victims upon their arrival in the country, and opening 
bank accounts to have access to credit via overdrafts, bank loans, and 
credit and debit cards (see FATF/OECD, 2011).
In those cases in which there is an actual investment of money in the 
trafficking business, the start-up capital derives from funds from legal 
businesses, and smaller or bigger savings. These legal businesses are often 
functional to the exploitation of trafficking victims (e.g. massage parlours, 
clubs, etc.) or irrelevant to the exploitation phase but useful for the 
trafficking process as a whole. For instance, we have come across a case 
in which a Lithuanian labour trafficker owned a minibus company in 
Lithuania. He used vehicles for the trip to the UK for £150 per person. 
The passengers were then introduced in labour exploitation schemes that 
the Lithuanian minibus company owner was a “stakeholder” (see GLA, 
2016b).
Sometimes money invested into human trafficking derives from funds 
from other criminal activities especially by those traffickers, who have a 
diversified criminal portfolio. In a rather unusual case that was described 
by an investigative officer working for the HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs), the money from counterfeiting activities committed in 
the UK was invested in the construction of a hotel in Pakistan. The 
hotel was essentially an investment from proceeds of counterfeiting and 
facilitated a human trafficking scheme, which provided cheap labour to 
various businesses in the UK:
“We had information about a British Pakistani couple in Bradford. They 
were owners of a relatively big clothes company in Bradford and our 
intelligence suggested they were involved in counterfeiting. Clothes, 
bags, belts, you name it. We raided the premises in this area full of 
warehouses, and we started searching for money, products, documents. 
People were also working illegally in the business. One of my colleagues 
noticed a poster of a big building on the wall. Looked like a big house 
abroad but the thing is that this house was in bigger and smaller frames 
in their house too... In the living room, in the office, in the kitchen. 
Our investigation revealed that this building was in fact a hotel that was 
built with money from the counterfeiting business, and it was used as a 
recruiting and harbouring venue for trafficked persons from Asia, mostly 
Pakistan. After they came to the UK, they would work in the clothes 
company, in restaurants...” (UK-E12).
Access at critical moments
There are a number of critical moments in the human trafficking business. 
These critical moments are, firstly, business-related. Many times, especially 
in relatively small localities and venues, and in relation to small schemes 
in the sex industry, there is a saturation point manifested in a reduced 
number of encounters with clients, after which the entrepreneurs must 
“renew” the sex workers under their control. This set of critical moments 
is dealt with by the creation of new cycles of sex workers in which 
women in a locality (or a venue) are renewed to attract clients. This 
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system is elsewhere (Monzini, 2005) referred to as a ‘carousel system’. 
It is not unusual for women to be transported to other cities or 
even regions (e.g. from London to Belfast in Northern Ireland) or be 
exchanged (UK-E2; UK-E16; restricted intelligence reports). The system 
is based on pre-existing personal relationships between traffickers in the 
various locations and previous collaboration, not necessarily in human 
trafficking. Thus, the importance of social capital (i.e. connections and 
relationships) and symbolic capital (i.e. trust and reputation) are often 
more important than financial capital in sustaining a human trafficking 
scheme in the UK.
Secondly, critical moments in the human trafficking business are law 
enforcement-related such as, for instance, people being arrested by the 
authorities at UK ports and airports and/or deported or the traffickers 
being arrested by the authorities. These critical moments are financially 
covered by amounts of money that have been obtained from the 
business, or by the traffickers’ legal business portfolios (UK-E1).
Finally, there are miscellaneous critical moments which may vary from the 
women and girls escaping, being rescued by family, friends and NGOs, 
being “stolen” and/or taken away by lovers; or the women/girls in the 
sex industry or men in labour sectors not being able to provide their 
sexual and/or employment “capital” (e.g. due to pregnancy, injuries, 
illnesses, operations, deaths). These cases, although they may cause an 
inconvenience, present no significant financial implication for the criminal 
entrepreneurs because, as mentioned earlier, there are no or very low 
market entry costs to the human trafficking business, and because of the 
large supply of (potential) victims (UK-E1; UK-E9).
3.2. Settlement of payments
Payments in cash are almost exclusively the case in the human trafficking 
business for both sexual and labour exploitation. As one of the experts 
interviewed emphatically noted, “the trafficking business is a cash economy… 
cash is king” (UK-E9). This is also exemplified by convicted traffickers’ 
views on asset recovery in a Home Office study (Webb and Burrows, 
2009). Although a number of these convicted traffickers had been aware 
that there might be an attempt to recover some of the money from 
their trafficking business, and a number of the respondents were (at the 
time of the research) subject to asset recovery processes, they did not 
perceive this as deterrent as most businesses were cash-based. We have 
not come across any cases in the UK in which credit was present in any 
level of the business for both sexual and labour exploitation.
Basically, there are six types of relationships between and among actors 
in the human trafficking business, which requires settlement of payments. 
These include:
1. Trafficker to trafficker. When there is an exchange between traffickers, 
e.g. selling or re-selling of women, the payment is mostly made in 
cash. In the case of the ‘carousel system’ mentioned earlier, there 
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is no payment as such but women who are perceived as having 
the same “sexual capital” (UK-E1) are simply exchanged between 
traffickers.
2. Trafficker to employees in a trafficking scheme. In these cases, payments 
are made almost exclusively in cash unless the business relationship 
takes place within the confines of a legal business or service. In the 
latter case, payments are also made electronically.
3. Trafficker to corrupt officials. Irrespective of the service offered to the 
trafficker or simply turning a blind eye to the trafficking-related 
activities cash is the type of payment although, occasionally, sex is 
provided as payment.
4. Clients to sex workers/victims/traffickers. In these cases, payments are made 
predominantly in cash. Occasionally, jewels, handbags, and clothes, 
are gifted along with the regular payment, and this is especially the 
case if there is more personal relationship between the victim and a 
(returning) client, and in those schemes that allow some professional 
freedom to the sex worker (UK-E4). In extremely rare cases, especially 
in labour exploitation schemes, some payments are made by card 
directly to the owners of the legal businesses in which exploitation 
takes place. These are covered behind payments to legal businesses 
for (actual or supposed) services provided. An example that was put 
forward in one of the interviews involves the card payment for a 
package of “deluxe” cleaning services for a transportation company 
fleet by a cash wash (UK-E2).
5. Traffickers/exploiters to victims. In cases of labour exploitation, the 
victim’s wages may be withheld entirely, thus ensuring money stays 
with their exploiters, or the victim receives a very meagre amount 
of earnings for their work. In cases of extreme exploitation (in the 
sex or labour markets), which constitute the ideal cases of “human 
trafficking,” payments are made in the form of accommodation, basic 
amenities, clothes, and/or food (see GLA, 2016b).
6. Victims to traffickers/exploiters.
The traffickers employ various methods of ensuring payment from victims; 
methods which can be defined as negative, positive and administrative. 
The negative approaches, which are mostly adopted with victims who 
come from contexts outside the EU, include:
• Blackmail, violence and threat of violence directed not only at the victim 
but also at family members who may be outside the UK;
• Juju. This is a form of witchcraft that exists alongside Christian and 
Islamic beliefs predominantly in Nigeria and applies to Nigerian victims 
of trafficking. Within the context of juju, rituals include the taking of 
blood, pubic hair, etc., and swearing oaths to gods, who supposedly 
have power over the victims’ life and death. The victims also sign 
contracts, which are “blessed” by juju “priests” in Nigeria, and once 
at the country of destination they are under control from a distance 
with victims being threatened with infertility or death if clauses of 
the contract – including the ones relating to payments/paying back 
debt – are broken;
• Economic dependency and debt bondage. As found in other pieces of 
research too (e.g. Korsell et al., 2011), sex workers are expected 
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to repay the costs for their recruitment and transportations to the 
destination country often at a highly inflated interest rate. Sometimes 
the debt bondage spills over to the victim’s children:
“I was sentenced for falsifying documents, for smuggling people and for 
human trafficking. I have spent almost six years in prison. I smuggled 
about 1,000 people… Sometimes they didn’t have the money to pay 
you, so they’d offer you two or three children to work for you to pay 
their debt. They are put to work in all kinds of jobs – prostitution, steal-
ing and construction sites. If they don’t want to work, they are forced 
to work” (ex-trafficker quoted in HSBC, 2017).
Moreover, the wages of trafficking victims, alongside any state benefits 
that have been fraudulently claimed in their names, are frequently paid 
into bank accounts that are controlled and managed by traffickers (see 
NCA, 2016, see also following section):
“There were a few of us there and the trafficker who interpreted for 
us, but he was really there to control what we did… I never had 
access to my bank account… Personally, I didn’t see my own bank 
card. Once, I stood a few metres away from a trafficker who was 
shuffling bank cards as if they were playing cards. There were so many 
of them he could barely hold them…” (labour trafficking victim quoted 
in HSBC, 2017).
• Emotional/psychological manipulation often linked to illegal immigrant status 
(e.g. UK-E11).
The positive approaches, which are primarily present in the sex industry, 
include forging business relationships based on trust. Traffickers and sex 
workers are seen as “partners” despite the power imbalance that exist 
between the two parties. Although legally this is a rather weak way of 
enforcing a contract in an illegal market, an agreement or a contract is 
signed with responsibilities for both sides, e.g. for traffickers to receive 
a percentage of payments earned from their victims in exchange for 
protection. Within this context, traffickers – as a gesture of good will, 
which is functional in the exploitative relationship being seen as a 
“partnership” – often allow sex workers to keep tips (provided by clients 
in addition to the normal payment for sexual services) for themselves 
(UK-E1; UK-E2).
Finally, the administrative approaches include:
• Fines. The fines vary significantly – they can be as little as the daily 
payment or as high as £2,000. The latter are never paid but this 
process strengthens the debt bondage between a victim and the 
exploiter.
• Daily quotas. The introduction of daily quotas relieves the traffickers 
from the burden of having to identify ways of checking whether a 
sex worker, who works outdoors, steals money or does not reveal an 
accurate number of clients, sexual services provided and amounts of 
money obtained (see also Petrunov, 2011).
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• “Tie-ins.” Some employers (especially in rural areas and mostly in 
agriculture) keep workers’ payments for ‘safekeeping’ supposedly 
in bank accounts, and deny access to these accounts (see also 
Skrivankova, 2014). Essentially, the more an exploited individual works 
for such an employer, the higher the level of dependency.
• Micro-accounting. In many cases, especially in those in which the 
sex workers have some freedom (i.e. working outdoors), they are 
asked to report to the trafficker the number of clients they had 
and the amounts of money they made on a daily basis. The 
information in this micro-accounting process is kept in small pieces 
of paper. In a large sex trafficking case dealt with by the police, 
which involved sexual services being hidden behind (legal) massage 
services, transactions were recorded by the girls in diaries as 
“Swedish massage” (normal massage) or as “tantric massage,“ which 
referred to sexual services offered. These diaries were used by the 
authorities as evidence (UK-E16).
3.3. Costs of doing business
The costs of doing business depend on a variety of factors. The scale of 
the trafficking scheme and its logistical complexities, the distance of the 
country of supply of victims, the degree of legality of the scheme, the 
number and types of actors involved in the business, and a number of 
unforeseen expenses all contribute to the costs.
Recruitment. The Internet enables traffickers to place several adverts 
on several sites simultaneously for free or little charge. These adverts 
can be posted daily and reach a very wide range of potential victims. 
There have been, however, cases in which victims have been bought by 
traffickers. Accounts that have been publicised suggest that individuals, 
mostly women, have been bought by traffickers for extremely small 
amounts of money. In a rather atypical case a vulnerable woman from a 
central European country was sold by her parents for £8 (UKHTC/SOCA, 
2013). Other amounts we came across during the research varied from 
£300 in some poor counties of Africa to £4,000 for some women from 
eastern Europe. Home Office accounts also suggest that women could 
be purchased at UK entry points for £3,000-£4,000 per person, although 
the most quoted figure is around £700 (Webb and Burrows, 2009).
Documentation expenses. Documentation is an important part of the 
human trafficking process especially when the victims are from non-EU 
member states (see Wheaton et al., 2010). According to Home Office 
research, passports from a variety of European countries such as the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Spain were bought by human traffickers for 
non-EU trafficked nationals for prices that ranged from £40 to £200; 
there was also reference to Australian passports and visas provided for 
£2,000 (see Webb and Burrows, 2009). Forged documentation costs a 
minimum of £850 per item in the UK. The expansion of the EU after 
200411 cut the overheads in this type of expenses as entry could now 
11 2007 for Romania and Bulgaria.
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be made on passports from the new accession states that are generally 
easier to forge or acquire than those in the UK and some other popular 
west European destinations.12
Transportation/transit expenses. Expenses for travel vary on the basis of the 
distance involved. For those cases involving human trafficking from another 
geographic context into the UK, and excluding cases of legal transportation 
into the country, it would plausible to argue that transportation expenses 
are roughly similar to the (assumed) average fee for irregular migration 
facilitation: from Africa – £2,200; from Asia – £23,800; from the Middle 
East – £8,800; from “Other” geographic contexts – £8,400 (UK Border 
Agency management information cited in Mills et al., 2013: 89).
Functional, exploitation-related expenses. These include expenses that are 
essential for the exploitation phase. When victims are based and work 
in one of the larger cities of the UK, such as London and Manchester, 
renting accommodation, such as private houses and flats can reach 
approximately £800-2,000 per month depending on the quality and 
size of accommodation and area (UK-E3; UK-E4). In cases of labour 
exploitation, we came across cases in which small rural buildings in 
which as many as 10 victims were housed were rented for £300-500 
per month. To these expenses victim subsistence expenses should be 
added. Additionally, mobile phones are often purchased as means to 
keep in constant contact with the victims. Pay-as-you-go sim cards, 
although cheap and offering a way to avoid detection, can be costly 
when purchased in bulk for many victims (UK-E3). Finally, in a scheme 
that was identified by the authorities in Scotland (the so called ‘Brazilian 
network’), the traffickers had an appointment booking facility outsourced 
in London. This was basically a system which constituted a customer 
channel based on an online platform for which a fee was paid. The 
forensic accountants’ investigation showed that this fee was in fact the 
biggest cost of the scheme (see UK-E16).
Corruption costs. It should be mentioned that corruption costs are not 
an integral and standard set of costs for all trafficking schemes for 
both sexual and labour exploitation. Traffickers/exploiters do not actively 
seek officials to bribe if the officials’ portfolio is not essential for the 
scheme (e.g. travel documents) or if/when there is no knowledge of 
a trafficking scheme on the part of the officials. Corruption costs in 
human trafficking become unavoidable when officials become aware of a 
trafficking scheme, and in this case corruption costs are used as a type 
of “business insurance” by traffickers (Kugler et al., 2005). Corruption 
costs are reduced when payments are made in the form of sexual 
services rather than money (UK-E3).
Investment in the human trafficking business. One such way to invest in the 
business is to hire professional photographers or photography equipment 
12 The visa waiver for the new accession states practically reduced all costs related to documents 
for travel to zero. These costs, however, remain relevant for traffickers from other source 
regions – former Soviet countries, Western Balkans, Africa, Asia, etc. According to the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), in 2016 the most frequently identified forged 
travel documents at external borders are those of Poland, Italy, Spain, and France (FRONTEX, 
2017).
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to take high-quality shots of the victims that will be placed on various sex 
sites, as a way of maintaining a “professional” aesthetic (UK-E3; UK-E4). 
Similarly, some entrepreneurs invest in high quality escort services luxury 
business cards to display a sense of quality of services provided and 
professionalism. In a rather atypical case we came across, a Romanian 
trafficker invested in the physical improvement of one of his female 
former classmates he exploited by providing the necessary funds towards 
the woman having a rhinoplasty (nose plastic surgery) and a breast 
surgery as a way of enhancing her “marketability” (UK-E11).13
Payments to the victims. There is a wide range of payments on the 
basis of how clandestine the market is, the relationship between the 
trafficker and the sex worker/labourer, as well as the assumed worthiness 
or unworthiness of the sex worker/labourer. In those cases in which 
“victims” are voluntarily and knowingly recruited in a sex scheme, 
the sex workers receive or (to be more precise) keep 50% of their 
earnings. In cases in which there are significant exploitative conditions, 
and excluding those cases in which victims receive no payment at 
all, trafficking victims receive around 20% of the total turnover and 
sometimes as little as 2% of the revenues. For instance, some southeast 
European sex workers were made to earn £1,000 (daily quota) but were 
given only £20 (UKHTC/SOCA, 2013). In a case of labour exploitation in 
the tarmacking and block paving industry that was identified by the then 
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA, currently NCA), those who 
were considered skilled workers were paid £60-80 per day, and others 
who were considered workers of lower status were paid £20-30 per day 
(UKHTC/SOCA, 2013). In cases of exploitation of vulnerable individuals, 
these individuals most often receive no payment at all.
Payments to other actors. As mentioned earlier, these actors are “freelancers,” 
who are peripherally linked to a trafficking scheme and, in fact, may 
even be unaware of the scheme or the level of exploitation:
• managers of brothels and other (legal) venues of exploitation are paid 
£50-100 per shift;
• receptionists are paid £50 per shift;
• security guards working at legal businesses in which exploitation of 
victims takes place are paid £50 per shift;
• card boys, who deliver sex workers/escort business cards, are paid 
£10-20 per round;
• general helpers collecting girls and transferring them are paid £200 for 
each job (Webb and Burrows, 2009).
Legal expenses. In the course of our research we did not come across 
continuous legal consultancies to human traffickers. However, when legal 
assistance was required, lawyers were available and their fee varied 
considerably depending on: the location (with London law firms charging 
at least three times the hourly fee as a law firm in the north of the 
country); how successful and able a lawyer/law firm working in criminal 
13 The interviewee did not provide amounts that had been invested in the surgeries. However, a 
rudimentary examination of prices in UK private surgeries price lists revealed that the average 
rhinoplasty costs approximately £3,000 and a breast surgery approximately £2,500.
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Some indications about the financial scale of labour trafficking in the 
UK can be found in GLAA annual reports of 2013/2014, 2014/2015 and 
2015/2016. From 2013 to 2016, 78 OCGs were identified or disrupted by 
the GLAA (and partner agencies), the worth of criminal assets identified 
was £18,400,000, and the amounts identified as unpaid wages, holiday pay 
or excessive transport charges reached £6,600,000 (Table 4). Obviously, 
these figures refer to the cases known to the GLAA.
The profit margin from the human trafficking business in the UK depends 
on a number of variables:
• The rationale of the entrepreneur for entering the business. In the case of 
sexual exploitation, those who enter the trafficking business to make 
“a bit of money” and become “brokers of sex” to friends and others 
14 There is no estimate for child sexual exploitation or other forms of human trafficking in the 
particular report.
cases was considered; whether the services required were for contentious 
or non-contentious work; and whether the relationship between the 
lawyer and the client was a long one and based on legal advice in the 
context of the legal business owned by the trafficker (UK-E1; UK-16).
3.4. Profits and profit sharing
It is often argued that the financial scale of trafficking in human beings 
for sexual and labour exploitation is significant with big profits for those 
involved (see, for example, Belser, 2005). A Home Office study from the 
early 2000s estimated sexual exploitation at approximately £275 million 
in 2003 (Dubourg & Prichard, 2008). Similarly, a relatively more recent 
study (also by the Home Office) estimated sexual exploitation of adult 
foreign women in the UK at around £130 million (Mills et al., 2013) on 
the basis of an estimated annual revenue of £48,000 per foreign sex 
worker, as put forward by Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency 
(SCDEA, 2011) (Table 3).
ТаBle 3. scale oF human traFFicking oF Foreign women For the purpose 
oF sexual exploitation, uk By country14
         * Figures may not sum due to independent rounding.
Sources: Project Acumen and Northern Ireland Organised Crime taskforce cited in Mills et al. (2013: 86); SCDEA (2011).
Number of victims Unit Cost £ Total (£ million)
England & Wales 2,600 48,000 £120,000,000
Scotland 73 48,000 £4,000,000
Northern Ireland 23 48,000 £1,000,000
Total 2,696 Approx. £130,000,000*
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in their social circle tend to have the smallest profits. This is not only 
because these are usually people who tend to exploit a very small 
number of victims, generally one or two, but also because very often 
they do not accept money for the sexual services which their victims 
provide; the position they have in their social circle as sex brokers is 
more important. In the case of trafficking for labour exploitation, those 
who enter the business in order to save expenses from the working 
of their legal business with the goal to save their business have no 
significant profits. Generally, the biggest profits come to those who 
are geared towards making significant profits, are diversified in their 
predatory activities, and are willing to exploit their victims in more than 
one ways. In some cases the latter type of traffickers’ profits made from 
the sexual and/or labour exploitation of the victims are supplemented 
by profits from additional activities for which the victims’ identities 
and family circumstances are essential. Firstly, these traffickers run 
into debt the victims’ bank accounts. After their arrival in the UK, the 
victims are not given the promised job for weeks or even months. This 
makes them completely dependent on their traffickers for their living 
expenses, and in this way debt is built up since traffickers pay for/or 
provide accommodation and food. This debt is often used as leverage 
on victims to open bank accounts so that they can apply for jobs and 
once the bank debit card is sent, it is kept by the traffickers and used 
to withdraw relatively small amounts of cash from ATMs. Secondly, 
traffickers obtain loans in the victims’ names. This is especially the case 
in labour exploitation cases. This also creates a situation in which the 
victims think twice about leaving the trafficker/gangmaster and starting a 
new life with heavy debts. Thirdly, traffickers (especially east Europeans) 
get child benefits for the victims’ children, who live in their country of 
origin, as well as working tax credit for each (exploited) worker, which 
is approximately £2,000 per worker per year (see GLA, 2016b).
• The number of victims exploited by a trafficking scheme. According to 
Belser (2005), the accurate estimation of the profits from trafficking 
(π) results from multiplying the total number of the trafficking victims 
ТаBle 4. ocgs identiFied/disrupted, worth oF criminal assets identiFied 
and amount identiFied as unpaid wages holiday pay or excessive 
transport charges, glaa investigations (2013 – 2016)
         * Affected by one substantial case.
Sources: Compiled from GLA (2014; 2015; 2016a).
OCGs 
identified/
disrupted
worth of criminal 
assets identified (£)
Amounts identified as unpaid 
wages, holiday pay or excessive 
transport charges
2013 – 2014 10 900,000 1,700,000
2014 – 2015 32 5,100,000 3,500,000
2015 – 2016 36 12,400,000* 1,400,000
Summary
2013 – 2016
78 18,400,000 6,600,000
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by the average turnover from each victim (the value-added, VA) minus 
total wage payments or other expenses (W): π = VA-W. Naturally, 
the bigger the number of the victims exploited by a trafficking 
scheme, the higher the profits (UK-E16).
• Vulnerability and “quality” of the victims. Vulnerability of trafficking 
victims generally means that payments to these victims are either low 
or non-existent resulting in a bigger profit margin for the trafficker. In 
fact, many of the victims are not even aware of financial transactions 
taking place between someone, who has sex with her and a trafficker/
exploiter (UK-V1). The same applies to labour exploitation. Victims 
of labour exploitation with mental health problems, for instance, are 
either not paid at all or paid insignificant amounts of money.
• The embeddedness of the exploitation phase of trafficking in a legal business. 
Trafficking profits are related to the modus operandi of the traffickers, 
and the interaction of the victims, actors in the trafficking collectivities 
and, of course, the client, during the exploitation phase. Sexual 
intercourse with a trafficked woman many times, especially when it 
is embedded in a legal business (e.g. massage parlour, spa, club), is 
not only the result of a procedure in which the prospective client 
approaches the trafficker and/or the woman (or vice versa). It involves 
a number of steps of financial significance. It was noted earlier that 
trafficked women are introduced to street and brothel prostitution or 
prostitution that is covered behind the provision of other services in 
bars, clubs and massage parlors. Some of the money that traffickers 
get in the non-street and non-brothel prostitution is a product of 
the labour of women and not of the exploitation of the women’s 
sexuality per se. For instance, many times a massage (the legal service 
in a massage parlor relating to labour) may lead to sexual intercourse 
(the illegal service relating to the exploitation of sexuality of women). 
In this case, sexual services are the reason why people received non-
sexual services too. In many cases, clients are obliged to consume a 
certain amount of drinks or certain types of drinks (e.g. champagne) 
before the provision of the sexual services. Profits from trafficking of 
women for commercial sex that take place in legal business settings 
include profits from the labour exploitation of the women too (ℓ): to 
slightly enhance Belser’s (2005) formula, π = (VA-W) + ℓ. Importantly, 
the embeddedness of a human trafficking scheme in a legal business 
allows for the reduction of costs for the trafficking scheme.
• Whether loans are lent with sometimes logical, sometimes irrational 
interest rates in the process of migrating in the UK. According to some 
traffickers, in many cases in which women knew which labour sector 
they were going to be involved and, in fact, actively sought entry to 
the UK sex market, the women had accepted the facilitation fee as 
their own debt. Traffickers would lend £1,000 to the women to travel 
to the UK and the women would then be expected to pay £1,500 
from their work in the sex industry (Webb and Burrows, 2009).
Spending and investing human trafficking profits. In most cases of trafficking 
in the UK, profits are simply spent on lifestyle expenses, jewels, holidays, 
gifts for girlfriends, and cars. According to GLA (2016b), traffickers may 
use the victims’ names for car tax and insurance so that the cars are 
not tracked to the traffickers. Significant parts of the profits are used to 
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paying off debts incurred by the traffickers and their families and friends. 
Profits are also invested in the legal economy and specifically in cash 
intensive businesses (that are often identified as venues of exploitation) 
such as fast food restaurants, car washes, nail bars, and beauty salons. 
Sums of money are used for property purchases in the UK and in the 
country of origin of non-British traffickers (UK-E9; UK-E14; UK-E16; UK-
E20; Box 1). Rarely, trafficking profits are used towards the expansion of 
the business. The more clandestine the scheme, the more difficult it is 
for this scheme to be expanded; schemes that are embedded in legal 
business are more likely to be invested upon.
Box 1. Proceeds of labour trafficking: The case of Stasys Skarbalius and virginija Skarbaliene
Stasys Skarbalius and Virginija Skarbaliene operated as gangmasters illegally between 2006 and 2010 after 
fraudulently setting up Scunthorpe-based business CV Staff Services. They did it under a fake identity and 
in turn applied for licences from the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) and mortgages to build a 
property portfolio. During this time, they facilitated hundreds of people into work in the agricultural and 
horticultural industries in Lincolnshire and Humberside, across Yorkshire, Suffolk, Norfolk and Cambridge. 
Off the profits of the business, which had an estimated turnover of £12 million, they lived lavish lifestyles. 
The sham was exposed in 2011 when Skarbalius’ bogus Dutch passport, which he held under the name 
of Charles Rene Luske, expired and he was unable to renew it for the purposes of the annual licence.
Both of no fixed address, Skarbalius, aged 62, was jailed for two-and-a-half years and Skarbaliene, aged 
58, received three years. They were also disqualified as company directors for seven years. Sheffield 
Crown Court heard how they had each received total benefits of £1 million from their criminal exploits. 
They were served with Confiscation Orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act on their available assets – 
£187,219.85 for Skarbalius and £231,687.68 for Skarbaliene. Included in their assets are substantial bank 
account balances, recovered cash, a Mercedes Sprinter van, a Lexus Sport, a Volkswagen Transporter 
van, their four-bedroom detached home in Scotter, Lincolnshire, two three-bedroom houses occupied 
by tenants in Scunthorpe, and their Scunthorpe business premises.
Source: GLAA website.
Money laundering and movement of trafficking proceeds. Money laundering 
on a sophisticated, complex and systematic scale was not a common 
practice identified in our research. Illicit profits were used to establish 
licit business interests insofar as this may be regarded as money 
laundering. However, illicit proceeds were not subsequently laundered 
through these legal businesses once they had been established. There 
have been, however, cases reported in which traffickers involved in small 
trafficking schemes laundered their money via simple fraudulent child 
welfare benefits schemes (see also section 4 in this chapter). In a rather 
exceptional case, MX, a Chinese “madam” who ran a series of brothels 
across north London, purportedly had had strong links to the Triads, and 
was involved in sex trafficking and drug trafficking, was convicted for 
money laundering (intelligence case provided in Hutton, 2017).
With regard to the movement of trafficking money out of the UK, 
the general perception during the course of the research was that 
because of the fragmentation of the business, there is not much need 
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to move money internationally. When there is movement of trafficking 
money, legal financial institutions are used. In cases of east European 
traffickers, there has been some repatriation of funds through bank 
transfer of small amounts that do not alert the authorities and which 
have “…nothing extravagantly sophisticated about it” (UK-E16). One of 
the interviewees referred to a ROCU (Regional Organised Crime Unit) 
investigation into a Chinese criminal organisation which transferred 
millions of pounds by a number of banks in the UK to Hong Kong. 
The bank accounts, which were in different locations in the country, 
were linked to brothels. It was estimated that between £5-15 million 
were transferred to Hong Kong (UK-E14). However, usually instant 
money transfer services such as MoneyGram or Western Union, in 
which small deposits are made at a time, are used by traffickers. In this 
case, money from the trafficking business is transferred to the country 
of origin of the traffickers and sent to extended family members and 
friends (large number of recipients) (see also Broad, 2013). The Brazilian 
network mentioned earlier, used the Telecom 2 Surf and Pay facility, 
a secure web-based credit card payment gateway solution, to process 
their online spending; a significant portion of the expenditure was 
in Brazil. They also used the NatWest (National Westminster Bank) 
remittance service to repatriate cash sums back to Brazil (UK-E16). 
Finally, in those cases in which women are collected at UK entry points 
and purchased on the spot, transporters/escorts are paid in cash, and 
money is immediately physically transported back into the originating 
country (see Webb and Burrows, 2009).
3.5. The role and impact of the internet 
on human trafficking activities and finances
The internet (and ICT in general) has affected the business models of 
traffickers in all phases of the trafficking process as well as the financial 
aspects of their activities. With regard to recruitment, a plethora of websites, 
including social networking and microblogging services such as Facebook 
and Twitter, as well as online classifieds, dating and international marriage 
agency sites, have been documented as recruiting people into trafficking, 
for the purposes of sexual or labour exploitation, along with offline forms 
of recruitment, such as word-of-mouth, or through friends and relatives. 
To lure and recruit victims online, traffickers frequently place spurious, 
promising advertisements on employment, dating and marriage websites for 
jobs including administration, cleaning, home help, child and older people 
care, waitressing, hostessing, pole dancing, the collection and delivery 
of charity bags, agricultural farming and construction roles, educational 
courses or work in the tourism sector (UK-E1; UK-E2; UK-E3; UK-E4; UK-E5; 
UK-E18, etc. see also Europol, 2014). Direct contact is also initiated with 
victims in chat rooms or via social networking sites, where traffickers pose 
as friends or lovers to recruit victims, often exchanging e-mails, messages, 
photographs and videos with their victims to build a relationship and gain 
their trust and confidence (see also Diba et al., 2017).
Another interesting point raised in the interviews concerns the usage of 
social media applications by sex traffickers to determine the proximity 
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of a potential victim to them, in terms of a nearby town or city, or 
even within the same locality, thus enabling them to easily track, meet 
and build up a relationship to gain the targeted victim’s trust. Many 
electronic devices such as mobile phones and tablets have, within 
their settings, built-in location services functions that enable any third-
party applications and websites to use information based on the user’s 
current location, and to provide numerous location-based services, such 
as finding nearby amenities that include parks and restaurants. On this 
point, if a user has enabled location services, knowingly or unknowingly, 
on their device, then such action would allow social media applications, 
such as Facebook and/or Twitter to gain access to and publicly display 
the user’s location to their “friends,” through the user’s status updates, 
uploading of photographs and messages sent via Facebook’s Messenger 
feature or, depending on the user’s privacy settings, whoever is able to 
view their profile. Consequently, the visibility of one’s location to others 
can have negative implications for the user, and possess much benefit 
for a trafficker searching for women to recruit. NGO representatives 
interviewed by Diba et al. (2017) mentioned that many of the victims 
they had worked with were not shrewd in their use of the internet 
and were neglectful in checking their location services settings on their 
mobile phones. Finally, with regard to the recruitment phase, the Internet 
has allowed not only the easier identification of potential victims but 
also additional opportunities for profits at this phase. In one case of 
labour exploitation, for instance, potential victims from Lithuania were 
recruited via a Lithuanian website and paid £350 each to the trafficker, 
who managed the particular website to secure a job in the UK (UKHTC/
SOCA, 2013).
The internet has also facilitated the transportation of trafficking victims. 
Social media sites have been used to aid the transportation process 
by, among other, facilitating the booking of tickets and obtaining travel 
documentation in several types of transportation. Tickets are purchased 
online by traffickers often by using compromised credit card data, in 
order to conceal their identities and, thereby, add another layer of 
anonymity and distance to their criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the 
use of stolen credit card information beneficially ensures that neither 
the tickets nor the victims are able to be easily linked back to the 
traffickers (Diba et al., 2017). Digital technologies enable counterfeiting 
as better fake documents essential for the trip are developed at reduced 
prices (UK-E3).
With regard to exploitation, the ICTs has also augmented the nature of 
sex work from a predominantly physical environment to an increasingly 
virtual landscape to such an extent that most prostitution is currently 
advertised and solicited online, in what has been referred to in the 
literature as “virtual red light districts” (Cauduro et al., 2009: 59). 
Correspondingly, there has been a significant shift in human trafficking 
activity for the purposes of sexual exploitation to the virtual sphere, with 
both the supply and demand side having benefitted from the use of 
the Internet and digital technologies, with trafficked victims often being 
advertised online (see Diba et al., 2017). Naturally, ICTs have elevated 
risks of detection of trafficking schemes. Adverts can be captured via 
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screenshots, with “digital traces” being left such as remnants of old/
expired adverts. As a means to counteract residual criminal activity, one 
very common pattern adopted by traffickers is the repeated posting of 
adverts, often several times a day for a week, then all of the adverts 
being closed. After a few weeks, again, several adverts are then placed 
and repeatedly advertised with the listed women being featured under 
new aliases and often, different locations, which would signify repeated 
movement across cities in the UK (UK-E2; UK-E3; UK-E16).
The financial implication of the use of the internet and ICTs for human 
trafficking is that, firstly, the costs for recruitment are minimised. The 
research found that spurious job advertisements are placed on various 
employment, dating and marriage websites at the same time to lure and 
recruit potential victims for free. Websites are often created by traffickers 
in the countries of origin and in the languages of potential victims, with 
one site linking to another, building international recruitment networks. 
As such, the content on the first site can be used as a template, and 
the same layout can be used over and over again, and translated into 
the different languages of the sex markets where the traffickers desire 
to trade. ICTs have also reduced costs that are related to the control of 
victims in the exploitation phase:
“20 years ago a trafficker would require someone to look out for the 
girls. This is not necessary any more, at least not to that extent…” 
(UK-E3; UK-E1).
In addition, ICT have led to some changes in the facilitation of the 
business and on spending patterns by traffickers in some trafficking 
schemes. The ‘Brazilian network’ mentioned earlier, used a system based 
on an online platform to handle customers as well as a secure web-based 
credit card payment gateway to process their on online spending in Brazil 
(UK-E16). However, the general consensus among the participants in the 
current research was that when it comes to financial aspects linked to 
the exploitation phase “ICT… means leaving a trace, and this is against 
the logic of this illegal market” (UK-E8; also UK-E15; UK-16, etc.)
In the UK financial investigations into ‘organised crime’ cases typically 
operate within the legal framework of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 (POCA), which is the primary legislation of financial investigation 
introducing a number of asset recovery powers.15 Specifically, POCA 
contains four distinct means of confiscating the proceeds of crime:
15 This report was written before the Criminal Finances Act 2017 came into force. The new Act 
constitutes an enhancement and a significant reinforcement of the provisions of POCA, 
introducing – among other – unexplained wealth orders (powers to seize suspected criminal 
property without bringing a prosecution). See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/22/
contents/enacted.
4. FINANCIAl INvESTIGATIONS OF THB CRIMES: 
 CHAllENGES AND GOOD PRACTICES
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– Criminal confiscation: powers to confiscate the proceeds of crime 
following a criminal conviction as part of the sentencing process;
– Civil recovery: confiscating the proceeds of crime in the absence of a 
criminal conviction through the civil courts;
– Cash forfeiture: powers to seize and forfeit cash through a civil process 
where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that it is the proceeds of 
crime;
– Criminal taxation: allowing the NCA to access revenue powers to tax 
income, which it has reasonable grounds to suspect are the proceeds 
of crime (Wood, 2016: 2; House of Commons – Home Affairs 
Committee, 2016b).
Apart from the use of officers from economic crime units that are 
embedded in police forces (UK-E15), law enforcement agencies employ 
specialised financial investigators that assist the main line of investigation 
of organised crime cases pre- and post-arrest. These investigators were 
initially trained, accredited and monitored by the National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA), which was founded in 2007. The NPIA 
retained the statutory responsibility under the POCA 2002 to deliver the 
training, accreditation and monitoring of Financial Investigators through 
the Proceeds of Crime Centre (POCC); however, this function was 
transferred to the NCA upon the dissolution of the NPIA in 2013. In 
the first quarter of 2013, the total number of Financial Investigators was 
673 (NPIA, 2013). POCC has also successfully upheld the Joint Asset 
Recovery Database (JARD), an information database implemented in 
2003, maintained by the NCA, and used by approximately 4,500 users 
across the country (NPIA, 2013). In addition, POCC manages the Financial 
Investigation Support System (FISS), which provides resources and tools 
for financial investigators.
An important source of support for (local) law enforcement use of 
financial investigation and asset recovery is provided by Regional 
Asset Recovery Teams (RARTs), which were established in 2004, with 
the very purpose to increase the numbers of confiscations and the 
value of assets seized. RARTs are largely multi-agency teams that 
provide specialist support in several aspects of financial investigation of 
organised crime, and among other they have the objective of targeting 
professional facilitators, such as solicitors and accountants (Brown et 
al., 2012).16 Although there is a rather robust framework with regard to 
financial investigation of organised crime in general, a framework that 
is naturally applicable to human trafficking activities in the country, 
there are significant challenges to the financial investigation of human 
trafficking. These include, firstly, occupational cultural law enforcement 
practices against human trafficking:
“There are 2 forensic accountants in Scotland... Portugal, which is only 
one-and-a-half times bigger than Scotland, has 30 forensic accountants. 
The issue is that we have to cover the set of skills that are required to 
deal with finances… It is ridiculous when the police officers say ‘I don’t 
feel comfortable working on finances’… And the criminal justice system 
16 See http://www.nersou.org.uk/
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as a whole needs to develop in this way. Getting prosecutors who feel 
confident… yes, ‘confident’ is the word… and competent in dealing with 
financial issues is difficult. The legislation is there! The tools are there!.... 
There is an issue there... we need to make this cultural adjustment” 
(UK-E16).
Although human trafficking and modern slavery is very high on the 
political agenda17 and the national law enforcement agenda in the UK 
(cf. ATMG, 2013), financial aspects of human trafficking are not the 
priority at the local level (UK-E8; UK-E18) (perhaps with the exception 
of specialised units). The major concern is disrupting trafficking activities 
and saving the victims:
“Human trafficking is a top political priority. There is a lot of pressure to 
deal with it internationally and nationally. But locally we get the ‘good 
publicity’ and the ‘mileage’ from stopping traffickers committing their 
crimes and saving the victims… not going after the traffickers’ money” 
(UK-E15).
The major objective of the relevant local authorities has traditionally been 
to secure a trafficking conviction. As one of the experts interviewed 
emphatically noted, “when a trafficking conviction is secured, why bother 
with finances?” (UK-E8). Because of the decentralised nature of human 
trafficking, its relative simplicity, and the myriad of small schemes, there 
are most often no interesting financial aspects that may be necessary for 
a conviction to be secured.
Secondly, the reluctance on the part of (local) law enforcement to 
engage in financial investigation of human trafficking in cases in which 
there might be a significant financial element is also a product of 
numerous practicalities. The embeddedness of many schemes of sexual 
and labour exploitation in legal businesses and the legal economy, makes 
financial aspects more complicated, law enforcement officers (perhaps 
with the exception of HMRC officers) uneasy and reluctant, and requires 
specialised investigators, who are expensive:
“Investigating requires some financial accounting abilities and expertise, 
and in cases in which significant accounting abilities are required, 
the officers tend to think that this is a job for the HMRC or forensic 
accountants… Financial investigation of human trafficking cases, just 
as with other cases of organised crime, falls into the trap of lengthy, 
complicated process. Disruption is here and now! It’s quick! We should 
not rely on the finances to do the whole thing. We have a financial 
investigation team [in the police] working on organised crime cases and 
human trafficking… but you reach at a certain point when a forensic 
accountant will be needed and this is very, very, very expensive…” 
(UK-E9).
17 In 2016, the then Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, announced an £11 million Modern Slavery 
Innovation Fund to be awarded for projects towards identifying and disrupting human trafficking. 
The fund is part of £33.5 million of overseas aid funding to support the UK’s leading role in 
tackling modern slavery internationally (Home Office, 2016).
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The financial investigation of human trafficking is also considered a very 
lengthy process and a “procedural nightmare” especially when financial 
institutions’ (e.g. banks) contribution in the form of evidence/statements is 
required (UK-E9; UK-E19). These financial institutions are rather reluctant 
to provide the necessary evidence for cases that do not proceed to court 
(see Brown et al., 2012). Under POCA 2002, the confiscation procedures 
involve negotiating the offender’s financial benefit from their criminal 
activities in order for an order to be made to deprive them of this benefit. 
Bullock (2014) suggests that a number of factors complicate ascertaining 
criminal benefit, on one hand, and identifying the available amount that 
can be confiscated, on the other, including the discretional practice of 
police officers and financial investigators, organisational restrictions and 
compromise between defence and prosecution. As Hutton (2017) notes, 
the confiscation and financial sections of the cases dealt with by the 
Metropolitan Police very often stretch for years and in many cases the 
human traffickers serve their sentence and are released before the end of 
the confiscation proceedings.
Thirdly, a financial investigation into human trafficking does not often 
produce results commensurate to the effort and resources invested by 
law enforcement (UK-E14; UK-E19). Operation Pentameter 2, launched 
in October 2007, for example, was a joint national venture that involved 
all police forces in the UK, SOCA, the UK Immigration Service, the 
Crown Prosecution Service, and several NGOs. The operation resulted 
in 528 traffickers arrested, and “more than £500,000 worth of cash […] 
recovered from those criminals arrested” (Home Office, 2008). If, for 
the economy of the argument, we accept that the cash seized amounts 
to £550,000, the cash seized per trafficker was an average of £1041.66. 
Sproat (2012) analysed British Ministry of Justice figures on Confiscation 
Orders placed on sentenced human traffickers for the period 2004 – 
2009. These figures show that nearly 90% of the traffickers were not 
even issued a confiscation order, which made Sproat (2012: 156) offer 
a plausible explanation: human traffickers “had so few assets [and] the 
police/CPS did not even bother trying!” This is echoed in one of the 
interviewee’s accounts suggesting that when it comes to organised crime, 
human traffickers in the UK are not financially interesting compared to 
other organised criminals, who are the priority of financial investigation, 
such as drug smugglers:
“Financially speaking human traffickers, at least the ones in the UK, are 
at the bottom of the ‘food chain’ of organised criminals. Drug dealers 
are at the top. It is the drug dealers’ Lamborghinis and Porsches the 
government and the public want us to go after…” (UK-E15).
It is perhaps relevant to note here that, according to Bullock et al. 
(2009), who examined JARD data, in 2006/07 62% of confiscation 
orders were made for offences of “drug trafficking” followed by fraud/
deception (10% of orders), burglary/theft (7% of orders), and VAT 
fraud (0.5% of orders). With regard to their value, confiscation orders 
with the highest mean values were VAT frauds (£336,000), followed 
by money laundering offences (£255,000), robbery (£21,500), drug 
trafficking (£20,000), and burglary/theft (£14,500). Human trafficking 
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did not feature in the analysis. Moreover, in a Home Office study, 
Brown et al. (2012) selected a number of cases that had a confiscation 
order assessed benefit value of £100,000 or more in order to identify 
the more serious cases, which were also considered most likely to 
relate to “organised” criminality. Of those, the percentage of cases that 
could possibly (but not necessarily) be “human trafficking-related” were 
only 5% for “prostitution” (3 cases) and 7% for “immigration offences” 
(4 cases). The reasons for the small reported proceeds of trafficking 
may be a result of the actual small profits for traffickers given the 
human trafficking in the UK is a purely competitive market, the fact 
that the most significant part of the business is cash-based, which 
makes the tracing of money extremely difficult, and the fact that 
payments are often made in source and transit countries. Of course, 
one needs to bear in mind that it is impossible for the authorities to 
differentiate between those human traffickers, who have simply spent 
their crime money and those who have successfully hidden their assets 
in other contexts. For instance, MX, the Chinese madam in Hutton’s 
(2017) study, transferred significant amounts of money to China and 
Malaysia.
Despite the challenges, there have been successful cases involving the 
investigation of human trafficking through even rudimentary financial 
aspects. For example, an investigation may come as the result of a 
trafficker displaying – e.g. on Facebook – income of more than £50,000 
per annum without him/her having the corresponding legal means to 
support the lifestyle (e.g. UK-E15; UK-E19). In other cases, financial 
intelligence gathered from SARs (Suspicious Activities Reports) submitted 
to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (NCA) has been instrumental 
in instigating and supporting investigations on human trafficking. In 
one case in 2015, during an investigation into an OCG suspected of 
human trafficking, a potential victim was identified through a SAR. The 
subject was able to provide investigators with useful information, which 
confirmed that she had been trafficked by the OCG, and arrests were 
made. In another case in the same year, a SAR built up the profile of 
an individual suspected of being involved in the trafficking of women 
for sexual exploitation and the running of brothels. The investigation 
instigated by the SAR provided information about the offender making 
suspicious payments to hotels (bookings on behalf of clients) and receiving 
cash payments of unknown origin (NCA, 2015b). In an investigation on-
going at the time of writing, which is looking at human trafficking and 
drug offences, numerous SARs have been received referring to cash 
credits being deposited all over the UK by individuals purporting to be 
studying on student visas. Around £2 million is believed to have been 
transferred to other persons involved. As a result, a number of arrests 
have been made, over £600,000 in cash has been seized and over 
£400,000 restrained (NCA, 2017d).
In some other cases financial investigation has been instrumental in the 
conviction of human traffickers in the UK, and money laundering cases 
have been prosecuted where human trafficking has been the underlying 
predicate offence to money laundering (although human trafficking is a 
predicate offence to a lesser extent than the “main proceeds-generating 
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activities of OCG”)18 (Moneyval, 2015: 60; Moneyval, 2005). In one case, 
for example, a couple were fraudulently receiving child welfare benefits 
for a child in their care. These benefits were paid directly into the 
subjects’ joint bank account and the subjects would then withdraw the 
payments in cash from an ATM. A few hours after the withdrawal of the 
money, the couple would deposit the amount back into the account. 
The financial investigation revealed that the money deposited back was 
the proceeds of human trafficking, and that the couple were using the 
bank to launder their trafficking money. After several weeks, the couple 
would withdraw a lump sum and transfer it overseas via a money service 
business. The offenders were convicted of human trafficking and money 
laundering (FATF/OECD, 2011: 56-57).
It should also be noted that the UK is one of the countries that 
has committed to developing public-private financial information-sharing 
partnerships (FISPs) that bring public agencies and major financial 
institutions together to tackle money-laundering (and terrorist-financing). 
In one case, four members of a human trafficking network operating 
in the country were convicted in November 2016 as the result of 
an investigation developed through the UK FISP. Intelligence from law 
enforcement agencies on individuals and addresses linked to the sexual 
exploitation of women in London was shared with major UK banks. 
A bank’s intelligence team used this information to identify a human-
trafficking network, linked through common addresses, and reported this 
to law enforcement (Maxwell and Artingstall, 2017).
Understanding the broader range of financial aspects of human trafficking 
is an important component of the process of crimes for gain and 
can contribute to more effective investigation and prevention (see 
also Antonopoulos et al., 2015; Levi, 2013). However, despite the fact 
that “proceeds of crime” and “tackling criminal finances” have been a 
priority for policymakers and law enforcement agencies in the UK (and 
internationally) (see, for example, HM Government, 2015), there is “low 
level financial intelligence captured” (UK-E16) and relatively little is known 
about the financial management of human trafficking in the country.
Human trafficking data in the UK are unreliable, and apart from technical 
reasons (e.g. dark figure, dependency on actions by the authorities, 
identifying potential victims, etc.) this is because these data are often 
produced with an eye to isolating human trafficking from the illegal and 
legal economic activities trafficking facilitates (see Kopp, 2012).
Our research has shown that the human trafficking scene in the UK is 
extremely fragmented and with a low entry threshold. In those cases in 
which there is investment in a trafficking scheme, the start-up capital 
18 E.g. tax frauds, drug-related crimes and smuggling of high-taxed goods.
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derives from funds from legal businesses and savings and/or funds 
from other criminal activities especially for those traffickers who have 
a diversified criminal portfolio. Payments in cash are almost exclusively 
the case in the human trafficking business; the exceptions are some 
transactions that take place within the confines of a legal business 
or payments in kind (e.g. provision of free sex to corrupt officials). 
The traffickers employ a variety of negative, positive and administrative 
methods to ensure payment from victims.
The costs for doing business depend on the scale of the trafficking 
scheme and its logistical complexities, the distance of the country of 
supply of victims, the degree of legality of the scheme and its possible 
embeddedness in a legal business, the number and types of actors 
involved, and a number of unforeseen expenses in critical moments. The 
profits depend on the trafficker’s rationale for entering the business, the 
number of victims exploited, the vulnerability and (perceived) “quality”/
worthiness of the victims, the embeddedness of the exploitation phase 
in a legal business, and the presence of loans to victims.
Although some significant amounts have been laundered in specific cases, 
generally, sophisticated laundering schemes are the exception rather 
than the rule in the UK. The management of profits from human 
trafficking reflects primarily the fragmented nature of the phenomenon, 
the relatively small size of most schemes, the financial abilities of the 
criminal entrepreneurs and possible embeddedness of a trafficking scheme 
in a legal business, as well as the traffickers’ personal circumstances. 
Investments are modest (reflecting in most cases the modest profits 
made in a rather open and highly competitive business), and apart from 
property, traffickers invest in cash-intensive businesses.
A number of recommendations can be made on the basis of our 
account. Firstly, continuous development of the knowledge base on 
the social organisation of human trafficking and its financial aspects 
is necessary. Finances are not just another element of the human 
trafficking process but are integrally linked to the social organisation of 
the phenomenon from recruitment to exploitation. In addition, there is 
a need for research to be done on the rationale of human traffickers 
for entering the business. Considering “getting money” as simply the 
rationale for entering (and staying) in the business offers a partial and 
incomplete view. Moreover, there is a need for continuous development 
of the knowledge base on the ways ICTs have been impacting on the 
social organisation and finances of the particular business. In the online 
sphere, a few years can be an era in terms of developments.
Secondly, and from a law enforcement practice point of view, it is 
important for a financial investigation of human trafficking (and other 
manifestations of organised crime) to begin as early as the intelligence 
collection phase for two reasons:
• financial investigation may provide material that can reveal details 
about a suspect’s life, activities, associates, etc., that are functional for 
the criminal investigation (see also ACPO, 2006);
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• if the financial investigation does not run in parallel with a criminal 
investigation, there is significant risk that the assets would not be 
available when the authorities reach the stage of confiscation.
Given that the financial investigation remains secondary concern to an 
investigation of human trafficking, and given the difficulty in changing 
culture in the criminal justice system, it is imperative that the performance 
of the authorities is not judged only but how much trafficking money 
they confiscate against a target (which may be set artificially high) (see 
Bullock et al., 2009) but also how trafficking statistics are influenced 
by denying traffickers their assets (see House of Commons – Home 
Affairs Committee, 2016b). Although this is rather difficult to do, 
methodologically speaking, it may incentivise law enforcement agencies 
to integrate a financial investigation at an early stage of the whole 
investigation process.
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ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers
CPS Crown Prosecution Service
EEA European Economic Area
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FISS Financial Investigation Support System
FRONTEx European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GAIN Government Agency Intelligence Network
GlAA Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority
 (formerly Gangmasters Licensing Authority)
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
JARD Joint Asset Recovery Database
MPS Metropolitan Police Service
MSHTU Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit
NCA National Crime Agency
NERSOU North East Regional Special Operations Unit
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency
NRM National Referral Mechanism
OCGs Organised Crime Groups
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation
 and Development
POCA Proceeds of Crime Act
POCC Proceeds of Crime Centre
RART Regional Asset Recovery Team
ROCU Regional Organised Crime Unit
SARs Suspicious Activity Reports
SCDEA Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency
SOCA Serious and Organised Crime Agency
SPOC Single Point of Contact
UK United Kingdom
UKBA United Kingdom Border Agency
UKFIU UK Financial Intelligence Unit
UKHTC United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre
UNTOC United Nations Convention against Transnational
 Organised Crime
lIST OF ABBREvIATIONS
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19
19 The author is indebted to Iris Mordue for the interview with the rescued trafficking victim.
lIST OF INTERvIEwEES
Name Position/department Institution/role
UK-E1 Academic researching
organised crime
UK University
UK-E2 Academic researching
organised crime
UK University
UK-E3 Academic researching
human trafficking
UK University
UK-E4 Member of NGO Barnardo’s
UK-E5 Senior Police officer –
Organised Crime Unit Lead
British Police
UK-E6 Police and Crime Commissioner British Police
UK-E7 Police and Crime Commissioner British Police
UK-E8 UKHTC/NCA representative National Crime Agency
UK-E9 Senior Police officer/Organised 
Crime Unit
British Police
UK-E10 GLAA representative Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority
UK-E11 Police interpreter [working with 
Romanian migrants]
British Police
UK-E12 Investigative officer HM Revenue and Customs
UK-E13 Manager Residential Child Care/Social Services
UK-E14 Official Strategic Centre for Organised Crime,
Home Office
UK-E15 Detective/Organised Crime Unit British Police
UK-E16 Head of Forensic Accountancy British Police 
UK-E17 Member of NGO ECPAT (Every Child Protected Against Trafficking) 
UK
UK-E18 Head of local Cyber Crime Team British Police
UK-E19 Coordinator Regional Special Operations Unit/GAIN
UK-E20 Criminal and Financial
Investigation Officer
Immigration Crime Team, Home Office
UK-v1 Rescued trafficking victim19
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